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Solidarity: Years Later. A New Introduction to 
the English Edition
This volume may well seem a collection of outdated scribblings. It ponders social 
developments that took place a very long time ago. It recounts the first (and, 
in general, scarce) studies on the social movement of Solidarity in Poland in 
1980–1981. It seems so ancient that we would be justified to scratch our heads, 
wondering whether it even makes sense to recall those days. The idea to rehearse 
reflections on Solidarity from several years ago may indeed raise more than one 
brow. After all, democracy that Solidarity trade-unionists made their goal has 
long been achieved. But now, in 2017, this goal seems at jeopardy in Poland and 
elsewhere in Europe. The aspiration to live in united Europe, which millions of 
Poles had cherished for years, came true quite a while ago. But united Europe 
looks nowhere near stable even as we speak of it now.
I will answer these doubts with a boldness typical of authors: the same wave 
of social processes that is surging across Europe and the globe these days, appar-
ently pitting nationalist and authoritarian discourses against the ideas of liberal 
democracy, makes this book a worthwhile reading. For this volume was written 
by a social scholar, not by a historian. As such, it helps understand processes 
which so strongly promoted democracy and social cooperation back then, in the 
circumstances hardly favourable to individual and social freedom. After all, the 
demolition of the Solidarity movement by the military government of the com-
munist Party1 precipitated the total societal delegitimisation of the regime. And 
a few (long and hard to Poles) years later, it put an end not only to the system 
constructed in Poland after the Second World War, but also to the entire Soviet 
system. A scrutiny of social, political and psychological mechanisms at work in 
those days and an insight into people’s unfulfilled dreams can give us valuable 
knowledge to rely on in our perturbed, astonishing times.
This volume contains my research not only on the formation and rise of a 
vast social movement, but also on its consequences, peculiar “obliviousness” and 
failure to fulfil people’s aspirations. The chapters compiled in this book come 
from various periods, whose exact dating is far less relevant than distinctive 
 1 The communist Party refers to the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polish:  Polska 
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza), which was popularly referred to as the Party 
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social mobilisations and experiences. These periods include the rise of the 
Solidarity movement and Trade Union, the dark years of severe communist dic-
tatorship in the 1980s and, finally, the time of liberation and the formation of a 
new society and a new state in the 1990s, followed by the years when democracy 
matured. What on paper seems barely more than a dozen years was felt by people 
as several different epochs.
The memory of Solidarity in Polish society is a paradoxical thing. The unex-
pected triumph of Solidarity’s fundamental aspiration – social and political lib-
eration – has not resulted either in reviving the movement itself nor, perhaps 
even more poignantly, in reinvigorating the civic values, which had been so pro-
nounced in original Solidarity’s liberating and reformatory movement. People’s 
civic engagement and the notion of politics as thinking together about how to 
organise a good social life have proved but fleeting values. And expectations have 
outgrown the actual possibilities of the emergent new socio-political order since 
the very beginning.
Both the general public and the Solidarity-formed social elite (or elites) ex-
pected a renewed mass engagement with the Independent Self-Governing Trade 
Union “Solidarity,” emulating its legal period, and a rise of a huge, peaceable 
civil movement. Back in the late 1970s and 1980s, even when the trade union 
was officially disbanded, people were actively involved in pro-democratic, 
socio-political work across various levels of social life. Yet, when freedom finally 
came, most Poles turned out surprisingly reluctant to engage in social and 
civil commitments. The available Polish literature does not offer any tolerably 
coherent or homogeneous explanation of this development. What happened to 
what seemed Solidarity’s fundamental notion that people’s care for their own 
and their loved ones’ lives also entailed the right and the obligation to commit to 
others and to the common good, which was a major factor in personal success 
and failure? What happened to the belief that, while fully enjoying individual 
human and civil rights, we must not fail to feel part of society, of a civic commu-
nity, whose wellbeing was everybody’s indelible responsibility? What happened 
to the movement assembling dedicated and infinitely resourceful citizens after 
their common enemy had disappeared and the fruit of the joint action could 
be freely savoured? And, finally, what happened to the spirit of tolerance and 
mutual kindness, to the deep-running belief that everybody was equally enti-
tled to have a say in matters they found important, disturbing and/or perti-
nent? That everybody’s voice should be listened to without hostility towards or 
exclusion of those thinking differently than the majority? Since answers to such 
basic questions are very hard to find, it does not come as a surprise that many 
scholars now tend to agree that the Solidarity movement was a unique “festival” 
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and “social carnival”:  an exceptional development that cannot be expected to 
continue or to produce a stable framework applicable in the “regular” demo-
cratic social life.
This view, however, cannot be fully endorsed, for the Solidarity movement 
was certainly a highly democratic enterprise within the developing independent 
trade unions. The fundamental thesis of this book is expressed in its title; I argue 
that the Solidarity social movement and the trade union, which operated legally 
in 1980–1981 and clandestinely afterwards, invented and attempted to practise 
a distinctive and original model of democracy. Therefore, Solidarity can serve 
today as a model project of a democratic order at the level of societies, states, 
institutions and/or big organisations.
In hindsight, we can see that it was a utopian model, and, in fact, it has been 
described as such by various researchers. This approach is exemplified in Marcin 
Frybes and Patrick Michel’s Apres le communisme. Mythes et legendes de la Pologne 
contemporaine published first in France in 1996.2 There was a time when I dis-
puted the authors’ theses, but now I believe that the utopian element in Solidarity 
people’s thinking about the organisation of the future social world must not be 
overlooked. At the same time, this particular utopia is still on people’s minds and 
hearts, not only in Poland.
The Polish-Danish philosopher Bronisław Świderski offered a surprising 
interpretation of the significance of the Solidarity movement in his 1996 book 
Gdansk i Ateny (Gdansk and Athens).3 Świderski’s main insight is that the ideals 
promoted by the Solidarity movement resembled, in fact, the Athenian direct 
democracy. Even though I disagree with Świderski’s many views, I could sub-
scribe to this fundamental thesis; it still rings true and provides stimulating food 
for thought.
Świderski’s central tenet is close to my basic thesis about the social movement 
of Solidarity: the movement was an attempt to turn “ordinary” Poles into citizens 
and make dedication to the common good part of people’s focus on everyday, 
individual prosperity. People’s participation in decision-making on matters of 
interest to entire society, matters which directly or indirectly, immediately or 
eventually affected everybody, was the most profound ideological – and I would 
 2 Marcin Frybes and Patrick Michel, Après le communisme. Mythes et légendes de la 
Pologne contemporaine (Paris: Bayard Edition, 1996). For the Polish edition, see Marcin 
Frybes i Patrick Michel, Po komunizmie: o mitach w Polsce współczesnej, trans. Jan 
Maria Kłoczowski (Warszawa: Krupski i S-ka, 1999).
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even say spiritual – aspect that swayed people to embrace common action. This 
was the factor that I believe helped lay the foundation for the Solidarity men-
tality, combined with the “citizenation” of the nation. Being part of a community, 
which entailed the right and even the imperative to participate in the debate on 
social action – that is, in politics – was founded on another inalienable compo-
nent of the Solidarity identity: on personal dignity, individual dignity, which was 
encapsulated in the popular notion of “subjectivity” (podmiotowość).
“Subjectivity” made a staggering career in 1980 and 1981. It became common 
currency among the educated and the uneducated alike. It also served as a pow-
erful ideological weapon, as it emphasised that a system could not possibly be 
good unless it guaranteed basic rights and dignity to the citizens. To this core 
set of values, “subjectivity” – that is, the capacity to hold one’s fate and that of 
one’s loved ones in one’s own hands – added each citizen’s commitment to the 
common good and communal life. Consequently, a system could not possibly 
be good if it limited individuals’ right of self-constitution and did not allow 
them to discuss and assess the policies of the state, of the party-state to use the 
sociologist Jan Strzelecki’s very apt coinage. The right to subjectivity was handily 
weaponised against the communist order.
This was intimately associated with the “citizenation” of the nation. After all, 
the citizens who united around civil liberties and rights made up a “nation.” And, 
equally importantly, while being a nation they were part of Europe, part of the 
West as opposed to the East. The opposition of Poland/West and the Soviet, or 
Russian, East was one of the major factors organising the way people thought at 
the time. The “not like in the East” adage represented the inclusion of respect for 
freedom into the ensemble of national values. Politically independent society 
and statehood went hand in hand with the citizens’ personal freedom and indi-
vidual rights. National, state and individual independence formed an insepa-
rable ideological “cluster.” Citizenation and subjectivity entailed readiness to act, 
and social pro-activeness involved commitment to communal matters as cap-
ping a good, adult life, a fully moral life even. This ideal is still vibrant in the 
social memory of the “first” Solidarity activists, as suggested by the studies on the 
memory of Solidarity which have been carried out by the Centre for Research 
on Solidarity and Social Movements in collaboration with the Gdansk-based 
European Solidarity Centre since 2010.4
 4 In 2010, I launched the first research project entitled Solidarność – doświadczenie i 
pamięć (Solidarity: Experience and Memory) in collaboration with Warsaw’s Centre for 
Public Opinion Research, funded by the European Solidarity Centre. The Polish pub-
lication with the study’s findings was released in the same year. As the project went on 
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What happened to the civil society galvanised by Solidarity which was robust 
even in the dark 1980s is a crucial question that haunts Polish social and political 
scholars. When, at the long last, Poland thankfully got its chance to build an inde-
pendent and democratic state, its citizens’ engagement in public life plummeted. 
For years, the voter turnover, both in the general and in the local elections, has 
been consistently low. Even 1989, the year of the first semi-democratic election, 
which incisively changed the political system, did not see any eruption of partic-
ipation. Just over 60% of the citizens went to the booths. And to think that the 
election set off “the Autumn of Nations” in Eastern Europe and, consequently, 
hastened the dismantling of the communist system in the USSR as well! For 
comparison, in Bulgaria, where social resistance movements had been frail to the 
point of non-existence, nearly 90% of the citizens voted in the first free election.
Secondly, the formation of Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s first non-communist cab-
inet was not followed by any spectacular increase in social activity. Admittedly, 
as shown by Polish-American researchers Jan Kubik i Grzegorz Ekiert,5 in the 
first years of the transition Poles organised first and foremost in protests. The 
protests expressed various demands and served as a form of public debate, or 
rather they filled in gaps in the existing public debate, with streets of the capital 
city serving as a huge public discussion forum. Citizens took to the streets to 
debate in an endless string of marches and rallies. Even if we agree with Ekiert 
and Kubik that this served as a platform for social debate, where views could be 
shared and confronted with each other, the debate would likely have been more 
effective, to-the-point and nuanced if as many people had indeed been involved 
in a full-fledged, candid, both unfettered and more orderly discussion. This actu-
ally was the case with the “first” Solidarity.
Ii is for good reason that I refer to it as the “first” Solidarity. The movement 
and trade union activists we interviewed in our research agreed that it was an 
in subsequent iterations, another book appeared in 2016 (Solidarność - doświadczenie i 
pamięć [Solidarity: Experience and Memory] and Solidarność – doświadczenia i pamięć 
po raz drugi [Solidarity: Experience and Memory Revisited]). My research team from the 
Centre for Research on Solidarity and Social Movements at the Sociology Department, 
University of Warsaw, included Wojciech Ogrodnik, Marcin Jóźko, Krzysztof 
Martyniak and Dominik Wasilewski. The study was carried out across Poland, spe-
cifically in Białystok, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Zielona Góra, Żyrardów, Łódź, Płock, 
Radom, Rzeszów, Legnica–Lubin–Polkowice and Bielsko-Białą.
 5 See Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Rebellious Civil Society:  Popular Protest and 
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apt choice, and that the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” 
reactivated in 1989 was not the same as the union destroyed by martial law. The 
new Solidarity neither regained its powerful membership nor revived its never 
fully expressed ideological potential. The union robustly engaged with abrupt 
and often costly political and economic changes, and it soon became a political 
actor of quite firm ideological leanings. Consequently, the trade union started 
to lose its membership base rapidly and took a definite position as a player on 
the political arena. In 2010 and 2011, even the activists of the current union 
hailing from the first Solidarity were highly critical of the union’s “excessive 
politicisation,” despite their overall allegiance to the political party to which the 
union had become “a political annex,” so to speak.
To finish with, let me stress that this volume is not a simple re-edition. 
Inspired by the Head of the European Solidarity Centre, I  added a third part 
to it. It includes texts that revisit the earlier discussed factors in and the values 
of the Solidarity experience in order to understand what happened to the civil 
society that issued forth the Solidarity movement and then was shaped by this 
movement in turn. I do not know whether I can answer this question compre-
hensively, but I hope that my insights will shed some light on the phenomenon 
of Solidarity, which is transforming into a big socio-political myth, as French 
sociologists pithily put it.
In Conclusion, I  will look into the questions asked in this Introduction 
through a social scientific lens and see what happened with the Solidarity expe-
rience, whether its legacy is still vivid in the memory of its participants (as 
suggested by field research) and whether it still harbours a social, political or, 
simply, civic potential. My answers, tentative though they may  – or perhaps 
must – be, will hopefully add up to a pertinent account of our knowledge of the 
social and trade-unionist movement of Solidarity and our perception of Poles’ 
grand collective work of the 20th century.
The Forgotten Past
In the early 1980s, the word “solidarity” captured people’s imaginations and 
became a common catchphrase. And that was the case not only – one could say 
particularly not – in Poland. The word was revived, taking a new lease of life and 
a new relevance as a social and political tag. Before 1980, “solidarity” featured 
in political discourse in two contexts which gave it a slightly ambiguous ring. 
In one of them, when used by serious political scientists, it sounded ironic and 
corresponded to “social solidarism.” Back then, social solidarism was (and as a 
matter of fact still is) viewed as an unfeasible socio-political concept that posited 
bonding and collaboration between social groups – classes – despite their con-
flicting positions.
In broad lines, political scientists are ironic about solidarism, as its advocates 
have generally failed to appreciate either the relevance of conflicts spawned by 
divergent interests or the power of mutual dislike, envy and resentment between 
those on “top” and those at the “bottom” of the social hierarchy. Solidarists firmly 
believe that the upper echelons of society are ready to take account of the needs 
and demands of the lower strata, while the latter are perfectly capable of tem-
pering their claims for the sake of common good; serious researchers insist, 
however, that this belief is belied by historical experience and the lived social 
reality. They also sneer ironically at solidarists’ belief that the upper social classes 
can become a genuine authority for their social inferiors, which will breed har-
mony and understanding between the “top” and the “bottom” rungs of the social 
ladder.
Anyway, conflict lines can run not only between classes but also between 
other large groups of citizens who hold different positions and embrace entirely 
different political arrangements or entirely different notions of national tradi-
tion and its role in the state. In such cases, solidarists will also presuppose that 
agreement is possible, especially if facilitated by commonly recognised authority 
figures.6
In the other context, the word “solidarity” was also given a class-inflected 
meaning, albeit one opposed to the solidarist vision. Solidarity was supposed 
to be intrinsic to the working class, whose members had come to be aware that 
they shared the same fate. On this model, the working class was a symbol of 
all the oppressed, the humiliated and the exploited. Consequently, proletarian 





solidarity was attributed to all the oppressed, the humiliated and the exploited. 
Hence, Stanisław Skorupka’s 1968 Słownik frazeologiczny języka polskiego (A 
Phraseological Dictionary of the Polish Language) lists multiple examples of 
such usage of “solidarity” and “solidary.” The dictionary describes solidarity 
by modifiers such as “internationalist,” “of the proletariat,” “of the peace bloc” 
and, finally, “of the fighting proletariat.”7 By definition, solidarity between the 
proletariat and capitalists was out of the question, but solidarity of all workers, 
regardless of their national, occupational or financial differences, was indeed 
necessary as only such solidarity could help workers, in fact humans as such, 
shake off their fetters. In this sense, solidarity was contrasted with solidarism, 
which could hardly be anything else than an invention of the ruling and monied 
classes designed to beguile the exploited. Therefore, solidarity only concerned 
the working class and its allies who grasped the proletariat’s historical mission. 
Only the humiliated and the exploited could stand in disinterested solidarity 
with each other.
The Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” was founded as 
an organisation mainly because people were stirred by another meaning of “sol-
idarity.” Even in the Skorupka Dictionary, “solidarity” primarily designates sol-
idary involvement in common action: “acting in unison – one for all and all for 
one.” And the “solidarity” entry in the Słownik języka polskiego (Polish Language 
Dictionary) says that “being solidary” refers to unity in action and aspirations 
as well as to unanimity or consensus,8 adding that “to stand in solidarity” also 
denotes “to feel co-responsible.”9 Given this, we can argue that Solidarity as a 
trade union and a social movement that founded it has contributed to crafting 
a new social and political scientific term. One of my major goals in this book it 
to interpret the new theoretical meaning that the common noun “solidarity” has 
accrued.10
 7 Stanisław Skorupka, Słownik frazeologiczny języka polskiego (Warszawa:  Wiedza 
Powszechna, 1968), p. 163.
 8 Słownik języka polskiego, ed. Witold Doroszewski, vol. 8 (Warszawa: PWN, 1966), 
p. 490.
 9 Ibid., p. 491.
 10 The meanings invested in the word “solidarity” were interpreted by Reverend Józef 
Tischner in his Etyka solidarności (Ethics of Solidarity) (Kraków: Znak, 1981). Many 
of his ideas dovetail with mine, but I believe that insights presented by Rev. Tischner 
are impacted more by his philosophy than by a sociological analysis of the meanings 
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Firstly, “solidarity” as a catchword and a name targeted the self-appointed 
group that had claimed for decades to express the concerns and ambitions of the 
proletariat and of all the oppressed, the persecuted and the humiliated. But, at 
that moment, it had long been clear to everyone that the ideology which allegedly 
stood up for workers had become a tool of tyrannical control over individuals 
and all expressions of human life.
Secondly, “solidarity” very specifically called for bonding between the groups 
“on top” and “at the bottom.” This jarred with official ideology, in which the “top” 
positions were to be taken by the working class. In fact, a number of ideological 
and, even, administrative manoeuvres were implemented to adjust life to the ide-
ology and elevate workers over the intelligentsia, or at least some working-class 
groups over your “average intellectual.” The manoeuvres hardly proved effective.
Such measures were anyway doomed to failure given that ordinary people – 
common workers – even when pushing their own claims were inclined to ac-
cept that, say, doctors deserved to earn more, for they had studied for years and 
their job was very important. Solidarity was founded on such common-sensical 
thinking; common sense, in fact, offered a new quality, as it entailed thinking 
about society as a community of varied groups and individuals who, though 
differing in their social situations and roles, had common and equal rights, 
while taking upper or lower positions should depend first of all on people’s indi-
vidual efforts. If the social reality was different – and it was very much different, 
indeed – so much worse for the reality! For that reality veered drastically from 
what had started to emerge as the ideal of a good social system.
It seems that the socio-economic inequalities and differences were interpreted 
in the “solidarist” vein by those less favourably situated “at the bottom.” Their 
interpretation was based on the common-sensical idea of justice and the con-
viction that the principles of social life should comply with this common sense. 
Whether one was a steelworker, a university professor, a shipworker or a teacher, 
one should have a feeling that one’s position was equitable and warranted. And 
that was impossible in the system that denied voice to people and, thus, pre-
cluded a communal debate on their individual lives and collective fate. First and 
foremost, the laws on which the rules of life were based should conform to the 
citizens’ will and values.
The common and equal law for all was supposed to institute and safeguard 
equal rules, enabling the citizens to arrange their lives and compete with each 
other for the positions they pursued in the social hierarchy. By the same token, 
solidarity was based on and evoked people’s equal right to decide about their indi-
vidual lives and collective life. In this way, Solidarity contributed to re-defining 
“politics.”
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Politics could not be ignored when serious and responsible discourse 
commenced on how individual citizens could manage their lives. Responsibility 
for oneself and one’s loved ones necessarily entailed developing and agreeing on 
the ways and rules of interacting with other people who, equally, cherished their 
own aspirations and pursuits.
For these reasons, the social movement that developed around and through 
Solidarity came to be called a civic movement. David Ost, an American researcher 
of Solidarity, considers the exceptional trade union to be a continuation of “the 
politics of anti-politics,” as he dubs the strategies developed earlier by what came 
to be called the democratic opposition. Ost claims that Solidarity did not have 
either a full-fledged, firm political identity or a specific, recognisable agenda 
easily classifiable within the historical political traditions. The movement’s 
leanings, as Ost states, were neither leftist nor rightist. The main goal was to 
foster possibilities for the citizens to have a say in the development, priorities and 
policies of the state, which represented society and protected citizens.11
Admittedly, Ost examined the divisions within and the inner diversity of the 
democratic opposition movement in the 1970s and the later ideological and polit-
ical complexity of the Solidarity movement, yet his “anti-politics” highlighted, 
basically, a moral and ideological attitude which was shared by all the activists 
and shaped the way society thought of the goals of social changes.
Social transformation was impossible unless individual citizens and, subse-
quently, society as a national and civil collective regained their subjectivity. Anti-
politics was possible because all social actors involved in the fight for freedom 
and democracy reached a unique agreement as to the fundamental moral values 
guiding them in their quest for a democratic state. There was thus “a value 
consensus” that underpinned the attitudes of solidarity shared by people who 
differed on more specific political matters.
The major point of the “anti-political politics” was to prevent any ideologi-
cally driven group, tempting though its agenda might have been, from imposing 
its will on the other ones and from monopolising the interpretation of social 
wishes, interests and shared values. No such group was supposed to become 
a self-anointed champion of “workers,” “society” or “the nation.” The nation-
cum-society itself was framed as free to decide whom and when to entrust with 
representing its interests and which solutions to adopt.
 11 Cf. David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-politics: Opposition and Reform in 
Poland Since 1968 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).
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This new notion of politics showed that democratic society, based on human 
and civil rights, had its hidden moral underpinnings. Democracy became 
a dream of millions of people. The experience of living in a monolithic state 
governed by an autocratic party made them think of democracy, paradoxically, 
as impracticable without an underlying moral agenda.
Democracy means a pluralistic, diversified, stratified and even utterly 
fragmented society, where a myriad of discrepant tendencies are at work. In their 
daily practice, democratic societies also seem conflicted on moral principles and 
moral standards of life. Polish Solidarity surprisingly showed such diversified, 
disputing and eternally quarrelling communities a common moral foundation.
This moral bedrock was encapsulated in the notion of “civil society.” Both 
Ost and another American scholar Michael Bernhard evoke this concept, which 
had hardly been used in social and political scientific studies before the 1980s. 
Still, this very notion proved indispensable to understand and give an account of 
Solidarity’s democratic reform movement.12
Another surprising thing, which was to stir a serious intellectual debate later, 
was that the ideal of a society of free citizens animated not only Polish intellectuals 
(or, in broader terms, the intelligentsia), but also workers and so-called ordinary 
people, who adopted it as their own and relied on it to channel their aspirations. 
Politics trickled into their lives as a requisite component of the fully lived, respon-
sible, adult life. Participation in politics as a common social debate on matters 
of interest to all came to be seen as a sine qua non of decent life and individual 
sense of civil dignity.
The subtitle of Bernhard’s book lists side by side workers, intellectuals and 
oppositional politics in pre-Solidarity Poland. Both Ost and Bernhard try 
to explain how the ideals touted by a small and seemingly isolated group of 
dissidents were claimed by millions as their own and discussed by the masses. In 
their view, Solidarity as a trade union and as s social movement would not have 
been possible without the democratic opposition of the 1970s, mobilised around 
the Workers’ Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotnikiów; KOR) and 
assembling many other groups, such as the extremely important Movement for 
Defence of Human and Civil Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela; 
ROPCiO).
 12 Cf. Michael H.  Bernhard, The Origins of Democratization in Poland:  Workers, 





Ost, who sees a simple continuity between the democratic opposition and 
Solidarity, attributes the formative significance to the KOR and independent 
publishing promoted by KOR-affiliated circles. Bernhard, however, is far more 
tentative and, though he by no means ignores the contribution of the KOR and 
the entire democratic opposition, he understands that it took something more 
than just the independent press and books to disseminate democratic ideas. 
Therefore, he also lists the impact of the Church and the pro-democratic and 
freedom-focused Catholic ethos evolving since the late 1970s.
Jan Kubik’s notion of the “ceremonial revolution” seems a very interesting 
interpretive approach. The revolution was “ceremonial” since no other one 
would have been possible, not only because of the system’s overwhelming mil-
itary and infrastructural advantage. The democratic values, strongly informed 
by religious – Catholic or, better, Christian – attitudes and motivations as they 
were, precluded, it seems, an armed revolution. Given that the “system” against 
which the opposition protested had been produced by the military Soviet revo-
lution, a vast majority of workers and intellectuals simply recoiled at the idea of 
changing the system in any similar fashion.13 Kubik’s analysis is corroborated, 
to some extent, by the Church’s persistent mobilisation of religion to encourage 
non-violent fight for human and civil rights, regarded as the natural, moral foun-
dation of a good social system.
The “ceremonial revolution” is, so to speak, a vivid symbolic outline of a new 
social order that, to use a sociological term, delegitimised the previous, socialist 
system and invalidated its justifications and slogans. The project of a new order 
was not merely a figment of people’s imagination or a drive behind their attitudes; 
it also materialised in joint action. The Solidarity trade union was a social labo-
ratory for and a dress rehearsal of implementing the new principles as the basic 
structures of the state.
It is thus hardly a surprise that, in the title of Kubik’s book, “the power of 
symbols” is juxtaposed with the “symbols of power,” because history has showed, 
again, that raw power expressed in state violence against society is impotent 
against the power of innocuous symbols if only these symbols can re-forge a 
collective of individuals into a community unified by common bonds and an 
organised social movement.
 13 Cf. Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols and Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and 
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Solidarity’s symbols delineated a special space which was permeated by a new 
social order – an outline of a new system, yet a project. But the revolution had 
already happened by then, sweeping across attitudes, beliefs, imaginaries and 
people’s latent and explicit dreams and expectations. The compromised symbols 
of power and violence had to back down.
All the authors referenced above agree that the project would not have been 
possible without the democratic opposition’s work, but it must be emphasised 
from the start that Solidarity and its trade union were not simply a continuation 
of any prior oppositional organisation; nor can any oppositional group (even 
the most distinguished ones, such as the KOR and the ROPCiO) be viewed as 
the sole source of fundamental ideas and social attitudes that coalesced into the 
vigorous civil project of a new social order. It still remains to be determined how 
precisely the democratic opposition and the Catholic Church’s engagement con-
tributed to the rise and work of Solidarity. Similarly, there are still more specific 
issues to be figured out, such as whether Solidarity’s ideals picked up and applied 
the ideals of the KOR only or, perhaps, also of any other hubs of the democratic 
opposition.
As a matter of fact, it is no trifling question. It became particularly pertinent 
after 1989, when the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” was 
re-activated, yet failed to become the chief axis of any mass social movement. 
Instead, various political groups and parties mushroomed, all of which drew on 
the symbol and the ideological legacy of Solidarity from 1980–1981.
This issue has never been thoroughly and objectively debated in Poland, 
excepting mutual accusations and insinuations levelled by erstwhile adamant 
friends and allies, now involved in a fierce political rivalry.
To return to Solidarity, a direct impact of oppositional thinking on the trade 
union’s official agenda can likely be traced. But this agenda, though democrati-
cally adopted by Solidarity’s Convention of Delegates (Zjazd Delegatów), cannot 
be equated with that “vigorous project” which fuelled the social reform move-
ment and was symbolically practised within the trade union.
This observation is substantiated by a much earlier study which applied very 
original empirical research methodologies. Alain Touraine and his French and 
Polish colleagues set out to study and depict the ideals and action modes of the 
Solidarity movement. Touraine came up with the concept of Solidarity’s dis-
tinctive “triangle” in which political, national and social goals were inseparably 
interwoven. Democratic state reform, national independence and self-governing 
society as the agent of power controlling the economy were the goals Touraine 
ascribed to Solidarity.
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Always evoked in one breath, they never appeared alone, and Touraine argued 
that disjoining these goals and actions would immediately result in the disinte-
gration and decline of the Solidarity social movement.14 This seems to confirm 
that a holistic project of organising life in Poland was nursed in popular con-
sciousness as well as in more organised forms of collective consciousness.
But who actually “authored” the project of the organisation of life which, 
as Touraine’s study vividly shows, was being forged day in day out in inces-
sant debates that pervaded the daily lives of workers, the work of the union’s 
board and its press? Was it authored by workers or by the intelligentsia, or per-
haps by intellectuals? Rumour about conflicts between worker-unionists and 
intellectual-experts was rife both when Solidarity operated legally and when, 
officially disbanded, it went “underground.” Lech Wałęsa, the symbol of the 
union, was himself rather vocal about his anti-intelligentsia sentiments.
The question whether Solidarity was more “of the workers” or “of the intelli-
gentsia” stirred a heated debate in the US in the early 1990s. Roman Laba and 
Lawrence Goodwyn, two major voices in the debate, each published a book 
entirely devoted to the issue in 1991.15 Laba had spent a few years in Poland 
collecting data for his study. That his book was released a few years after the 
author had returned to the US seems to have impacted its content: apparently, 
the account of Solidarity was incorporated into a broader theoretical and ideo-
logical discussion and coloured by the beliefs held by the author (or, rather, 
authors, for Goodwyn took a similar stance).
To recognise Solidarity as an inherent achievement of the working class and 
to trace it back to the reflection and values of the working class was germane to 
socialist or socialist-inspired theory and ideology. Communists are known to 
have assumed that, in their struggle to improve their lives, workers must be aided 
by the “ideologically sound” intelligentsia, who would “contribute” an appro-
priate socio-political consciousness (this is a crucial addition Vladimir Ilych 
Lenin made to the Marxian theory). Left to their own devices, workers could not 
develop a democratic consciousness, let alone create a just, socialist alternative 
to bourgeois democracy.
 14 Cf. Paweł. Kuczyński et al., W poszukiwaniu ruchu społecznego. Wokół socjologii Alaina 
Touraine’a (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 1994).
 15 Cf. Lawrence Goodwyn, Breaking the Barrier:  The Rise of Solidarity in Poland 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity: A 
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Solidarity was thus a case at which social democrats were all too eager to 
pounce:  they could use the example of a powerful and, eventually, victorious 
social movement of workers to disprove the theses of Marxist-Communist polit-
ical philosophy; more than that, they could show that workers aspired to demo-
cratic forms of socio-political life “all by themselves.”
Involved in the socialist movement in his youth, Touraine only did research in 
Poland in industrial plants, and his interlocutors were chiefly workers, members 
of activist groups. But it was also evident to Touraine that Solidarity was an 
outcome of a rather extraordinary merger of workers’ and the intelligentsia’s 
ambitions, which seemed to build on the protests of 1968 (students and the intel-
ligentsia) and 1970 (workers). In the early 1990s, US researchers and analysts did 
not realise that Solidarity could be associated with the experience of 1968 and 
1970, and their accounts were impacted by a specific context.
Goodwyn’s and Laba’s interpretations provoked polemics from other scholars, 
such as Andrzej Tymowski and Michael Bernhard, to mention just two of their 
critics. A Polish translation of Bernhard’s text appeared in Krytyka, but it did not 
raise any special interest.16
In his exploration of the protests of shipworkers and other workers of the 
Baltic Coast region, Goodwyn argues that the 1980 revolt built on the experi-
ence of the 1970 strikes. It is a very tempting notion, all the more so that Lech 
Wałęsa has repeatedly referred to the events of December 1970 as formative of 
his mindset and his further life. I and my colleagues posited the same relation-
ship when we commenced our research on new trade unions formed in Warsaw 
in 1980; earlier experiences could after all be expected to influence the actions 
and thinking of the working-class protesters. However, the issue proved far 
more complex. The texts compiled below will show that even if workers largely 
capitalised on the prior experience, in doing so, they tended to rely on general 
social memory and inspirations from the oppositional press. In fact, evidence of 
any direct influence of the people who had orchestrated prior protests, often in 
the same factories, and suffered for that, is nowhere to be found.
 16 Cf. Michael Bernhard, “Nowe spojrzenie na Solidarność,” Krytyka 38, 1992. Republishing 
this text, I need to mention an important critique of Laba’s and Goodwyn’s concepts 
offered by Kubik; cf. Jan Kubik, “Who Done It? Workers or Intellectuals. A Controversy 





It seems that the developments in Gdansk followed a similar trajectory; for 
though the Shipyard gate, where workers had been killed in December 1970, 
became a symbol, social memory only reclaimed this symbolic place years later.
It was only in the late 1970s, when oppositional organisations had already 
been firmly in place for some time, that attempts were made to commemorate 
anniversaries of the December events. Those celebration were suppressed by the 
People’s Militia (Milicja Obywatelska) with greater or lesser ruthlessness.
Lech Wałęsa, himself a participant in the illegal celebrations, joined the pre-
August oppositional unionist movement, but his engagement does not seem to 
have originated in his experience of December 1970. Rather, it seems associ-
ated with how December 1970 was re-worked by a new consciousness emerging 
towards the end of the Gierek epoch.17
In polemics with Goodwyn’s and Laba’s findings, other authors have often 
foregrounded the concept of “civic consciousness” as informing the pursuits of 
Solidarity. The concept holds that civic consciousness germinated at the onset of 
the formation of the unionist movement. The shipworkers who went on strike 
in the summer of 1980 and all those who later joined the Shipyard’s mass strike 
did not seek their short- or long-term group interests, as had usually been the 
case earlier. While under Gierek striking had become a regularly used tool for 
improving the living standards of families, the strike in August 1980 was not 
devised in order to obtain from the government what the strikers wanted just for 
themselves, i.e. for particular worker groups or “industries” (though the official 
parlance of real socialism framed workers as a ruling class, with the PUWP18 and 
the Soviet CPSU governing on their behalf). The strike of the Gdansk Shipyard 
(which was still named after Lenin) quickly mutated into a more general, even 
nationwide protest. The strike committee at the Gdansk Shipyard included 
representatives of various enterprises based in Gdansk and, later, in the entire 
Tri-City.19 This only further shows that the shipworkers did not lay partisan 
claims but expressed demands and attitudes shared by many other workers who 
embodied the civic mindset. This mindset was confirmed when the release of a 
 17 The Gierek epoch/era/decade denotes the decade of the 1970, when the position of the 
First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party and, consequently, the leadership 
of the state was held by Edward Gierek. (translator’s note)
 18 PUWP stands for the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polish: Polska Zjednoczona Partia 
Robotnicza, PZPR). (translator’s note)
 19 The Tri-City (Polish:  Trójmiasto) is a collective name designating three coastal 
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dozen arrested opposition activists was included among the conditions to end 
the strike and to sign an agreement with the government, as the phrase used back 
then had it. This also shows how vitally the actions and demands of the workers 
and the pro-democratic intelligentsia were interlocked. Anti-intelligentsia 
sentiments were overcome in the name of civil community.
Yet were the attitudes of the workers’ indeed so pro-democratic and did they 
view the new, just order as necessarily founded on individual civil rights? A rele-
vant piece in this jigsaw puzzle has a national colouring and involves thinking in 
terms of “our” national interests as pitted against the Party and state interests of 
the People’s Republic of Poland. As such, it concerns “them” who, at the time, had 
already come to be commonly identified as agents of the Soviet, if not Russian, 
interests. Solidarity activists dwelled on this issue repeatedly, both in public and 
in private everyday discussions. As the codename “geopolitics” enthused the 
public and individual imaginations, many people fantasised that if only Poland 
could be miraculously relocated on the globe, it would immediately turn into an 
entirely different country…
The idea of a national Poland, where only “our own people” could represent 
society and govern while “strangers” or “foreigners” were suspect and did not 
deserve the same civil rights as Poles, cropped up time and again in a variety 
of forms across the Solidarity-inspired masses. Towards the end of Solidarity’s 
legal activity, a movement of so-called true Poles came into being and, with 
little success, tried to gain some influence with the Mazovia Region20 delegates 
in Warsaw. The movement received no support either from the top activists or 
from most rank-and-file members of the union.
A dislike of strangers, of those who were “not our own folk,” also surfaced 
in anti-Semitic slogans or nation-centred ideas redolent of anti-Semitism. But 
such voices were hardly robust and often sounded peculiar. There were attempts 
to confront the anti-Jewish stereotypes with reality, but they stumbled upon a 
prosaic difficulty: members of Jewish communities were very hard to find. At the 
same time, the oppositional intelligentsia and the entire March generation shared, 
so to speak, their experience of the anti-Semitic campaign that had targeted their 
professors and friends in 1968. As a result, the discussions involving workers 
and intellectuals from the March generation could sound peculiar indeed, for 
the workers tried to find out how reliable or justified their familiar anti-Semitic 
stereotypes (part of their “natural” social knowledge) were. And because other 
 20 Mazovia (Polish: Mazowsze) is the name of the geographical and historical region 




cornerstones of popular knowledge had to be revised as well, the anti-Semitic 
stereotypes were not given much credence anymore. This conjuncture is quite 
insightfully described by Michel Wieviorka in a book that has never been trans-
lated into Polish (or English).21 It is a pity, for the ideas trumpeted by the “true” 
Poles in 1981 seem to have resurfaced recently (and with vengeance, too) and 
are rumbling across the re-established Independent Self-Governing Trade Union 
“Solidarity.”
The national agenda was acknowledged in Touraine’s study as one of the 
Solidarity movement’s essential ideological investments. However, thinking in 
terms of national interests did not in the least contravene the universal principles 
of equal rights for all citizens, whatever their idiosyncratic, individual and group 
identities. It seems that, in the day, the “true” Poles were rather an exception, 
while the general ideological climate did not promote nationalist attitudes. The 
stance adopted by the Church, an active champion of human and civil rights as 
the foundation of the just social order, greatly favoured the democratic leanings 
in Solidarity’s national thinking.
The problem of thinking in national terms and of guarding national interests 
is perhaps the least studied one in the literature on Solidarity, at least in the more 
recent publications. The theme is nonetheless relevant, and a thorough debate 
on it could spawn some new meanings and new symbols. Such meanings and 
symbols would certainly help give a well-judged expression to national traditions 
and interests, which are all too easily dismissed as a mere parochial prejudice by 
the progressive and liberal intelligentsia. Such a morally demeaning assessment 
of an ofttimes profound reflection on matters relating to Poland and Poles has 
done a lot of harm to us all over the years.
* * *
In the foregoing, I attempted to list the most important points raised in recent 
years in discussions on Solidarity. By necessity, I have passed over earlier studies 
and only evoked the most important issues which still remain underexamined in 
Poland. In deciding to publish the handful of essays below, which accompanied, 
so to speak, collective actions and thinking, I was inspired by two phenomena. 
One of them was the staggering pace and the impressive compass of the pro-
cess in which millions of people had constructed a grid Solidarity’s units. The 
other was a perhaps even more puzzling process in which millions of Poles had 
forgotten about the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” and 
their own Solidarity involvement.
 21 Cf. Michel Wieviorka, Les Juifs, la Pologne et Solidarnosc (Paris: Denoël, 1984). 
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This obliviousness is all the more surprising, given that in the second half of the 
1990s, a few years after Poland had gained democratic sovereignty, the political 
movement looking back to Solidarity and revolving around an Independent Self-
Governing Trade Union was revived. But this is an entirely different Solidarity; 
its political ideals deviate from those cherished in the 1980s. This volume can 
serve as a mirror showing uncanny meanders of history, human lives and human 




Part One   The Way It Was: Solidarity and 
Empirical Sociology
Part One of this book reports on the findings of a sociological study on the for-
mation and rise of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” 
in Warsaw. The bulk the study was conducted in the autumn of 1980 while the 
last interviews were administered in early January 1981. The idea of the study 
sprouted in October 1980 and was partly inspired by Professor Stefan Nowak of 
the Social Research Methodology Chair at the Institute of Sociology, University 
of Warsaw. Our team’s report, entitled Polacy – Jesień ’80. Proces powstawania 
niezależnych organizacji związkowych (The Poles in the Autumn of 1980: The Rise 
of Independent Trade Unions), was only published at the University in 1983 as 
a special edition bypassing state censorship. Its print run was 100 – one hun-
dred – copies. This was given as the official number in order to conform with 
the regulations in force then, but, in fact, twice as many copies were printed. 
The research team that contributed to the final publication included Grzegorz 
Bakuniak, Iwona Jakubowska, Anna Kruczkowska, Ireneusz Krzemiński, Jan 
Poleszczuk and Henryk Banaszak, who analysed the press of the “hot summer” 
of 1980 for us.
The key chapter of the 1983 report, accompanied by a methodological intro-
duction, makes up the core of the first part of this volume. The introduction 
explains how this author conceived of sociology back in the day, which, as a 
matter of fact, does not differ much from his current ideas.
Parts of the study appeared in samizdat journals and, then, in regular journals 
in 1997, followed by a complete Polish edition in 200522 within the series of 
Socjologia niezapomniana (Unforgotten Sociology), edited by Antoni Sułek and 
published by the Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw. The series included 
sociological studies released by samizdat publishers in the 1980s.
 22 Ireneusz Krzemiński et  al., Polacy  – jesień ‘80, Socjologia Niezapomniana, vol.  3 






“Hot Sociology”: Research Assumptions  
and Procedures
The idea of the study germinated in October 1980. Our team’s major research aim 
was to trace the formation of trade unions which had been mushrooming in and 
around Warsaw since September 1980. In our project proposal, we wrote: “The 
situation is a novelty to our society and fosters a new social experience as well as 
offers an opportunity to augment sociological knowledge about Polish society in 
particular and theoretical knowledge of social mechanisms in general.” Further, 
we formulated our central research aim: “The study we envisage aims to do more 
than just improve academic knowledge of society as the data we will generate 
are also expected to help us understand the currently developing and anticipated 
social actions. As such, the knowledge yielded by our study will be hot knowl-
edge and itself part of the studied social process.” As can be seen, our idea was to 
inform decision-making agencies and the broad public of the findings gleaned 
from the study in progress. Our model of social sciences differed, thus, from 
empiricist sociology. Regrettably, we did not quite make good on our promise. 
The report on our findings was only completed in the spring of 1983, when the 
social conjuncture was radically different from the autumn of 1980 and from the 
vistas it had seemed to augur.
Workplace-Based Communities: The Selection Criteria
In our study, we planned to examine the formation process of trade-union 
institutions in various enterprises. We selected a sample of eleven enterprises 
based on a few intersecting criteria. Firstly, they were big industrial plants of 
special economic – and, consequently, social and political – relevance, particu-
larly those whose workforce were a significant factor in the trade union develop-
ment in the region. For the sake of contrast, we also included small enterprises 
which had joined the unionist initiatives relatively late. Secondly, they were big 
enterprises from the capital city and enterprises of a comparable size from the 
surrounding area. Thirdly, they were organisations that employed either mainly 
men or mainly women. Fourthly, they were industrial plants where most of the 
staff were workers and enterprises where university-educated employees were in 
the majority. Fifthly, they were manufacturers and service-providers in the cap-
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The Multi-Perspective Research Design
Within each enterprise, we studied all the organised actors of the unfolding 
social process. This meant that we examined the actions and views of:  1) 
directors; 2) secretaries of the enterprise-level PUWP23 units; 3)  leaders of the 
enterprise-level boards of the old trade unions (branch unions); 4)  leaders of 
youth organisations (ZSMP24); 5) heads and other members of the Enterprise 
Committees of the NSZZ “Solidarity”25; 6)  leaders of other newly established 
trade unions in respective enterprises (the unions were typically referred to 
by our interviewees as “directorial,” though at the time of the study they were 
commonly called “autonomous trade unions”). Our object was to look at the 
events preceding August 1980 and the social process unfolding ever since 
through the eyes of all the social actors involved.
We wanted our interviewers to contact the initiators of the Founding 
Committees of the NSZZ “Solidarity,” that is, people who were the driving force 
of social actions (this also held for all other newly set up trade unions).
The autumn of 1980 was also a time when old organisations were adjusting to 
the new circumstances. In particular, the old trade unions, which were assem-
bled in the CRZZ,26 were transforming. Our interviewers went wherever change 
had taken place and interviewed both the new heads of Enterprise Councils and 
their predecessors who had been in office in August 1980.
Besides, we planned (7) group interviews with representatives of workforce in 
order to get at least a fragmentary insight into the views of “ordinary” workers.
The interviewers stumbled upon some difficulties when trying to interview 
the directors. In two cases, the directors not only refused to be interviewed but 
also did not permit us to collect our research data in their enterprises.
The enterprise-lever PUWP first secretaries often declined to be interviewed, 
delegating other people instead. In three enterprises, the secretaries refused very 
firmly. We managed to interview two ZSMP members.
 23 PUWP stands for the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polish: Polska Zjednoczona Partia 
Robotnicza, PZPR). The Party’s lowest organisational unit was called the Basic Party 
Organisation (Polish: Podstawowa Organizacja Partyjna, POP). POPs were set up 
within every office, factory, enterprise, etc. (translator’s note)
 24 ZSMP stands for the Związek Socjalistycznej Młodzieży Polskiej (Polish: Polish Socialist 
Youth Union). (translator’s note)
 25 NSZZ is the acronym for the Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy, i.e. the 
Independent Self-Governing Trade Union.
 26 CRZZ is the acronym for the Centralna Rada Związków Zawodowych, i.e. the Central 
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The data we collected also include (8) interviews with members of the post-
1976 democratic opposition.
Another set of interviews (9)  includes interviews with the founders and 
activists of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Scientific, Technical 
and Educational Employees (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy 
Pracowników Nauki,Techniki i Oświaty, NSZZ PNTiO), which was an organi-
sation of Warsaw’s intellectual community, established concurrently with the 
NSZZ Mazovia. The NSZZ PNTiO, which enjoyed immense popularity in the 
capital, self-disbanded at the 2nd General Convention, and its units were incor-
porated into the structures of Solidarity’s Mazovia Region. Our interviews about 
the PNTiO activities were administered slightly later than the other interviews.
Competent Informants and the Main Research Questions
The interviewees were our competent informants. We expected our collection of 
interviews to help: 1) trace back the formation process of the new societal insti-
tution and identify factors conducive or adverse to the establishment of inde-
pendent trade unions; 2) determine what previous social experiences and prior 
involvements underpinned current activism; and 3) depict the response of the 
“old structures” to the rise of a new trade-union institution.
The respondents were, consequently, also researchers who were expected to 
describe their own and their partners’ pursuits as well as to depict the behaviour 
of their opponents and the prevalent way of thinking within their enterprise-
based community.
The (multi-perspective) research design enabled us to analyse each social 
actor’s activities, based on the comparison of self-reports from various 
participants in the studied events. Overall depictions of respective enterprises 
could be produced in this fashion, too. Even though our data were incomplete 
and statistically non-representative, they made it possible to test the reliability of 
our competent informants regarding people’s general views.
In this way, we sought to offset the impact of what Hans Speier called social 
perspectivism,27 which we could expect to encounter in interviews with the 
“formal” and “spiritual” leaders of enterprise-based communities.
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Research Methods: The Epistemological Underpinnings
Yet, truth to be told, we wanted primarily to find out about individual actors’ 
unique social perspectives on the developing situation. While the external 
criteria helped us control, to a degree at least, the image emerging from our 
respondents’ reports, they did not serve us to substitute our “unbiased,” “scien-
tific” competence for our subjects’ participation-based competence.
We assumed that the functions our competent informants performed in social 
life predestined them for the role of natural social researchers. We concluded 
that, in what they were doing, our competent informants had to objectively mon-
itor their own actions as only by adopting such an objectivising and rationalising 
view could they maintain their position in the system of collective pursuits and 
make sure that their community’s efforts were effective.
The objective view of what is going on and what I take part in only becomes 
meaningful when juxtaposed with the perspective in which I-am-the-one-that-
acts or we-are-the-ones-that-act. This particular perspective is a sine qua non for 
grasping the totality of the social process at hand. This seems to be a prerequisite 
for objective sociological knowledge.
In such scientific knowledge, ramifications of social perspectivism are not just 
a source of “cognitive errors” for the sociologist; rather, social perspectives which 
evolve in social life make up the basic object of sociological research.
Sociologists usually describe social developments as objective and produced 
by an objective set of intertwined factors.28 People’s actions are identical with 
behaviours, that is, with behavioural responses to the stimuli to which people 
are exposed (called conditions or correlates in sociological research). Action is 
conditioned by the environmental patterns external to people and is itself sub-
ject to mechanisms independent of people’s will, for example systemic factors. 
On this model, such patterns, regularities and factors can only be fathomed by a 
researcher who investigates them from outside of the process.
Designing our research, we concluded that to adopt such a point of view 
would be self-defeating in terms of our intent to provide an effective account and 
an adequate explanation of social reality, all the more so because the autumn of 
1980 saw Polish society faced with a highly problematic situation.
 28 Durkheim’s central rule to treat social facts as things seems to be the still unshaken 
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Basic Theoretical Assumptions: Symbols and Actions
Theoretical underpinnings of our research design were derived from sym-
bolic interactionism, which did not preclude the use of other theories for data 
interpretation.
Put very simply, our theoretical assumption was that, as a rule, the social 
world seems as permanent as material objects to people. The social space does 
not differ much from the physical space. Yet, every now and then, this stable 
social world disintegrates before everybody’s eyes or, alternatively, people them-
selves decide to change it. The previously taken-for-granted form of social phe-
nomena suddenly becomes problematic, while the so-far latent foundations of 
the stable structures are exposed. Participants in these events begin to realise that 
natural and social objects necessary to or facilitating life are available because 
of a complex network of collaboration whose principles are by no means evi-
dent or “natural.”29 In such moments, objective sociology as such also becomes 
problematic.
A problematic situation reveals what we are oblivious to in daily life, i.e. that 
what we take for a stable social world is, in fact, a continually unfolding process 
within which we align our actions with the actions of other people. The problem-
atic situation also shows that social reality is a symbolic reality. The continuity 
of behaviours and the stability of the social world depend on the durability of 
spiritual forms and modes of thinking that use such and not any other symbols.
We struggle to grasp the suddenly “problematising” reality until we find new 
symbols to frame the situation as a form, that is, as having a certain order (and 
thus being a “situation”). The symbols trigger a social process, for they compel 
people to re-assess the situation and re-invent themselves as seen by themselves 
and others. This helps people comprehend how the new situation is related to 
their conduct and to the goals they cannot possibly abandon. This reflection 
represents the first step in the new social process.
 29 “Societies develop just as animal forms develop, by adjusting themselves to the 
problems that they find before them,” writes George Herbert Mead: “Living forms 
have found themselves up against problematic situations: their food gone, their cli-
mate changed, new enemies coming in. The method which nature has followed, if we 
may speak so anthropomorphically, has been the production of variations until finally 
one variation has arisen which survived. Well, what science is doing is making this 
method of trial and error a conscious method”; George Herbert Mead, “The Problem 
of Society – How We Become Selves,” in George Herbert Mead, On Social Psychology, 
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How people make sense of the world is conveyed in significant or meaningful 
symbols, as George Herbert Mead explains.30 We depend on symbols in two ways, 
i.e. as on tools, units of exchange in the communication process, and as on things 
and thought-objects that present the world’s real meaning to us. We can take var-
ious positions vis-à-vis symbols and rely on them to anticipate in our minds the 
consequences of behaviours in order to select optimal responses. For concepts 
to adequately represent objective meanings in our minds, the participants in 
events must share the same significant symbols. In this context, sharing means 
adopting similar attitudes to situations and using the same symbols as “others” 
do to choose what to do next. The rationality of action hinges thus on the scope 
and intensity of human communication. Our action depends on symbols which 
our thoughts use and, consequently, on our bonds with others, which are based 
on the fact that we communicate.
Cooperation is a spontaneous process of adjusting individual behaviours. It 
is directly predicated on mutual communication and free, ongoing discussion. 
Common action entails common thinking.
How the social process develops depends on well-informed decision-making 
of human agents. Consequently, all social phenomena, including mass ones, 
result from the system of common actions initiated and controlled by social ac-
tors. These “social actors” form an organised community.31
Research Method: The Insider’s View
As implied by the argument above, popular reflection, at least in problem-
atic situations, involves the cognitive effort of focusing rationally on one’s 
own activity in the world. Sociological reflection, so to speak, “extends” and 
“abstracts” the cognitive social process of popular reflection. Popular reflection 
and scholarly reflection are similar in that they are both forms of human self-a-
wareness which must take others’ awareness into account as an element of the 
world. When making sense of social experience, a social researcher must nec-
essarily refer to experiences of his/her subjects in order to produce an account 
of the social process as viewed by its actors. S/he must thus adopt an insider 
perspective to capture the totality of human experience as “an object” to which 
 30 For a discussion of significant symbols, see George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and 
Society, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 69, 
71–72, 73, 181 n7.
 31 In this text, the social actor is understood similarly to the generalised other in Mead, 







Research Method: The Insider’s View 39
the actors themselves responded and which is also external to those who will 
develop this experience. Sociological knowledge is therefore, like all science gen-
erally is, a link in the social chain of human life. This assumption guided our 
approach to our study as production of hot knowledge.
Adopting the insider’s view is a prerequisite for reliable sociological knowl-
edge. Rather than from the “outsider observer’s position,” “unbiased judgment” 
results from efforts to understand all the actors involved in a social process. This 
does not entail that researchers accept the actors’ statements at their face value. Of 
course, there is no reason not to trust them, but equally there is no reason to naïvely 
believe them. Research conclusions are actually formulated by comparing reports of 
informants who view the same events from different perspectives.
Our respondents were not simply representatives of organisations. During the 
interviews, they articulated various viewpoints on the issues under investigation, 
depending on their actual or potential positions in the network of interactions 
developing in the mainstream of social action. On some occasions, they spoke in 
terms of the function they performed in the collective venture, expressing common 
interests and values; on other occasions, they spoke in personal terms, expressing 
individual perceptions which were determined by their mental traits and specific 
biographies; and in yet other moments, they interpreted the joint action in terms 
of the national tradition and its legacy. There were, of course, more perspectives 
and roles of this kind. By confronting various viewpoints of respective respondents 
and comparing them with reports of other subjects, we could distinguish self-a-
ware reflection which rendered immediate experiences in general language from 
systematising interpretations which used symbols and “stereotypes” of popular 
knowledge and conveyed social experience in hindsight.
This point is well illustrated by an example from the interviews with the 
founders of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Scientific, Technical 
and Educational Employees, which sheds light on the formation of independent 
trade unions as such.
Asked what people initiated the establishment of the independent trade 
union, a respondent answers:  “Generally, there was a pattern to it […] 
Research workers were as a rule young people. I  mean, people of my age, 
twenty-somethings to thirty-somethings. At most. And educational workers 
were chiefly older […] people from the National Museum and the Warsaw 
University Library, they were, let’s say, middle-aged ladies”32 (NTiO, E, 
 32 The passages from the interviews are translated so as to approximate the respondents’ 
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pp. 7–8).33 Our respondents often repeated that Solidarity was a movement of 
young people. The respondent quoted above starts from expressing the same 
view, goes on to say things that seem to contradict this statement and, neverthe-
less, finishes restating that the majority of union founders were young people. 
That particular respondent actually belonged to a multi-generational group of 
union founders, which was a less frequent case in our sample (such groups gen-
erally tended to include people from the same generation). Asked to describe the 
initiators of social activity, our respondents as a rule answered: they were young 
people. The view was usually prompted by the “general traits” of youth:  the 
young are more courageous and better educated, they know better, do not have 
families, have little to lose, are romantic and have not gone through as much as 
we, the older ones, have; they are rebellious and believe they can make change. 
These “positive” justifications were almost invariably intertwined with negative 
assessments:  the young are irresponsible, imprudent, short-sighted, etc. When 
the opponents of Solidarity used the term “young initiators,” they usually gave it 
a very pejorative ring.
Nevertheless, the stereotypical view that Solidarity was founded by the 
young is entirely untenable. Nearly in all cases, there were people from various 
age-groups among the founders; according to our estimations, the first union 
activists were aged 25 to 40 years old, or even 25 to 50 years old. Our data do 
not support more accurate estimates. Nonetheless, there certainly was an upper 
age limit to engagement in social activity. (Conventionally speaking, it stood at 
“around” 55 years of age. This limit is very conspicuous, with hardly any older 
people found to be actors of the studied social action, at least in Warsaw). On 
the other pole of the age axis, the youngest generation of the labour force, both 
workers and intellectuals, certainly did not initiate trade-union activities.34 In 
fact, the youth, though popularly gestured at as the leading protagonist of the 
events, engaged in these events as rarely as people on the verge of retirement, at 
least in the first stage of the studied process. Interestingly, “the rebellious young” 
or “the courageous young” is the only social description of the initiators of inde-
pendent trade unions available in our data. “I saw those people for the first time 
in my life. And I only knew them by the colours of their jumpers. It was even 
 33 See the note on citations at the end of this section.
 34 Of course, members of the intelligentsia, included into this category based on the 
“mechanical” criterion of education, achieve independence and full social maturity 
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difficult to know where they were from [i.e. from which enterprise], who the 
speaker was, even though they had to introduce themselves, and this rule was 
observed, but even if it was observed, everything was drowned in that clatter, 
in that noise, truth to be told” (NTiO, C, p. 5). This is how an “older” colleague 
of the NTiO member quoted above describes people who took the floor during 
one of the first organisational meetings and were, undoubtedly, initiators of 
the movement. The respondent immediately proceeds to give this experience 
an ordered structure and offer the familiar interpretation which identifies this 
random “medley of people” as the youth.
A ready-made cliché and a convenient “stereotype” help generalise experi-
ence and make sense of reality. Yet why was this particular cliché applied while 
it was so easy to prove it false? Our respondent goes on: “Absolutely, the youth 
prevailed, the youth in terms of age and the youth in terms of work, junior 
research workers, junior teachers …” (Ibid.). This sheds light on the social 
classification of the trade-union initiators as the young. They were young in the 
sense of “junior” as typically used in bureaucratic parlance:  a junior research 
worker could equally be 24 years old or 35 years old. In this framework, the cate-
gory of “adulthood” practically disappears as people are considered either young 
(junior) or eminent, which is synonymous with distinguished old age.
Thus the interpretive cliché acquires a specific meaning which, nevertheless, does 
not abolish the original sense of the word. The utterance becomes ambiguous, and to 
understand it, the duality must first be illuminated. It must be taken it into account 
that, within the network of institutional relations, junior researchers are viewed as 
the young, no matter whether or not they are classified as such in any other setting.
Another reason behind the pervasiveness of this cliché is to be found in workers’ 
interviews. (Nonetheless, the bureaucratically defined “youth” is also likely to be 
at play here.) It seems that young age is associated first and foremost with moral 
courage, disobedience and resolve to implement one’s ethical ideals in the world. 
The categories of “adult” or “middle-aged” seem to be gradually dropped out of the 
social circuit. “Middle age” tends to playfully describe an aging person rather than 
to designate the period of social potency, maturity and robust life.
However, the use of the “youth” label is telling in that it reveals another truth 
about the studied events. Its ubiquity points to what people believed to be req-
uisite for social activity and suggests what obstacles people had to surmount to 
engage in action. First of all, they had to overcome their fear of politics,35 which 
 35 The issue is aptly presented in our colleagues’ research report (see “Lęk i zniechęcenie – 
główne regulatory działań w sferze życia publicznego,” in Mirosława Marody et al., 
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involved the dread of any spontaneous social activity. Besides, they had to revise 
their stereotype that active involvement is a thing for the young, who, though 
daring, are also rash and reckless.
Such analysis must use the data which are generated based on the insider 
view revealing the interplay of people’s relationships and interactions as well as 
the interplay of relevant interpretations. The respondent-informants’ accounts of 
actions can then be juxtaposed with their understandings of these actions. This 
yields a sociological picture which, as opposed to empiricist sociology, does not 
flatten reality but, instead, conveys the depth and dynamic tensions of the social 
world. Such is, after all, the social world we all inhabit.
Limitations of the Study
Of course, our methodology entails various limitations. First of all, our 
findings concern spontaneous activities around the establishment of an inde-
pendent trade union. As such, the study certainly does not provide a complete 
sociological picture of the social situation in September-December 1980, espe-
cially if the social situation is understood as a sociological depiction of the 
state of society. We were interested neither in society’s state nor in its structure; 
instead, our focus was on the social process of changes in society’s state and 
on the movement for re-structuring it, that is, the phase of building new social 
structures.
Hence, the situation and the state are rendered in categories which refer, as 
Mead would have said, to the universe of discourse constructed by the move-
ment itself. This is an important limitation; our aim was to describe the situation 
vis-à-vis and within which the subsequent phase of the movement took place, in 
terms of the meanings which the actors involved accorded to this situation as an 
objective one.
We can easily imagine an observer who looked at all this differently, for 
example within the framework of “scientific laws” or “the laws of history.” In 
such a case, the researcher would explore whether and in how far the social sit-
uation and its transformations conformed to the pre-defined objective theoret-
ical categories. The research field would not overlap with the meaningful field of 
social experience. As such, it would have to be initially manipulated to become 
the researcher’s empirical field.
Polacy ʼ80: wizje rzeczywistości dnia (nie)codziennego [Warszawa: Instytut Socjologii 
UW, 1981], pp. 117–136, and the 2004 re-edition, pp. 110–126).
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Of course, I do not deny that such a sober, “external observer’s view” of the 
social situation described here has its advantages. In particular, it could iden-
tify the compass of the social process over time. In our study, we follow those 
people whose social behaviours triggered adaptive responses of other groups 
which either joined or tried to thwart common action. Metaphorically, the social 
process can be compared to the ripples expanding in circles across the water. We 
focused on what triggered the consecutive stages of action and mobilised new 
social groups, even as this action still developed. But in this way, we were not able 
to study the social field which was not drawn within the process. And this does 
not only mean all those who were the passive “audience” of the social spectacle, 
for they did take part in it exactly in the capacity of the audience. This means, 
first and foremost, outsiders who entirely stayed out. This means a social field 
unaffected by the huge movement and living in its own rhythm.
Admittedly, such outsiders were few and far between, especially in the autumn 
of 1980. Nevertheless, our study does not provide any data about the size of this 
group. All beliefs about it remain, consequently, purely conjectural. This is a fun-
damental limitation of our study which, importantly, becomes increasingly rel-
evant in retrospect.
Our findings are typological generalisations and, as such, “models” of phe-
nomena in which “individual” social experiences are expressed in universal 
language. This language is more general than our empirical data. When we posit, 
for example, that the generation of March’68 and the generation of Juneʼ76 were 
particularly instrumental in the founding of independent trade unions, this 
hypothesis is empirically valid for Warsaw and its surroundings. As our data 
were only collected in the Warsaw area (not to mention that they were not quan-
tifiable), we cannot define the geographical applicability of our hypotheses. For 
example, we are unable to state whether our generational hypothesis also holds 
for the population of Gdansk. Actually, we could reasonably assume that the 
generational configuration in the Baltic Coast region was more complex. We 
could presuppose that a form of generational consciousness was shaped in the 
region by the December’70 events, even if this consciousness did not produce 
a uniform generational group. It may also be the case that such a group was 
crucial to the strike movement and later developments in Gdansk, Gdynia and 
Szczecin. We are unable to determine in how far these and similar hypotheses are 
substantiated. Finally, at least some of our hypotheses do not have strictly fixed 
time-frames. Undoubtedly, the formation of Solidarity’s units and branches was 
a multistage process. Our generalisations, though proposing an overall depiction 
of the social movement, as a rule concern its first stage. Drafting our report, we 
already looked at the entire process through a historical lens. Consequently, we 
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could be accused of failing to offer at least a tentative concept of how exactly the 
Solidarity movement developed. For if we believe that it developed in stages, we 
could be expected to express this belief discursively. That we have not come up 
with such a model is our clear theoretical limitation.
As a result, our image of the social process is interrupted and lacks a “natural” 
closure. Yet, the history of the huge social movement of Solidarity still continues. 
As Gestalt scholars say, it is an “incomplete figure.” Instances of stylistic awk-
wardness in the interviews and the incompleteness of our argument are, by 
the same token, a peculiar rhetorical device that bespeaks the drama of social 
processes.
Note on Citations
This chapter contains ample quotations from our interviews. As a rule, they 
are the words of our respondents, unchanged in transcription and quoted ver-
batim. Omissions are marked with […]. Explanations and additions from this 
author and, sometimes, from the interviewers are also bracketed. Citations con-
tain the interview number (ascribed to the interviews on being delivered by the 
interviewers), preceded by the indicator of the respondent group (S  – NZSS 
“Solidarity”; P  – PUWP; D  – management of the enterprise; B  – Enterprise 
Council of the old (branch) trade unions; R  – workers/group interview; 
NTiO – Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Scientific, Technical and 
Educational Employees; other organisations are identified by their acronyms). 
Citations also include the page number of the quoted passage. In some cases, 
citations start from additional letters (A to K), which designate the respondent’s 





The Rise of the Independent Self-Governing 
Trade Union “Solidarity”
Celebrating the Agreement
The signing of accords in Gdansk and Szczecin was a moment of relief and joy. 
It opened up opportunities for spontaneous social action. For many groups and 
individuals, it was a time of collective celebrations of a settlement reached by the 
government and the representatives of society, whose demands embodied the 
communal will and attitudes prevalent in Polish society.
The experience of this festive celebration involved several different feelings. 
First of all, it was the celebration of the triumph of collective will and collec-
tive reason over the will and reason of the government, which not only made 
up a social minority but also had long and consistently disregarded society’s 
opinions and needs. That government had ignored people, which practically 
belied its competence to make decisions about the fate of the social body. 
Secondly, society celebrated the newly regained dignity of people who had 
been a collective object of the government’s doings. The reclaiming of dig-
nity was associated with the reappraisal of membership in society and cit-
izenship, which was again available to people as conscious and responsible 
subjects of social action. In being members of society and citizens, individuals 
had the right to engage in social action and to assess others’ actions publicly. 
This had twofold consequences:  the individual was entitled to make claims 
on other society members, and, at the same time, the individual was enti-
tled to make pronouncements about the principles underlying society as a 
whole. By signing the agreements with the Government Commission, the 
striking workers of the Baltic Coast accomplished two feats:  they won their 
struggle for workers’ interests, and they asserted their right to act as citizens. 
For this reason, thirdly, while celebrating the accords, people manifested 
and relished social bonding. In workers’ view, “our own” workers had won 
as advocates of collective interests, values and will. For the huge masses of 
non-workers, the workers had won “for us” (or, even, in our stead) as rep-
resentatives of society and citizens. In both cases, this perception produced 
strong bonding emotions. Rooted in the direct or indirect victory of “our own 
people,” the experience of bonding heralded the first positive sentiment felt 
towards the regime in long years. Fourthly, the celebration involved a par-
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gained social credit. Because the idea of negotiations and compromise 
prevailed over the idea of repressions and confrontation, the Party and state 
authorities garnered some social approval. That the regime transmuted into 
party-and-state authorities was no coincidence, for power-wielders came to 
be viewed as recognisable individuals with distinct social roles, functions and 
competences. In most general terms, the image of the until-then largely anon-
ymous regime symbolised, at its most personalised, by the First Secretary of 
the PUWP’s Central Committee – the vague and indeterminate image of gov-
erning “them” – was shattered. “They” turned out to be a diversified and com-
plex group of people whose actions were determined by a variety of functions, 
hierarchies and interests – briefly, by an ensemble of specific and decipher-
able social roles. The signing of the agreements showed that the government 
could act not only in its own interest (imposed on society and articulated as 
the objective interest of the state and the nation), but also for the good of the 
society. In this way, a sense of communality was bred: our interests might still 
differ from theirs, but this difference (fundamental though it might be) was 
subsumed within an even more elementary, general community. There was a 
primary plane where we were all “us” (“we’ve come to terms like a Pole with a 
Pole”), while differences were secondary offshoots.
Fifthly, the signing of the accords was a festival of nationhood. It marshalled 
the central symbolism of national tradition, crucially including the religious tra-
dition and Catholic symbols. The celebration robustly showcased and honoured 
the national identity. This only bolstered what is described above as personal 
dignity restored to people as society members and citizens. An entirely new 
meaning was conferred on society as a result of that experience of national iden-
tity, even though society as a community of citizens and agents co-responsible 
for the social body is not identical with the nation as such.
However, the sense of national belonging clearly reinforced people’s self-
experience of subjectivity and “membership in society.” All this resulted in the 
sixth factor:  the cessation of fear. The signing of the agreements was a great 
festival of relief, of breathing freely and releasing enormous energy, which had 
been paralysed and consumed by dread before. Although the accords did not 
entirely eliminate anxieties and distress, they transformed these sensations by 
alleviating that fear which had pervasively saturated all fields of action, even 
though one could never put one’s finger on it. For this reason, the signing of 
the agreements in the coastal cities did not simply spark celebration, but also 
marked the moment when extraordinary social pro-activeness erupted and gave 
rise to the nationwide Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” in 
late September.
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The Explosion of Self-Organising
“The work of trade unions in the People’s Republic of Poland has failed to meet 
workers’ expectations and hopes. It is therefore considered necessary to establish 
new self-governing trade unions to authentically represent the working class. 
Thereby, people’s right to remain in the present unions is in no way questioned, 
and a possibility is envisaged for the old and the new unions to collaborate in the 
future” (Paragraph 1 of the Agreement between the Governmental Commission 
and the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee, concluded at the Gdansk Shipyard 
on 31st August 1980).
Human memory is fallible. In several interviews, our respondents repeat that 
establishing independent, self-governing trade unions was from the very begin-
ning about building the nationwide Independent Self-Governing Trade Union 
“Solidarity.” It is not true. What is true, however, is that in most cases when an 
independent trade union was set up, the underlying idea was to build a big orga-
nisation extending beyond one factory or one voivodship (province) and onto 
entire society. In Warsaw – or, speaking in terms of Solidarity’s topography, in 
the Mazovia Region – first Independent Self-Governing Trade Unions came into 
being as early as four days after the Coast accords had been signed.
“After the signing of the agreement in Gdansk, we were advised to con-
tact Gdansk about our trade union. But we decided to self-organise. When we 
returned from Gdansk, the WSC [Workers’ Strike Committee] became part of the 
Founding Committee. On 1st September, we went to the director and told him we 
were setting up an independent trade union. On 5th September, we showed the 
director the Mazovia statute. He called in a lawyer, hoping that the lawyer would 
say it wasn’t a statute. But the lawyer said, if people had signed it, it was a statute. 
The director had thought that it was only a draft, so short, merely two pages. Oh, 
and on 4th September S.  [the PUWP Secretary at the Ursus Machine Factory] 
chased us away from the office building, saying that if we didn’t leave, the militia 
would come in within half an hour. There were about fifty people there, delegates 
of the MZK, the FSO36 and Ursus who’d come for the Mazovia founding meeting. 
And they agreed on the name Mazovia there. So we left and signed the statute 
outdoors” (S 35, p. 4). This is how the first workers’ trade-union in Warsaw came 
into being.
 36 MZK stands for the Miejski Zakład Komunikacji, i.e. City Transportation Services. 
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“This started on 2nd September […] On the 2nd, I went to the KIK [Club of 
Catholic Intelligentsia], where a friend […] of mine […] works for the edito-
rial board of Więź.37 And the first thing you could get there, from them, was, 
exactly, explanation. I got a note there about what the ILO Convention 87 was, 
citing the relevant paragraphs […]. And there […], at the KIK, I also met Ms. 
B. S., I guess, and it turned out that […] there’d be a meeting at a private home 
[…], and people from a few departments were coming […] to set up an inde-
pendent trade union. The whole point was that we didn’t know at the begin-
ning whether the agreement signed in Gdansk only concerned Gdansk, only the 
Coast, or whether it was valid nationwide […]. The thing is that even before 
that happened [the meeting in Hoża Street], something similar had already been 
formed at the Polish Academy of Sciences, that first organisation only called 
the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Science Workers. It took place 
on 3rd September […]; things were happening at a mad pace, because on the 
1st the agreement was signed, and already on the 4th the first meeting was held. 
I suppose there were about sixty people there […] my colleague P., who chaired 
the meeting, proposed that all those present at the meeting were the founding 
committee […] and resolved to establish the Independent Self-Governing Trade 
Union of Employees, and I’m not saying what employees, for people disputed it” 
(NTiO 49, pp. 2, 3, 4). Eventually, the trade union was named the Independent 
Self-Governing Trade Union of Scientific, Technical and Educational Employees 
and came to be popularly called the nine-letter union (as its acronym in Polish 
was NSZZ PNTiO).
The two unions “met” on 4th September, though, as our respondent describes 
it, the encounter was not particularly propitious: “[…] around eleven, or twelve 
at night, I  guess, a man from Ursus rushed in […] it could have been Bujak, 
but I  can’t vouch for that though I’m almost sure it was Bujak […] And he 
announced that today, exactly on 4th September, a Mazovia trade union had 
been founded […], so he rushed in and said: ‘Listen, stop debating; the Mazovia 
trade union was set up at a meeting held in […] There were representatives of 
Ursus, the Warsaw Steel Plant [this bit of information is not accurate; numerous 
other interviews in our study indicate with absolute certainty that no delegates 
of the Warsaw Steel Plant attended the Mazovia founding meeting], the TEWA,38 
 37 A highly respected Catholic opinion magazine on political, social, cultural and religious 
topics. (translator’s note)
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I guess, and a few other factories, and we nearly set up the Mazovia trade union, 
which is a branch of Solidarity in the Mazovia Region.’39 So he got asked first 
‘What does nearly mean?’ ‘Well, as the things panned out,’ he replied, ‘the FC 
[Founding Committee] were driven away from the room by our first secretary.’ 
So, well, there were laughs, laughs […], for it sounded kind of silly. People were 
quite sceptical about it” (Ibid., p. 6).
That scepticism may seem unfounded now, but the initiators of the trade-
union founding movement had absolutely no idea how rapidly the society-wide 
process would unfold and how many people would be drawn into it. At the same 
time, the fear of reprisals expressed by the newly-founded Mazovia members 
sounded misguided to the research workers for, as our respondent put it: “Things 
were happening in a really spontaneous way and […], at least that was my impres-
sion, how would the Security Service or other services track down people when 
three fourths of the town did nothing else but set up trade unions?” (Ibid., p. 6).
In fact, the situation was neither so bad nor so good. The majority of Warsaw’s 
population did not take part in establishing independent trade unions (even 
though they did support them). Similarly, it is not true that the state’s institutions 
remained passive and did not try to foil the movement (even though they did not 
stage spectacular crackdowns). The most important factor in building indepen-
dent organisations was that mutual distrust which was rife in the early stages of 
the turbulent process was swiftly overcome and replaced by organic social bonds 
among people of various backgrounds, occupations, attitudes and mindsets.
The quoted report contains a few other elements typical of the formation of 
independent organisations. Firstly, there certainly were barriers to new forms 
of social activity. One of them was a deeply entrenched fear: people were afraid 
of reprisals and the almighty control apparatus; they also dreaded spontaneous, 
uncontrolled action. The other barrier, which in fact enhanced fear, was that 
a sense of social bonding was sorely missing while divisions yawned between 
 39 This emphatically illustrates the fallibility of human memory, because, while some 
people might already have formed an idea of a mass, nationwide trade union by 4th 
September, the concept of a trade union called Solidarity was certainly not in the 
cards yet. This idea germinated when delegates from all over Poland met at Gdansk’s 
MKZ (Międzyzakładowy Komitet Założycielski, i.e. the Inter-Enterprise Founding 
Committee) on 19th September 1980. That notion had been developing gradually 
until Karol Modzelewski came up with a suggestion to combine the existing regional 
Founding Committees into one Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity,” 
according to the “Information on the development of the independent trade-union 
movement” No. 2 of 18th September 1980.
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individuals, vocational groups, factories, communities and even workers’ groups 
within one organisation. Building an independent, self-governing union above 
all required overcoming objective and emotional obstacles. The former were 
caused, for example, by a lack of “public” communication channels, while the 
latter were brought about by multiple negative stereotypes and mutual prejudices 
fuelled by the way social life was organised.
Secondly, the above-cited report implies that the great social process, dubbed 
“renewal” by the official propaganda, followed two trajectories. One of them was 
charted by self-organisation efforts which were undertaken by workers of big 
industrial plants, while the other was mapped by the capital city’s intellectuals – 
emphatically, intellectuals rather than the traditional intelligentsia, as research 
and academic institutions were predominantly hubs of social action and, from 
the very beginning, sought to attract some intelligentsia groups (primarily 
teachers).
The nine-letter union, whose name echoed the official employment structure 
(science, technics and education), assembled several thousand people and devel-
oped less robustly than the Mazovia. Importantly, both the Mazovia (still as a 
regional organisation rather than as part of Solidarity) and the NSZZ PNTiO 
were grassroots organisations that embraced similar values, thought of the social 
situation in similar terms and pursued similar goals.
The slightly comic initial misunderstandings could result from different 
early assessments of the situation. The intellectuals had a very clear awareness 
of the social situation, had closer links to the independent democratic opposi-
tion and/or were directly involved with the independent democratic movement 
institutions (such as socio-political associations, samizdat publishers, the Society 
for Educational Courses, etc.). As such, they may have been more hopeful about 
the progress of the social movement and less preoccupied with possible obstacles 
than workers-activists.
The intellectuals were more realistic in their assessment of the workers’ pro-
test and self-organising than the engaged leaders of the workers’ community. 
As a matter of fact, direct experience corroborated the workers’ less optimistic 
appraisal of the situation as operations aimed at thwarting the rise of indepen-
dent trade unions targeted predominantly industrial plants.
The swift growth of the NSZZ PNTiO was halted when the nationwide trade 
union Solidarity was established. The nine-letter union’s activists in attendance 
at the second general convention in November 1980 resolved to disband the 
organisation and join Solidarity. The process was certainly complex, controver-
sial and fraught with passionate disputes. The 2nd General Convention of the 
NSZZ PNTiO Delegates itself, the preceding campaign in which the union’s 
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units developed their own instructions for the delegates and, likewise, the very 
procedure of incorporation into Solidarity, all added up to an invaluable lesson 
in democratic institutional practices, despite many non-democratic group 
behaviours and ventures. We shall later focus on understanding what “democ-
racy” means and defining “democracy” in fixed terms immune to vicissitudes 
of interests. Such considerations were all the more important as the communist 
regime often spoke of “democracy,” but used the word with an array of adjectives, 
among which “socialist” was invariably reiterated. In contrast, the catchword 
“democracy” without any modifiers was evoked from the very onset of the inde-
pendent trade-union movement.
The relations between workers’ and intelligentsia’s communities were essen-
tial to the development of the social movement which produced Solidarity. 
Admittedly, the trade unions of Warsaw’s intellectuals and Warsaw’s big-industry 
workers developed separately at the beginning, but this did not mean isolation 
or incompatibility. Controversies, which seem to have been inevitable at least in 
the early days, did not set the pace or rhythm of work and social consciousness. 
Even if organisationally autonomous, both movements were, in practice, uni-
form as they grew out of similar experiences and reflections, embraced the same 
ethos and pursued the same goals. This is illustrated by the nine-letter union’s 
consistent involvement in Solidarity’s actions (e.g. a token strike on 3rd October, 
drafting laws to be implemented after the Gdansk accord, protests against the 
refusal to register Solidarity, etc.) and by the massive engagement of the NSZZ 
PNTiO members in organising Solidarity (first at consultation points and then 
in the Mazovia Bureau).
The two trajectories of the trade-union movement in industrial plants and 
science institutions, respectively, can also be interpreted as bespeaking contro-
versies around the model of independent trade unions in Poland. The contro-
versies surfaced not only in that there were separate trade-union organisations 
but also in how Solidarity developed as a societal institution. The basic ques-
tion was whether the independent trade-union movement should take the form 
of one uniform, nationwide organisation or, rather, of several self-governing, 
nationwide organisations for respective occupational groups (conceived out-
side the bureaucratic notion of industries, or “branches,” as defined by the state), 
which could form alliances or confederations. This raised further queries. One of 
them was whether the new trade union should express interests of occupational 
groups, or whether it should aim higher and modernise the entire social system. 
This dilemma was to become particularly pertinent soon.
Such uncertainties were associated, on the one hand, with the negative expe-
rience of the CRZZ, a highly bureaucratised “mammoth of an organisation” and, 
The Rise of the NSZZ “Solidarity”52
on the other, with the symbolic meaning invested in the workers’ protest on the 
Coast and in the agreement with the party-and-state authorities. The point was 
that the victorious protest not only paved the way for new modes of expressing 
workers’ interests but, essentially, symbolised and heralded a more general change 
in the social order. It restored the notion of “the citizen” its proper meaning.
Eventually, the fusion of the two independent organisations into one regional 
organisation of Mazovia, which was itself part of the nationwide Solidarity un-
ionist movement, betokened the rise of a model where the trade union expressed 
multiple occupational interests and, besides, was a fulcrum of reform in society 
and the state.
The Formation of the Social Movement
The Summer of Revolt and Protest
The formation of the independent trade union, its principles and organisational 
structure is only a fragment of a longer and more momentous historical narra-
tive. What I mean by this is the development of a huge social movement that 
found its “material,” institutional manifestation in the trade union. This nar-
rative tells how a certain form of social consciousness developed, how a cer-
tain spiritual and interactive community arose, and how a system of emotions 
and reasons evolved into maturity, all of which added up to a definition of the 
social situation that called for action. As a matter of fact, this should be put 
even more straightforwardly: people who had such a definition of the situation 
could not possibly fail to undertake action for which it called. The summer of 
1980 in Poland “capped” the realisation that change was necessary, a realisation 
which was by no means a new one. In the interviews, our respondents regularly 
rehashed a simple idea that could indeed serve as the slogan of the day: “It can’t 
go on like this anymore!” The words got a veritably symbolic ring, conveying 
the relevance of the accumulating social experience. “These conversations,” one 
female respondent admitted, “were the same as everywhere else […], low spirits, 
irritation, the sense that things could no longer go the way they had, that some-
thing must change […]” (S 22, p. 3). “We were off the night shift ‘cause we had 
a special night commission, so we were off the night shift and didn’t go back to 
work. Later, a friend of mine told me that she’d talked with other workers, and 
that we wouldn’t go back to work; simply that mess couldn’t be allowed to con-
tinue” (S 39, p. 2). “It’d have been against my conscience to do something like 
that, to condemn a person, people, a group of people who put up a protest, even 
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genuine class revolt, with people pushed to the wall […]. The strike was a neces-
sity. […] you could say that they’d been luring people with a sausage stuck under 
their noses and then snatched the sausage away. And enough was enough” (S 66, 
pp. 1, 2, 12). “People talked a lot, for they simply hadn’t been allowed to speak 
out loud […]. So you got to hear […] that they only summoned us to work, but 
we got nothing out of it” (AS 67, p. 1). “In the early days, people […] were purely 
emotional about things having to change, about things finally being taken care 
of and that it might be for the better. We didn’t know yet why it might be for the 
better and who was supposed to make sure it’d be for the better. Anyway, there 
was simply this feeling that something must finally change in the country” (S 64, 
pp. 7–8). “It isn’t just about monies, after all, it’s about the cause; what’s impor-
tant is that it’s about this drive towards something new simply […]” (S 43, p. 3).
The belief that things had to change in Poland was articulated with ultimate 
clarity during the strike in Gdansk. Therefore, the signing of the accords trig-
gered a snowballing constructive social action. Yet the full-fledged action of 
establishing new social organisations (i.e. independent trade unions) was pre-
ceded by another action involving spontaneous resistance and manifestations of 
discontent. This preceding stage brought about a wave of disconnected strikes 
in the summer of 1980. Some of the strikes did not even involve entire factories. 
The strikers’ demands basically did not go beyond financial and subsistence is-
sues. Importantly, however, individual strikes in the Warsaw region were held 
with greater resolve than any previous protests. At the same time, information 
kept coming in about strikes organised all over Poland. The protests surged 
so ubiquitously that the news about them spread despite the government’s ef-
fort to curb the strikes themselves and to suppress information about them. 
The regime’s obstruction of information was first dismantled by the mass pro-
test of factories in Lublin. The news about strikes undoubtedly fostered further 
protests. The strikes as a rule ended rather quickly when pay-rise demands were 
met. At the same time, the strikes were too numerous and widespread for the 
government to proceed to reprisals after “putting down the fire” at individual 
locations. In all probability, the government was, in fact, not very eager to launch 
large-scale reprisals on that occasion since not only ordinary PUWP members 
but also lower-ranking Party functionaries were inclined to acknowledge, partly 
at least, the reasons behind strikes.
Nearly all participants, in particular the active organisers of strike actions, 
point out that, in the aftermath of the victory, the belief soared that the vic-
tory had only been illusory and that altogether different claims should have been 
made. Discontent did not disappear, even though the financial demands had been 
fulfilled. This feeling promoted the birth of a new consciousness by generating 
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a problematic situation that called for a solution, reflection and discussion with 
others. In this way, the summer strikes contributed to a new atmosphere, as they 
directly produced a new network of social contacts and a powerful sense of social 
bonding. At the same time, negative experiences accrued in many enterprises; it 
repeatedly turned out that wherever social bonding and solidarity in protests 
had been missing, all those involved had been on the losing side. This raised the 
consciousness of the supreme idea which served as the name and the catchword 
of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity.”
The strikes re-configured the elites of workforces as the protest actions 
conferred a moral authority on their organisers, who did not cave in to fears 
and succeeded in getting others engaged. A specific, albeit incomplete, under-
standing of the reasons behind the victory also evolved. For no matter how spon-
taneous the strikes in the Warsaw region over the summer of 1980 might have 
been, they were all consistently based on a set of principles. Symptomatically, our 
respondents from the FSO, Ursus, Róża Luksemburg,40 the Milanówek silk plant 
and MZK report that exuberant and spontaneous behaviours were combined 
with an unusually rational strategy of action. The strategy was an outcome of the 
already conceptually organised social experience associated with staging strike 
actions. This did not perhaps involve a “particularist” consciousness, so to speak, 
but was certainly linked to the direct prior experience of protest actions. Even 
in the enterprises that had their own history of striking (such as the FSO, Ursus 
and the MZK), people drew not so much on the direct knowledge of former 
participants and organisers as rather on widely disseminated, generalised his-
torical knowledge. Nowhere did strike activists stem from the groups that had 
arranged and managed earlier protests. Strikes were organised so as to mini-
mise the risk of reprisals and to prevent the government’s manipulations and 
provocations. Decision-making was informed by the well-entrenched recogni-
tion that rational conduct was exigent. This recognition was in turn founded on 
the realisation that the protesters and the Party and government functionaries 
had widely different interests. Consequently, people saw the situation in terms 
of fighting for their rights and believed that the government, with all its alluring 
declarations and promises, must not be trusted.
Warsaw on Strike: The Summer of 1980
Actually, three waves of protests can be distinguished, with the first surging in early 
July, the second coinciding with mass strikes in the Coast region (mid-August) 
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and the third involving either planned or actually launched solidarity strikes in 
sympathy with the Coast strikers (late August 1980). The first two instalments 
were similar. The strikes vented discontent growing of late and evinced the for-
mation of a negative definition of the social situation, which called for an open 
protest. At the same time, the strike experience bred a new consciousness of and 
a comprehensive reflection on social issues. This stage culminated in the signing 
of the agreements in the Coast region.
The third wave of (solidarity) strikes was a bit different. The protests grew 
from the recognition what the social discontent actually meant and what goals 
and values were focal to the struggle. Such a solidarity strike was launched in the 
Warsaw Steel Plant. The strike was also symbolic, with the Warsaw Steel Plant 
striking, so to speak, on behalf of other workers of the capital.
The simplest typology of strikes is based on how and by whom they were 
organised, i.e. on whether a strike was spontaneous and, as such, represented an 
emotional revolt or whether it was well prepared by a group of people.
This question is important for a few reasons. Firstly, the official propa-
ganda presented the strikes preceding the signing of the accord as stirred by 
anti-socialists forces in an attempt to use workers’ disgruntlement for their own 
agenda. In this propagandist portrayal, the movement of protesting workers was 
painted as an elaborately orchestrated and centrally masterminded strike “ac-
tion.” The strike wave was treated as a meticulously designed plot against the 
government, following a prior script and deliberately launched by a mysterious 
and cynical brain-trust bent on exploiting simple people’s social discontent for 
its own secret purposes. Secondly, and more importantly for our argument, 
such a conspiracy notion of history surfaces in our interviews. In this perspec-
tive, the strikes were part of a campaign planned down to the tiniest detail and 
had been, in each case, carefully prepared in advance. Such ideas appear, for 
example, in the following interview excerpt: “At four I got the message, by five I’d 
already reached the workplace, and talks started, but to little effect since nobody 
went to work that day […]. You talked with the majority of the workforce. The 
workforces never agreed to talk in smaller groups. [Interviewer: ‘Why?’]. I don’t 
know [smiles slyly]. Today you could say that it was the fixed tactic. I had no idea 
of it back then, but I’ve been told since that it was a special strike instruction 
[…]. Some [people in the enterprise] went on strike spontaneously, but others 
had been prepped and knew the instruction. Later, I  asked that question and 
was answered that it’d been in the works since 1976 […]. That’s how things must 
always be, from general to specific. A general outline must be given, and then 
details are only filled in. Somebody orchestrated it all […]” (D 73, p.  2). The 
respondent goes on to describe representatives of the workers on strike: “Some 
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of them were truly respectable people, and others had nothing good to show for 
themselves. They were people who’d only worked briefly. I  suppose they must 
have been trained since 1976 and then sent off to various enterprises” (Ibid., p. 4).
Asked whether people who had been active during the strikes later joined the 
Founding Committee of Independent Self-Governing Trade Unions, the respon-
dent answers: “You need to look at it differently. There were two groups: those 
who climbed up the bars and made sure that people didn’t leave [while the strike 
was in progress] and those who compiled and put down the demands – spokes-
people for the workers, so to speak. And those spokespeople joined the founding 
committees, while those at the boom-gates, I mean those well-trained sentries, 
didn’t, for they’d already done their job” (Ibid., p. 6).
Another respondent subscribing to the conspiracy theory of history says: “I’d 
never have thought anything like that [protests and the establishment of inde-
pendent trade unions] could ever happen. It seems this movement is an excep-
tional case, and I  believe it must have been hatched since long ago, and the 
attempt to change prices was an excuse, I guess; because something that came 
up like that must have been devised, undoubtedly […]. I’m completely sure that 
it was a bottom-up thing. I mean, the protest in Gdansk seemed natural to me, 
but the programming of the entire and the organisation of that whole strike and 
the entire…team that ran it later, that had been prepared in advance. […] They 
knew that those people weren’t supposed to go out of the shipyard, because it’d 
be very difficult to control. It’d have taken just one person saying ‘We’re going 
out of the gate,’ and no force would have been enough to control the situation. 
And this is where those organisers had simply anticipated that and arranged it so 
that the movement, those workers, those engineers, all those people who worked 
there simply stuck to their work-stations and didn’t take to the streets. And this is 
what, I believe, is only possible if you think of it in advance. It can’t be otherwise. 
[Interviewer:  ‘Right, but perhaps the workers thought of it in advance them-
selves?’]. Nope. It’s very rare. I was a worker, too […], when things happened 
in 1956, and I must tell you that when people respond to evil, there is always 
some brutality to it […] in such moments reason is hard to find. Only people 
with experience, people who have experienced time and again and who are man-
aged by someone can self-organise in such a movement as that in Gdansk” (D 
8, p. 1). The respondent addresses the details of this organisation: “But I must 
say that even at [our] enterprise, when the strike was being organised, there 
were well prepped people around. For example, people from the University who 
did manual labour  – there’re a few of those who were organisers, so one can 
expect the entire organisation was thoroughly pre-programmed, and you have 
no doubt, surely, that it was very neat. Very efficient.” (Ibid., p. 14).
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Quoted at length, the passages reveal the logic of conspiracy in thinking 
about social processes. Organised social actions are construed in bureaucratic 
terms. Rational and orderly action involving many individuals is believed to be 
a matter of coordination, as is the case in bureaucratic institutions. Bureaucratic 
organising is based on hierarchical relationships and distribution of well-
defined tasks. As a result, there are always top and bottom levels, with coor-
dination resulting from top-down orders and prohibitions, i.e. “instructions” 
issued for those at the lowest rungs. The instructions are detailed and very con-
crete, and although people appointed to implement them do not have the full 
picture of the action plan designed at the top, their position in the “reporting 
lines” obligates them to follow the instructions unfailingly. As a consequence, all 
actions are coherently channelled to achieve presupposed targets. It is beyond “a 
bureaucrat’s” imagination that people can act in different ways and that there are 
different mechanisms promoting rational and concerted action. Advocates of the 
conspiracy version of history believe that there must be an obedience-inspiring 
“figure of authority,” capable of swaying people to follow his/her instructions. 
Our conspiracy champions, unfortunately, do not specify in what way the “strike 
organisers” enforced obedience. In some interviews additional details are given 
to complete the picture:  “Those organisers threatened people, applied moral 
pressure, blackmailed and even used force to make people join the ‘action.’ In 
the afternoon, drivers started to refuse to work these routes, explaining, well, 
that there were people hanging around at the stops and threatening, intimidating 
them, saying you’ve no right to ride here […], and don’t spoil our cause […]. 
They were simply civilians who, sometimes by soft persuasion and sometimes by 
threats, beating, just like that, chased those drivers away from the routes serviced 
by the Pożarowo company. And so, on the following days, the stoppages were 
longer and […] drivers from other companies refused to go out” (P 48, pp. 3–4).
Our respondents talk in similar terms about joining Solidarity: “There was, it 
must be said clearly, a huge moral pressure, browbeating of sorts: ‘C’mon, aren’t 
you going to join, really?’ ” (P 32, p. 10).
In the bureaucratic framework, individual actions are coordinated by exacting 
discipline in task performance. The disobedient are punished. Given this, the 
strike organisers must necessarily have relied on repressive measures.
Another typically bureaucratic thing is that specialist tasks require compe-
tence and training. Hence, the cited interviews highlight the organisers’ com-
petence and expertise as well as lengthy preparations in which people were 
purportedly primed to perform particular tasks during the strike. Strike orga-
nisation is thus viewed as a product crafted by a group of human management 
savvies.
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Another important assumption is that the top and the bottom of the hier-
archy differ not only in terms of their roles but also in terms of their awareness 
and interests. Those in charge who organise the strike use people’s discontent 
for their own purposes. This is where “conspiracy” thinking is at its fullest. If 
one leads a social movement, one is in charge of it. And one is in charge of it 
not to accomplish the common goals of the movement, but to achieve one’s own 
purposes, which nearly by default cannot overlap with the aims that fuel the 
human “mass” involved in action. Collective action of sizeable human groups is 
framed in terms of black-and-white binaries: either it is spontaneous (i.e. trig-
gered by emotions and not organised) or it is engineered by a handful of experts 
(who have their hidden agendas, to accomplish which they craft a bureaucratic 
organisation out of the “mass” before action proper is commenced). On this 
model, a collective of many individuals cannot act rationally and effectively un-
less controlled by this or that power.
The relationship between the conspiracy-underpinned interpretation of 
the workers’ protest in the summer of 1980 and the bureaucratic take on 
social actions is corroborated by the fact that conspiracy-slanted views are 
most commonly voiced by the directors and the heads of the old trade unions’ 
Enterprise Councils. They are rarer and less pronounced in interviews with the 
enterprise-level PUWP secretaries. Though occasionally evoking conspiracy, the 
Party secretaries generally are quite firm about both the strikes and the rise of 
independent trade unions being manifestations of a spontaneous social process. 
They realise that social actions are driven by various mechanisms and do not 
have to emulate bureaucratic models.
This is how a PUWP secretary describes the same strike that was exposed 
as a scheming plot by the director quoted above:  “It seems to me that, at the 
very beginning, that stoppage wasn’t prepared in any way, initially no demands 
were formulated, and only later during the standstill, only then […] did the 
drivers and motormen, pencils in their hands, got round to calculating; and 
vis-à-vis them the company’s management […]; simply on that day, on 11th 
September, they were not prepared enough to immediately come up with partic-
ular demands, particular claims. Only as they started to look about themselves 
did it occur to them that there were options, and so it grew slowly” (P 48, p. 6). 
“Simply, out of that group that stopped cars from going out, well, no leader group 
emerged to negotiate with. Only at around nine o’clock a, let’s say, a committee, a 
group started forming that began to kind of take charge of that whole stopping of 
traffic, and then they were all invited to the common room and negotiations took 
off […]. And on the following days, the stoppages expanded, and drivers from 
other companies also refused to go out […]. Anyway, on the following days, you 
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could see they were organised better, and someone’d taken charge of things ‘cause 
if bus and tram services stopped, they stopped so that whole boroughs had no 
transport” (Ibid., pp. 2–4). The enterprise PUWP secretary notices that a form of 
organisation emerges incrementally from spontaneous social activity.
Finally, the upholders of the conspiracy theory of history offer a specific 
interpretation of the reasons why the strikes erupted. The choice of “erupted” 
is in itself illuminating. The motives behind the collective protests are viewed 
as defined, substantive stimuli, as “pulling the trigger,” so to speak. We already 
know that the cause “proper” is the activity of a conspiring group. The group, 
eager and ready to act, waits for a suitable moment. This moment comes when 
discontent erupts. Common people’s disgruntlement always arises from feelings, 
such as revolt or anger. There is a stimulus that makes them feel in jeopardy. 
Most of the interviewed directors and Enterprise Council heads identified 
people’s living conditions as the direct cause of their dissatisfaction. As implied 
by the interviews, in some enterprises the strikes were provoked by raising meat 
prices to the level of what was then referred to as “commercial” prices (the price 
increase was announced in July and was later revoked). When people calculated 
how much they would have to spend on meat, they rebelled and went on strike. 
At that moment, the conspiring organisers supposedly stepped in to use this 
expression of discontent for their own purposes.
However, there are tiny, albeit extraordinarily relevant, details to the July 
protests which complicate this clear-cut picture. Alongside the increased meat 
prices, the price of packagings in which meat was sold at factory shops was also 
raised fourfold.
As observed by a respondent who was HR deputy director at the time, this 
seemed to infuriate people far more than the rocketing meat prices themselves. 
However, her interpretation of the fact sounds rather unconvincing (cf. D 14, 
p. 1pass.).
It does not come as a surprise though, given that her view of people’s 
motivations is reductively mechanical, and that she primarily comprehends 
human action as a response to a stimulus. The conspiracy-driven account ignores 
the dynamics of people’s thinking along with the growth of their social experi-
ence, which encouraged their reflection and prompted them to develop a shared 
definition of the situation.
What sense people made of the stimuli “administered” by the government in 
the summer of 1980 no longer depended on the government; instead, it came to 
depend on the social consciousness which had long been growing and expanding. 
The strikes were brought about by the development of people’s thinking and the 
dynamics of the group definition of the social situation.
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The drastic rise of the price of plastic bags in which meat was sold seems 
to have been so outrageous to workers that it was erected into a symbol. This 
indicates that a consciousness must have developed by then in which that fact 
was ascribed a motivating power. An apparently trifling event came to symbolise 
the government’s slighting of people and belittling them as children who would 
not notice additional exploitation.
Our team wanted to establish why, throughout Poland’s post-war history, meat 
price rises, no matter their economic justifications, had invariably triggered col-
lective protests only to eventually engender a mass-scale revolt. Our answer was 
that meat price increases implied that the government ignored people’s attitudes, 
needs and interests. This reading of price rises had been forged and perpetuated 
in and by historical experience. The first centrally-decided and substantial meat 
price rise took place in 1953. While meat prices were raised, the prices of pro-
duction inputs and big machinery (engines, rail tracks, ships, etc.) were lowered. 
The Stalinist propaganda proclaimed that move to be another splendid triumph 
bringing Poland closer to the socialist prosperity of the working people. This 
stirred considerable commotion in many enterprises, and several people who 
openly denounced the outrage became targets of harassment. Symptomatically, 
few people today remember those circumstances, even though all subsequent 
meat price rises bore the same connotations as in 1953. These meanings became 
fully recognisable and were discursively articulated only in 1980. For, of course, 
if people in Warsaw went on strike, it was not because the price of meat pack-
aging increased from two to eight zloty, but because people viewed the rise as an 
attack on their dignity. Therefore, if the increase in meat and packaging prices 
caused the Warsaw strikes in July 1980, it was not because meat mattered so 
much to working people in Poland, but because the rise had already acquired a 
definite symbolic meaning and consenting to it would discredit workers in their 
own eyes.
One of the PUWP secretaries insightfully depicts this knotted nexus of 
factors:  “I personally think that this was the mounting up of, I’d say, the dis-
content of the working class, including I guess entire society, because of, among 
other things, or as a result of not meeting the requests and, additionally, well, so 
to speak, that funny pretending that nobody had the slightest clue about requests 
or demands to be met; this is one thing. Another thing, I believe, the decisive 
factor was the price rise announced by the prime minister without society’s pre-
liminary approval, and, generally speaking, what finished it off, I guess, was what 
the former leaders of the government and the Party said who, well…focused on 
trifles and believed that, perhaps, if they threatened society in their speeches, all 
this would be prevented. […]. Factory X went on strike after a meeting at the 
The Formation of the Social Movement 61
Central Committee about the assessment of the country’s economic situation, 
where they talked a lot about, with comrade Edward Gierek, a former first secre-
tary at the time, obviously presiding, where they talked about the development 
of agriculture, and started saying that rains, cloudbursts and exceptionally bad 
weather conditions would make us nearly starve” (P 9, p. 2). These words aptly 
indicate a tangled mesh of meanings associated with the meat price rise which 
was the direct impulse for strikes.
Besides the meat price rise, there was certainly one more reason behind 
the summer strikes in 1980. In spring and early summer, wage scales were 
changed: wages were ostensibly raised, but at the same time production targets 
were altered, which resulted in lowering rather than increasing incomes rela-
tive to actual workloads. In several enterprises, workers did not grasp imme-
diately what ramifications the purported improvements would have. It was in 
the summer of 1980 that the new wage scales and production targets came into 
effect. The moment that workers realised they had been deceived coincided with 
the meat price rise, aggravating shortages on the consumer goods market and 
fuelling protests across the country. The strikes in Lublin were of particular rele-
vance to Warsaw. Tolerably accurate information about their scale and intensity 
provided a model for other protests until, obviously, the mass strike in the Coast 
region absorbed everybody’s attention.
Back to the depiction of the summer strikes in Warsaw. None of them (at least 
in the enterprises we researched) was organised the way that the advocates of the 
conspiracy interpretation of social events imagine them to have been.
This is how the actors themselves describe them: “And, you see, I rushed to the 
plumbers and was urging them to go on strike. Then off, to the electricians, and 
I got them all in one room. So we decided, and it was 2nd July, how to do it. I mean, 
to go over to the CHP, stand by the boilers and stay put. And as we said, we went 
over and stood there. Others started to join us: ‘What’re you doing?’ ‘We’re on 
strike.’ But many people were a bit scared. Z. rushed in and asks: ‘What’s going 
on?’ ‘We’re on strike.’ That is, by the time he came over from the plant, I’d already 
made this strike. The manager came over, but he didn’t want to talk with us, only 
with the foremen. So I say: ‘Sir, if you wanna talk, talk with everybody. We’re on 
strike.’ He went pale. Everybody was scared. One foreman […] was so nervous 
he had a seizure. It was a risky business after all. No one knew how things would 
pan out. We decided to go to the gaffers’ room and sit in there. And to demand 
that the management come over. We put down first demands quickly. There were 
three: pay rise by one scale-level for all, more danger money for all, and a high-
price allowance or something like that. I don’t even remember it exactly […]. 
[Interviewer: ‘Did anybody else go on strike on Monday?’] They did. Three other 
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departments did. And, in fact, we’d already worked out a plan of shutting the 
heat plant down […]. There’d already been a memo dispatched to the forge boss 
to work all the material already in the furnaces so it didn’t go to waste and not to 
put out any new material. Otherwise, the management would be accountable for 
the losses. So things were under control. Fourteen hours: the phone rings, they 
tell us not to shut down, and that the director and the management are coming 
over in fifteen minutes” (interview J; S, pp. 6–7).
This is how the same strike is related by the factory’s PUWP secretary: “Since 
1st July, we’d been preparing the implementation of a new wage system for the 
steel sector […] and because that sector had been receiving pay rises since 1st July, 
while other sectors hadn’t, rather heated discussions started […]. It was quite 
clear that the prevailing attitude was that of making claims, of demanding wage 
regulations for the other departments as well. This coincided with the decision 
to increase prices of meat products and caused strikes or – as the phrase went 
back then – downtimes […], all this didn’t have any organised form then, the 
strikes, well, somehow occurred spontaneously. [Interviewer: ‘Do you remember 
the representatives?’]. They were not any selected group; they were simply rep-
resentatives of a wide collective who spontaneously went to the meeting with 
the management. [Interviewer:  ‘But who were they? Do you remember those 
people now?’]. As a matter of fact I do […]. For example, at the CHP […] a group 
formed who […] put forward certain claims […] in a systematic […] way” (P 44, 
pp. 2–3).
“It’s not that one person stands up, right?, and says: ‘we’ll go on strike,’ right? 
There’s a problem, an issue, so people come together and talk. First, it is, and it 
goes without saying, all about anger, right?, and later people think on what to do 
next, right? What we can do and how. Say, we’ve tried to reason with the foreman 
or the manager in this or that way. He throws up his hands and says that this 
or that can’t be done. Or the cases when people are told they’re wrong. This is 
what especially drives people mad. And then there’s the question, right, what are 
we supposed to do in such a situation? Well, the only form of protest is to stop 
working” (a rank-and-file PUWP member, P 13, p. 3).
Another person recounts the same strike: “First they gave us a pay rise and 
then said we had to produce 250 pieces more […]. So what kind of a rise is it, 
if I have my workload increased and have to do much more? […]. I knew more 
or less what was going on ‘cause the previous day a friend of mine’d mentioned 
we’d refuse to work, for that rise was unfairly distributed. When I went down, 
I found out what it was all about. […]. [It was] the morning shift. We were off 
the night shift ‘cause we had a special night commission, so we were off the night 
shift and didn’t go back to work […]. We went to have some tea, coffee in fact, 
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not to fall asleep […] there’s a canteen in that department, there’s a cooker and 
gas supply. Later, a friend of mine told me that she’d talked with other workers 
and that we wouldn’t go back to work; simply that mess couldn’t be allowed to 
continue […] more pieces to produce, the workload increased […], it’s no pay 
rise […]. Supplies are poor, and we came out about it. Later, around seven, the 
director came over, later ladies from the Factory Council came over and said: ‘Go 
back to work, roll up your sleeves’[…]. And later the factory secretary came over, 
too […]. He goes: ‘Get down to work, get down to work.’ We say that we’re paid 
too little, that we demand a bigger rise […]. After twenty years in the job, we’ll 
get the least of it. And he replies:  ‘That’s because the world’s a funny place.’ So 
I ask him: ‘Why is the world a funny place?’ ‘Because there’re too many people in 
wrong positions.’ […]. [Interviewer: ‘The director came in and was very uppish 
towards you; how did you respond?’]. We say: ‘Wait a moment, we’re not going 
back to work, listen to us, please.’ He replies: ‘Back to work, back to work, right 
now!’ We say:  ‘We’re no workhorses, we can go back to our jobs, but listen to 
us first, please.’ Later we got a reply in writing […] that the production targets 
would be reduced” (S 39, pp. 1–3).
Here are other reports: “The July strike was, it was basically differently made 
than the later ones, possibly because it was the first one, still before the Coast 
strike. And it was […] so impetuous […]. It all started in the toolroom. And this 
is almost a rule ‘cause it’s a shop with old workers, with little staff turnover. The 
people’ve been there for long, know each other very well, so they’re automatically 
more solidary in action than others […], they’re simply in sync, so it’s easier for 
them to make certain claims and to have a uniform view on these claims […]. 
Of course, we got to hear about the reasons why they’d [the toolroom workers] 
stopped working, they only had pay demands then […]. The other departments 
mustered their courage at that moment, for the toolroom had already stopped 
and, one by one, practically on the same day, almost the whole [factory] came 
to a standstill […]. At that moment, there was no, it must be admitted, there 
was no agreement among the departments when the strike started. Only later, 
as the strike went on, opinions were shared and claims, too [Interviewer: ‘Who 
had made up the group that initiated the strike?’]. So there was a little problem 
with that. Officially, such groups were not formed. And that was because there 
was a fear of reprisals against particular people, and it was well founded. […] 
there were claims made by the whole group from the department, that is, by all 
the workers elected at that moment. […] But there was a spontaneity about it, 
and that spontaneity was there also in other factories. Only, let’s say, Gdansk had 
a programme of sorts, and it was later implemented in the strikes […] When 
the strike was beginning, there was not time to put up a programme […]. There 
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was only this unanimity that the lists of demands overlapped in all departments 
‘cause indeed the problems were the same everywhere” (S 20, pp. 1–3). So, there 
were situations in which the strike was initiated by one, known group, but there 
were also cases in which spontaneously brought-together workers elected a 
group of their representatives.
“Yes, 10th, 13th August […], it was already after the Lublin thing, so there 
was a mood around that something can be done. What did the strike look like? 
Well, two, three people say: ‘We’re not going out.’ And others go: ‘So what are we 
doing?’ ‘We’re not going out, we’re staying put.’ So we’re staying put, the group 
is growing, no buses drive out – they’re blocked, and people basically stop, not 
knowing what for. When the crowd had already gathered, they go: ‘What are we 
stopping for?’ ‘Well, ‘cause we’re collecting demands.’ ‘What demands?’ ‘Money’ 
[…]. And when Brzostek41 came over and asked ‘What are you doing it for?’ 
People said ‘For money.’ So Brzostek goes: ‘I’ll give you the money.’ But see what 
turns out then? It’s not enough […]. ‘Cause those people were disgruntled not 
because they had no money, but because they remembered all the past vices of 
the management […]. So money was that first main trigger. But then it turned 
out money wasn’t the point at all […] – the money crap was even cut completely” 
(S 36, pp. 2–5).
These passages vividly show how a strike “is made.” Like any collective action, 
a strike is indeed organised, but it is organised differently than the upholders of 
the conspiracy-underpinned bureaucratic interpretation envisage it to be.
All our respondents talk of people who are faced with a problematic situa-
tion in which conditions change, directly affecting individuals as members of 
a collective. Any change in living conditions demands responding to the new 
situation – “something” must be done about it. This sets off the process of nego-
tiating positions with other people involved in the same situation. As a result, a 
common definition of the situation is developed and incisively impacts people, 
determining the range of actions to be undertaken in the new social conjuncture. 
The definition of the situation is confronted with the previous state of affairs 
and with people’s desires, because as the situation changes an active reaction is 
required. Consequently, people must answer the dramatic question of “what to 
do now?” If there are available action models suited to their particular problem 
situation, or if rational ideas and agendas come up, the collective’s joint action 
develops at a staggering pace.
 41 Jerzy Brzostek, Deputy Mayor of Warsaw. (translator’s note) 
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This was exactly what the studied strike situation looked like. People were 
ready for it, because they shared a negative definition of the social situation. 
When protests start to pop up and/or people come forward and make a clear, 
well-founded case for a strike action, a decision is made which, though indi-
vidual, is underpinned by the shared image of reality. The decision concerns a 
particular collective action, which initiates the next stage of social negotiations 
of, so to speak, technical nature. The objectives of the action must be discussed 
alongside the ways of expressing the “collective will,” which is exhibited in 
multiple individual decisions to join the strike. The addressee of the claims 
(and thus the opponent whom the action targets) must be defined. The rules 
of in-group cooperation must be developed and, consequently, tasks must be 
distributed:  somebody must contact the management, somebody else must 
put down the demands, still another person must secure the machines, etc. 
Collectively negotiated, the role allocation results from individual motivations 
to engage in tasks at hand as well as from collective expectations towards par-
ticular people. In this way, the collective evolves into a community of collabo-
rating individuals.
Cooperation is spontaneous, while the joint action is emotionally loaded 
but also opens up new vistas of reflection. As such, it requires ongoing com-
munication and deliberation. It is a spontaneous process of thinking together. 
Acting together is, at the same time, a continual discussion. This is where the 
rationality and coordination come from. In the discussion, practical effects of 
individual actions are worked through, and the collective feelings are made 
sense of and channelled. Spontaneity and impulsiveness intrinsic to such ac-
tion neither contradict nor preclude rational organisation, if organisation is 
taken to mean the social process of negotiation and mutual adjustment of 
individual acts.
The Factors behind Collective Protests
Sociologically speaking, a few types of strike situations can be distinguished 
based on the degree to which workers are prepared to launch common action. 
Common action involves three major elements:
 1) the definition of the social situation which sways people to act, determines 
the objectives of action and informs the programme of protest;
 2) the sense of social bonding within and without the workplace;
 3) informal leaders who are trusted and ready to act as organisers and 
spokespersons for the protesting workforce.
As the third factor is perhaps easiest to describe, let us start from it.
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The Discontented-and-Defiant
There are three basic models of informal leadership.
 1. There are informal bonds among opinion leaders and generally trusted spokes-
people for the workers’ interests. In such circumstances, people respected by 
the workforce know each other and are in close, friendly relations with each 
other. Befriended, they share the same consciousness, beliefs and values, 
express them publicly and pursue common goals. At the same time, members 
of such groups know that they are trusted by their co-workers, whose attitudes 
and interests (both social and work-related) they assert. Such groups tend to 
“seal themselves off ” in fear of reprisals because, when meeting up, they dis-
cuss political and social issues in ways which, obviously, stray from the Party 
and state orthodoxy.
The discontented-and-defiant were noticed not only by those whose interests 
and beliefs they had the courage to vocally articulate, but also by the directors 
and the PUWP secretaries. A  respondent speaks of the attempts to get rid of 
informal leaders: “Attempts were made to fire us. We never drank any alcohol at 
work. When going out, we always searched our pockets and bags for things they 
might have planted on us. At a name-day event,42 it was in March, I and Z. betted 
on when the entire management would turn up to see the mercury room, for a 
mercury room was just being built [at the respondent’s factory]. Half one and the 
whole management walk in, as if casually: ‘We’ve come to see how the mercury 
room’s going.’ And, in fact, they came to see if we’re offering and drinking vodka. 
They were just looking for an excuse to fire us” (interview J, pp. 10–11).
The factory’s PUWP secretary describes the same people in the following 
way: “For example, in the CHP a group formed, I mean set itself up, which was 
the most active of all, and they made certain claims in a methodical way, so 
to speak, and one of its organisers is now an activist in the new trade unions. 
[…] whenever I met them, I must say, I could feel that they had a huge grudge 
both against the management of our factory and against our state authorities 
about the way things were going. Those people talked about simple, but also 
wide-ranging problems which might have been addressed here and there, but 
were still underappreciated” (P 44, p. 3).
 42 The name-day, i.e. the feast of one’s patron saint, was traditionally celebrated in 
Poland more conspicuously than the birthday. Putting up small name-day events for 
co-workers at the workplace during the working hours was a widespread custom, which 
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The conduct of that small group invested them with moral authority, and con-
sequently they were viewed by their co-workers as possible future leaders. When 
such informal groups appear within an enterprise, they clearly influence the 
dynamics of striking: the pace accelerates, strike actions are more effective and 
more rational, precise goal-setting is facilitated, resolve in negotiations with the 
authorities is promoted, and resistance to their counter-measures is increased.
This predominantly happens because engaged, pro-active individuals keep in 
touch with each other and, instead of being anonymous, they are morally and 
intellectually prepared to take up roles assigned to them by the participants in 
collective action.
 2. While there are informal leaders well known to the workers’ community, 
enjoying their support and regarded as moral authority, they do not form a 
group as defined in sociology.
It means that, as a rule, they are not acquainted with each other, have no pri-
vate contacts with each other, are not mutual friends and do not discuss things 
together, which precludes them sharing a group self-consciousness. Their social 
impact is limited either to particular departments of the enterprise or to a cer-
tain social circle (e.g. a relatively intimate group of colleagues, a shift crew, etc.). 
What this model and the previous one have in common is that informal leaders 
explicitly declare their views, and their attitudes are widely known, even though 
they may only be popular with a few workers.
How the attitudes of the discontented-and-defiant are manifested and in what 
public circumstances they win trust and support can beg an explanation. It turns 
out that the relevant opportunities were provided by KSR43 meetings and by 
numerous gatherings and rallies held by the old trade unions or Party agencies. 
Such occasions offered a forum for voicing criticisms and negative assessments 
of the management, the Enterprise Council and, even, the PUWP and the gov-
ernment. Such critiques were all the more meaningful as the mood of fear, torpor 
and helplessness was pervasive. Consequently, those who articulated them risked 
reprisals and inspired admiration and respect in their co-workers.
Such conduct and attitudes made the defiant natural candidates for leaders of 
collective action when workers started to stage protests. In such moments, they 
 43 KSR stands for the Konferencja Samorządu Robotniczego – the Conference of Workers’ 
Self-Management. Instituted in 1958, KSRs in enterprises included members of the 
factory’s PUWP unit, members of the factory’s trade-union council and selected rep-
resentatives of the workforce. (translator’s note)
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tended to meet each other personally and quickly form a leadership group. If 
there were several well-known defiant people within an enterprise, the author-
ities could not manipulate the protesters easily, while chances improved that all 
workers would engage in the joint action and accomplish the strike objectives.
 3. As the strike action progresses, it brings forth leaders and spokespeople for 
the collective interest.
This situation differed from the previous two models in that people who had 
earlier earned social recognition did not actually become leaders. Instead, as one 
respondent puts it, they were vested with tacit authority. They were reputed for 
their beliefs and/or organisational skills among their close friends, or they re-
vealed their capacities when the collective decision to go on strike was made. 
Only the strike situation itself made them into leaders and champions of the 
collective will. This concerned first and foremost the enterprises where fear was 
particularly paralysing and could only be overcome as a result of the collective 
resolve to act.
This had significant consequences for the course of the strike action. Firstly, 
this happened during strikes initiated within particular departments or spatially 
and organisationally separate divisions, without extending onto the entire enter-
prise. Whether or not the example set by co-workers was stimulating, when lead-
ership candidates were missing, negotiating common goals and bargaining on 
behalf of the enterprise’s entire workforce were severely thwarted. Secondly, the 
community was only forged in and through the strike experience out of which 
social opinion leaders and moral authorities emerged. Thirdly, that helped the 
bureaucratic apparatus manipulate workers in order to sow divisions by meeting 
very limited demands which did not represent the workers’ general interests.
We: The Circles of Community
Let us focus now on social bonding, i.e. the second major aspect of strike actions. 
Social bonding designates a sense of community  – community of interests, 
beliefs and values. The “psychological” sense of community is an inner condi-
tion in which a person feels that s/he is not alone and that others will not be 
indifferent to his/her fate, while s/he will not be indifferent to their fate. This 
feeling motivates the person to take up action when the perceived psycholog-
ical affinity is corroborated in everyday life. This experience primarily involves 
direct contacts and interactions as prerequisites for joint action. Given this, 
what was said and done by the discontented-and-defiant, who had the courage 
to express their criticism, fostered the crystallisation of social bonds. Such 
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people became living symbols of the community on whose behalf they spoke out 
(thereby clearly putting themselves on the line). Besides, taking personal risks 
to protect collective interests, they garnered trust since, while their views might 
not have been universally favoured, their intentions could not be doubted. The 
third situation (i.e. one in which social activists only came forth as social action 
progressed) was different. The activists were protected by the group, while their 
motivations “dissolved,” so to speak, in the experience of the community. They 
had not been tested for strength and integrity before. This had ramifications for 
the entire group: the leaders were watched with an alert eye and a degree of dis-
trust. At the same time, the likelihood of the leaders being set up by the authori-
ties to manipulate social action increased. This is what indeed happened in some 
enterprises. Spontaneous leaders were used by the bureaucratic apparatus, for 
example, to meddle with the formation of independent trade unions by founding 
trade unions to which our respondents referred to as “directorial.” The idea to 
set up such trade unions was often proposed by an experienced, usually PUWP-
affiliated economic activist with ample practice within the old trade unions.
It can be posited that the course of strike actions, the efficiency of protests and 
their further relevance to the participants were correlated with the strength and 
extent of social bonding among the representatives of workers: the more devel-
oped the bonds, the more spontaneous the strike and the more determined and 
effective the protest.
The typology of strikes in the Warsaw-based enterprises includes two basic 
situations. In one of them, the strikes manifested the sense of social bonding and 
grew out of the workers’ feeling of community. In the other, the strikes entailed 
building social bonds and turned the workers into a community. In the latter 
case, the early, initial bonds were very limited and tied only small groups, where 
closeness resulted from the simple fact of having long worked together. As such, 
they knew they shared the same beliefs and fought for the most elementary 
cause of equal consequence to everybody. Such groups often did not even extend 
across a company’s organisational units; rather, they were separate work-teams, 
shift crews or, at best, departments.
Importantly, strikes that sprawled over entire enterprises were as a rule ini-
tiated by toolroom crews (or their equivalents). The frequency with which the 
toolroom is attributed the initiating and model-setting role in our data strongly 
suggests that it cannot be a coincidence. As our interviews imply, the toolroom 
is crucial to an industrial plant, forming, so to speak, the heart of industrial 
production and staying in touch with most other units of the plant. Central to 
technological processes (tool preparation), it usually assembles workers with 
expertise and experience. As such, the toolroom crew are certainly an elite in 
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terms of occupational competence. At the same time, the toolroom is a setting 
which promotes the formation of the plant’s social elite. Unlike assembly-line 
workers, the toolroom crew are, by default, regarded as inventive and self-reliant, 
perform individualised, specialist tasks and are personally accountable for their 
execution. They set the production rhythm themselves and are largely respon-
sible for the final product.
All this requires greater mobility, both social and intellectual, and makes col-
laboration expedient. In the toolroom, one must consult one’s co-workers and, 
often, advise and assist others. As a result, strong, informal bonds are forged.
As some of the interviews cited above indicate, other workers tend to view 
the toolroom crew as a closely-knit community which becomes a role model for 
others. When the toolroom goes on strike, it sets an example which mobilises 
other departments of the enterprise, no matter whether the workers orchestrate 
this spread deliberately or whether they contact each other only after the strike 
spontaneously ensues. At any rate, in our study, the spontaneous strikes in sepa-
rate workplaces or departments as a rule merged into common action, and their 
organisers and leaders sought contact with each other, attempted to develop a 
shared definition of the situation and tried to establish the common rules and 
objectives of their struggle. In doing this, they followed the model provided by 
the toolroom.
The attempts to launch common action were not always successful. There 
were several adverse factors productive of barriers and debilitating, if not entirely 
abolishing, people’s preparedness to commit to the pursuit of common interests.
One particularly potent factor was, as mentioned, above, the absence of the 
discontented-and-defiant recognised as symbols and appreciated for attitudes 
and authority. Another factor was organisational as the structure of enterprises 
could either thwart or facilitate formal and informal contacts among the work-
force. The size of the enterprise could matter in this respect, though not as much 
as it might be expected. Counterintuitively, it was not the case that the smaller the 
enterprise was, the stronger bonds developed among its workers. What seems to 
have mattered more than the size itself was the organisation of the workers’ com-
munity and possibilities of informal bonding, which depended on how tightly 
the enterprise’s functional units were interconnected.
Symptomatically, as soon as a strike erupted, the management, the old 
trade unions and PUWP agencies exerted themselves to block communication 
channels and thereby to prevent meaningful interactions among people. One of 
the strategies was to prohibit assemblies (in one plant, no more than three people 
were allowed to gather at one place), to suspend passes authorising people to 
move between the enterprise’s departments and to implement other practical 
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measures (cutting off telephones, forbidding entrance to some rooms, etc.). 
The point was, obviously, that without exchange of information, discussion and 
negotiations, any common action was out of the question.
The third factor thwarting the development of social bonds concerned nega-
tive group stereotypes. Actually, the stereotypes appeared not only as a result of 
propagandist mongering but, first and foremost, as a consequence of diversifica-
tion among workers’ groups, which enhanced social atomisation. Such disinte-
gration was spawned by granting modest privileges to some groups and making 
earnings dependent on employment in particular organisational sectors instead 
of on jobs and competences. Such regulations violated the sense of social jus-
tice as some people’s paycheques were only bigger because they worked at the 
A department rather than at the B department. Such a division bred jealousy and 
contributed to the negative stereotype of the A department, especially if there 
was little direct contact between their workers. Such ploys and measures were, 
in fact, deliberately used. Another device was incorporating separate, small and 
specialised sections within bigger ones where work was entirely different. It was 
assumed, aptly indeed, that such arrangements coupled with income differences 
would disintegrated the collective as the smaller group would tend to seal itself 
off from the bigger one, while the bigger one would be hostile and distrustful 
towards the smaller one. Such policies had an impact on strikes.
A respondent reports:  “Why am I  saying it [the strike] was spontaneous? 
Because no one even said clearly they were stopping. A few machines stopped, 
people started to cluster around and discuss why the toolroom had [stopped] 
and whether we could as well. So others started switching off [the machines], 
and practically at a certain moment all the machines were shut down. Of course, 
a few people staunchly opposed that and kept working, but when we had an 
understanding, the talk was they […] mustn’t disorganise the strike. So, I  say 
there were some strong pressure groups, but there were generally no beatings 
[…], two different crews worked in that one room and opinions clashed to an 
extent […]. That other section crew, one that wanted to go on strike, it was a 
small group. They were afraid that the management could personally threaten 
to fire them […], so they asked the others for help, saying they’d all strike as 
one group in solidarity. And that smaller crew that’d asked for help to proclaim 
the strike, they got pay-rises earlier and earlier announced the strike to be over. 
This was an ugly thing to do, and it was widely commented on, because when 
they were in need, they asked for help, but when they got what they’d wanted 
[…], they didn’t want to go on striking in solidarity with others” (S 20, pp. 5–7). 
The same respondent points to other difficulties: “And there was the white-collar 
issue, too, ‘cause some people said it’s ridiculous if they go on strike, ‘cause when 
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you go into the office you don’t know anyway if they’re working or striking. So 
this had to be discussed at the workshop […], with people there, that white-
collars were joining the strike […]. At that moment, there was no close com-
munication between the white-collars and the blue-collars, it means that those 
old antagonisms were felt, as at that moment the strike could be prolonged and 
demands made for the white-collars to get more, but when the news came they’d 
get 10% more, while the blue-collars seven hundred […], the blue-collars were 
satisfied and quick to forget that the white-collars weren’t just bureaucrats” 
(Ibid., p. 7). To dispel such negative stereotypes was an exigency that took active 
effort: “The situation was that they kept refusing to give the white-collars [a pay-
rise], but because we were together at the rally in the workshop, and I also talked 
there that we had the same stomachs, and so on, that the same demands should 
be fulfilled […], they could give all departments on strike pay-rises on the same 
day. They thought that by giving some departments a pay-rise, other ones would 
feel alienated and back off and stop striking” (R 10, pp. 5–6).
Generally, the strikers did not cave in, but in the company depicted above, 
the management was able to differentiate wage increases considerably, with the 
“meek” ones obtaining less. This shows another divisive factor at play when 
social protest is in the formation phase. The authorities decided to meet selected 
demands in order to split the revolting group and to prevent the spread of com-
munity feelings. This was a strategy designed to put down the flames of rebel-
lion before they roared and set the entire enterprise, neighbourhood and region 
ablaze. Sometimes substantial populations of workers only found out about the 
summer strikes a few months later, when new conditions and options of commu-
nication were in place. Importantly, this was the case not only in big enterprises.
Entangled in a mesh of mutual negative stereotypes, the white-collar vs. 
blue-collar division, whose disintegrative impact is identified in the passage 
above, was undoubtedly crucial when strikes were launched. Interestingly, the 
division changed over the following months (which will be addressed in the 
depiction of the formation process of the independent trade union below).
The fourth factor adverse to social bonding was fear, above all a fear of 
reprisals against the protesters. Our respondents often talk of terror within 
enterprises (Ibid., p.  7). Tellingly, while manifestations of general dissatisfac-
tion and critiques of the government and the PUWP were on the whole con-
doned, it was deemed highly “improper” to disapprove of the way the enterprise 
was run and operated. The more the criticism focused on the enterprise, the 
more dangerous it was. The defiant were disciplined in various ways, including 
threats of dismissal. Another frequent punitive measure involved reassignment 
to worse jobs, often ones with an increased health hazard, even for people with 
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documented medical histories. Our respondents often report such cases. In 
many organisations, people very well remembered the harassment inflicted on 
active participants in past protests. This strong negative collective memory was 
one of the most important determinants of the structure of collective actions 
during strikes. Actually, the reflection on the organisation of collective protests 
was fuelled by the desire to avoid reprisals, which made people develop a fun-
damental sense of solidarity in common struggles. Nearly in all enterprises, the 
promise of non-reprisals against the strikers featured among the conditions to 
end the strike. Guarantees were demanded that nobody would be disciplined for 
taking part in the strike.
Sometimes no official representatives were appointed and even Strike 
Committees were not formally constituted for fear that they would be targets of 
future repressions. “Why the Strike Committee was not set up was rather inter-
esting. So, as such […] nobody wanted to lead it ‘cause everybody was afraid of 
reprisals, that’s one thing. The other thing is […] that there was no communica-
tion as such among departments […] somehow it was impossible to get together 
and strike a deal […]. Nobody wanted to be on that strike committee ‘cause we 
all talked about possible reprisals, and our representatives were simply people 
who went over to hand in those demands. But they didn’t call themselves a com-
mittee nor were the official organisers of that strike. Consequently, they couldn’t 
be made accountable for anything” (Ibid., pp. 4–5).
There is credulous ring to this reasoning as the respondent believes that ac-
tive strike participants will not bear the consequences of their deeds unless they 
adopt “officially rebellious” roles. This naïve thinking is in itself an expression 
of fear in which it is unthinkable that people have the right to stand up for their 
interests and living conditions. This was actually a major obstacle to defining 
struggle as struggle, revolt as revolt and conflict as conflict. Such fear drained 
people of self-confidence and the sense of empowerment.
The crucial challenge was to overcome that fear, which paralysed the very 
thinking about action, let alone action as such. Our very general hypothesis is 
that the sense of community is a fundamental counter-fear mechanism. In the 
foregoing, we depicted social bonding within individual enterprises and indi-
cated the factors that fostered or hampered it. When the strikes were in progress, 
the management and the political leadership of enterprises made every effort 
to forestall the transformation of workers into a social community, a collective 
inspired by shared goals and shared consciousness. Their measures were in gen-
eral poorly effective, despite sustained efforts to antagonise people and inflame 
fear, mutual aversion and distrust. These attempts were overridden by various 
mechanisms of spontaneous social bonding.
The Rise of the NSZZ “Solidarity”74
Joint protest actions took shape, firstly, around groups of active members of the 
collective – the discontented-and-defiant, who epitomised all workers’ common 
interests and desires; secondly, around populations that formed closely-knit 
workers’ groups as role models for other workers (such as toolroom crews and 
their equivalents); thirdly, around the informal networks of relationships forged 
among people who formally belonged to a particular unit of the enterprise  – 
people on the crew of a department, a section or a shift were not only specialised 
performers of technological tasks but also a community, a circle of friends.
Our data suggest that strikes were particularly difficult to launch wherever 
the ties among workers were loose and only based on working together in a 
team that pursued the same production targets. The key factor instrumental in 
transforming a formal group into an informal group, into a community, was the 
period of working together. Where the staff turnover was biggest, informal bonds 
were weakest and collective action was most difficult to undertake. This is what 
one respondent talks about: “Well, there’re sections we generally have all the time 
the most difficulty with, such as the assembly section and a few others, with 
a very big workforce turnover, ‘cause they’re mostly new arrivals, it is a mixed 
group, they’re people from the countryside. And, generally, uniform beliefs are 
few and far between among them, and making uniform claims is a problem. 
Basically they’re satisfied with whatever they’re given” (S 20, p. 3).
Such bonding mechanisms are, of course, part of sociology’s basic knowl-
edge. Yet besides such obvious and banal factors, the process of bonding, of 
forming communities and of developing a sense of togetherness among workers 
in Warsaw (and, likely, across Poland) in the summer of 1980 involved one 
more, far less trivial aspect. It could be briefly described as the crystallisation 
of a general social sense of community. Shaping the active notion of “us,” which 
made striking possible in the first place, the elementary bonding mechanisms 
within enterprise communities seem to have been a harbinger of a far wider 
sense of community and a far more general awareness of the social “us.” Our 
thesis is a radical one: the shaping up of social bonds within enterprises during 
the strikes in summer 1980 was the first substantive symptom of the birth of a 
general social sense of community. The discontent that motivated workers’ com-
munities to engage in collective protests in defence of their interests palpably 
embodied a yet vague and still inarticulate feeling of community that Poles felt 
in July and early August 1980. While this broad communal context was not yet 
patently on the minds of social actors, it certainly suffused social action and 
social knowledge. This knowledge predominantly concerned the mechanisms 
of reprisals and the reasons behind the failure of earlier social protests, though 
it was not a direct expression of cumulative experience. As already mentioned, 
The Formation of the Social Movement 75
the organisers of strikes in the summer of 1980 were not disciples of the former 
activists and protesters from their enterprises. Rather, they drew on generalised 
social knowledge, on, so to speak, society’s abstract lore. This general knowledge 
was the basis of organisational decision-making within individual workplace 
settings. This meant, at the same time, that this knowledge integrated respec-
tive working communities into a far broader social “us,” linking these groups to 
others which had engaged in similar action over years. The “we” of the protesting 
workforce had a social history behind it, a history populated by those who had 
refused to lay low in the past. In this way, a continuity of interests and an affinity 
of circumstances were felt and propped the self-image of people who now expe-
rienced that continuity and that affinity. People felt they were not alone, because 
they were buttressed by a shared history.
What remained to be done was discovering “our folks.” Not yet lucid or 
keen, the consciousness of community, informed by the bond with the past and 
finding in that past takeaways for itself, charted two trajectories of explorations 
and references to reality. One of them focused on re-creating the enterprise’s 
social past. This vague sense of shared experience of working people in Poland 
enlivened and activated the collective memory of people’s most immediate tra-
dition. The phrases “we the Ursus workers” or “we the Steel Plant workers” came 
to refer to something more than just the setting where people worked at that 
moment. The fate of Ursus or Warsaw Steel Plant working collectives came to be 
perceived as similar to the fate of other working collectives, and the experience 
of the direct forerunners came to be viewed as attesting to the reliability of gen-
eral social knowledge. The memory of the past directly concerning workers of a 
given factory enhanced the sense of community, which was expressed in readi-
ness to go on strike.
This consciousness built, of course, on collective memory salvaged in many 
enterprises in one way or another. Our data show that this active conscious-
ness of the community affected the interpretation of the past and helped bring 
to light knowledge about the events overlooked in collective memory before. 
This is what happened at the MZK, where the former protest actions were not 
remembered before the onset of the strikes. Only the active consciousness of 
the community dug deep to disclose the events of 1976, when the MZK workers 
staged a powerful protest. In searching for people’s own tradition, a new collec-
tive memory was formed and a new image of “us” came into being among the 
city’s transport workers.
As a result, they started to compare themselves with and to others in a similar 
situation. Protests launched in some enterprises served as an impulse for workers 
of other enterprises to take up action. Initially, the workers of Warsaw-based 
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companies followed the example of the Lublin strikers. Their potency as a role 
model was rooted in the perceived community of situation. It was not yet a man-
ifestation of self-conscious social bonds, but it was likely a first step towards it. If 
they – people from the past – had been able to stand up for themselves and defy 
the government in the name of their interests, why should we not do the same 
thing as well? Generally, nobody tried to establish whether those interests were 
indeed similar to our own ones. No attempts were made to establish affinities 
between these sets of interests either in direct contact with the activists of old 
or in reflection. The fact of standing up for one’s living conditions was enough.
This fact affected bonding, as it offered a point of reference for the emergent 
working community within a given enterprise and sensitised people to what 
others were doing. A  vast process of social reflection and a grand conceptual 
project were in the offing.
Metaphorically, the strikes was an avalanche-like series of mobilisations of 
enterprise communities making their demands. In these mobilisations, workers 
were swiftly forging a community, aware at the same time that the same thing 
was happening in other enterprises. Workforces watched each other with a 
kindly interested eye, but for a while no attempts were made to communicate 
directly with each other. Everybody seemed to be waiting for something.
The awaited impulse eventually came from Gdansk. A communal thinking 
mode was already in place, but the sense of a new social “us” was still devel-
oping unconsciously. The strike at the Gdansk Shipyard, the spread of solidary 
actions that stirred the entire Coast region and the drafting of 21 demands radi-
cally changed the situation. Solidarity strikes were already different. The strikers 
transformed into a consolidated community just because a more general sense of 
“us” appeared, in which “we” and they in Gdansk were one group.
This was emphatically exemplified in the strike at the Warsaw Steel Plant in 
late August 1980. Earlier, at the beginning of July, some of the plant’s departments 
had gone on strike for a few hours demanding wage increases. Those strikes, 
however, had not evolved into any determined communal action (the finan-
cial demands had anyway been fulfilled immediately). The strike that began on 
28th August was understood by entire Warsaw as a symbol of solidarity with the 
Coast workers and sympathy with their demands.
Our data suggest the following dynamics of the situation. Similarly to the 
strikes discussed in the foregoing, the strike of August 1980 was initiated at one 
of the Steel Plant’s departments and soon spilled onto two other ones. Over the 
following dozen hours, it spread further to include the entire staff, both produc-
tion workers and part of the administrative segment (“the office building”) alike. 
That strike differed from the previous ones in a number of respects.
The Formation of the Social Movement 77
First of all, many of our respondents say that the idea for the strike was put 
forward by particular people. If individual initiatives transformed into a vast 
communal action, it can be assumed that people had been spiritually prepared 
for such a mobilisation and for making thousands of individual decisions to join 
the strike.
Secondly, the strike immediately took on highly organised forms, following 
the models set by the Gdansk strikers, the intended recipients of solidarity and 
support. This is clear in reports from the Warsaw Steel Plant: “So I believe that 
they [the strike initiators at the Steel Plant] had no experience, that’s why the 
strike started at the A department, at the medium-fine rolling mill, and it was 
initiated by X […]. And he has a very strong personality. He is very persuasive, 
has the gift of the gab, which was indispensable back then, and the A depart-
ment had practically no striking experience […]. Certainly, if the A department 
had been first to go on strike in the whole country, I don’t know whether that’d 
have worked” (S 4, p. 15). If the strike at the Steel Plant worked, it was certainly 
because of the Gdansk example, our respondent insists: “[people] realised that if 
somebody’d been on strike for nearly two weeks, since the 16th or 14th of August, 
I don’t remember exactly, and they’d endured somehow, we can endure that too. 
A day or two, or a week or two weeks, perhaps, we don’t know, that consciousness 
wasn’t yet around, but we already knew that somebody was handling it all right. 
And that comforted us. But had they started it alone, I don’t think we could’ve 
organised something like that at all. That Gdansk strike was a stronger stimulus 
that it was possible, that you could organise something like that” (Ibid., p. 15).
“One department started it, in fact a group of workers did […], he [one of the 
initiators] basically can be said to have proclaimed the strike. He put forward 
those three demands […] and asked the people to contribute to the strike as a 
solidarity strike in support of the workers and their demands and, at the same 
time, in order to join and somehow bargain about them at the Steel Plant as 
well. And that was initiated in one department […], later, liaisons, so to speak, 
went to other departments, and they proclaimed the strike too, well in the first 
stage, three departments stopped […] and later other ones started to join them 
[…], so that, practically, within one day the entire Steel Plant came to a stand-
still” (Ibid., p. 5). The demands included: “free trade unions, freedom of expres-
sion in the Polish mass media and recognition of the right to strike” (Ibid., p. 1). 
They encapsulate the ideological “ignition” of the strike, whose character was 
emphatically defined as solidary: “with an address enclosed that this is, gener-
ally, a solidarity strike in support of the striking workers of the Coast region […], 
and it was announced at the medium-fine rolling mill through a megaphone” 
(Ibid.). The strike initiators began to disseminate their idea resolutely, briskly 
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and determinedly. A megaphone was used, an announcement was made via the 
factory’s p.a. system and a placard was placed at the gate with details of the strike 
explained and an appeal to all workers to join it.
The gesture of solidarity with the Coast strikers, which seemed veritably a 
moral obligation, was simultaneously a mobilisation in the local workers’ own 
interest. As a respondent explains:  “We knew that […]. We realised that as 
other departments joined the strike, an agreement would be reached quicker 
in Gdansk, and we’d be all eventually able to begin seriously with that renewal 
people were slowly starting to talk about. And that was the weightiest argument, 
and also […] there were voices from the staff that we showed solidarity with the 
Coast region, but we also wanted to obtain something for the steel industry, for 
ourselves […], the fight was about nationwide issues, but also about our own 
ones” (S 7, p. 4). The situation was clear: the strike backing the demands of the 
Coast workers could only finish when an agreement was reached between the 
strikers and the authorities. At the same time, the strike’s objectives also included 
the interests of the Steel Plant workers. “Demands” became a buzzword on the 
spot. As the demands concerning the strikers’ own enterprise were being for-
mulated, the organisational structures of protest actions were being formed and 
Strike Committees were being set up: “As soon as we shut down the rolling mill 
[…], the Strike Committee was elected in our department […]. We went to the 
shift foremen’s room, and we simply made it into the interim Strike Committee. 
The entire staff gathered in the finishing room, where Mr X started a rally – he 
simply told us what the strike’s aim was and that it was a solidarity strike in 
sympathy with the Coast as well as immediately the catchphrase ‘bring on our 
demands’ appeared […]. And I must say, I’m proud to say I was the first to bring 
in three demands on a sheet of paper. I remember them even: the first demand 
was about reinstating the Steelworker Charter, the second about equal pay for 
production workers […] and process engineers, and also about making our 
Factory Council answerable for what they’d done over the past five years and the 
CRZZ for the past five years” (Ibid., pp. 1–2).
“On my way to work, I read an announcement that a strike’d started and in our 
[…] room, which we shared with another work team, most of the department’s 
workers gathered; and they decided, spontaneously and immediately, to select 
a Strike Committee and told that Strike Committee to get detailed information 
about the strike action and then to develop that strike action across the depart-
ment. I must say that we acted very quickly in that situation. What is the aim of 
our strike? It is a solidarity strike in support of the shipworkers from the Coast, 
both Gdansk and Szczecin, and we want to find out what is actually going on in 
Gdansk […]. And then we went back to our department. We even divided the 
The Formation of the Social Movement 79
roles among us to quicken up and streamline things […]. I went to the most 
important department […] the furnace room. And I made the case there […]. 
The colleagues there said that we were right indeed to demand that and decided 
to join the strike with us […] and it was obvious then that the steel shop was 
shutting down. And when the steel shop doesn’t work, no other department can 
do anything for they’ve got nothing to produce” (S 6, pp. 5–6).
“In each department, a Strike Committee was immediately formed and went 
about organising things. First, demands were collected and drafted. Second, 
delegates to the all-factory Strike Committee were elected. Third, the factory 
property had to be secured. [Interviewer: ‘How did the strike develop?’]. In a flash. 
[Interviewer: ‘What was being done?’]. Everything. Literally everything, not to 
overlook anything, either securing production or making sure that the workers 
were safe as well as that no unauthorised person entered the plant […]. The 
Strike Committee was made up of the departmental strike committees. Simply, 
to avoid further ado, all representatives of the departmental strike committees 
were appointed to the Factory Committee. [The departmental committees] 
were selected by sections, departments, work teams. Candidates were put for-
ward. Across the departments, there was urging:  ‘Set up committees here, in 
your departments. Whom would you see on such a committee, who of you can 
represent you as a social and occupational group?’[…]” (Ibid., p. 7). “Certainly 
[candidates to Strike Committees] were people not so much unknown as rather 
having informal authority. They were authority of sorts, but for one reason or 
another they’d stayed away from socio-economic politics before. In fact, among 
the praesidium there were four PUWP members, but nobody objected to that; 
elections followed like that: a candidate was proposed by those gathered, and was 
said to be a good choice and, say, you stood up and said you’d worked for so and 
so many years in this or that job, had no criminal record, were no shirker and 
no drunk. ‘Can anybody present contradict what I’m saying?’ And if anybody 
stood up and said it wasn’t true, ‘cause the person had a shirking bout some six 
months before, that candidate was automatically crossed out. This aspect, the 
moral aspect was taken very seriously. Not to have anybody saying later: did you 
do a good job electing drunkards and slackers!” (S 7, p. 4).
The demands from individual departments were compiled and passed 
to the Factory Strike Committee, where a list of top demands was ultimately 
put up. Negotiations with the Steel Plant management and the Minister of 
Heavy Industry (Franciszek Kaim at the time) concerned nineteen demands 
(respondents from one department talk about eighteen demands, while two 
interviews mention nineteen of them). The impact of the Coast example is very 
vivid. This invites the question how steelworkers found out about the details of 
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the events in Gdansk. Our respondents primarily refer to the list of twenty-one 
Gdansk demands, which were printed in the Sztandar Młodych.44 At the same 
time, as one respondent explains: “before that main solidarity strike, towards the 
end of August, flyers appeared in some departments, urging to join the striking 
workers of the Coast and listing demands, those 21 demands” (S 4, p. 4). Thus 
people knew about the demands, about the formation of Strike Committees and 
about the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee. The available information was very 
general, but it proved sufficient to spur action.
The Gdansk example did not impact people either through any particulars of 
the Coast strike organisation or, even less so, through any direct instructions. 
Rather, it affected the imagination. The symbols provided by the striking 
Coast workers served as a trigger and a behaviour model. This model, how-
ever, had to be fleshed out by lived experience. This is what happened at the 
Steel Plant. The impulse from the Coast developed into a system of activities 
modelled upon the Gdansk example. It was governed by the logic informed 
by the feeling of affinity, which was sparked by the first gesture of solidarity 
in going on strike. This is the reason why the strike at the Warsaw Steel Plant 
resembles the Gdansk Shipyard strike. The two did not only rely on the same 
organisational structure. They also shared symbolic objects and ritual collec-
tive behaviours, flaunting similar attitudes and feelings: “when the SC assem-
bled, when they negotiated, for example, with the management, at any bigger 
gatherings, the national anthem was sung to end the meeting […]. A  mass 
was read […]. People had various ideas […], why that mass was read […]. The 
mass was read because many workers are religious […], because of their jobs 
[…], and steelworkers, too; well you could say, belief in faith, in a supersti-
tion or something, in hard work which isn’t always safe. So an idea appeared 
to read a mass. Cardinal Wyszyński was asked whether […] a mass could be 
read at the Steel Plant, and secondly, to authorise some priests […]. Within 
an hour or two, people made a big wooden cross, put an altar together and a 
holy mass was read here, in front of the main gate” (Ibid., p. 11). “Everybody 
wanted that mass, and there was an enormous pressure from the people to hold 
a mass, actually […] to hold a mass in each department […], that we couldn’t 
agree to, because it was only the beginning of the strike. A  mass was read 
twice on Sunday […]. Why did people need it so much? First, as everybody 
knows, most workers, like a huge majority of Poles, are Catholic; besides, the 
 44 The Sztandar Młodych (literally The Banner of Youth) was a youth daily published in 
Warsaw from 1950 to 1997. (translator’s note)
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situation, let’s face it, was quite hazardous, and everybody was aware of that. 
In previous years, strikes had been cracked down on violently, so in this sense, 
people better remembered what mattered most to them. Well, what matters 
most to a Catholic is being close to God above all […]” (S 3, pp. 3, 15). “I don’t 
know whose initiative it was, but I liked it a lot. I guess I know why this mass 
took place among other things. Because after the strike was over, I found out 
that the Strike Committee’d wanted to contact a lawyer, an economist, for we 
wanted to discuss various issues, and there may have been an idea to follow 
the example of the Gdansk or Szczecin MKZ and do something like that here, 
in Warsaw […]. And it was likely then that the idea appeared to, well because, 
listen, people’d stayed after the night shift and there’re many religious people 
here, to follow the Coast example and organise, that is, hold a mass. And the 
idea was quickly picked up” (S 7, p. 9).
Were the national emblems and the mass a spontaneous idea of the Steel 
Plant’s workforce on strike, or were they a conscious emulation of the Shipyard 
workers? Our respondents’ views vary, and it is actually impossible to offer a 
conclusive answer. The logic of the Steel Plant strikers picked up and carried 
on the elements they shared with the Gdansk shipworkers. When people took 
action as a gesture of solidarity, they understood they embraced the same order 
of attitudes and values. If some of them knew about the liturgical element of the 
Gdansk strike, they must have seen the re-enactment of the mass as their “nat-
ural” need. If they did not know about it, the mass must have been their acutely 
felt and ineradicable need. That the same rituals took place at both venues tan-
gibly corroborated the bond between “us” and “them.” This is, in all likelihood, 
the central relevance of this experience.
The model-setting influence of Gdansk was not only limited to the emo-
tional and symbolic layers. The solidarity strike at the Warsaw Steel Plant 
called for a palpable acknowledgment. One of the first things the Factory 
Strike Committee did was sending a delegation to the Shipyard:  “the man-
agement was applied to for a car, a delegation was sent, two Polonezes45 drove 
off […]. One belonged to the management, and the other to the MPT.46 The 
director paid the expenses” (S 4, p.  8). “It was made simple, for they [five 
people went] got business trip assignments saying that the Factory Council 
 45 The Polonez was a popular car make produced in Poland (specifically, in Warsaw) 
under licence from Fiat. (translator’s note)
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dispatched them as workforce members and representatives to the Strike 
Committee in Gdansk. The assignments were each signed by Leszek Wałęsa 
up there” (S 6, p. 8–9). Asked why a delegation was sent to Gdansk in the first 
place, the Steel Plant strikers cite two basic reasons, a rational one and an emo-
tional one. The rational reason is explained as follows: “We sent our represent-
atives over there […] because it was generally one of our conditions: we’d stop 
striking if they went over there and told us on coming back that the strike on 
the Coast was over. We couldn’t trust radio and TV news because we knew it 
could be redacted in various ways, and we simply didn’t believe it to be real 
facts” (S 3, p. 2). The emotional reason is described as follows: “ ‘Cause, when 
it was said at once that we as the Steel Plant stood in solidarity with the Coast, 
and especially with the shipworkers in Gdansk […], the decision was made to 
simply send them a written statement that the Steel Plant had been on strike 
for that many days as a sign of solidarity and total support for their 21 points, 
yes, demands, and also wanted to do something for those demands to hold for 
entire Poland, and not only for them over there, plus for its own demands that 
it had and would go about by itself. And that the strike here would end as soon 
as their strike over there did. You can say people went over there with a double 
purpose, first to let them know that the Steel Plant was on strike, which was 
in fact reflected in […] the strike bulletin issued by the paper Solidarity in 
Gdansk […]. [Second] to bring some resources […], so that people here could 
simply see what those workers, to obtain more information” (S 4, p. 9). On 
coming back, the delegation confirmed that an agreement had been signed at 
the Gdansk Shipyard and brought over the Gdańska Solidarność (The Gdansk 
Solidarity) (a strike newspaper) along with the Shipyard workers’ flag: “That 
delegation that had been to Gdansk came back and even brought the flag of 
the Gdansk shipworkers. [When] Wałęsa came here during the strike on 3rd 
October, that token one, it was also brought out and displayed, it’s cherished 
‘cause the steelworkers got it from the striking Gdansk shipworkers” (Ibid., 
pp. 9–10).
The two reasons for the trip to Gdansk were equally relevant. Above, they are 
only playfully defined as rational and emotional. In fact, both bespeak the same 
need to chronicle the sense of bonding. For solidary actions to make any sense, 
they had to be continued until the common goal had been achieved. The radio 
and TV could not be trusted, and an eyewitness’s proof was needed to know that 
the Coast strike was indeed over before the Steel Plant strike could be ended. At 
the same time, as the Steel Plant expressed solidarity with the strikers in Gdansk, 
this support had to be communicated to them, for solidarity unrecognised by its 
addressee is pointless. Such communication could reify the sense of community.
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“So the four demands remained, and those nineteen were signed with a staff 
representative in attendance on the night of the 31st. […] We resumed work in 
the morning. Yes, the strike was ended in the morning. It went like that: on the 
31st the strike in Gdansk finished, our delegation came back from Gdansk and 
we also ended it. At two in the morning the delegation came along, and at four 
our demands were signed here, in this room” (S 7, p. 7). The room was decorated 
with white-and-red flags, a red-and-black steelworkers’ flag and a white-and-
blue one, brought over from Gdansk, the shipworkers’ flag. A new era of social 
life had begun.
To the best of our knowledge, the strike at the Warsaw Steel Plant was 
the only solidarity strike in support of the Coast demands in what was to 
become the Mazovia Region, though similar actions were also planned at 
other enterprises, and the steelworkers were not the only workers’ delegation 
from Warsaw to Gdansk. The Coast strike was relevant first and foremost 
because its impact capped off a long process of new consciousness formation 
among working people in Poland. The Gdansk example made workers aware 
of the road behind and ahead of them: it helped them grasp the previously 
vague motives behind their actions, assess social reality, understand desires 
that animated them and set common goals. Discontent, the sense of threat, 
needs and values turned out to depend on engagement in shared life and 
shared fate. Nonetheless, this social cluster was by no means homogeneous. 
Just the other way round: the awareness of sharing in and depending on the 
common fate of entire society compelled an appreciation of how diversified 
people actually were. As interests and values were patently varied, people 
started to perceive clearly who shared their beliefs, aspirations and attitudes 
and who did not.
It was also the moment when people began to realise that the previously 
uncoordinated and isolated actions had been fuelled the same motives and 
represented the shared experience of the overall social situation; and, finally, 
that the chaotic movement was enlivened by the same spirit. All this added up 
to an awareness of being united in the common cause. When this initially self-
unaware mobilisation focalised around a clearly defined and commonly accepted 
goal, a social movement came into being in which human masses pursued one 
cause. A lucid and obvious definition of the situation drove those human masses 
to revolt and protest. That breakthrough moment also projected a new, shared 
definition of the future. The past and the future emerged concomitantly and as 
mutually interrelated. The picture of the current situation took shape when it 
became clear what our point had been and why, and what our point was and why 
exactly that.
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The Common Definition of the Situation
In the following, we will focus on the last factor that formatively influenced the 
summer 1980 strikes. We called this factor the definition of the situation which 
pushed many workers’ communities to launch collective protests. Of course, 
defining the social situation was a process. As already observed, mobilisations in 
early July and mid-August 1980, though successful, had left something to wish 
for. Intellectual and emotional tensions lingered on persistently, and debates 
went on restlessly. This was easier now since the protesting workers had already 
forged communities in action. How quickly the rational definition of the social 
situation was “ripening” can be seen in the progression of the strikers’ demands.
The interviews cited above confirm that, at first, strikes were generally 
launched to enforce certain group claims, mostly quite limited and simple: as the 
economic situation worsened and prices rose, people wanted higher paycheques. 
Conspicuously, such demands were usually expanded as soon as financially-
motivated strikes had started. People seemed to conclude that if they had already 
gone on strike, it would be a waste of their energy to rest satisfied with a few 
hundred zloty, while so many other issues still rubbed them the wrong way. 
Consequently, demands were made concerning the organisation and operations 
of enterprises. Such an extension of strike claims marks, in itself, a re-modelling 
of the prevailing viewpoint as the sphere of reality the strikers seek to influence 
changes. This represents a transformation of the self-image: while in retrospect 
the actors themselves believe the expanding list of demands to have been simply 
“unsatisfactory,” extending this list, in fact, portends a re-invention of their social 
role. People grow confident that they can indeed change the present situation. 
This situation ceases to be the only possible form of reality.
The process is illustrated by a respondent who retells an encounter with high-
ranked PUWP and government functionaries in July 1980: “Karkoszka47 came 
and Minister Kopeć48 and [somebody] from the machine industry, the district 
secretary […]. We were prepared for the meeting with Karkoszka, and I was then 
among the three; later a few other people joined us, and we started doing things 
a bit, we were prepared […] Minister Kopeć took the floor first and complained 
about difficulties as was the fad back then. Gierek would complain and every-
body would about objective, subjective and other difficulties […]. Then the boss 
spoke […] typical success propaganda  – that we complain, but fail to see the 
 47 Alojzy Karkoszka, a former Deputy Prime Minister, a member of the Political Bureau 
of the PUWP’s Central Committee. (translator’s note)
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achievements, and he went on about achievements. Then I spoke as well, I say 
we know about successes all right, you blow every trifle up into a great achieve-
ment, that’s your big successes. And we know the things to be appreciated, but 
we’re here about shortcomings, that’s what we’ve gathered here for. And as far 
as Karkoszka is concerned, whatever he could get from the offices answerable 
to him, it’s a done deal, comrade P., put it down, you’ll have that overpass, the 
junction, we’ll see about that […], consider it done, and we’ll contact the top 
tiers about the other things […]. Most people were glad leaving the meeting, 
but despaired the following day, when they saw what that meeting had actually 
given them, as it was basically nothing […]. Only that people’d offloaded” (R 
10, pp. 8–10). “When we left the meeting,” another participant recalls, “we were 
leaving, right, the way you leave a meeting, still discussing things, so when it was 
over, we felt simply like fools, forehead-slapping, what was it actually that we’d 
come here for? Idle promises, put down this, put down that, that was it. And the 
guy put it down, playing dumb all over again” (S 21, p. 4).
“The day after the meeting, a strike began. The PUWP secretary had no doubt 
that the two were connected …” (see P 9, p. 2).
Importantly, in these and other interviews, the same insight is reiterated, 
insisting that people must start to shape their social world by themselves. This 
means that elements of the definition of the social situation have been redefined 
and what underpinned them before has been invalidated.
A new definition of the situation is always formed in a continuous process, 
in which action and reflection alternate. People gradually come to discern the 
relevance of their actions. A breakthrough moment occurs when they ultimately 
grasp what their behaviour actually means.
When the strikers in Warsaw found out what the twenty-one Gdansk demands 
were all about, they comprehended the full meaning of what they had been doing 
so far. The signing of the Gdansk accords was a breakthrough moment for other 
strikers.
The definition of the situation that motivated people to go on strike 
throughout the summer of 1980 must be gleaned from the actors’ testimonies. 
Admittedly, when they engaged in action, they were still unable to account for all 
the elements that went into the making of their motivational definition of the sit-
uation. But what they construed as the meaning of their actions had been there 
before in the form of active factors provoking them to adopt certain attitudes. 
As attitudes transformed into a system of common action, the situation changed 
and an entirely new self-awareness arose. But what was only later to be framed as 
rational and systematic by the actors was already inscribed in the activities they 
undertook in the summer of 1980.
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The beliefs that made up their definition of the situation were by no means 
homogeneous. What some people had viewed as obvious even before the 
negotiations between the government and the strikers in Gdansk were over was 
only fathomed by others much later. Given this, there must have been people 
whose active thinking reflected what was to be accepted as an “obvious” belief 
by everybody.
Intellectuals and Big Industry Workers: Generational Groups
It would be very difficult to depict individuals who stirred the intellectual fer-
ment among their co-workers. Undoubtedly, those whom we labelled the 
discontented-and-defiant inspired and promoted reflection. In the next stage, 
this function was picked up by the organisers and first leaders of new trade 
unions. However, it seems more pertinent to identify social groups that exerted 
an especially profound influence on public reflection. We posit that generational 
groups which had particular biographical experiences were hubs of this intel-
lectual effort. It was the way in which these groups thought that formatively 
contributed to the new definition of the situation. In Warsaw, two major gen-
erational groups of this kind can be distinguished. One of them comprised the 
intelligentsia and the other, workers. The “intelligentsia” generational group 
consisted of people aged 30–35 years of age in 1980. Their formative experience 
involved the events of March 1968. The “worker” generational group included 
slightly younger people, aged ca. 24–28 years of age. Their formative experience 
dated back to the June 1976 events. Why do March’68 and June’76 seem to count 
as generation-shaping moments?
For both groups, the experience of momentous socio-political developments 
marked the onset of their adult social biographies. As eye-witnesses or 
participants, they simply had to take a position on those events. It was the first 
time that they had had to relate as adults to what was going on in social life. 
This laid the foundation for their self-awareness and fostered their political con-
sciousness, values and self-images as community members. We do not claim 
that they all had the same worldview. But though ideologically differing, if not 
polarised, they had the same point of reference in having to side with one of the 
parties to the conflict, this choice determining their individual identities and 
demarcating their social communities.
When we talk of the two generational groups as vehicles of a new popular con-
sciousness, we mean those who, in most general terms, sided with society and 
against the government. This (often only latent) expression of allegiance bore its 
explicit fruit. We assume that people for whom March’68 or June’76 stood out as 
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formative moments were a similarly distinguishable group within the population 
which supported the party-and-state apparatus. This is a purely theoretical con-
jecture which our findings could not prove or disprove. At the same time, this 
author has not studied PUWP functionaries closely enough to offer any reliable 
assessment.
Besides, it is clear that other sociological groups actively developed the new 
definition of the situation as well. Just as the biographical experiences of the 
intelligentsia and workers – the March generation and the June generation – 
clearly dovetail, the affinity of intellectuals and big industry workers is also 
undeniable.
Further, the workers’ groups that fostered the new consciousness boasted 
better education. Such groups, characteristically, worked in big factories and had 
specialised (usually secondary) vocational education. Another important group 
to consider encompassed democratic oppositionists. In Warsaw, they formed a 
relatively broad social circle whose social relevance cannot be overemphasised, 
even though they did not directly influence the mobilisations. The very fact that 
democratic oppositionists were there and were fundamentally active was pre-
ciously symbolic, irrespective of the particular political or social agendas they 
championed.
The KOR and the Democratic Opposition
What has come to be referred to as the democratic opposition is a fascinating 
social development in its own right. A small group of Warsaw workers stayed 
in touch with the activists of independent social organisations. Some of the 
discontented-and-defiant regularly communicated with the independent 
activists. What such contacts looked like is explained by a respondent: “I found 
out in May that I was ill and went into therapy […] at that time I was in Zakopane, 
those first discussions with Y. […] Y said he was afraid ‘cause I was so pumped 
that I’d shoot ‘em all dead. When you’ve got no information and don’t take things 
with a cool head, you’d just put them up against the wall and shoot right away. 
I thought like that – something didn’t feel right. But I didn’t know what it was. 
Of course, Y had more information than me. […] I knew Y was somebody I can 
learn a lot from. […] I listened rather than talked. We noticed right away that 
Y knew about things. And he had the literature […]. This was the first sign that 
he had some contacts. And discussions with Z, too, of course. The joke was, 
when we had such a lively Sunday, that we outshouted the machines. We hung 
around and yelled, arguing like hell, everybody had their own opinion […], and 
we didn’t discuss politics then, but all issues. […] I remember like it was today 
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that once we had a laugh about the ‘deer in a rut.’49 We argued for a good four 
hours, and I grew completely hoarse, and so did he […]. These discussions made 
us closer and started to absorb us […]. After some time I told Y […] I’d bring a 
friend along. Of course, Y was cautious as usual […], but I say he’s a trustworthy 
person, he’s got his opinions and is a very interesting man who can do some-
thing. And Y agreed. Y was a good psychologist and judged people quite well. 
He and Z hit it off immediately […] Z was delighted with what Y was saying. 
Anyway, he also knew stuff. ‘Cause we’d literally been devouring that literature 
for months. I’d sit up long into the night and read. Any moment I had, at work, 
or wherever else, I’d sit down and read right away. I devoured everything: philos-
ophy, some psychology books Y gave me, I read basically everything, in partic-
ular history […]. Over those five months, I learned more than in all the years at 
school. Y promised […] and brought us a big bag with books – we were delighted 
we had so many and started to distribute them […]. We didn’t get anywhere 
near enough of Robotnik50 – only a dozen copies or so. We took those books, but 
money was a problem ‘cause I had a wife and a kid to provide for, I earned not 
even five… it was little, I scraped as much as I could, together [with Z] to buy 
books. Our principle was that we must have them all. Later we specialised. Z’s 
job was to disseminate the literature and mine to yap, that is, to mouth off. Our 
first meeting when I went yapping so hard was before the 8th Congress [of the 
PUWP]. I gave a really sharp talk. The first question was about the USSR. And 
I described what that heartfelt friendship was all like. At the end, I said: isn’t it so 
that this friendship, perpetuated in thousands of slogans, is based on the princi-
ples which Chamfort summed up in one sentence: ‘Be my brother, or I’ll kill you.’ 
D’you know what that could mean back then? People looked as if something had 
hit them” (interview J, pp. 1–5).
Contacts with democratic oppositionists stimulated young workers’ intellec-
tual and social development. The links between worker activists and Warsaw’s 
independent intelligentsia were very unlike what the conspiracy theory 
champions paint them to be. Their bonds were spiritual rather than political or 
organisational.
Such bonds were fostered mainly through the independent press and book 
publishing. The direct influence of samizdat publishers is difficult to assess. One 
reason is that we have only fragmentary evidence. Another, more important 
 49 An expression used in Poland to refer to popular kitschy paintings of sylvan landscapes. 
(translator’s note)
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one is that our respondents talked about the independent press in strikingly 
vague terms, suggestive of a lingering fear. The general impression was that in 
December 1980 and January 1989, this was still a subject not to be canvassed 
freely. It was popular knowledge that there was the independent press and the 
“oppositional organisation.” At the same time, our respondents claimed that 
samizdat publications had a small readership:  “Here, at the XX, there was no 
independent press at all. […] People had no idea about things. They’d have heard 
about, say, the KOR, the most famed thing, but they’d no clue about other polit-
ical organisations or the KPN,51 and stuff […] not what they were, not what 
the acronyms stood for” (S 4, p. 5). “You mean, was it something organised in 
advance, a hidden spirit that copied the illegal newspapers and inspired people? 
No, nothing like that in our factory. There were, surely, sympathiser groups affili-
ated with various organisations and – I don’t know what to call them – that pub-
lish newspapers, but they were groups that had no influence on the workforce 
as a whole […]. That movement was not popular. If there were people involved 
in this, it was a closed group” (S 7, p.  36). “No, you know, even if there was 
any, I had no access to it. As I say, if there was any, it was very small and acces-
sible to people who could have access to it or had access to it through another 
channel, purely occupational simply” (S 6, p. 13). “Individual people had var-
ious… people showed flyers to one another, or some newspapers with that stuff 
which were published clandestinely. They’d be shown in mutual trust. […]. 
[Interviewer:  ‘Were those newspapers exchanged on a big scale?’]. Not really, 
no” (S 66, p. 27). “You could only say that we knew about but one organisation, 
about the KOR, which well… simply not from any reading or brochures that 
found their way to the factory, it was a rare occurrence and always in secret […]. 
[Interviewer:  ‘But did you get any samizdats or not at all?’]. Very rarely only, 
and we read them fearfully in holes and corners […]. Yes, from time to time, but 
there were no regular supplies, only sporadically […]. By chance, we got it from 
people from other departments. There was no regular courier […], every now 
and then only, and they were copies, not originals, typed copies. But we knew 
that the KOR was kind of the first organisation that stood up for, well, workers” 
(S 38, pp. 13–14).
These responses imply that a certain taboo is violated if talking about this 
topic and prove that only few people regularly read the independent press. But, 
 51 Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej – the Confederation of Independent Poland – a 
political party with strong nationalist leanings, founded in 1979, unrecognised and 
persecuted by the communist regime. (translator’s note)
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characteristically, information about samizdat publications and the democratic 
movement circulated anyway. Clearly, such information was transferred along 
very “intimate,” so to speak, social channels. A co-workers’ group did not seem 
to guarantee enough security, and information was only shared with the family 
and close friends. As fear was very strong and deep-running, the independent 
press, along with the information about it, was disseminated at the very basic 
level of social relations.
The impact of the democratic opposition is fascinating to study. This impact, 
rather than direct, was primarily symbolic and affected people’s attitudes and 
spontaneous reflection processes. Characteristically, the differences in the 
agendas of particular groups within the independent movement were viewed 
by the broad public as, basically, minor. Let us define the relevance of the demo-
cratic opposition to the development of Solidarity.
The founding of the Workers’ Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony 
Robotników, KOR) was a genuine breakthrough moment. The KOR became a 
symbol of the bonds sprouting between the intelligentsia and workers. The cul-
tural elite, professors and writers stood up for workers and in doing so not only 
defied the regime but also promulgated a moral agenda to vindicate their posi-
tion. As a result, the workers’ protests of June’76 drastically differed from the pic-
ture trumpeted by the government. At the same time, KOR activities highlighted 
the values which were showcased in the workers’ protest. The very fact that the 
KOR was set up lent heightened moral dignity to the protest actors, as its agenda 
restored self-respect to workers. Notably, the crackdown on the 1976 protests was 
followed not only by persecutions, but also by a concerted campaign of moral 
shaming. The government made every effort to discredit the striking workers 
before the public, using not only the mass media, but also “events” orchestrated 
all over Poland in which workers were forced to participate. In Warsaw, a huge 
rally was held at the 10th-Anniversary Stadium (the city’s main and biggest 
sports stadium), with thousands of people in attendance, where the “sycophant” 
intellectuals led by Stanisław Ryszard Dobrowolski denounced the Ursus and 
Radom workers as rabble-rousers. In our data, the memory of those events is 
highly relevant to Warsaw workers as an unforgettable experience of humiliation 
and a turning point at the same time.
The government-disseminated insulting image of workers and the disgrace of 
having workers themselves take part in the spectacles of shaming proved decisive 
factors in forming the public appraisal of the entire Gierek decade.
In such circumstances, the founding of the KOR had a few direct and indi-
rect effects. First, it initiated an independent movement to aid the persecuted 
victims; second, it launched a counter-image which salvaged workers’ dignity, 
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vilifying the government; and, third, it changed a general social attitude to the 
intelligentsia and the cultural elite. People of high social status – professors and 
authors (as well as students)  – not only repudiated the government, but also 
advocated for victimised ordinary people, voluntarily putting themselves in 
their shoes. This radically changed not only the image of the intellectual elite 
but also, probably, the image of the intelligentsia as a social group. Before, the 
worldviews of the intelligentsia might have diverged from the “official canon,” 
but they had anyway been stereotypically considered the regime’s allies. The 
KOR and the later democratic opposition undermined and dismantled that 
image. (Importantly, in official journalism various measures were applied to sus-
tain the idea of the government-intelligentsia alliance. An excellent case in point 
is a series of articles published in Polityka in 1977 or 1978 at the instigation of 
Jerzy Urban.52 The first article in the series was authored by Kowalczyk, who, 
on behalf of the technical intelligentsia, upbraided the humanistic intelligentsia 
for flawed economic policy-making, equating the humanistic intelligentsia with 
the authorities). Clearly, a crack in the intelligentsia image was emerging, with 
the regime-supporting intelligentsia contrasted with the government-opposing 
intelligentsia, who cherished moral values and public good. This is where the 
divided social collective started to morph into a social community. Society began 
to split away from the party-state and seized opportunities for establishing its 
own identity. The slogans of the democratic opposition might not have been 
unanimously endorsed, but one thing was certain: their voice was an authentic 
voice of society. Besides, in practical terms, the democratic opposition formed 
a distinct group within the intelligentsia that could be approached for help and 
advice.
The founding of the KOR and the democratic opposition movement was 
also of immense importance for the intelligentsia themselves and, in partic-
ular, for the opinion-making circles. As independent institutions championed 
their agendas of struggle for human and civil rights, artists, authors, scholars 
and journalists could not but firmly define their position and choose their iden-
tity. The independent press and samizdat publishing, which flourished despite 
repressions, were certainly a highly tempting outlet and, in extreme situations, 
a real alternative to the official channels of expression. They enabled people to 
speak out abiding by their own conscience. At the same time, the wide platform 
 52 A writer, journalist and politician. In 1981–1989, he was a government spokesman and 
press secretary to General Wojciech Jaruzelski. (translator’s note)
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of independent social activity triggered real differentiation of worldviews, which 
in turn nurtured reflection on social matters.
The democratic opposition’s immediate impact consisted primarily in fos-
tering an independent information flow, starting independent social initiatives 
(such as free trade unions and the Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych [Society for 
Academic Courses]) and maintaining direct contact with a relatively small group 
of opinion leaders from enterprises, whom we have dubbed the discontented-
and-defiant. The Robotnik (The Worker) magazine turned out to be very signifi-
cant to the workers’ community.
The Pope’s Visit and the Catholic Church
The KOR’s social impact largely and relevantly converged with that of the 
Church.53 The way the KOR and the entire democratic opposition interpreted 
the 1976 events was powerfully reaffirmed when Pope John Paul II came to 
Poland in 1979. The pope’s visit consolidated the emergent new consciousness 
and occasioned an enhanced experience of the communal spirit. Society came 
to embody and see themselves as embodying a community of values, historical 
tradition and national interests, independent of the regime and its interpretive 
framework. Each of the Pope’s gestures and utterances reasserted society as a 
historical agent and seemed to address each person as an individual who was 
responsible for his/her life and co-responsible for the life and continuation of the 
entire community and national culture. Most importantly, the Pope underscored 
the inalienable human right to live according to one’s own conscience and to 
enjoy human dignity paired with the right to influence the life of one’s social 
community. That the rights of the citizen were unambiguously treated as canon-
ical human rights had an enormous resonance, and the fact that while traversing 
his homeland the Holy Father time and again referred to the nation buttressed 
the sense of social bonding.
Spiritually poignant as it was, the Pope’s visit also induced another con-
structive experience. Over that dozen days, a wave of freedom swelled across 
Poland. In towns and villages people could behave freely without fear. The few 
days of freedom also abounded in spontaneous organising underpinned by 
 53 As Poland has long been and still is a predominantly Catholic country, it has been and 
still is customary, even in highly formal and/or scholarly contexts, to talk simply of “the 
Church,” dropping the “Catholic” modifier. This convention and attitude are reflected 
throughout this volume, and wherever “the Church” appears the reader is supposed 
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very different principles than those applied by the government and experienced 
daily in Poland. Namely, the crowds following the Pope (and they were crowds 
indeed) proved capable of self-discipline as people simply “adjusted” to each 
other without any threat of violence.
The organisation of the Pope’s visit was a social action on an unprecedented 
scale. Thousands of people were involved in its preparation and implementation. 
Even the simplest roles, such as in cleaning or technical services, afforded an 
opportunity to learn something about social action. Additionally, the general 
public could find out about various organisations which coordinated the venture 
alongside the clergy, for example the KIK (Club of Catholic Intelligentsia). As 
such, people learned whom else to contact for help and advice.
Our research implies that, in Poland, religion is treated primarily as a source 
of moral values, and it is the responsibility of the Catholic Church to express and 
defend these values. “Religion is the mainstay of human dignity, it teaches respect 
for your neighbours, and it teaches what law is,” says one of our respondents (S 
66, pp. 17–18). Another respondent specifies this thought: “The sermon opened 
people’s eyes to see that this rule of law was not what it ought to be” (S 7, p. 10). 
In breakthrough moments, “when human lives are directly at risk,” says another 
respondent when explaining why the mass was read during the strike in August 
1980, “people embrace Christian morality and God” (S 3, p.  7). Yet another 
respondent states that “when you realise they may shoot at you, you think of 
religion” (S 36, p. 5).
Religion as the source of the individual’s spiritual worth and the mainstay of 
human individuality is the most pronounced element of Polish religious con-
sciousness. Consequently, the Church is regarded as obligated to defend human 
and civil rights, which are morally validated by religion. This new form of reli-
gious consciousness seems to converge with the fundamental tenets of the dem-
ocratic opposition movement. At the same time, there is also a more traditional 
form of religious consciousness which, less liberal while more authoritarian and 
dogmatic, very closely associates Catholicism’s universal ideas with national 
thinking. In this ethos, the Church is supposed to cultivate and defend national 
tradition rather than champion universal moral principles which can be given a 
nation-specific interpretation by the community.
These two varieties of religious ethos and responsibilities ascribed to the 
Church were essentially differential in terms of people’s consciousness. They 
also differentially affected people’s actions. The data we generated reveal a 
clear connection between the ways Solidarity functioned at enterprises and the 
ways in which the trade union’s activists interpreted religion and the Church. 
Therefore, interpretations of the role that religion and the Church have in 
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social life are an essential element of broader worldviews, and differences in 
such interpretations can be regarded as an indicator of a more general dis-
tinction between liberal and authoritarian attitudes. At one pole of our axis, 
the new consciousness is bound up with a tolerant ethos of openness, spon-
taneously established rules of action and ongoing deliberation about what to 
do next; at the other pole, there is a less open and less tolerant ethos which 
prioritises group values and authority, protects the “group spirit” and invests 
more in controlling people’s compliance with the rules than in mechanisms of 
instituting rules.
Within these ethoses, more and less authoritarian attitudes were expressed, 
for the catchphrase of democracy and democratic values was uniformly the 
most precious element in the new consciousness. A more liberal democracy 
and a more authoritarian democracy are terms that best depict those fluid 
distinctions typical of the period. We treat this differentiation as a structural 
axis, because communities in various enterprises where we conducted our 
interviews could be arranged into a continuum. Solidarity units founded in 
various enterprises differed in terms of action styles, while workers’ commu-
nities differed in terms of the distribution of preferences for one or another 
ethos. The poles of our axis are “empirical types”: we found two big enterprises 
which exemplified the two models. The relationship between these types of 
thinking and the actual styles in which Solidarity operated in those enterprises 
is indeed fascinating.
Clearly, these two ethos models represent two different interpretations of the 
function of religion and the Church in social life. In one of them, religion is 
the source of basic moral norms, and the Church is socially significant insofar 
as it advocates human rights. In the other, religion is a direct embodiment of 
basic values and the foundation of national values, while the Church cultivates 
national tradition and national raison d’état, though its role in championing 
universal human rights is not denied. Different though these approaches indeed 
are, they are not entirely divergent, and it is not impossible for them to nego-
tiate a common ground. Undoubtedly, at that particular historical moment, 
the shared definition of the situation adopted by the Solidarity social move-
ment members was incomparably more important than differences within the 
movement.
This overwhelmingly relevant common definition of the situation included 
the following key components: 1) the image of the previous social order and the 
sources of the crisis; 2) the vision of a desired social order and solutions to the 
crisis; 3) principles of social action.
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Implementing the Ideal: Building the Independent Trade Union 
Autumn 1980: Definitions of the Social Situation
It Can’t Go on Like This Anymore
The definition of the social situation presented here was a long time in the making. 
In the foregoing, we pointed to its elements as gleaned from our respondents’ 
statements and the meanings they attributed to actions undertaken back then. 
The symbolic catchphrases they produced aggregated into a coherent motiva-
tional framework and propelled a far-ranging process of social action. In the pro-
cess, independent trade unions were founded and started developing. What we 
present here is a snapshot that captures an image which had essentially been pro-
cessual until it took a definitive shape in the minds of the actors when they were 
asked to recount the turning point. Consequently, our snapshot is synthetic and 
schematic, yet it is certainly derived from the self-awareness of people who many 
months later were still involved in social action. Our account thus presents not so 
much people’s actual views and states of mind in early September 1980 as rather 
what people believed these states of mind to have been while depicting them in 
hindsight.
The definition of the social situation is most succinctly expressed in a plain 
statement that persistently recurs in our data: “It can’t go on like this anymore.” 
This implies that people acutely recognised that the social situation was in crisis. 
The awareness of the economic crisis was situated in a broader context: that crisis 
seemed to people to be just a symptom of a far more general disintegration of 
social life. “The public want, it runs in the Poles’ blood that there’s more to life than 
simply chow, right?” said an activist of the factory trade-union unit (S 4, pp. 3–4). 
Another respondent tried to recount conversations at his enterprise days before 
the signing of the agreements in Gdansk and Szczecin. He told us that people had 
talked about poor supplies, a decline in agriculture, chaos in the economy, faulty 
accounting and management in the company (no matter how hard people worked, 
the profit they produced always disappeared), about not having any influence on 
decision-making and even not getting any information about the decisions made, 
about overstaffing in the administrative segment and hare-brained directives (cf. S 
64, pp. 9–10). In the interviews, the economic crisis is viewed as a social and polit-
ical fact, and its descriptions yield a picture of social relationships and the rules of 
political action. Consequently, the economic crisis cannot be possibly separated 
from the social order and, as such, is discussed in terms of a crisis in trust for the 
Party and state leaders (S 76, p. 16). The gist of most interviews is encapsulated in 
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the minority governs the majority.” These words recognise and denounce the fact 
that social life is subordinated to the administration, which executes orders of the 
Party leadership. That life is dominated by the Party is reiterated by our respondents 
(cf. S 21, p. 35; S 38, p. 4). “Decision-making all top-down, everything prearranged 
in advance” (S 67a, p. 1). The monopolistic, socially uncontrolled power of the 
Party degenerated the executive apparatus (cf. S 22, p. 14; S 30, p. 18). Activists of 
the existing trade unions, the PUWP and youth organisations did not represent 
the interests of people and their organisations (cf. S 30, p. 19). In enterprises, the 
KSRs were subordinated to the management (cf. S 74, p. 2). Such a concentration 
of power in the hands of the Party and state leaders bred first of all stagnation and 
passivity, especially after 1976 (cf. S 38, p. 16); apathy and inertia ruled the day, for 
nobody felt like doing anything (cf. S 4, p. 8); what came to be referred to as silent 
meetings were a common fixture since people declined to speak on any issue in the 
belief that it was pointless anyway (Ibid.). People generally felt incapacitated and 
were paralysed by fear. Many of our respondents talk about how dangerous it was 
to voice any critique or to propose any change, be it the simplest one (cf. S 29, p. 5; 
S 3, pp. 7, 15; S 6, pp. 1, 14, 15; S 74, p. 7; S 39, pp. 6–8; S 4, p. 32).
Secondly, such circumstances engendered the feeling of humiliation and 
impaired people’s self-dignity, all the more so that – thirdly – the power system 
blatantly breached the principles of social justice. As a result, workers and the cler-
ical staff were disadvantaged both in living conditions and in the social potential. 
As regards the former, our interviews paint a dismal picture of workers’ working 
conditions; and as regards the latter, our data show that people felt divested of 
any possibility, any right even, to influence their own lives.
At the same time, the power system produced a privileged group who rev-
elled in luxury and were exempt from any social control. “Marx and Lenin, they 
wanted workers to have good lives, and not some caste of people, some ruling 
group” (S 30, p.  20). “People […] couldn’t speak out, they only call on us to 
work, and we’ve got nothing besides it – all decisions are made on top, nobody 
has any say on them” (R 67a, p. 1). Workers believed that their opinions were 
ignored in all questions, not only the economic issues, that “they’ve simply stop 
noticing workers at all” (S 3, p. 6). The management disregarded the workforce, 
and the cult of personality was ubiquitous (cf. S 74, p. 27). “They only went on 
bullying us,” adds another respondent (S 36, p. 14). “Some people, it seemed to 
them that they had a total immunity” (S 3, p. 14). Somebody shouts: “Oh, the 
wilfulness of the management!” (S 74, p. 11), and other respondents add more 
epithets:  autocrats (S 64, p. 32), red bourgeoisie (S 22, p. 15), new propertied 
class (S 66, p. 22), aristocratic lifestyle (S 37, p. 3), and similes: “no worse tyrant 
than a peasant turned into a lord” (S 74, p. 30).
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In the interviews with Solidarity activists and group interviews with workers, 
cultural disadvantage is also a salient theme. This involves complaints about lim-
ited access to education and cultural production as well as limited information 
on the developments in artistic, intellectual and cultural life. “For, my dear, my 
beloved, if we’re talking privately,” a worker says, “the government somehow 
failed to think of the urban transport, the drivers. They should know that in 
transport services there are not only such chaps who, indeed, only care about 
money and not at all about culture or education” (R 75, p. 6). “I want it, and we 
all do […],” says another respondent, “we’ll come to work… but let that work be 
like work should be. We, unfortunately, have to work, but we should have proper 
conditions so that our work isn’t stressful, that we could work in peace, leave in 
peace and go home. Well, no, perhaps not directly home, but to a shop, to do 
shopping, and then go home, fix some dinner quickly, sit down with the child, 
play a bit, even read a newspaper, not at work, but at home. And go to the cinema. 
I haven’t been to the cinema in three years, I guess. Well, I’ve got no time for it” 
(S 7, p. 8). Another respondent even counts impeded access to culture among the 
motives behind the protests in the summer of 1980: “People simply saw no other 
chance to improve their lives, their existence, work and generally everything that 
goes into human life, both work life and private life. No cultural development, 
educational development – just the opposite” (S 29, p. 24). Another respondent 
broadly discusses the political factor in barriers thwarting access to cultural pro-
duction: “there’re many people who don’t watch TV, because there’re also people 
who like to live like that: you come back from work, have dinner, watch TV, do 
your conjugal duty, go to bed, get up in the morning, day in day out. But look 
what people demand, abolishing censorship, it’s not in order to lash out against 
somebody indiscriminately, because that’s nonsense as well […] But there’re 
some historical facts that mustn’t be hidden, mustn’t be denied, mustn’t be rigged. 
The same’s true about culture as such; for it releases, well… in the nation, this 
impulse to work better. If you know that you’ll go to the cinema and see, uncen-
sored, Robotnicy’80, undoctored, you’ll work more smoothly. That’s my assump-
tion. Or you’ll see a good show on TV, or read a good book, or buy that book. 
There’s more to life than chow […] These factors that have been disregarded, 
they’re factors, I  believe, that strongly stimulate all employees to work. These 
cultural factors, exactly. That Miłosz54 guy got the Nobel Prize, true. And so what, 
who knew about it, who knew about him at all, well, who? And now the KOR can 
say: ‘We promoted him.’ […] All independent bulletins that I’ve seen […], all of 
 54 Czesław Miłosz won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1980. (translator’s note) 
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them wrote about Miłosz. Well, after all, it was a tremendous thing. There were 
some who knew. Putrament55 knew, for he’d studied with him in Vilnius, right? 
And he wrote something about him [Miłosz] once. But he wasn’t talked about 
at all. Iwaszkiewicz56 would sometimes give him a go in Twórczość, and so what, 
Iwaszkiewicz was the way he was: neither hurting nor helping, the Iwaszkiewicz 
style, as people put it. But, boy, did it buoy people! When I heard about it [about 
Miłosz winning the Nobel Prize], I lost it completely, I called friends one by one, 
I was so happy. For I know who Miłosz is. […] But plenty of people didn’t know, 
did they? But they were uplifted anyway” (S 4, pp. 34–36).
For this reason, Solidarity trade-union units early engaged in cultural and 
educational work:  “In Żoliborz,57 there’s a Youth Culture Community Centre. 
They have discussion panels, but few people know about them. At this moment, 
we’re working to arrange meetings with various people. At this moment, we’re 
organising a meeting with Bratkowski, a journalist. Later, we’ll try to hold a show 
for our company’s workers. Perhaps we’ll manage to invite as famous actors as 
Jan Pietrzak, maybe Himilsbach, perhaps, say, Jacek Fedorowicz, maybe actors 
who’ve been banned so far. How much of it we’ll be able to do, we don’t know yet. 
Certainly, if we pulled something like this off, more people besides the workers 
would come to such a meeting […] But our idea is that our workers come first 
and invited guests second” (S 6, p. 22).
Impeded or almost blocked access to education and cultural production and, 
above all, severe restraints on what products of culture were made available to 
the general public were felt as an insult to human dignity.
Fourthly, the decisions made by the “privileged” caste, who lived off workers’ 
labour, caused a deep economic crisis. Our respondents assess the bureaucratic 
apparatus as incompetent and irrational in the matters of economy (cf. S 22, 
p. 15; S 76, p. 16; S 29, p. 23) and claim that management was poorly organised 
(cf. S 30, p.  18; S 36, p.  3; S 74, p.  27), enterprises suffered from a faulty ac-
counting system (cf. S 64, p. 8), Poland’s economy was inherently wasteful (cf. S 
66, p. 23), the government’s decisions bred “economic absurdities” (cf. S 4, pp. 3, 
33; S 6, p. 2), and foreign loans were squandered (cf. S 19a, p. 13). A respondent 
states:  “We wanted to put an end to this rampant chaos” (S 7, p.  4). Another 
 55 Jerzy Putrament, a writer, publicist and politician, was a member of the Central 
Committee of the PUWP. (translator’s note)
 56 Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, a poet, writer, essayist and translator, served at that time as the 
Editor-in-Chief of the literary monthly Twórczość and was the President of the Polish 
Writers’ Union (Związek Literatów Polskich). (translator’s note)
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respondent concludes more generally:  “We’ve had enough of that demagogy; 
mendacity and injustice must be put to an end” (S 38, p. 3).
The observation that the situation could no longer be condoned almost auto-
matically prompted a very general change project. Democracy, in its broadest 
sense, was the key slogan, and its applications ranged from political governance 
to relationships at the workplace. Our respondents insist that the inordinate 
number of regulations (most of them defying common sense) must be trimmed 
down, and the government’s actions must be subjected to social control at all 
levels (state, region and enterprise). One respondent states that Social Control 
Committees should be established and demands freedom of public expression 
and the transparency of state documents (economic policy projects, statistics, 
etc.), at the same time saying that “the PUWP may remain the nation’s leading 
force, but it can’t govern the country. The country should be governed by workers 
and peasants under a socialist system” (S 64, p. 34). “The Party can define gen-
eral goals but in consultation with society. The Party shouldn’t make economic 
decisions. And the Sejm58 and national councils should have their competences 
enlarged” (cf. Ibid., p. 32–34). This very detailed statement summarises the basic 
political demands and outlines the envisioned restructuring of society. “We must 
personally participate in decision-making that concerns us” (R 67a, p.  4), the 
country and state cannot be governed without workers (S 3, p. 6), and “we must 
all know more about what’s going on in Poland” (R 67a, p. 4). The demand of 
social control over various governmental agencies is restated time and again (cf. 
S 30, p. 22; S 21, p. 35; S 6–4, p. 32), social consultation is demanded in deci-
sion-making processes (cf. S 3, pp. 30, 34), and democracy is addressed as a con-
dition of political competition (cf. S 66, p. 24).
Freedom of expression is framed as a key value, invariably accompanying the 
demand of democracy (cf. S 29, p. 29; S 20, p. 24; S 4, pp. 3–4; S 6, pp. 1, 15; S 
3, p. 8; S 37, p. 19). Other demands include restoring the rule of law, subjecting 
the Party and administration apparatus to law and observing the separation 
of powers and their respective independence (cf. S 22, p. 17; S 30, p. 22; S 37, 
p. 19). The last item in this list concerns abolishing factional privileges which 
cause social opportunities and living conditions to be lopsided (cf. S 30, p. 15; 
S 66, p. 22).
 58 Sejm refers here to the Polish parliament, which was a one-chamber body in the period. 
Historically, before the Second World War, the Sejm was the lower house, while the 
Senat (English: Senate) was the upper house of Poland’s parliament. This structure of 
the country’s supreme legislative organ was reinstated in 1989. (translator’s note)
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Many of our respondents also demand incisive economic reforms. Such 
reforms should include the decentralisation of the management system (cf. S 29, 
p. 29), a greater autonomy for enterprises (cf. Ibid., p. 30), a reorganisation of 
economic and political management (cf. S 66, p. 24), the development of private 
farming, making enterprises profitable, curbing the expansion of heavy industry 
and the promotion of technical development and innovativeness (cf. S 4, p. 34).
Democratisation is defined as the establishment of a social order in which 
people can genuinely participate in decision-making concerning their lives. 
This seems to have lain at the core of society’s aspirations. “Workers, as workers, 
should feel they are co-managers of their enterprise and have a say in decisions 
about the economy. Workers, as citizens, together with other strata and groups, 
should have a right to participate in government’s decision-making concerning 
society. Poles, as society and nation, must have a right to manage their own lives. 
We want to know more about everything that is going on in Poland […], at this 
moment, I guess, we all have faith in what will happen in the enterprise or in 
Poland, for this concerns all of us. We’ll all be in this together” (R 67a, p. 4).
This was the backdrop against which the role of Solidarity was defined. The 
trade union’s organisational principles and its operative modes were a vast 
experiment. In our respondents’ relations, Solidarity resembles a grand game 
people played with themselves and each other in order to live up to their ideals 
in everyday action and to prevent this wonderful, beloved “child” from disap-
pointing the faith they had in it. “While demanding the implementation of the 
democratic ideal in entire society and in the state, we must live up to this ideal 
in our independent trade-union unit. Even at this early stage of the development 
of the social movement, people were clearly aware that the NSZZ ‘Solidarity’ was 
a guarantor of social change. But to perform this function, Solidarity itself must 
be a democratic institution. Solidarity teaches democracy” – this is a verbatim 
quote from our interviews (S 76, p. 6; S 43, pp. 12, 17; S 64, p. 28).
The emergent trade union’s major achievement was that it reaffirmed people’s 
belief that they could actively influence their own lives and the fate of their 
group. “People finally came to believe that they didn’t have to wait for anybody 
to tell them what to do and then do as they were told” (S 64, p.  23). “People 
grew more confident and convinced that they were able to act of their own ac-
cord, without orders from the Party and administration apparatus” (S 29, p. 5). 
Grassroots initiatives are frequently emphasised: “Wherever any grassroots ideas 
appear, we do our best to entrust these issues to the proponent immediately, 
to the one who came up with the idea, and I must say these people go about 
these things very efficiently” (S 22, p. 7). The principle of agency of organisation 
members is confirmed:  “The point’s not to wait for instructions” (S 6, p.  25). 
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Sometimes difficulties appeared in developing the trade union, because workers 
tended to expect “somebody to come and explain things in more detail” (S 67a, 
p. 5). Certain basic rules had to be observed in order to encourage people’s ac-
tive commitment. One of the rules was transparency, i.e. clear information about 
what the trade union was all about (cf. S 22, p. 10; S 76, p. 9, 10; S 43, p. 6; S 20, 
p. 23; S 66, p. 30). One respondent says that PUWP members in his enterprise 
envy Solidarity complete and transparent information (cf. S 25, p. 6).
Another rule concerned the elimination of the command-structure from the 
trade union. Our respondents stress, for example, that decisions made at the 
organisation’s lower level could not be revoked at an upper level (cf. S 76, p. 13), 
the union leaders were controlled by the members (cf. S 30, p. 14) and, crucially, 
decision making was not arbitrary but involved all the interested parties (S 4, 
p. 30). These principles are pithily captured by an activist who explains the rule 
to call strike only if a poll among the workforce backed it: “[Solidarity’s] factory 
committee cannot issue any decisions all by itself ” (cf. S 64, p. 21).
Our respondents point out that Solidarity’s democratic style was vitally based 
on democratic elections and believe that the trade union could indeed express 
the interests of its members only if its activists were genuine representatives of 
the membership (cf. S 20, pp.  16–18). In one interview, the respondent anal-
yses organisational missteps and addresses the democracy vs. autocracy con-
flict which surfaced when a person appointed chairman of the union’s factory 
committee started to rule autocratically, disregarding the opinion of the com-
mission and the board. The respondent recounts a complicated process in 
which the chairman was removed from office and voices dilemmas encoun-
tered when implementing the rules of the newly established trade-union unit. 
“For people should be given a chance, you just can’t destroy new bonds bred 
by the very fact that the organisation has come into being” (S 20, pp. 22, 23). 
The same respondent also stresses that truly democratic action arises from a 
difference of opinions. Conflicts do not harm democracy (cf. Ibid., p. 27). The 
respondent reports how the Factory Committee, which had evolved from the 
NSZZ “Solidarity” Founding Committee, “viewed itself as an interim body and 
in order to feel a genuine and legitimate trade-union agency, a new, fully dem-
ocratic election to the Praesidium of the Committee and the Board was called” 
(Ibid., pp. 16–17). In our respondents’ view plurality is the basis of democracy 
(cf. S 3, p. 13).
The fundamental aim that united individual people and groups was building 
an organisation independent of the state and the PUWP. This ambition must 
have been exceeded if what started as a popular mobilisation for building a new 
organisation mutated unbelievably fast into a huge movement for social reforms. 
The Rise of the NSZZ “Solidarity”102
Important elements of the definition of the situation fostered a new social con-
sensus. It is no coincidence that the reasons behind the social crisis mentioned 
above were also cited by the leaders of PUWP organisations we interviewed.
Our data include interviews with the secretaries of PUWP basic organi-
sation in small enterprises and with the secretaries of PUWP Committees in 
bigger enterprises (originally, we had planned to interview first secretaries, but 
as already explained, some of them declined the invitation and referred us to 
their deputies). Their definition of the situation overlaps in essential aspects 
with the definition outlined above. At the same time, it differs from the defi-
nition formulated by the directors and the members of the old (branch) trade 
unions. Below we compare the portrayals painted by the representatives of var-
ious organisations.
The Public Must Understand
Their fundamental similarity is that the crisis is blamed on the centralised power 
system. This is a very important observation, pointing to a crisis within the 
PUWP itself. Undemocratic ways, decisions flouting social interests and the fact 
that even Party activists had little possibility to influence the leaders’ decisions 
and criticise their policies are listed as the causes of the social crisis. “The crisis 
arose because there was no control over decision-makers and, additionally, wise 
people were not listened to” (P  1, p.  16). “Gigantomania prevailed, domestic 
technology and inventions weren’t used, but everything was based on licences 
from abroad, and mistakes were made buying and implementing those, the 
crisis in the world’s economy wasn’t taken into account” (cf. P 2, p. 19). “Inane, 
command-based management and faulty decisions made at the central level 
were explained by objective reasons such as the weather. Such babble from the 
highest ranks of the PUWP makes one laugh” (P 9, p. 2).
The definition of the situation as formulated by the Party functionaries made 
them demand a renewal. The renewal was comprehended primarily as the 
democratisation of both the PUWP and social life. The views of the enterprise-
level Party functionaries are at their clearest in their assessment of the renewal 
process. After four or five months, they assessed it more critically than ordi-
nary Party activists did. This was undoubtedly caused by the identification of the 
former with their organisation. The demand of calling an extraordinary congress 
of the PUWP as quickly as possible was voiced time and again; this was the axis 
around which the functionaries’ expectations revolved (cf. P 4, p. 15; P 48, p. 13). 
Another typical element of the Party functionaries’ attitude was that they insisted 
on calling the Party and state leaders to account relatively more emphatically 
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than the activists of the newly formed union did. “The renewal can’t happen with 
the old people in the lead” (P 9, p. 15), “the renewal hasn’t reached everybody” 
(P 48, p. 13), “the Central Committee should change more thoroughly” (cf. P 17, 
p. 2), “the tainted ones must be punished” (P 40, pp. 13, 14, 17).
“The renewal itself is superficial, this process of renewal is too sluggish, 
I guess; the guilty ones haven’t been called to account consistently, there’s not 
concrete agenda for the Party or economic policy” (cf. P 9, p. 14). “Despite the 
renewal nothing has changed, and again there’s no information about what the 
Central Committee is doing” (cf. P 17, p. 3).
The demand to democratise the PUWP was repeated time and again: “The 
party organisations can’t have everything imposed on them from the top, 
because things will continue the way they’ve been so far” (cf. P 17, p. 2). “Party 
activists and organisations must be autonomous” (cf. P 40, p.  15). “Party 
members shouldn’t be afraid to say what they think; the Party must be urged 
to operate in transparent ways and allow open discussions” (cf. P 17, p. 2). The 
reform agenda proposed by the respondents included the decentralisation of 
management, the economy based on sound profit-loss calculation, self-man-
agement for enterprises and self-government territorial divisions, independent 
decision-making (only strategic decisions should be made centrally while local 
matters should be decided locally), a reduction of investments and the promo-
tion of agriculture (cf. P 2, p. 24). As can be seen, both the language and the 
substance of the Party functionaries’ agenda differ from the general definition of 
the situation. Their language is more technical and economy-focused than the 
language of trade unionists and workers.
Many Party activists clearly embrace the workers’ protests and are committed 
to the reform process they initiated. Sometimes they talk about it directly: “the 
strike was a very unpleasant event because the workers did what I’d also have 
done” (P 9, p. 3). Another enterprise-level Party secretary confesses that he con-
tributed to establishing the Founding Committee of the new trade union unit 
by calling together activists from the company’s various departments and letting 
them hold their meeting in his office.
Two attitudes can be distinguished in the interviews with the Party function-
aries. In one of them, the social protest is regarded as justified, and a possibility 
is envisaged to democratise both the PUWP and the entire social system. The 
functionaries commit to the reformatory process without forfeiting their identi-
ties as PUWP members. As such, they believe it possible to reconcile their own 
interests with society’s interests.
The other attitude is radically different. Some Party functionaries are highly 
distrustful of and feel threatened by the organisers of the independent trade 
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union. These functionaries identify more closely with the bureaucratic appa-
ratus. They deem their interests jeopardised. Tellingly, they harbour a certain 
resentment: they insist repeatedly that PUWP activists have made identical or 
similar demands for years, but nobody has heeded them (cf. P 1, p. 4; P 2, p. 15; 
P 9, p. 1). Consequently, they tend to be critical of the Party and state leaders.
The Party functionaries do not express the views which we referred to above 
as a conspiracy version of history. They have no doubts that the mass social pro-
test is a spontaneous movement. Regardless of how respective PUWP secretaries 
judge the events, they are not inclined to believe that the developments were 
provoked or manipulated by a group of politicians in quest for power. This is the 
reason why the old Party activists try to get involved in the establishment of new 
trade unions. As a rule, they rely on help from their company managements; 
hence such trade unions come to be colloquially referred to as “directorial.” We 
shall address them in more detail in the following.
Some functionaries distinguish between right and unwarranted demands 
made by the protesters. Consequently, they tend to point their finger at 
troublemakers, i.e. those who push the protest in a wrong direction. Briefly, 
they set apart the good from the bad, thereby reducing a rich array of nuanced 
attitudes to a black-and-white model. These secretaries state that the majority are 
good, but there is a bad minority.
What the Party must do now is regain society’s trust. This goes hand in hand 
with insistence that the government must also recover public trust. This is by 
no means a coincidence. The Party functionaries think in terms of the polit-
ical system. In their interviews, they eloquently talk about efforts to incorporate 
the emerging trade unions, and emphatically “Solidarity,” into the existing polit-
ical system. They explain that trade unions must collaborate with each other 
and organisations must be established which could bring together representa-
tives of all social and political organisations. Asked what line of action the old 
trade unions should follow, one secretary answers: “First of all, they should find 
ways to cooperate with the new unionist movement. To prevent a general dis-
integration of the unionist movement and the working class. For such a risk is 
there” (P 15, p. 16). Asked “what should be the function of trade unions?” the 
secretaries tend to answer:  “Well, they must co-manage the enterprise and be 
co-responsible for it, because they’re not only subordinate, not only controlled, 
but they should also feel […] responsible for the enterprise, together with the 
board, with all the bodies” (P 40, p. 7). Asked about Solidarity’s cooperation with 
the old union, they say: “There’s collaboration, they’ve even invited the leader of 
the old unions to relocate to that bureau of Solidarity. Of course, they [the old 
trade unions] collaborate because they have more experience perhaps, and every 
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new organisation – it must take its time, right, until it sees for itself what all these 
problems are about …” (Ibid., p.  9). “But generally we want one trade union, 
and our basic assumption is that all trade unions work for the sake of the people 
[…]. To have one trade union would simply be better, for there’d be fewer people 
delegated away, fewer people to make decisions, and the factory would have an 
authentic representation” (P 9, p. 12).
“Solidarity did tackle such issues, and it must be said, that it was in close col-
laboration with the department’s management; in collectives […], where, let’s 
say, the collective must decide, there’re in them […] representatives of the old 
Council, but also representatives of Solidarity, who all the time take part in all 
these matters” (P  1, p.  13). “So far, they’ve been coming over, generally […], 
I talked to the director, and we decided: let them come, the Solidarity guys, and 
let them see that decision making isn’t a piece of cake. Let them simply learn. 
And they can finally see that the collectives, quite wisely and reasonably, make 
decisions for the good of the workers and the company, not the way some of 
them thought” (P 32, p. 6, 7). The same secretary confesses: “Of course, I kept 
telling them [members of the Branch Trade Union Factory Council], persuading 
them to collaborate with that Solidarity. My point was, of course, to appease that 
aggressiveness of Solidarity, to eliminate those activists that use Solidarity not for 
the unionist work but for the dealings at odds with our interests here, Poland’s 
interests generally, right […]. I’d like trade unions to collaborate together, to 
cooperate for the sake of the workers and the enterprise and, of course, with the 
Party organisation, and I’m sure it’ll come to pass” (Ibid., pp. 11, 13). “No one 
from the management or the Party organisation does anything to provoke any 
antagonisms […]. At this moment, we have a broad idea of what’s customarily 
called the directors’ council, besides the directors, the council also includes the 
Party organisation secretary, representatives of all the trade unions and repre-
sentatives of the youth. And all the key decisions are made by them. All the ex-
isting organisations have their say. [Interviewer: ‘And does what Solidarity says 
matter?’]. Of course. It matters and makes sense” (P 101, p. 6, 7). “I consider 
one thing to be most important […]. Everybody must find their own place […] 
in the current situation. As time goes by, things should somehow get adjusted 
and cooperate […], in order to have unanimity, because I believe that in such 
circumstances we won’t have unanimity, and it’d be bad for us not to be unan-
imous, but of course, the clash of opinions, of attitudes, as we know, is part of 
progress” (P 2, p. 18). One of the secretaries quoted above says: “We’ve adopted 
and followed all the time this line of action – to keep the workforce as closely 
united as possible. And this, I guess, should be a goal for our country. To keep 
the nation united. This is, I guess, the most important thing. Everything can be 
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achieved, riding this renewal wave, if the nation is united, in peace, if it’s possible 
to work normally and keep things normal” (P 15, p. 15).
Clearly, we are faced with a complex situation: on the one hand, collabora-
tion and unity are an important goal while, on the other, differences of opinions 
and attitudes are acknowledged as a precondition of progress. The basic 
dilemma of the PUWP secretaries is how the national unity can be maintained, 
while allowing free debate and independent trade unions. Importantly, all the 
interviewees emphasise that the Party organisations within their enterprises 
do not interfere with the operations of trade unions. “I can’t influence, I mean, 
I did influence the old trade unions, because there’s a bond of sorts with the old 
trade unions though they’re independent. But even in contact with the old ones, 
I always proceeded very cautiously because they were also afraid to be suspected 
of being steered by the Party’s committee” (P 32, p. 11). This entails a meaningful 
change in how the Party organisations work. They cannot directly command 
and need to solicit support for their ideas by sound argumentation rather than 
by “bossing around.” This means that they can only impact the events by using 
subtler methods and building a favourable self-image.
For the supporters of reforms, it also means something else: people’s opinions 
must genuinely be taken into account. The renewal thus requires adopting a new 
way of thinking (P 101, p. 11). This is a serious challenge, for it demands sur-
rendering the privileged position: “Well, what should be done, what measures 
should be used? First of all, listen, listen to advice of smart people, keep directly 
in touch with the workers, listen to their often, though perhaps not always, what 
do you call them, well, caustic remarks, often unpleasant, but sending you on 
the right track and, you could say, to people’s often very healthy and apt words” 
(P 1, p. 16). “ […] what good would it do to try and influence the staff and, right, 
coerce people and whatnot, if Solidarity’s won popularity […], what the repre-
sentatives of one side and the other say is equally taken into account and given a 
thought in the current situation, which wasn’t the case before, this is about taking 
the working class into account, that’s how I’d put it, the government reckons 
more with what the working class say now” (P 40, p. 4, 17). “If you work, you 
want your work to matter, to be recognised, and not just to be a workhorse and 
only follow the orders” (P 60, p. 22).
The Party secretaries are satisfied with the way the social conflict has been 
solved: “[…] we’re and have been a highly tolerant country, uncommonly pro-
gressive in all respects. Even what’s going on in our system now is uncommonly 
progressive, I mean in the country. It’s unthinkable anywhere else, but we man-
aged to have both, one side and the other come to terms, as we’ve come to terms 
on one fundamental matter, so people have also come to terms, right. That’s it” 
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(Ibid., p.  12). “It seems to me that it’s a good thing that this has been finally 
solved in this way and not another, which was often used in the past, and that 
we all, exactly we all have finally lived up, so to speak, to the task and come to 
terms with each other, because it seems to me that solving conflicts is not about 
using violence and force, but about candidly coming to terms. And it seems to 
me that this is the only possible way to go there is” (P 1, p. 14). “I believe, sense 
prevailed on both sides, and it made it easier to reach an agreement on all issues” 
(P 2, p. 5). Asked “How do you assess the way the social conflict has been solved 
so far?” the interviewees answered: “You mean that the new unionist movement 
has been kind of legalised? Absolutely correct. It was necessary, I guess, and it 
should’ve happened earlier than it did. The atmosphere in enterprises would be 
far healthier” (P 15, p. 14). “Well, finally somebody drew conclusions from the 
sorry events. Finally solving this meant talking and reaching an agreement. But 
it needs to be said that this period was very, very painful for everybody. Painful 
and tense” (P 101, p. 10–11). “I’m fully convinced that it’s the only method. The 
method of concession, I call them clearly a concession – the agreements. Because 
some items included in these agreements are simply unrealistic, but they’ve been 
signed […], for example, right, the agreements say – and it’s only one example, 
many more could be found – that you’ll wait five years to get a flat. But both sides 
knew it’s absurd, that it can’t be done right away. Getting there will take long 
years of struggle […] But, I repeat, they were concessions. And these concessions 
had to be made. There was no other choice” (P 32, p. 15, 16).
“Well, it seems to me the reactions were divided. Well, some considered it 
[allowing an independent union movement in the accords] a failure of sorts, […] 
because they weren’t listened to, well some voices weren’t, this happened… And 
that’s what they considered […] a failure, but, finally, most of those who … this 
department council […], most of them also joined the new unions” (P 1, p. 10).
The last utterances in this series clearly show that the PUWP secretaries differ 
in their assessment of the accords. Some of them seem to identify more with the 
reform process and to endorse the fundamental values articulated in the social 
protest. Others regard the agreement as a necessity but view it as a concession 
on the part of the government. Both positively assess the signing of the accords 
and solving social conflicts by discussions and negotiations, yet their aim is to 
integrate the new movement with the existing socio-political system. Despite 
clear differences, the PUWP secretaries share a common vision of the situation.
Firstly, the protest of the Coast workers fully expressed workers’ actual 
interests. But in most interviews, the secretaries claim that the workers’ demands 
were similar to the initiatives of the Party organisations and state that Party 
members firmly supported the protest, participated in the strikes and joined 
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the Solidarity union movement despite initial distrust. “But liberty, freedom 
of choice, be my guest, and we were even open in our Party meetings that the 
comrades had the right to choose a union […], there was no campaigning to stop 
anybody joining […], but we declared everywhere and always that, comrades, we 
leave the free choice to the comrades, no hard feelings, but take care, comrades, 
not to change your colours59 in this new union” (P 32, p. 4), says a secretary who 
defends the existing social order in his interview.
On the whole, the social demands and political activity of the Solidarity 
trade-union movement are assessed in positive terms. “I believe they want to 
take care of a lot of things, and perhaps they don’t exactly know how it works 
because, whatever you might think, well, you can’t have everything done all at 
once and start doing things entirely differently. In the enterprise, you go about 
it, clearly, step by step. Anyway, they want, in my opinion, to do the right thing. 
And, I think, we’ll eventually reach an understanding in all matters” (P 15, p. 10).
Secondly, the PUWP secretaries are optimistic about reaching an agreement 
with Solidarity, which they perceive as a powerful mobilising force, highly rele-
vant to combating the crisis. “To put it briefly, I believe that it’ll have a very pos-
itive influence, we needed something like that” (Ibid., p. 16). “They [Solidarity] 
are, after all, an authentic force and not only in our enterprise. We realise this 
and would like [trade unions] to take care of the affairs of the enterprise, of the 
workers […]. It [this force] will be helpful because it’s, I believe, it’s a new, healthy 
force siding with which you can do much more – honestly – that much more can 
be done than with the old unions. Because, it’s new, vigorous, enthusiastic, full of 
expectations and recognised as important” (P 32, p. 5). “But one thing is good, 
I mean that we – at least the Committee, the management – hope that because 
people join the Solidarity union spontaneously and think of this union as their 
own union, we all shall or we’ll all be able to muster as much good will as pos-
sible to improve the economic condition of the factory, and not only of the fac-
tory; secondly, to contribute to more rhythmical production, and third – well, it’s 
always true that if people want something and it appears spontaneously in such 
and not any other circumstances, just as the Solidarity union has just appeared, 
you hold out much hope that if you propose something good for the factory, the 
 59 The admonition not to “change the colours” is doubly meaningful in this context, as 
one of the central symbols of communism was the red colour, and hence members of 
the PUWP were popularly called the “reds” in Poland. The insistence on not changing 
the colours – not losing the “red” colour – boils down to reminding people that they 
should remain loyal to the party and follow the party line.
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country or Warsaw, this will be supported and implemented. I  remember the 
early 70s, when the secretary also appealed for help and all people appealed too, 
irrespective of the Party or social membership. They helped and were let down, 
and in connection with this I think that, as concerns this matter at hand and the 
establishment of these trade unions, it won’t be wasted but it’ll serve us all” (P 9, 
p. 12, 13).
Thirdly, the secretaries notice that the system must be changed. “Generally, 
everybody agrees that the system can go on only if the structures are made more 
flexible, and greater freedom is given to people and to the units of the political 
and economic apparatus. […] certainly, these transformations that took place 
in, as they say, the hot summer of 1980, well, should produce a certain institu-
tional framework, some guarantees that such a bumpy ride won’t happen again” 
(P 2, p. 20). First and foremost, trust in the authorities must be restored. This 
means that law must be observed, the signed accords must be abided by, the 
obligations incurred must be kept, and the compromised leaders must be called 
to account. “People know that our representatives have let us down, this is a uni-
form view, that they should be made more accountable […], some were called to 
account at the 8th Plenum, right, that some people should be called to account” 
(P 40, p. 12). Besides: “The genuine and not only declarative role of self-manage-
ment in enterprises, in villages, in cooperatives should be restored” (P 2, p. 20). 
Further:  “The decision-making competences should be divided a bit. There’re 
strategic decisions […], but there’re also decisions that needn’t be made centrally 
but should be delegated to the lower levels of administration. […] It’ll mean 
decentralisation and likely a democratisation of, I’d say, overall social action 
[…], we need to continue this renewal process; it’s an ongoing process, I believe 
[…] the structures must be constantly improved, it mustn’t be a stiff organism, 
but a fluid organism, always in motion, for we know that it is life that changes 
conditions, and people must adjust to these conditions” (Ibid., pp. 20, 21). “We 
admonish, we want, let’s say, the Constitution to be respected, and law, let’s say, 
to be law” (P 60, p. 1).
Making the political structures more flexible is down to three basic factors: 1) 
the division of competences and the clear demarcation of the decision-making 
spheres of the system’s respective powers (PUWP’s Central Committee, par-
liament, government); 2)  institutional forms of social control (Solidarity); and 
3)  democratic changes within the PUWP. The secretaries cautiously allude to 
the separation of powers. That the state’s institutions must be subject to society’s 
control is stressed even by not very democratically minded secretaries. Our 
respondents differ on what specific political reforms should be launched. Many 
of them believe that reforms should boil down to making the systemic principles 
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which are already inscribed in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland 
a reality in actual social practice. Others insist that changes must be more pro-
found. The solution they envisage is holding a congress of the PUWP in order 
to develop a clear agenda which will give the social interests and aspirations a 
desired “institutional framework.”
The PUWP secretaries tend to have a binary vision of trade-union movement 
activists. “There’re good and bad people in Solidarity, both in enterprises and in 
the National Commission. Let’s say there’re more liberal factions, radicals, etc., as 
in any other large group of people; at X, there’re also very different attitudes – calm 
people, and more impulsive people – related to their personalities, experiences 
and, let’s say, employment in this enterprise, right, and age” (P 2, p. 18). “On the 
whole, you could say that they’re in the process of organising […], not really 
consolidated yet because they simply haven’t elected their basic bodies yet and 
all they do is, I’d say, relatively fluid […]. Generally, I’ve no problem with that, 
but it seems to me that there’re various nuances and various, well, yes […] groups 
[…], yes, individuals. Well, not individuals, but some, some groups, nuances 
which, it seems to me, are not always helpful but often, often even harmful to that 
whole movement” (P 1, p. 19). “All new things produce their own problems, and 
the way it happens is that many people have joined this union quite randomly, 
and many people’ll likely stop – that’s what I think, and I don’t know whether 
that’s right – when they have their election campaign, will stop functioning as 
committees… I think a moment’ll come when that union achieves stability, in 
organisation and in agenda, and then they’ll start working properly […] I don’t 
like it… I mean, it seems to me that the leaders aren’t united […] I don’t like it, it’s 
the most important thing, I don’t know whether I have a right not to like it, but 
that’s my opinion that the Solidarity leaders at the national level have no control 
of the situation […] It’s highly disquieting […], I guess the regional Solidarity 
centres are to blame for this, for they don’t shrink from such things against the 
leaders or without letting the leaders know, and in this way they stir that chaos or 
disquiet in the country” (P 9, p. 10, 15). This idea is fully articulated by one of the 
secretaries: “But Solidarity must first of all focus on the union-related matters. 
They can’t go beyond their statute. [Interviewer:  ‘And what do you regard as 
non-union activity?’]. It’s political activity they’ve engaged in so far, even before 
the 8th Plenum. Narożny [the respondent means Jan Narożniak60] is arrested – a 
 60 Jan Narożniak, an oppositionist, samizdat publisher and Solidarity member, dis-
seminated the Attorney General’s confidential instruction on “prosecuting anti-
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flyer campaign starts; the Warsaw Party Organisation legally elects […] comrade 
Kociołek61 – a flyer campaign starts, a protest starts. [Interviewer: ‘Well, yes, but 
you know why actually…’]. But it’s our business, the Party’s business, not theirs. 
[Interviewer:  ‘Well, if the Party is the governing power, it’s also their business 
in a way.’]. Yes, but not in this way, not [saying] that he’s guilty of crimes against 
humanity, excuse me. He’s the boss of my organisation. Is it a proper way to go 
about it? And I don’t even mention… But there’s no political culture in this fight, 
is there? […] It’s not defence of the union, I mean: defend it, but not at all cost, 
I said, there are some limits. When you breach the order of things, the legal order 
in this case, well it’s not the way to go about it, I guess; the state is our supreme 
cause, the order of the state, and not this or that man-unionist, if he violated this 
order” (P 32, p. 8). These words express the anti-democratic attitude of some 
enterprise-level Party functionaries. The state is defined as superior to society, 
i.e. not as an institution that promotes social interests, but as a power which is 
independent of society and delimits social aspirations.
The limit to social demands was another axis around which the thinking of 
the PUWP secretaries revolved.
Their thinking essentially negotiated between the acknowledgment of the 
rightfulness of social demands which should be incorporated within the system, 
on the one hand, and the imperative to sustain the socio-political status quo, on 
the other. Importantly, already at this early stage, Solidarity activists also thought 
along tolerably similar lines. This may be why, even if the Party functionaries 
negatively assess some of Solidarity’s practices, they conclude that political 
judgment indeed prevails among the unionists. Even the most anti-democratic 
PUWP secretaries observe that the situation is beginning to level out. Some of 
the secretaries point out that the 7th Plenum of the PUWP’s Central Committee 
was instrumental in bringing about stabilisation and “assuaging” Solidarity. 
They insist that, while participating in decision-making about the matters of 
importance to working people, Solidarity must accept the existing limitations. 
According to our respondent, the union’s activists were inclined to acknowledge 
these limits (cf. P 32, p. 18). All the secretaries whom we interviewed subscribe to 
this opinion. Half a year after the signing of the accords in Gdansk and Szczecin, 
they believe it is possible to collaborate with Solidarity. “A working consensus” 
has been achieved.
 61 Stanisław Kociołek, a politician and PUWP functionary, was Deputy Prime Minister in 
December 1970, when the Tri-City’s shipworkers went on strike. He was an accessory 
to a brutal crackdown on the strikers that left many of them dead. (translator’s note)
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“[…] people on these boards seem to have hit it off, I guess. People you can 
really discuss things with. But I say that sometimes even two or three meetings 
of one commission produce no results for a given set of problems. Yet in the fol-
lowing meetings, we reach an agreement for the sake of the workforce and the 
enterprise. You could say the situation has settled down” (P 101, p. 5).
This is the context for the negative assessments of the government, as men-
tioned above: “They should’ve arranged some earlier negotiations and devel-
oped a line of action based on the Gdansk agreement between the government 
and Solidarity, and others too, in order to prevent what’s been going on till 
now. It’s very irritating and upsetting, too” (P 15, p. 15). At the same time, the 
Party secretaries accuse the workforce of their enterprises of bickering, slug-
gishness (P 101, p. 9) and anarchy (P 32, pp. 12, 14). They believe that the basic 
outline of the new “institutional framework” has already been established, and 
now the decisions made so far should be implemented as quickly as possible; 
it is time to get round to the toilsome work of overcoming the crisis:  “The 
beginnings were very good, as regards Solidarity […] at this moment, perhaps, 
in my opinion, there’re too many strikes, yes, in various regions, if the state 
has no funds from which to give anything more […], the public should under-
stand, and I believe that knowing perfectly well what situation the country is in, 
they shouldn’t make any more trouble, but they [the union] should somehow 
together…” (P 40, pp. 16, 18). According to the PUWP secretaries, society must 
understand that the process of change is, exactly, a process and the demands, 
no matter how well-founded, can only be met incrementally. The Party secre-
taries evoke the national values as an essential plane where an understanding 
can be reached and the basis for the historical compromise. “As far as the trade-
union movement is concerned […], well, it is, I guess, a new factor, an unprec-
edented one […] in the history of the People’s Republic of Poland, and it must 
be said it’ll likely be a permanent factor. Solidarity itself is bound to evolve, 
too, but, obviously, we need to adapt, and Solidarity, as well, and entire society 
to the new conditions, to the new realities; first of all, we must all feel we’re 
Poles and only secondarily members of the union or the Party, or other, right, 
citizens; that’s I guess the most important thing, the cause of Poland’s raison 
d’état” (P 2, p. 21).
The upswing of social ambitions, on the one hand, and delays in implementing 
the decisions, on the other, clearly upset the enterprise-level Party secretaries.
Some of them embraced the reform process and were more critical about the 
government, whereas others were anti-democratic and emphasised the prolif-
eration of “unfounded” social demands. Despite that, the situation in Warsaw’s 
enterprises undoubtedly levelled out at the turn of 1980. Hence, the secretaries 
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optimistically believed that both sides would play by the new rules of social game 
and that this was the best solution for the entire country.
“Somebody Must Be in Charge of the Whole Thing”
The leaders of the old unions (this is how we referred to the entrenched branch 
trade unions during our study as different from the arising Solidarity trade-union 
units and from the autonomous, so-called directorial trade unions) found them-
selves in a far worse situation than the Party functionaries. Even though most 
of them were PUWP members, they primarily identified themselves as union 
activists. The renewal slogan brandished by the PUWP leadership corresponded 
(declaratively at least) to the social demands, which reaffirmed derogatory 
opinions about the existing trade unions and, consequently, induced very strong 
emotions. The interviews with the old union activists, who feel betrayed and 
vulnerable in the new circumstances, ooze anger and resentment against both 
the PUWP and ex-members of the old trade unions. Even though they openly 
hate quick-rising Solidarity, they cannot disagree, much like PUWP function-
aries, with its assessment of the social situation: “the demands were right” (B 31, 
p. 5); “The Coast makes demand for us all; all working people have benefitted” 
(B 61, p. 7). Nevertheless, more often than not, they voice emotionally charged 
reservations. “I highly value what they do,” an activist of the old trade unions 
evaluates Solidarity’s work, “but I wouldn’t be able to declare to join them” (B 
28, p. 8). This attitude underlies the definition of the situation as professed by 
the branch trade-union activists. The definition was formulated in relation to the 
developing Solidarity. The respondents articulate a basic belief that the proposals 
which the activists of branch trade unions had been putting forward for years, 
in particular since 1976, didn’t differ at all from Solidarity’s demands. Even the 
demands of the Coast strikers were no different from those of the old trade 
unions (B 41, p. 3; B 26, p. 5). This belief produces a rather deprecating image 
of the new trade union: “To me, Solidarity in Gdansk resembled the CRZZ, a 
slightly different version of it perhaps; it would be the same, at a certain mo-
ment that Wałęsa would … well, exercise power through his committee over all 
the unions in Poland, and, obviously, there’s discipline, and because of it every-
body will be doing as they did before” (B 8, p. 6). “Solidarity is another CRZZ,” 
adds the same respondent (Ibid., p. 10). “Like any other organisation, Solidarity 
will be managed top-down” (B 62, p. 15). They also express a negative opinion 
about Solidarity:  “They organise strikes without the proper recommendation 
from Solidarity’s Main Board [sic!], so it seems to me that there was no order 
and no agreement with that Main Board of Solidarity, but people just did what 
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they wanted at random and that organisation was a mess” (B 28, p. 10). Another 
belief is that Solidarity is not consistent about calling the previous state lead-
ership to account (cf. Ibid., p. 10). Censure of the Gierek cabinet is an integral 
factor in how the branch trade unionists define the situation: “They’re to blame, 
they must be punished, why should we, honest trade union activists, bear the 
consequences?” They seem to cry: “We are scapegoats” (cf. Ibid., p. 6).
The old trade-unionists believe that the trade unions failed in their social 
roles because of the CRZZ coterie (cf. B 41, p. 7), which meekly surrendered to 
the PUWP; the fact that CRZZ members were at the same time members of the 
PUWP’s Central Committee severely restrained the old trade unions’ efforts (cf. 
B 37, p. 3; B 31, p. 19; B 62, p. 9). The trade unions were subordinated to the Party 
(B 28, p. 7), and elections to the Enterprise Council were decisively influenced 
by the PUWP executive (cf. B 46, pp. 1, 2). Our respondents also complain that 
the leadership of the trade unions never seemed to change: “Everybody believed 
that if one got that function, one would always have it” (B 34, p. 13). “Whoever 
held any position, they were Party members. […] When a top-down order came 
from, let’s say, a Party body, did a Party member disobey? No, they didn’t” (B 28, 
p. 13). Our respondents also mention a lack of control (cf. B 31, p. 14) and the 
direct subordination of the trade unions to the clerical segment (cf. B 31, p. 18; 
B 61, p. 1; B 62, p. 1). “We talked too much about achievements and too little 
about difficulties” (B 34, p. 6). At the same time, nearly all respondents claim that 
Enterprise Councils passed the members’ demands to the CRZZ, but to no avail 
(cf. Ibid., p. 3), and complain that the trade unions were impeded by bureaucracy 
and the centralised management system (cf. B 31, p. 5). “Bottom-up demands, 
people’s demands were, well, brushed off ” (B 34, p. 4). “Activists couldn’t per-
suade their leaders to mind people’s grievances, what they talked about” (B 26, 
p. 14). “The top-down steering method was inadequate” (B 31, p. 7), but that’s 
why “those on top are to blame” (B 31, p. 11).
As can be seen, the definition of the situation was constructed in reference to 
the image of the organisation, and the situation at hand was almost exclusively 
perceived in terms of the collapse of the old trade unions and their activists’ 
sense of threat. More general assessments are rather scarce and shallow. Among 
the reasons behind the crisis, our respondents list ill-advised investments and 
trade based on unequal terms (cf. B 34, p. 13), incompetent management, cor-
ruption, thievery, a lack of planning in the allegedly centrally planned economy 
(cf. B 31, p. 8), aggravation of social inequalities (cf. B 46, p. 6), low wages, diffi-
cult working conditions and a poor organisation of labour (cf. B 34, p. 5).
This resentment-inflected definition stretches between hatred of the former 
leaders and rancour against the membership, whom the activists accuse of 
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abandoning them en masse: “plenty of people upset us in a way, for they left in 
spite of what we’ve done for them” (Ibid., p. 7); “people don’t appreciate the effort 
of the Enterprise Council, this ingratitude hurts […] And, after all, we did our 
best for them” (B 61, p. 8, 5); “the Enterprise Council has always been people’s 
tacit friend” (B 62, p. 2).
But, even when seemingly expressing the essence of the social protest and 
agreeing with “people” about the causes of the crisis, “people’s tacit friend” turns 
out to represent fundamentally different values and interests than workers’ 
values and interests.
While the Party functionaries insist on democratising and re-defining the 
social role of the PUWP in order for the Party to be a genuine people’s champion, 
such attitudes are very difficult to find among the old trade-union activists. On 
the contrary, the latter are quite vocal in endorsing the former principles of orga-
nisation and governance. This attitude appears in the above-cited assessments 
of Solidarity as a new mutation of the CRZZ. Moreover, the old trade-union 
leaders tend to believe that Solidarity must by necessity morph into a CRZZ-like 
structure. “Solidarity is a group of people and, let’s not deceive ourselves, it’ll be 
managed, like any other organisation, by one board or another” (Ibid., p. 15). 
This represents the old trade-union activists’ attachment to the autocratic power 
system. Identification with power, comprehended as a capacity to determine 
what others do, and the imperative to control the members and their actions 
are the quintessence of the views of the old trade-union activists and demarcate 
their horizon of thinking about the social world and human beings in this world. 
For example, a long-time activist says: “The trade-unionist movement is just an 
addition to directives, it only serves as assistance” (B 41, p.  12), and another 
respondent remarks: “trade unions are a kind of humanitarian and philanthro-
pist activity” (B 46, p. 11–12). As such, trade unions should not dabble in poli-
tics: they should control people in power positions, but the Party should do its 
job:  “I don’t approve of mixing politics and the trade-union work the way it’s 
going on now” (B 8, p. 13). This is where the basic objection to Solidarity comes 
from; the respondents resent the trade union’s explicit involvement in politics, 
which they regard as the exclusive domain of the government. Finally, the old 
trade-union activists define their idea of social action: “What trade unions do 
should be based on deliberation how people’s actions should be channelled” (B 
61, p. 2). Another activist and organiser of a directorial trade union characteris-
tically speaks of his organisational effort: “It caught on, we ran it among workers, 
we got them round to work, etc.” The respondent positively states that “I may 
know workers’ problems better than they know them themselves” (B 3, p. 5). “I 
believe they need guidance, absolutely honest people need to be chosen who’ll 
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guide this movement and carry it on” (B 8, p. 7). “The goal was to give people 
a chance to do things for themselves […], and to guide those people’s activity 
simply for the sake of the enterprise’s workforce” (B 61, p. 2), “for, after all, there 
must always be somebody in charge of the whole thing” (B 26, p. 13).
This pattern underlies the old union activists’ entire social experience and 
identity. What has been happening seems an end of the world to them: they feel 
directly and personally threatened by everybody around – Solidarity, the PUWP, 
the workforce in their enterprises and the party-and-state authorities. The old 
union activists relatively seldom criticise their directors, even though a general 
critique of the “management” is not rare. Despite that, they also imply that the 
bureaucratic and autocratic principles are irremovable. They adopt the bureau-
cratic viewpoint of the state: “Of course, people’s good is at stake, but you also 
need to consider what’s good for the enterprise, after all, the workers and the 
enterprise are one and the same thing” (cf. B 31, p. 17). “Hence, there’s no need 
for Solidarity in the enterprise at all, perhaps in the country” (cf. B 41, p. 13, 14). 
For the old trade-union activists, the state is an organiser and “a manager” of 
human activity.
Although many of their critical opinions dovetail with the views expressed 
by Solidarity and the Party functionaries, the old trade-union activists basically 
do not uphold the emergent ensemble of commonly endorsed social values. 
First of all, they uncritically cherish the former principle of governance saying 
that somebody must “be in charge of the whole thing.” Such a person must have 
special competencies and be predestined for the role rather than being simply 
elected by the people involved. The old trade unions’ activists seem unable to 
perceive any collective otherwise than in terms of the authorities and the masses.
Nevertheless, some of them were inclined to reconcile their own interests 
with the social interest in more constructive ways. This less uncompromising 
definition of the situation accepted a pluralist system of trade unions. On this 
model, Solidarity was viewed as a competitor, and productive aspects of such a 
situation in the enterprise were cited: “competition between the unions is a good 
thing [because] if one goes about some things noisily, the other tries to hush 
up other things” (B 62, p. 3). Collaboration with Solidarity seemed a necessity, 
and the old trade-union activists put aside their grudges in order to win back 
at least some of their membership and gain social recognition. Consequently, 
they often declared their good will and eagerness to be on friendly terms with 
the new trade union, complaining simultaneously that Solidarity did not show 
a lot of inclination for “friendship” (cf. B 26, p. 8). “The old trade unions stretch 
out their hand to the new ones, but the new ones are blind to this gesture” (B 
28, p. 6); “We couldn’t find a common ground with Solidarity at all” (B 8, p. 12). 
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Although some respondents say that “you’re really terrified of some people from 
‘Solidarity’ […], ‘Solidarity’ wants to be a ruling party and it drives the country 
to the edge of the precipice, provoking a foreign intervention” (B 31, pp. 4, 5, 6), 
they do not accuse Solidarity of being an anti-socialist force (B 8, p. 11).
Symptomatically, the old trade-union activists’ way of thinking, logic of argu-
mentation and language itself were strongly redolent of propaganda campaigns 
rife on television and in some newspapers at the time. Among our respondents, 
the old trade-unionists most frequently used the ready-made linguistic and con-
ceptual clichés which were disseminated by the mass media. Their reflection 
and expression were least independent. Nevertheless, event they occasionally 
repudiated the propaganda language in that they did not define Solidarity as an 
anti-socialist force. Still, they tended to cultivate a conspiracy view of the events, 
even though they were not preoccupied with it, focusing on their own, rather 
dramatic situation.
“Three Souls” of the Directors
The definition of the situation as formulated by the directors of enterprises we 
studied sometimes borders on the old trade-unionists’ vision, the difference 
being that the former are less agitated and more resolved to adapt to the new 
circumstances. The directors largely share the workers’ assessment of the system 
in place and of the causes of the social crisis. Still, the directors speak, on the 
whole, in more precise terms and offer more detailed depictions of the chaos 
ripping the “planned” economy, especially when they address the flaws in the 
management system. Many directors also disprove the information spread by the 
mass media by claiming that the strikes neither disrupt discipline nor diminish 
production efficiency (cf. D 70, p. 17). Namely, even though the strikes result 
in losses, the losses are anyway negligible in comparison with the regular losses 
caused by power cut-offs and discontinuous supplies of raw materials (cf. Ibid., 
pp.  10, 12). The directors insist that wastefulness and losses are caused by ill 
management, wrong bureaucratic decisions and faulty central economic poli-
cies. Given all these, some directors, like the PUWP functionaries and the old 
trade-union activists, tend to insist that the workers’ demands are identical with 
what the directors themselves have often urged but what has always fallen on the 
deaf ears of the government (cf. Ibid., p. 6, 7). Nevertheless, the directors perceive 
the workers’ protests and the independent trade union (particularly at the time 
of its formation) as workers’ usurpation of the prerogatives of decision-making 
on issues beyond their expertise. The directors emphasise that their own pro-
fessional competence has been undermined although, as they admit, they have 
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never been able to prove this competence, because final decisions have always 
been made by the “higher rung” officials and the bureaucratic reason has come 
to dominate over the expert reason. This insight curbs the directors’ emotions, 
even though their feelings are often vented in the conspiracy version of history. 
Admittedly, the directors show how unfounded the propagandist interpretation 
of the genesis of the crisis is, yet they are eager to pick up rumours that the 
entire protest has been engineered by conspiring politicians and to patch them 
up together into a coherent theory. More importantly, the directors clearly look 
down on workers, considering themselves a separate social category – the upper 
class, as it is tempting to conclude. In describing the social situation, they use 
a specific language which objectifies workers as labour force, masses and staff, 
rarely defining them as people who have something important to say.
At the same time, however, the interviews with the directors register the 
beginnings of change in the representations and attitudes enforced by the new 
situation. The directors claim that Solidarity has effected a transformation in 
thinking which, in their opinion, is related to the political renewal (cf. Ibid., 
p. 18). They learn to see workers as human beings with dignity, whose opinions 
must be taken into account. Nevertheless, despite undeniable changes in their 
attitudes, the directors are hostile or distrustful towards the idea of democ-
racy: “Democracy is a waste of time, six hours spent debating on something that 
takes fifteen minutes to do” (D 73, p. 9).
Still, their definition of the situation has been evolving, as they have been 
adapting to the new situation so as to retain their position. First, the workers’ 
protest and the establishment of the independent trade union in the company 
infuriate the directors and provoke them to take action against the building of 
trade-union units. They define the situation as a threat to their power and to the 
principle of competency and expertise in economic management. A few months 
later, they view the situation differently. Workers become people entitled to eval-
uate the operations of their enterprise. Consequently, restrictions to the direc-
torial decision-making power are accepted. The directors are still distrustful, 
but Solidarity must be reckoned with as a fact: “if an overwhelming majority of 
workers are behind it, you need to acknowledge it” (cf. D 70, pp. 11, 12). At any 
rate, the directors are at a loss to find arguments against the democratisation 
of political and economic life. Negotiations and consultations between workers 
and directors were taking an institutional shape even as we were collecting our 
data. No matter how much they valued the old trade unions and how much ef-
fort they had put into stopping Solidarity (which will be discussed below), the 
directors perceived the rationality of the demands put forward by the new union 
members. Consequently, they stopped (or at least declared to stop) meddling 
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with trade-union activities and various trade unions’ attempts to get on with 
the other ones. “Trade unions simply must come to terms with each other, and 
they’ll do it best on their own” (Ibid., p. 13). At the turn of 1981, a working con-
sensus was achieved at Warsaw’s enterprises.
Importantly, the relationships between the workforce, in particular workers, 
and the directors turned into what Marxists describe as a class conflict. This 
is suggested by the image of workers formed by the directors, especially at the 
beginning of the process. The directors were opposed by a class made up by 
workers who had undoubtedly come to share a sense of common interest and 
forged bonds that organised this class. Nevertheless, it was rather “a class of 
employees,” for only a part of the clerical segment identified fully with directors 
and the state as the owner and the decision-maker. The latter included primarily 
the company’s major officers, while most specialists and other white collars 
rather spontaneously tended to join the workers’ protest or were among the 
founders of the independent trade unions. Importantly, white collars felt more 
at risk in the belief that their disobedience was easier to penalise. Consequently, 
they were more predisposed to accept a compromise, even though their living 
conditions were inferior to workers’, while their sense of social disadvantage was 
often more acute. The old trade-union activists, who were as a rule on enterprise 
payrolls, most clearly identified with the “director class.” Interestingly, for all their 
leanings toward the directors and the old trade unionists, the enterprise-level 
PUWP functionaries adopted the position of mediators between the “classes.”
While the PUWP secretaries often display political thinking framed by 
interests and values, the directors talk in more pragmatic and instrumental 
terms, although their rational language often articulates deep insights into 
national values and culture.
The directors navigate among several frameworks of reference, and some of 
them are aware of this vacillation. One of the directors we interviewed begins 
his assessment of Poland’s economic and political situation and evaluation of 
Solidarity’s activity with a telling confession: “Well, I must… two or three souls 
will struggle in me here” (D 15, p. 59). The directors’ “first soul” is associated 
with the power system of the state in which they are organisers and managers of 
economic life. This identification framework determines the “class” relationship 
between the directors as a social group and the workers or, in broader terms, the 
employees. The directors view their membership in the “upper class” and partic-
ipation in the exercise of power as grounded in their professional competency. 
This is where the directors’ “second soul” enters the stage. As experts/engineers 
and experts/managers, the directors cannot possibly appreciate the rules which 
have so far governed the state’s operations and policies. The rationality of the 
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enterprise and of the economy as a whole opposes centralisation, bureaucracy 
and politically motivated decision-making. In this context, Solidarity must invite 
positive appraisals: “One thing Solidarity did to deserve the highest credit is, in 
my opinion, if you realise that Solidarity started fighting that evil we were faced 
up with in that past period. I mean this, let’s call it, nutshell case or our own local 
case, where the abuse of power was so glaring, flagrant and blatant. The same 
is true on a larger scale, among many other dignitaries or non-dignitaries, eco-
nomic, political decision-makers” (Ibid.). Consequently, the directors support 
the democratisation of the system as the only way to make production more 
efficient by replacing the central management with economic mechanisms and 
to encourage people to exert themselves for preventing the country’s economic 
collapse.
“Reforms must certainly start from trust, there’s a number of things to be 
done, from retracting the imposed production plans, they should be developed 
within enterprises and based on realities, common sense, actual possibilities. 
We’ve often faced this problem ourselves; I had a talk just a while ago, I won’t 
go into all the economic details of it […], but I can tell you this – this thing’s 
imposed on us and causes misunderstandings, such misunderstandings that 
sometimes words just fail us. We’ve struggled so many years now!” (D 24, p. 8). 
The director envisages the following reform plan: “I’m not the only one to think 
so, I believe that we’ve had enough discussing; it’s time to get down to work, learn 
to govern, give power to the people who can govern and not to time-servers and 
carpetbaggers, give power to those we’ve actually elected. […] reforms to flatten 
the organisation structures, curb decision-making, put in an economic system 
where we must account and be responsible for what we’re really doing, where 
we’re given funds and means and then must show what we’ve done with them, 
and where we deal with concrete aims and not mythical categories […], where 
economic categories eventually prevail and the market laws work. Let them not 
force us to hire ten thousand people at, say, a construction site when I know we 
only need five thousand […]. That’s the world I live in: I go to see the minister at 
the end of the year and say: ‘Sir, the planned profit was eleven million zloty, and 
I’ve reached fifteen million.’ The minister says: ‘Director, what’s this? I need you 
to give me at least one hundred and twenty million, I need to have at least twenty 
percent in excess of the plan, I need the plan done at one hundred and twenty 
percent.’ And I must manoeuvre and cheat and somehow produce these millions 
from the hat to please the minister” (Ibid., pp. 9, 10).
Another director refers to the news from late August 1980 that the government 
does not allow establishing Free Trade Unions: “Well, there was always one expla-
nation, right: the Party’s executive role in whatever was going on. Well, especially 
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over the last decade, true, all initiatives, even the smallest ones, launched in Poland, 
whether social, economic or cultural ones, had to boast, well, the patronage of the 
Party or, well, at least of the Party activists, that’s how it must be understood” (D 27, 
p. 8). When asked “How do you understand the renewal and democratisation?” 
he answers: “Putting in a system of [local] self-government across the country. 
Without external pressures […], especially not from people in top positions, on 
who is to be involved, who is to be in the leadership of self-government at all 
levels […], at the lowest rung in particular […]. Without self-government and 
giving all those low-rung officials [of enterprise-level workers’ self-management 
and rural self-governments] an opportunity to act freely and democratically, 
I think, there won’t be any effects that the nation expects” (Ibid., p. 11). “Why is 
it necessary? For example, in one of our departments […] there’s been a break-
down in daily production targets. Nobody spoke with these workers […]. And a 
group of workers from that department spontaneously […] agreed among them-
selves, and decided to work ten to twelve hours longer to catch up with the plan 
[…]. And I think that such initiatives will be crucial, right, what people do down 
there, how people think. People are starting to see that the situation’s difficult in 
Poland, right, and it can get even more difficult, but if we believe that we work for 
ourselves, I mean not only for us in the enterprise, but for entire society, for the 
nation, such initiatives will spring up every day” (Ibid., p. 13). The respondent 
concludes: “We must develop a model where all initiatives, individual and collec-
tive alike, are taken advantage of rather than destroyed. That’s the crucial thing, 
I believe, and the democratisation of life is a basic condition of such an inclination 
to take up initiatives across society, generally” (Ibid., pp. 14, 15).
The directors’ reasoning was clear:  the economy depends on economic 
mechanisms, including the autonomy and self-reliance of enterprises, market laws 
and social control of decision-making. They believed that the democratisation of 
the management of economy was a necessity and, at the same time, that it would 
promote workers’ own initiatives and heightened effort. This was especially rele-
vant with a view to combating the crisis. Reforms entailed “creating a system of 
autonomy for economic actors, with or without federations […], that’s a minor 
thing, but creating authentic autonomy, well, I guess guaranteed by a Sejm bill 
so that it couldn’t be reverted by copier-made regulations, right? In Poland, the 
worst law is the copier-made law,62 which multiplies totally beyond control” 
(Ibid., pp. 16–17).
 62 “Copier-made law” (Polish: prawo powielaczowe) was an expression popularly used in 
Poland to refer to unpublished, internal by-laws, legal interpretations and guidelines 
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The democratisation of social life was a political condition of economic 
reforms. In the directors’ view, this predominantly entailed the democratisation 
of the PUWP:  “There won’t be any democratisation of life in the country if 
there’s no democratisation, but autocracy, in the ruling Party” (Ibid., p. 17). “The 
Party should engage in a wide-ranging dialogue with society. My view is, and 
it’s only my private opinion, that the Party displays an enormous social sensi-
tivity and wants to meet the aspirations of the working class mid-way, clearly 
showing that it’s learned the lesson of 1956 and later years” (D 44, p. 11). This 
respondent’s vision of reforms is less radical than, though in broad lines similar 
to, that outlined by the former one: “The point is to put in frameworks enabling 
some autonomous decision-making so that when you make a decision you know 
it’ll be implemented rather than changed immediately by somebody else and 
questioned away” (Ibid., p.  14). The same director says:  “I’d like the Party to 
finally brace itself up and fully represent the working class’s aspirations unlike 
before when the Party dealt with everything, the economy in particular, less ded-
icated to calling people to account. I’d like the Party to finally be on the offensive. 
For Solidarity to stop being the foremost power in making demands and pro-
posing solutions to problems in conformity with the expectations of the working 
class” (Ibid.).
The interviews cited above display a wide array of attitudes expressed by 
directors as experts/managers. They seek to salvage their “second souls” by 
embracing either the PUWP’s renewal process or the Solidarity-initiated social 
reform process. Those who believe that they can use their competency and rec-
oncile their professional interests with social interests voice far more coherent 
economic and political reform plans that those who are preoccupied with the 
idea of the renewal within the PUWP. The respondent cited above describes 
how substantially his mindset changed when the statement of a Gdansk-based 
director was discussed in a meeting: “This showed us finally what it was that 
the workers wanted, right; another thing  – that the workers didn’t just seek 
private goals and weren’t only interested in what’s good for them, but their atti-
tude was socially inclusive, and then we understood, right, and I understood 
myself that the Solidarity trade-union movement could contribute a lot to the 
renewal of life, in particular to the renewal of the democratisation of life in 
Poland” (D 27, p. 14).
which, though of dubious legal validity, actually affected the functioning and decisions 
of administration bodies. (translator’s note)
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Altogether, based on rational assessments of the economic system in place in 
Poland, the directors supported democratisation as the only effective solution to 
the economic crisis.
To save their “first soul,” they sought to square democratisation, on which 
their “second soul” insisted, with the renewal of the PUWP. As a result, their 
programme, though clearly limited, overlapped largely with the vision of those 
directors who were prepared to give up their power. The latter subscribed to the 
far-ranging reforms triggered by Solidarity.
Yet the directors had also a “third soul,” which helped them navigate these 
contradictions. It was their national soul: “What I see every day, those people 
from Solidarity” one director says, “are, after all, the most earnest Poles, the best 
workers, the most decent people, and I  can’t suspect or attribute to them any 
capitalist or imperialist, or anti-Polish beliefs or leanings because that’d make 
no sense. […] Communism or no communism, there can be socialist loyalties, 
honest and unaffected, in society, for we all, and many of us, don’t dream of, don’t 
want and indeed would be hostile to the return of the capitalist system. But, on 
the other hand, we can’t deny that we’ve been brought up in Western culture. 
That Rome, that Latin, that Church have shaped us all ideologically, with all the 
preferences of lifestyle, beliefs, the sense of justice, ethics, morality – all these 
factors have produced in us certain aspirations, ambitions, certain ideals which 
are entrenched in society and which are often brushed aside or forgotten, while 
we hasten to build the communist system. Perhaps, it’s a Russification theory, 
that may well be, yes… Silence over some facts of our history, some differences, 
some antagonisms that have grown between Poles and Russians for hundreds of 
years, and they’re not gone, they’re still there […]. We hated the Swedes for three 
hundred years, and today we’re not entirely indifferent to things Swedish. And 
it will take more than twenty or fifty years for us to really start liking Russians. 
All the more so as their methods are, well… controversial, to us, to our… to our 
mentality, they’re often unacceptable” (D 59, pp. 16, 17).
The directors’ national soul cultivates distinctively Polish tradition and cul-
ture and understands their relevance to human aspirations and beliefs; it upholds 
Poland’s allegiance to the fundamental values of European culture, which cannot 
be renounced even if embracing communist ideology. The exigency to reconcile 
these crucial cultural values with socialist ideology is at the same time a problem 
intrinsic to Poland’s relations with the USSR and central to the political model. 
Socialism in Poland cannot be a simple replication of the Soviet model; rather, 
it must grow out of and conform with the principles of national culture. Just 
like the workers, the directors are Poles, and this compels them to redefine their 
relationships with the workforce. The national identification alleviates and curbs 
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the “class” conflict between the directors as the ruling and the workers as the 
ruled. The directors come to realise that those in power must be strong, but their 
effectiveness is predicated on competency, while they are only legitimised if they 
endorse society’s values and culture.
Establishing Independent Trade Union Units
The process of establishing independent trade unions, most of which quickly 
joined forces to form the nation-wide Independent Self-Governing Trade 
Union “Solidarity,” was lightning-quick. By the turn of January 1981, when 
we stopped collecting our data, the organisational structures of the NSZZ 
‘Solidarity’ had taken firm shape, and the tripartite division into Solidarity, 
the branch trade unions (the old unions) and the autonomous trade unions 
(to which our respondents referred as directorial) had crystallised. The pro-
cess itself was uneven and, at the same time, eventful. In some of Warsaw’s 
social circles, it proceeded rapidly and efficiently. These circles served as an 
“engine” that powered up the formation of the regional organisation Mazovia 
NSZZ “Solidarity.” Two social groups seem to have been particularly instru-
mental in the process: one of them comprised workers of big industrial plants 
(with the workers of the enterprises that had gone on strike in the summer of 
1980 playing the most important role) and the other included intellectuals – 
scholars from universities, the Polish Academy of Sciences and other research 
institutions. As stated in the Introduction, the process of setting up inde-
pendent trade unions began within these two big social circles as soon as 
the Gdansk and Szczecin accords had been signed. For a while, the process 
unfolded along two separate trajectories, even though it was propped by sim-
ilar definitions of the social situation. The building of trade unions as part 
of Solidarity was staggeringly quick in big industrial plants, while in small 
enterprises and cooperatives the new union’s structures were only established 
later. The Solidarity-founding processes were very dynamic in the health 
care sector, engineering services and foreign trade organisations. The latter 
institutions were by far the quickest among other offices to set up independent 
trade unions.
Turning Points
Continuous though the process generally was, it had certain turning points that 
accelerated the establishment of Solidarity units. Of course, the first moment 
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consciousness evolved conterminously with the shared definition of the situa-
tion. One respondent says:  “People knew things were going bad […]. But, of 
course, they couldn’t precisely articulate, say, their demands, what it was actu-
ally that pained them, that oppressed them. They knew that it was no good, and 
that they were badly oppressed, and up there [in Gdansk and Szczecin] they 
had it articulated for them” (S 4, p.  9). We have shown the different nuances 
of the social definition of the situation. Emphatically, the events produced a 
wide-ranging social consensus, where even people who did not support the def-
inition of the situation (such as the job-holding old trade-unionists) did share 
the fundamental insights of the new consciousness, in particular regarding the 
causes of the crisis.
But, naturally, it takes more than just upholding a certain ensemble of beliefs 
(especially, if they are basic moral beliefs) for people to take joint action. People 
were scared (hence our respondents repeatedly state that Solidarity founders 
were brave people). The breakthrough moments in the union’s development 
were those when more and more social groups mustered their courage. On such 
occasions, the fear of spontaneous action was gradually overcome. “We sighed 
with relief when the agreements were signed,” recount the workers (R 67a, p. 2).
Subsequent turning points came when the NSZZ “Solidarity” was founded at 
the end of September and a one-hour strike was called on 3rd October 1980 to 
demand the registration of the trade union and its statute. In Warsaw, the strike 
was also joined by enterprises where Solidarity units had not been set up yet. In 
one of those enterprises, the workers were so determined that the management’s 
and the old trade union’s pleading and bullying were to no avail, and the strike 
took place despite the threat of pay cuts (cf. B 41, p. 10).
Another breakthrough came on 12th November 1980, when Solidarity was offi-
cially registered by the Voivodship (Province) Court in Warsaw. The trade union 
members were ready to go on strike in defence of their organisation. The regis-
tration definitively tore down the barrier of fear. Importantly, by that moment, 
the trade union’s organisation structures had already been formed. Moreover, 
the enterprises where the trade union was established after 12th November 1980 
reluctantly admitted that the Enterprise Committees had suggested an earlier 
date as a rule. The registration was a turning point, not only because it marked 
the closure of the Solidarity-building process. It also marked a moment when 
a new social consensus took place. The directors’ attitude to the trade union 
changed, which was a crucial development:  “The management have regarded 
as us worthy partners to negotiate with ever since” (S 64, p. 17). Arguably, this 
process had begun earlier as in many enterprises the strike of 3rd October 1980 
marked an important breakthrough (cf. S 20, p. 28).
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Models of Founding Independent Trade Union Units
The NSZZ “Solidarity” was set up in Warsaw’s enterprises based on two basic 
models. In one of them, the former Strike Committees transformed into the 
Founding Committees of Independent Trade Unions. As we know, members of 
these Committees decided to establish one, nation-wide Solidarity. Before this 
nation-wide trade union was founded, an independent, self-governing trade-
union organisation called Mazovia63 had been set up in Warsaw. The Mazovia 
initially assembled workers of a few big factories and some of the “intelligentsia” 
groupings. Elsewhere, specifically distinctly organisations were founded inde-
pendently. Their merger into one trade union coincided with the founding 
of Solidarity. Some of the organisations set up at the time tried to expand by 
teaming up with enterprises from outside Warsaw. These attempts were as a 
rule inspired by the old unionists and supported by the managements and the 
Party organisations. Importantly, enterprise-level Party functionaries took care 
not to get directly involved in the establishment of the unionist movement. The 
managements were more immediately involved, because the active founders of 
those trade unions often held upper positions in the administration segment 
of enterprises. In our study, we recorded two such cases. The goal, undoubt-
edly, was to generate a bottom-up movement which could be controlled from 
the inside by the economic management. Hence, as already mentioned, such 
trade unions quickly came to be called directorial. Regardless of how many 
people were involved in developing such organisations, the process was effec-
tively blocked by the establishment of the NSZZ “Solidarity” and the strike of 3rd 
October 1980. Most employees left the directorial trade unions to join Solidarity. 
To our knowledge, attempts to build an organisation that extended beyond 
Warsaw failed even though, for example, the Niezależny Związek Zawodowy 
Pracowników Motoryzacji (Independent Trade Union of Automotive Industry 
Workers), which was set up at the FSO, assembled initially employees of major 
motor vehicle manufacturers from all over Poland. The Związek Zawodowy 
Pracowników Komunikacji Miejskiej (Trade Union of Urban Transportation 
Services Workers), which was founded at the MZK, followed a similar trajectory. 
Some of its activists remained loyal to it and cultivated their identity as members 
of autonomous trade unions. Yet their influence was very limited and fell short 
even of the impact of the old branch trade unions, which worked hard to adapt 
to the new circumstances.
 63 Mazovia (Polish: Mazowsze) is the name of the geographical and historical region 
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Usually loose organisational structures based on the Strike Committees could 
be found in the enterprises that had gone on strike in summer 1980. In some 
of them, the Committees had taken a distinct institutional form, which was the 
case, for example, at the Warsaw Steel Plant during the solidarity strike in sup-
port of the Coast strikers. Generally, the Committees had been more or less for-
mally elected by the workers. Yet in most companies, such formal assemblies had 
not come into being for fear of reprisals. It was only at the end of August, when 
the accords were signed, that the workers whom we dubbed the discontented-
and-defiant received a real boost. The Founding Committees of the Independent 
Self-Governing Trade Union were formed similarly to, albeit more slowly than, 
the earlier Strike Committees. Their (usually informal) leaders communicated 
with other enterprises, especially with the ones which were symbolic to Warsaw’s 
workers. An important factor in this process was whether the workers’ repre-
sentatives made up a sociological group as described above.
The other trade-union formation model was found chiefly in the enterprises 
with no distinguishable group of the discontented-and-defiant. The signing of the 
agreements was a powerful motivator for people who had not been champions 
of collective interests before. Early in the process, they found support at what 
were called consultation points, i.e. mini information centres run by volunteers 
who offered legal advice, explained the labour law and regulations concerning 
organisations, distributed Solidarity statutes and, above all, dispelled doubts. 
Consultation points were highly instrumental in the establishment of the trade 
union; as was the quickly set up Mazovia organising bureau, which soon took 
over their functions and appointed consultants. These consultants were union 
members who disseminated information about the newly established organisa-
tion, made sure that new units of the union were set up in conformity with the 
statute and advised on practicalities involved in starting new union organisations.
This model of trade union formation involved two major stages. First, 
organisers came forward spontaneously. Having obtained information about 
establishment procedures and necessary resources, they sought prospective 
members. The group of enthusiasts relied on personal contacts when collecting 
membership declarations among the workforce. Such groups were as a rule an 
embryo of Founding Committees. Second, the trade union unit was officially 
set up and the Founding Committee were elected by those involved. Generally, 
this took place during workers’ meetings. Sometimes the meetings were called 
by the already existing Founding Committees, but more often than not the 
Founding Committee was appointed and workers declared readiness to join 
Solidarity during meetings organised by the old trade unions, which tried to 
enlist supporters. Such initiatives of the old trade unions nearly always resulted 
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in collective decisions to set up Solidarity and wound up as elections to Founding 
Committees. Then, the “officially” instituted Committees openly inaugurated 
their operations.
Of course, this model came in many varieties. For example, in one enter-
prise, the Founding Committee of NSZZ “ ‘Solidarity” came into being and 
went public with support from the factory’s PUWP secretary: “Earlier, initia-
tive groups were formed and collected membership declarations in various 
departments. An overwhelming majority of the workforce wanted to join 
Solidarity, but organisers from respective departments, who had lists of pro-
spective members, didn’t know each other. All over the factory, people talked 
of nothing else but setting up Solidarity, yet officially no one approached either 
the management or the workforce in the capacity of a union representative. 
The PUWP secretary invited those trade-union organisers and asked them to 
eventually institute an official Founding Committee and notified the company’s 
management. The secretary gave them his office and left them alone” (cf. P 17, 
pp. 6, 9; S 64, pp. 11, 12). Other respondents say that, at first, Solidarity mem-
bership declarations were collected secretly, “quietly” (cf. B 41, p. 8; S 43, p. 1), 
then the Mazovia Bureau in Szpitalna Street was consulted (cf. S 43, p. 7), and 
only afterwards an informational meeting was held with a consultant from the 
Regional Office in attendance. What began as an informational meeting ended 
up as an election of the trade union’s interim leadership at the enterprise (cf. 
Ibid., p. 3).
Ultimately, the difference between the two formation models was that wher-
ever there had earlier been Strike Committees, they quickly transformed into 
Founding Committees, which worked openly based on the Gdansk and Szczecin 
accords. The trade union developed similarly within enterprises with an informal 
leader group familiar to the workforce. Such groups tended to form Founding 
Committees. The other model was applied if informal leaders were less popu-
larly known or did not come forward at all. In such circumstances, the trade 
union initiators first sought social support and “quietly” put up lists of prospec-
tive members. Founding Committees were set up when the idea of establishing 
the trade union obtained public backing.
In all cases, the initiators emphasise that Solidarity did not do any canvassing. 
“Canvassing” sounds pejorative in this context. Consequently, the common 
opinion is that there was no canvassing whatsoever and people joined the union 
entirely of their own accord. Workers themselves spontaneously approached 
Founding Committees, while their common will and repeatedly expressed ex-
pectations fashioned certain people into trade-union organisers (cf. S 22, p. 3; S 
25, p. 3; S 76, p. 8; S 29, p. 7; S 67a, p. 3, 4; S 19a, p. 7).
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The Organisers
It is interesting to find out what people were the most active founders of 
Solidarity. Our study offers quite untypical answers. We directly asked our 
respondents about it. Their accounts help verify the empirically generalised 
statements and see how social stereotypes interact with the new consciousness 
of social actors.
That the union was set up by young zealots is the most common stereotype 
our respondents voice (cf. e.g. S 22, p. 2; S 29, p. 12). Solidarity appears to be 
the work of youth. Older people were distrustful (cf. S 29, p. 3; S 74, p. 9), but 
were ready to offer advice, leaving action as such to the young (cf. S 25, p. 3). 
This is restated in interviews with the activists of both Solidarity and the old 
trade unions. At the same time, when comparing interviews from respective 
enterprises, we found out that in all cases people who were most committed 
to establishing trade-union organisations represented very different age groups. 
The stereotype on which the actors rely in describing their own actions is true 
insofar that, across the enterprises, the oldest employee group on the verge of 
retirement (i.e. 55  years of age and older) indeed remained uninvolved as a 
rule. They were also not very eager to offer “good advice”; very clearly, they did 
not want to have anything to do with organisational work, irrespective of their 
appraisal of this work. It is not true that the youngest employees were partic-
ularly active as organisers. The young of the stereotype are in fact older than 
25 years of age. The picture of the events sketched by the interviews suggests that 
the core age group among Solidarity organisers were people who are popularly 
described as “adults” or “in their prime.” Psychologically speaking, this is a fairly 
banal finding as the time between adolescence and old age is as a rule a period 
of expansion. Consequently, not so much the young as rather people between 
25 and 50 years of age were the most active group in the formation of Solidarity.
Still, in the foregoing we proposed a generational hypothesis which said that, 
in Warsaw at least, similar social experiences of two generations were particu-
larly instrumental in the development of social action. These were the intelli-
gentsia generation of March 1968 and the worker generation of June 1976. The 
two observations – that a wide range of age groups were actively involved in the 
events and that the two generations were particularly important – can actually be 
reconciled. Admittedly, the consciousness of the generations which, on entering 
social life, had directly experienced the March and June events had a strongly 
formative impact on the new social consciousness in Warsaw. This, however, 
does not mean that these two generations were the sole important actors of 
the Solidarity formation movement. Simply, their way of thinking and lifestyle 
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seminally informed the behaviours which were picked up by other generations 
which were as eager to act on behalf of society.
Another thing our respondents persistently repeat is that the most active 
union organisers were production workers (cf. S 29, p. 4) and other low-ranked 
employees (S 22, p. 3; S 25, p. 4) whereas engineers, senior workers and white-
collars were more timid (S 21, p. 27). The respondents often contrast the most 
active group of ordinary production workers with the clerical staff and the 
technical intelligentsia without executive positions, who were reportedly less 
involved in setting up the trade union. This stereotype finds more corrobora-
tion in empirical reality than the age stereotype. However, no single enterprise 
in our data had Solidarity organised without active engagement of one or more 
white collars and technicians. Especially engineers and technicians directly 
responsible for technological processes, rather than for enterprise manage-
ment (employed in engineering and construction offices, laboratories, etc.), 
were extraordinarily committed to organisational work. Still, the stereotype 
seems to represent quite accurately the general attitude of respective workforce 
groups to the idea of establishing the trade union. Workers wholeheartedly 
supported the idea, while the same cannot be said about white-collars. The very 
active individuals hailing from the latter group were rather “untypical” of it. 
Importantly, however, the “untypical” office employees were to be found in each 
and every enterprise. This can be explained by resorting to the generational 
hypothesis. The “untypical” white collars were usually members of the March’68 
or June’76 generations.
Finally, our respondents state that toolroom crews (or analogical worker groups, 
e.g. repairers) were most actively involved in the formation of independent trade 
unions (cf. S 76, p. 5; S 38, p. 11, 12; S 66, p. 4; S 20, p. 8). In this case, the common 
opinion accurately reflects the actual events. The toolroom workers, or their 
equivalents, were the backbone of social action.
Impeding the Formation of Independent Trade Union Units
Another important question to answer is who was hostile to or opposed the for-
mation of trade unions. Our respondents point to:  middle-rank management 
(S 37, p. 14); foremen, middle-rung control personnel (S 38, p. 20; S 66, p. 10); 
those “glued to their jobs” (S 7, p. 11); people in upper positions who had good 
income and enjoyed privileges (cf. S 37, p.  10); people losing their privileges 
(S 29, p. 21; S 64, p. 6; S 36, p. 18); people in high positions (S 30, p. 6; S 21, 
p. 17; S 38, p. 21; S 66, p. 10); office employees (S 64, pp. 7, 26); and directors 
as “silent enemies” (S 76, p. 4; S 29, p. 8; S 30, pp. 7, 8). Also counted among 
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the opponents of new trade unions are ZSMP64 activists and the management’s 
henchmen (S 29, p. 13; S 30, p. 5). Characteristically, neither membership in the 
PUWP nor even being an enterprise-level Party functionary is straightforwardly 
associated with any specifically defined attitude to Solidarity. According to the 
widespread opinion, some PUWP members were “for” while some others were 
“against” Solidarity (cf. S 76, p. 20; S 43, p. 7). The accounts of social actions and 
the attitudes reported by PUWP members indicate that Party membership did 
not directly translate into a person’s positioning in the social process and was 
not a differential factor either in strike participation in the summer of 1980 (cf. S 
20, p. 9; S 66, p. 13) or in trade-union organising (cf. S 22, p. 17; S 29, p. 13; S 30, 
p. 5, 6). Divisions and differences in attitudes appeared when Party membership 
connoted certain privileges.
Activists who were on enterprise payrolls and had full-time jobs in the old 
organisations firmly opposed the formation of the new trade unions. However, 
some of them abandoned their former organisations and functions to contribute 
to the organisation of new unionist institutions. This process was supported by 
so-called trustees, i.e. the lowest-level old trade-union functionaries who were, 
as a rule, indeed elected by their colleagues and advocated for them (cf. e.g. S 20, 
p. 12).
Early in the development of the unionist movement, the establishment of 
Solidarity was also opposed by enterprise directors, as mentioned above in the 
discussion of how their attitudes evolved.
The opponents of setting up independent trade unions were usually an 
organised group. They were members of one or another institution, such as the 
old trade unions or company managements. The measures they used against the 
Solidarity movement can be roughly divided into practical and symbolic. The 
former included blocking social action and/or harassing individuals involved 
in it. The latter comprised an array of means aimed at affecting people’s con-
sciousness and attitudes so as to discourage them from establishing a new 
trade-union unit.
Practical Measures
The key practical measures involved preventing the development of spontaneous 
social action and molesting those who engaged in it. Such measures were already 
applied during the strikes and continued in September and October 1980. The 
 64 ZSMP is the acronym for the Związek Socjalistycznej Młodzieży Polskiej – the Polish 
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directors’ responses were symptomatic: they became furious, publicly yelled at 
workers and their representatives and hurled dismissal threats (cf. S 20, pp. 13, 14, 
28; S 21, p. 23). They issued orders which prohibited, for example, gatherings of 
more than three people on factory grounds (cf. S 38, p. 8). A passageway between 
two state institutions was sealed off when the Solidarity Founding Committee 
was formed in one of them: “The passageway had to be closed to prevent that 
from spreading” (cf. S 25, p. 2; S 22, p. 10). Telephone service within enterprises 
was disrupted, and/or phones used by the union founders were wiretapped. 
Company mimeographs were usually claimed to be broken or to have no “pro-
cessing capacity” to print union-related information (cf. S 76, p. 21; S 29, p. 8; 
S 30, p. 5; S 20, p. 18; S 66, pp. 5, 12). Employees who hand-copied such infor-
mation were threatened with job loss (see S 20, p. 18). Rooms were hardly ever 
available for meetings during which trade unions were expected to be formed 
or their leaders were to be elected (S 38, p. 18; S 66, pp. 3, 9). Foremen were 
instructed to tear down bulletin boards of the newly set-up union or remove 
notices and leaflets from them (S 38, p. 18; S 20, pp. 20, 29; S 21, p. 26). Lists 
with the names of prospective new trade union members were snatched (cf. S 
38, p. 18; S 66, p. 6). If the Founding Committees were formed anyway (which 
was basically always the case), directors claimed the right to censor and control 
communications of Solidarity broadcast over the enterprise’s p.a. (cf. S 22, p. 11; 
S 76, p. 2; S 66, p. 32). Attempts were made to intimidate individual activists by 
summoning them to a “talk” with the management and the PUPW secretary 
(S 22, p. 1, 2). Reprisals against activists were launched, including worse jobs, 
reduced pay and initiation of dismissal procedures. Sometimes people were sent 
warrants for questioning by the People’s Militia (cf. S 29, p. 9; S 3, p. 15; S 37, p. 7; 
S 19a, p. 9; S 21, p. 13; S 29, p. 21; S 66, p. 6).
When such measures failed, in some enterprises bribes were offered to trade-
unionists, such as better-paid jobs, car-purchase coupons and other coveted 
goods (cf. S 76, p. 19; S 36, p. 14; S 74, p. 6; S 20, p. 30).
Symbolic Measures
Symbolic measures were widely used by the old trade unions. Their activists 
tried to pressure people by telling them they would lose their deposits in their 
enterprise’s savings and loan scheme along with all social benefits, from bonuses 
to holiday subsidies and paid sanatorium vouchers (cf. S 76, pp. 3, 6; S 29, pp. 3, 
11; S 67a,p p. 6, 7; S 20, pp. 15, 20; S 21, pp. 7, 19). Such threats were also spread 
by PUWP functionaries (S 35, pp. 1, 3; S 36, pp. 12, 14; S 74, p. 10; S 43, pp. 3, 
4) and ZSMP activists (cf. S 38, pp. 15, 20; S 66, p. 11). The old unionists also 
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tried to undermine people’s confidence in the legitimacy of the new trade union 
and legal regulations concerning social and union perks. They picked up and 
warped Solidarity’s slogans (cf. S 76, p. 21; S 20, p. 13; S 66, p. 3) and manipu-
lated information. At the same time, in many enterprises a negative, “split” image 
of Solidarity was disseminated, which pictured the independent trade union as 
torn by clashes between extremists and moderate members (cf. S 22, p. 16; S 38, 
p. 19; S 66, p. 6). Rumours were spread, Solidarity activists were slandered, and 
fears were fuelled by circulating reportedly confirmed information about home-
searches and arrests among members of the newly founded organisation (cf. S 
22, p. 12; S 76, pp. 2, 11; S 29, pp. 7, 18; S 30, p. 26; S 74, pp. 7, 8).
Generally, the symbolic counterstrike against the founding movement of 
Solidarity was based on three major measures. First, insecurity and anxieties 
about subsistence were fuelled. Second, attempts were made to re-ignite the fear 
of politics long entrenched in society. As social activity within the trade union 
was also political activity, its legality was questioned by appealing to the ideas 
of law and lawfulness. Third, a negative picture was promulgated of Solidarity 
activists of various levels, i.e. within enterprises, the regional organisations and 
the National Commission. Two methods were especially often applied. One 
of them involved fabricating pejorative images of individuals and insinuating 
their moral inferiority. The other focused on spreading the idea that Solidarity 
activists were clearly divided into conflicted groups which fought for power. This 
aimed to make people suspect that the trade union’s representatives used the 
“masses” to their own ends.
Solidarity’s Organisational Dilemmas
It seems, however, that the symbolic influence of institutions which opposed the 
social movement was little effective. People were rather preoccupied with social 
work and ongoing debates on the problems accompanying the founding of a new 
institution. Three major groups of such problems were encountered: 1) a lack of 
models; 2) a lack of communication channels and the weakness of social bonds; 
and 3)  the pressure of social expectations on the union as a whole and on its 
individual units.
Lacking Models
Most of our respondents who sat on Solidarity Enterprise Committees repeat-
edly complained: “We didn’t know how to go about it.” The six months that it 
took to establish the organisation and make it operate on a daily basis meant 
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“translated” into fixed procedures and models of collective and individual ac-
tion for the sprawling organisational machine. Hence, people needed first and 
foremost historical and sociological knowledge. Legal expertise proved abso-
lutely indispensable for two reasons: first, in order to demand the observance of 
laws and to know what demands and decisions were legal, especially regarding 
labour and social answerability; second, in order to call for amendments or 
changes to the legislation in force. The primacy of the rule of law had been one 
of the most pronounced elements of the new organisational order since its very 
onset, as it was directly associated with the ethos and moral values that moti-
vated people.
The study of the past provided some relevant knowledge since, after all, the 
history of Poland and other countries supplied information about the ways of 
organising and deciding on the social order. As such, it could offer precious 
guidelines about constructive legal and institutional solutions. At the same time, 
history and sociology were sources of models to which to resort in particular 
circumstances. Everybody knew that Enterprise Committees should be dem-
ocratically elected, yet very few knew how exactly to go about it so as to make 
the process efficient and indeed enact the democratic ideals.
But acquiring literal knowledge was a means to an end rather than an end in 
itself. The learning that the Solidarity activists address in the interviews entailed 
primarily the collaboration of the social movement actors in developing clear 
rules on which to base the organisation’s routine operations.
Inevitably, different principles clashed in the process. Some value 
conflicts were caused by the circumstances which the union faced. The fun-
damental dilemma involved striking a balance between fully democratic 
decision-making and the necessity for Solidarity to be quick and united 
when confronting the party-and-state authorities, which required a degree 
of centralisation. The struggles in which the union was involved promoted 
some decision-making at odds with the democratic ideal of having all the 
parties concerned (i.e. all members of the organisation’s relevant unit) con-
tribute to important decisions. Yet, any considerable fragmentation of both 
demands and goals threatened to weaken the organisation as a whole (cf. S 
4, pp. 32, 33; S 3, pp. 9, 10). There was also another dilemma. Undoubtedly, 
Solidarity was set up as a trade union, but at the same time most activists 
and members insisted that the trade union must also guarantee reforms and 
control the state authorities. “Solidarity safeguards respect for human dig-
nity” (S 37, p. 19). “Solidarity is a social guarantor of the rule of law” (cf. S 4, 
p. 36), “a guarantor of obligations the state institutions took up” (cf. S 6, p. 1), 
“a guardian of worker rights” (cf. S 37, p.  19); briefly, Solidarity warrants 
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the democratisation of social life (cf. S 76, p. 6; S 43, pp. 12, 17; S 64, p. 28). 
To perform this general social and reformatory role effectively, Solidarity 
needed uniformity and efficiency and, consequently, had to limit plurality 
and lengthy deliberation. However, it was exactly in making these principles 
a social reality that the union’s fundamental value resided. Internal democ-
racy was thus an imperative and had to be reconciled with the “external” 
actions the union undertook.
Yet another dilemma involved a clash between equal and common participation 
in decision-making, on the one hand, and the rationality of decisions on the other. 
Sound decisions come from the expertise of decision-makers, while common par-
ticipation is largely incompatible with expertise and rationality. “Democracy must 
above all be based,” one respondent says, “on taking into account opinions of many 
people, first of all those who have most to say on the matters at hand, who know 
about them, because such people can kind of judge on such issues” (S 3, p. 15). How 
can this contradiction be solved?
It is also challenging to square the insistence on the union to have varied mass 
membership (as only such a union can effectively protect the interests of working 
people) with the necessity to lobby for narrower interests of individual occupational 
groups (cf. S 3, pp. 9, 10).
Models to follow were also lacking in far more “mundane” and “minor” issues, 
e.g. drafting election procedures, establishing strike decision protocols (cf. S 20, 
pp. 21, 22), developing collaboration rules with the management and other trade 
unions (cf. S 64, pp. 17, 22, 23), etc. These problems surfaced because, as a respon-
dent says, “none of us was a bureaucrat” (S 6, p. 19), and nobody wanted to use 
procedures of the state bureaucracy as a model.
Lacking Communication
Our account of the formation of the NSZZ “Solidarity” repeatedly evokes social 
bonding. The building of an independent trade union powerfully modified social 
relations. It altered the sense of social community, gave rise to new social circles, 
produced new criteria of experiencing community with others and forged new 
rules which made it worthwhile for people to bond in bigger groups. At the same 
time, social bonding was thwarted as there were no firmly established commu-
nication channels between groups, strata and territorial communities, while 
interactions among people were limited and weak. This considerably impeded 
activities of the emerging trade union as several examples in the foregoing indi-
cate. In most cases, enterprise collectives only developed a sense of community 
and a complex network of personal ties while involved in organisational unionist 
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work. This corroborates a recent thesis eloquently argued by Stefan Nowak,65 
who claims that in Polish society there is a substantial “gap” between “mid-
range” group bonds (such as bonds among family and close friends) and the 
sense of national community. In the process of building an independent trade 
union, people had to overcome several barriers caused by the fact that they did 
not know each other and that structurally separate societal segments had hardly 
any contacts with one another. To bridge such gaps, the basic network of human 
ties and contacts, i.e. bonds of family and friendship, was employed. Contacts 
between representatives of enterprise communities and their trade unions 
tended to be greatly facilitated if former schoolmates, friends from university 
or neighbours worked in the respective enterprises. Informal contacts were the 
basis for establishing relationships between communities and for constructing 
a network of social communication. Initially, such a network was the primary 
channel for disseminating union-related information.
This had its undeniable advantages, as it enhanced the sense of security, 
mutual loyalties and people’s dedication and commitment. However, there 
were downsides as well. Obtaining and transferring union-related information 
proved highly time-consuming. And when people who carried such information 
fell ill, contacts were interrupted. The Solidarity activists whom we interviewed 
repeated time and again that a stable and efficient information network was 
essential to the trade union especially when activists had increasingly less time 
to go about that problem themselves. As a rule, the first thing Solidarity did as 
soon as founded at an enterprise was put up a poster or a bulletin board where 
new information was posted every day. The demand for current, updated infor-
mation about the union’s activities was huge.
The Pressure of Social Expectations
The new trade-union organisations proliferated and expanded at a truly staggering 
pace. As a result, Solidarity at Warsaw-based enterprises had already embarked 
on routine organisational activities by the time we conducted our study, i.e. by the 
turn of 1980. Solidarity activists keenly felt the weight of work on their shoulders. 
 65 See Stefan Nowak, “System wartości społeczeństwa polskiego,” Studia Socjologiczne 4, 
1979; and Stefan Nowak, “Przekonania i odczucia współczesnych,” in Polaków portret 
własny, ed. Marek Rostworowski (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1979). Cf. also 
Ireneusz Krzemiński, “Latentne wzory kultury a dynamika postaw społeczeństwa 
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In the interviews, many of them talked about the mounting fatigue and the huge 
workload. Many of them also addressed a symptomatic phenomenon which we 
referred to as the pressure of social expectations. Members of the new organisa-
tion, who were still largely busy building its structures, continued to set new goals 
for the union and to make new claims on the trade union’s elected representatives.
At most Warsaw-based enterprises, the hot summer of 1980 saw workers 
draw up long lists of demands. Some items on the lists concerned issues spe-
cific to respective enterprises and could be dealt with locally, while other ones 
required broader operations. At the very start, Solidarity as a union was expected 
to make sure that the demands were met. Some of the demands pertained to the 
organisational and operational details of the trade union, yet other ones were 
addressed to the management, and Solidarity was supposed to monitor their 
fulfilment. Besides, the still evolving trade union had to focus on welfare issues 
at hand, taking over some functions of the old trade unions – some only because 
Solidarity members always defined their union’s role in slightly different terms 
than the old Enterprise Councils had done before. This position was pithily and 
pictorially expressed in saying that the trade union and its enterprise-based units 
had other things to see to than apples, carrots and grab-bags. Still, the savings 
and loan plans, allowance-granting procedures and holiday and sanatorium 
schemes were considered important issues.
In most cases, Solidarity Enterprise Committees set up special units to deal 
with and realise the incoming requests and demands. Solidarity was also actively 
involved in the work of analogous management-appointed bodies, which usually 
included representatives of all organisations from a given enterprise.
This notwithstanding, new requests and demands continued to pour in. They 
concerned enterprise-specific issues, the trade union’s activities within the enter-
prise and its nationwide operations. Recognising them as valid, the new trade union’s 
activists realised, however, that no matter how hard the union worked, it stood no 
chance of meeting all those expectations. Apparently, our study captured the mo-
ment of society’s great elation at having their own, independent trade union; people 
tended to expect it to deal with all their solicitations concerning living conditions, 
social issues, political activity and cultural participation. Solidarity, so to speak, sym-
bolically embodied the dreams of a better life, a life of dignity, and seemed to have 
come into being to open up a space of self-fulfilment for people. Active involvement 
in Solidarity was thought of as a mode of self-realisation. Solidarity units found 
themselves under the constant pressure of social expectations concerning nearly 
all spheres of life. Unsurprisingly, it started to become obvious that the trade union 
must choose one field in which it could reasonably achieve its goals and set the 
limits beyond which it would not venture, lest it found itself completely stranded.

Part Two   What Was Solidarity? 
Interpretations of the Solidarity 
Trade-Unionist Movement: 
Introduction to Part Two
The first part of this book contains findings of a sociological study which was 
carried out in compliance with scholarly, albeit not entirely standard, principles. 
It sketches an empirical picture of Solidarity. The second part, in turn, is of a 
slightly different nature, even though it also includes sociological essays. These 
essays, however, represent theoretical interpretations of the very phenomenon of 
the Solidarity trade-unionist movement and its meanings. While scholarly, these 
essays comprehend scholarship in rather broad terms.
In my interpretations of Solidarity as a social movement, I address not only 
socio-political reality but also spiritual and cultural reality, to put it some-
what enigmatically and perhaps pompously. Nevertheless, it is my deep belief 
that people’s spiritual reality has its sociological dimension as well. This is what 
I focus on, particularly in the chapter devoted to “The Rooted World.”
The disputes about the significance and nature of the Solidarity movement, 
about its ideological substance and thus about its spiritual relevance are by no 
means a thing of the past. In the mid-1990s, polemics and discussions were rife 
in international (especially US) political science, political anthropology and the 
philosophy of politics, concerning such issues as whether Solidarity thinking was 
socialist or rather liberal, whether the cradle of Solidarity was the working class 
or rather the intelligentsia, whether the demands Solidarity made were entitled 
and utopian or rather pragmatic and democratic, whether the Solidarity move-
ment was underpinned by nationalist attitudes or rather by the national, but also 
democratic and universalist mindset, etc.
In Poland, the dispute about how to interpret the Solidarity social movement 
has, for the most part, been relegated to a kind of an aside and has unfolded 
indirectly in polemics and political struggles. Essentially, the attitudes and the 
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projects of arranging social life attributed to Solidarity have been changing. This 
is what other essays in this part are devoted to.
Very little has survived today of the original ideals cherished by the indepen-
dent, self-governing trade union, even though 1997 was marked by the electoral 
victory of a coalition formed on the basis of Solidarity and mobilised against the 
post-communist party. This is what makes me all the more determined to salvage 
from oblivion the image of Solidarity as a project of a civil society comprehended 
as a community of equal, free and diverse citizens. Although this extraordinary 
experiment, which had involved millions of Poles, turned out to be just another 
short-lived dream in social history, it certainly deserves to be registered and 
remembered.
Solidarity was a civil movement, and denying this today is caused by projecting 
the later ideological changes back onto the past of the trade-unionist movement.
The Rooted World
While explaining the social experience of Poles over the last dozen years can be a 
challenge to anybody who seeks to understand the world, it is a very special chal-
lenge, indeed, to sociologists and the sociological study of social life. So far, the 
accounts and assessments of the social developments which took place in Poland 
between 1980 and 1986, therein in the “mythical” year 1984, have been domi-
nated by narrowly political or “moralist” standpoints. Understandable though 
such an approach is, we must not stop at it. Obviously, the years 1980–1981 are 
a crucial period. No matter what happened later and regardless of all failures, 
the efforts Poles then made to build a civil society have been and still are vital 
to the future. For this simple reason, it is urgent – ever more urgent as years go 
by – to use the lived social experience of those years in a more durable and more 
systematic reflection than exclusively political insights. The experience was so 
unique that it powerfully expands our knowledge of social life as such. It calls 
for revising the conceptual apparatus employed in scholarly investigations of the 
human world and for developing effective instruments to preserve this excep-
tional social experience.
This obviously requires a concerted action. My argument in the following is 
only a first, tentative step in such an exploration.
I will focus on psychological and sociological peculiarities of the mechanisms 
of social life which have been at work in Polish society over the recent years. 
How very peculiar they have been is revealed when they are studied by means of 
modern sociology’s conceptual grid, which seems, after all, tolerably comprehen-
sive and flexible. Even though a very general interpretation of the developments 
in Poland can be usefully furthered by a variety of sociological concepts and 
approaches, it turns out that many essential aspects of social life and, by the same 
token, of the human personality find themselves outside the horizon of the con-
ventional social-scientific scrutiny.
I will address this with caution:  my point is only that sociology’s scholarly 
paraphernalia presuppose (unwittingly as a rule) a certain image of society and 
the human being. This image is informed by some or other philosophical tenets 
which preclude studying certain aspects of the world without which, however, 
we cannot grasp the totality of social experience. It is not my aim to dispute 
the ideological and/or philosophical foundations of sociological thought. I just 




premises and that in order to develop sociology theoretically, we need to avail 
ourselves of philosophy again.
The call to found theoretical sociology on a philosophy that delves into the 
mysteries of existence, rather than on the positivist philosophy of science, is 
by no means a novelty (in Poland it has been vocally advocated by Edmund 
Mokrzycki66). More palpable than any scholarly experiment, social experience as 
such turns this call into an imperative.
Still, I will not explore this issue. Instead, my argument in this chapter will 
be guided by the following questions: What singularities of social life come to 
light when we confront sociology with social experience? What is it that is pat-
ently observable in Poland but is notoriously ignored in the scholarly study of 
society? How can the universal meaning of the particular “Polish” experience be 
conveyed in the language of social scholarship and popular science? My answer 
will be tentative, fragmentary and, by necessity, not rigidly scholarly. I will offer 
a sketch which can serve as a starting point for a more structured, rigorous and 
thoroughly documented study.
Civil Society: How the Idea Developed
The vast social movement of Solidarity has been interpreted within various 
frameworks as a trade-union movement and a social reformist movement. The 
existing accounts usually suggest that the distinctive feature of the movement was 
that it amalgamated several different elements into a cohesive whole. The aggre-
gation of these components into a developing social action and an integrated 
structure of aspirations determined the movement’s dynamics and success. This 
is the gist of conclusions proposed by Alain Touraine, who studied Solidarity as a 
social movement.67 On his model, Solidarity pursued three kinds of goals: trade-
union goals, societal goals and national goals. The democratisation of social life 
 66 Cf. especially Edmund Mokrzycki, Filozofia nauki a socjologia:  Od doktryny 
metodologicznej do praktyki badawczej (Warszawa: PWN, 1980), in particular the 
Chapter entitled “Filozofia nauki w perspektywie teorii kultury.”
 67 Cf. Alain Touraine, Michel Wieviorka, François Dubet and Jan Strzelecki, Solidarité. 
Analyse d’un mouvement sociale. Pologne 1980–1981 (Paris: Fayard, 1982); for the 
English edition, see Solidarity: The Analysis of a Social Movement, trans. David Denby 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Cf. also Paweł Kuczyński et al., W 
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was sought by and through a trade union that stood up for workers’ interests 
within enterprises vis-à-vis the state as an employer.
Social liberation and political democratisation were a springboard for actions 
geared to preserving national identity and attaining national sovereignty. 
According to Touraine, such intertwining of the three threads of action deter-
mined the trade union’s success and the social movement’s goal achievement. 
The coherent and unified set of goals of common social action also structured 
people’s individual motivations. While dedicated mainly to trade-union activism 
in defence of basic sustenance and living conditions, people were compelled to 
think of the principles of social life and institutional rules within and through 
which they could best express and stand up for their interests. The right to advo-
cate for one’s interests meant that collective life had to be reformed so as to 
make societal institutions directly and controllably presuppose and guarantee 
respecting individual rights in their daily practices. Without this, people could 
not freely express their genuine interests, and without a free, unintimidated 
expression of interests, it was impossible to defend those interests and, simulta-
neously, advance the common good.
The “new rules” (i.e. observance of the law) immediately ushered in the ques-
tion of political and national sovereignty. Namely, social liberation entailed the 
state-and-party authorities embracing the new principles, which only made 
the dependence of Poland’s government on the Soviet Union all too obvious. 
Consequently, all the components of this triadic structure were necessarily 
interrelated, while logical and empirical necessities overlapped, at least in the 
most general definition of the situation. Mediations among and interactions 
of these three layers – an interplay of desires and possibilities, hopes and risks, 
aspirations and limits  – released an extraordinary collective and individual 
mobility in Poland in 1980–1981, which continued later as well, albeit somewhat 
diminished.
Insightful as this interpretive framework is, it does not answer some questions 
and invites other perspectives to fill in its gaps. Admittedly, Touraine’s model 
aptly presents the basic structure of collective and individual motivations within 
the Solidarity movement and offers a comprehensive analysis of the movement’s 
actions and activities, yet it leaves us at a loss as to where such a motivational and 
action structure came from. Although Touraine explains why and how elements 
which are as a rule separate were combined and why such a “totality” of goals 
made sense, he cannot show the origins of this complex structure.
I believe that the notion of “civil society” can effectively help us depict the 
impulse that opened up a new perspective of self-experience and world-
experience, of re-thinking the self and the world and of viable action.
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The idea of civil society is by no means a simple one, and the model of social 
life it projects is multi-layered, complex and hardly straightforward in an existen-
tial sense. It cannot be expected that such an intricate idea will be an “impulse.” 
However, the core of civil society can be rendered very plainly and is rooted in 
elementary human experience. The fundamental observation that underlies civil 
society can indeed serve as a creative impulse. This observation, which can ap-
peal to all of us and which every human being can recognise as his/her “own,” 
was powerfully expressed by Simone Weil:
Difference between slave and citizen (according to Montesquieu, Rousseau…): the slave 
is subdued to his master, and the citizen to the laws. No doubt the master may be very 
kind and the laws may be very harsh; it makes no difference. The whole point is the dif-
ference between caprice and law. […] Why is it slavery to be subordinated to caprice? 
The ultimate reason is in the relation between the soul and time. Whoever is subdued to 
the arbitrary is suspended on the thread of time; he is obliged to wait (the most humil-
iating state!) for what the next moment will bring him. He has no control of his passing 
moments; for him, the present is not a lever by which he can act upon the future.68
I believe that the acutely humiliating experience of having “no control of passing 
moments” and being “obliged to wait what the next moment [would] bring” – 
with this entirely depending on the party-and-state authorities – triggered the 
formation of the social reformist movement and the trade union.
It is left to sociology to re-trace and explain the process in which people, on 
a mass-scale, came to view life dictated by the previous rules as humiliating 
and decided to assert themselves actively as citizens. The essence of the “hot 
summer” of 1980 and the creative, constructive appeal of the Baltic Coast strike, 
with its twenty-one demands, lay in that it was not only, and even not so much, 
a revolt but rather a productive action underpinned by a positive social agenda. 
We must thus scrutinise the process in which people came to believe that they 
were citizens and, as such, they must behave like “citizens,” i.e. actively assume 
responsibility for their passing moments and, without waiting any longer, 
take care of themselves, their families and their country as the common good. 
This realisation and the impulse it produced initiated joint action and set its 
goals.
The process had been brewing since 1976. I  described it elsewhere, based 
on the findings of a study on establishing independent trade unions at various 
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enterprises, which was carried out in the Warsaw area at the turn of 1980.69 
Rather than rehearsing my entire argument here, I will only list several factors 
that impacted the process: first, the “conditional” recognition of Edward Gierek’s 
leadership which hinged on the promised modernisation programme; second, 
the collapse of social expectations connected to the programme and the viola-
tion of working people’s – in particular workers’ – self-dignity in 1976; third, 
the rise of the democratic opposition that championed a moral agenda of the 
renewal of social life, focused on human rights in real socialism, and fostering 
bonds between the intelligentsia and common people; four, the influence of 
Catholicism and the Church, which promoted human subjectivity in the wake 
of the Vatican Council reforms; fifth, the election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as 
pope and, in particular, John Paul II’s visit to Poland in 1979, with his teaching 
about the human person’s “natural rights” as rooted in the transcendental order 
of values; six, the aggravating economic crisis, whose political causes were 
becoming ever more obvious to the broad public as the former modes of (at least 
partial) legitimisation of the power system were losing their viability.70
The Definition of the Social Situation and the Need for Roots
In the process, the definition of the social situation was formulated and capped. 
People came to understand with all clarity that the rules of social life and, above 
all, the modes of the exercise of power not only undercut people’s dignity and 
self-worth but also did not warrant fulfilment of basic needs and interests. Social 
thinking and action were underpinned by the belief that the principles of col-
lective life and institutions’ approach to people, to society, must change as they 
determined the living standards and economic outcomes.
First and foremost, the position that the state took vis-à-vis society had to 
change. Even though ineloquently articulated and hazily formulated, the idea 
that the time had come to change the rules of governance and the exercise of 
power, which decisively affected both the economy and people’s interactions, lay 
 69 Cf. Ireneusz Krzemiński et al., Polacy – jesień ‘80. Proces powstawania niezależnych 
organizacji związkowych (Warszawa:  Instytut Socjologii UW, 1983; and a 2005 
re-edition).
 70 See “The Formation of the Social Movement ” (p. …) in “The Rise of the Independent 
Self-Governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’ ” (p….). in this volume. The process is also 
analysed by Grzegorz Bakuniak and Krzysztof Nowak in “Procesy kształtowania się 
świadomości zbiorowej w latach 1976–1980,” in Społeczeństwo polskie czasu kryzysu, 








at the foundation of the evolving movement. The goal of reforming social life 
was conspicuous, especially at the early stage of social action. Social action did 
not aim to seize power or wrest it away from the governing PUWP, but to force 
the Party, if it wanted to retain its position, to change the rules of the game and 
accept equal laws for itself and society. The feeling of enslavement and violation 
of human dignity was induced by a system of privileges enjoyed by the party-
and-state functionaries. The system of privileges perpetuated the superiority of 
“people of the regime” and gave them the prerogative to decide about their lives 
and the life of the collective. Law had become an instrument for ruling and man-
aging social life, and the system of state institutions hampered free and sponta-
neous social action. The social system produced by the Gierek cabinet uprooted 
people by subordinating them. “To be rooted,” says Simone Weil,
is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul. It is one 
of the hardest to define. A human being has roots by virtue of his real, active and nat-
ural participation in the life of a community which preserves in living shape certain 
particular treasures of the past and certain particular expectations for the future. This 
participation is a natural one, in the sense that it is automatically brought about by place, 
conditions of birth, profession and social surroundings.71
The feeling that the socio-political system worked to uproot people, to wrench 
them out of the ground, was the substance of the definition of the social situation 
which was commonly formulated during the “hot summer” of 1980. Part of this 
definition was that, though being at home, people did not feel at home and that, 
though being themselves, they did not feel themselves.
Civil society best responds to the need to feel at home and to be genuinely 
oneself. This is so because civil society is based on the idea that every member 
of a community, whoever s/he is and whatever his/her role in the community, 
has a right to decide about his/her life and speak out on all matters that concern 
him/her. His/her voice can be foolish and may be dismissed, but his/her fellow 
citizens cannot deny him/her the right to speak out.
His/her voice can support wrong decisions, and s/he can be held accountable 
for that, yet nobody can strip him/her of the right to express his/her views and 
decide for him/her by assuming that s/he is less intelligent, has ulterior motives 
or does not deserve to decide on anything. In this sense, civil society fosters 
people’s roots in the world, for it does not take any special effort to be a cit-
izen – reaching the age of majority is enough. Being a community’s legitimate 
 71 Simone Weil, The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties toward Mankind, 
trans. Arthur Wills (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 43.
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member and being a citizen are both one and the same thing. For this reason, 
as soon as collective social action began, “democracy” became a catchphrase on 
everybody’s lips.
Of course, this relationship can be construed as having the opposite vector, 
and the social process triggered by the work of establishing independent trade 
union units can be said to have revealed and espoused the core idea of democracy.
The process showcased the fundamental, cultural  – spiritual, perhaps  – 
meaning of democracy as more than just a system of governance, a type of 
political practice or a technique of decision-making. Essentially, democracy 
demarcates and is demarcated by the human condition, affects the individual’s 
self-image and frames human bonds.
The Cultural and Spiritual Relevance of Democracy
As a form of civil society, democracy safeguards the fundamental value which 
determines the meaning of human life, i.e. the sense of dignity, the feeling that 
I am free to be myself and have the right to retain that spontaneous sense of self. 
I cannot enjoy either the sense of self or the sense of dignity and, consequently, 
I cannot feel “rooted” if I have been denied the right to be myself, if I have not 
experienced having my own place in the community and having personal rights, 
regardless of my vices and virtues, my achievements and failures. I may put these 
rights to a better or worse use. I may fail to take advantage of them or to recognise 
them altogether. But the rights I have as a member of a community are inalien-
able and, basically, make me equal with all other people as persons. Democracy 
is a state in which all people – not only I, but also all others – can be citizens, 
and in being citizens, they can be themselves and have their own place in the 
world, in the social world, among people. In this way, democracy asserts and 
protects the fundamental equality of people. We are equal in that which, when 
recognised and practically experienced, gives us roots in the world: we are all 
persons, rational and moral subjects, and as such we have the right to participate 
in the community, just the way we are, by virtue of natural laws. On this model, 
natural human laws and rights only make sense when they are a concretisation 
of an objective order of values. If law and its function of protecting the individual 
result from a transcendental dimension of the world, if law is erected on a moral 
foundation, and if morality focuses on, safeguards and preserves the worth of 
a human person, human and civil rights have a strong grounding. The value 
of a human person as a subject of life can only be highlighted in this way if the 
human condition is assumed to be decided by the merciful God of Christianity. 




the world is also largely untenable without the assumption of God’s presence, as 
convincingly argued by Max Scheler.72
Of course, the reasoning outlined above can be regarded as speculative and 
ideological. Nevertheless, I believe it to be an apt rendering of the mainstream, 
dominant way of thinking in Poland in 1980–1981. The point is that citizenship 
was defined within a framework in which social thinking – i.e. thinking about 
the organisation of social life, of life one shares with others – was intertwined 
with value-thinking and religious thinking. Moreover, it seems that it was the 
prominence of this, so to speak, transcendent or metaphysical aspect of social 
life in public discourse and social action that caused the events in Poland to res-
onate so powerfully across the world.
Empirically speaking, both the strikes in the summer of 1980 and the later 
developments confirm that quotidian and special, “red-letter” social actions 
were saturated with a vivid religious subtext and Christian concepts. At any 
rate, thinking in religious terms and making transcendental reality the basis of 
everyday reflection are common mental habits among Polish society.
Religion and the Idea of Democracy
This raises a serious question. If the above interpretation of common, pop-
ular consciousness is right, it suggests that the social movement in Poland was 
founded on an idea of democracy similar to the one which underpins American 
society. The notion of democracy as revealed in the mainstream of social action 
strikingly dovetails with the principles which Alexis de Tocqueville considered 
characteristic of American democracy. The fundamental similarity is that the 
idea of American democracy is rooted in an order of objective, moral and, thus, 
religious values.
 72 “There can be no doubt that the Christian ethos is inseparable from the Christian’s 
religious conception of God and the world. It is meaningless without this foundation. 
There have been well-meaning attempts to invest it with a secular meaning which is 
separable from its religious significance, to discover in it principles of a ‘humanistic’ 
morality without religious premises. Such attempts […] are fundamentally mistaken. 
At the very least, Christian morality must be tied to Christian religion by the assump-
tion of a spiritual realm […] This is precisely what Jesus calls ‘the kingdom of God.’ 
The precept of love is addressed to man as a member of the kingdom of God. […] In 
any case it [the kingdom of God] is conceived as a level of being – independent of the 
order, laws and values of life – in which all the others are rooted and in which man 
finds the ultimate meaning and value of his existence.” Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. 
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“Tocqueville stresses,” observes Wojciech Karpiński in his depiction of 
American democracy, “that in America no one dared propose, as did revolu-
tionary despots in Europe, that anything was justified if it allegedly served 
society’s interests  – ‘an impious maxim which seems to have been invented 
[…] simply to justify every future tyrant,’ ” Karpiński quotes Tocqueville and 
continues: “The point is that if law confers omnipotence on American society, 
religion reins in arbitrary ideas and forbids total defiance.”
There is a sphere in human interiority that must not be infringed even in the 
name of the loftiest ideas. “There are religious reasons,” Karpiński goes on,
which allow a human being to refuse the demands of the majority and the commands of 
the most democratic government. […] Religion is the foundation of individual freedom 
and of the meaningfulness of collective actions. Freedom of conscience is the basic req-
uisite. […] Although Christianity did not take part in the exercise of power in America, 
it played a greater role than anywhere else. Christianity was the cornerstone of civil 
freedoms. It defined relationships among people and tacit obligations accepted by the 
governing and the governed. Only those regulative ideas of social consciousness made 
laws and institutions meaningful.73
Like Tocqueville, Karpiński underscores the difference between America and 
Europe in the social position of religion and churches. He insists that the multi-
plicity of denominations was essential to American democracy. The separation 
of the Church and the state also brought about the mutual reinforcement of faith 
and freedom.
In Poland, the position of the Church has been very special, particularly in 
recent years. Catholicism conspicuously dominates over all other religions. But 
it actually seems that the mainstream process of reformist actions was suffused 
with democratic consciousness, comprised of characteristically American “regu-
lative ideas” of tolerance and freedom of diverse beliefs, including moral ones. At 
the time, the influence of the Church in Poland was quite unusual, as it was the 
adoption of a religious viewpoint and an evangelically-inflected interpretation 
of everyday life that made Poles so free, tolerant and so willing to endorse the 
varicoloured heterogeneity and complexity of the social world. It surprisingly 
promoted a spontaneous, mass understanding of the importance of pluralism 
 73 Wojciech Karpiński, “Strona Tocqueville’a,” in Wojciech Karpiński, W Central Parku 
(Paris: Libella, 1982), p. 65–66. The quotation from Tocqueville: Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America and Two Essays on America, trans. Gerald E. Bevan (London 




in the life of a social community. The “working consensus” achieved then was 
underpinned by respecting the other’s right to “otherness.”74
This is not to say that the mindset proved durable. It seems that this facet of 
the collective spiritual effort has been undergoing a profound transformation 
since 1981. No matter how it may be explained, the truth is that an essentially 
disparate trend has set in. This is what makes it even more urgent to produce the 
possibly most accurate account of the meanings and senses of those events in 
order to evade the pressures of the present moment while interpreting the not 
so distant past.
Rootedness in Values and the Diversification of Social Thinking
I argue that the distinctive facet of the social reformist movement in Poland in 
1980–1981 was that both the thinking about the organisation of social life and 
the actions bred by this thinking developed in a broader, veritably metaphys-
ical perspective shaped by the objective and transcendent recognition of the 
commonly endorsed order of moral values. Importantly, the moral basis of the 
social actions undertaken back then was not submerged in “moralising thinking,” 
which prevails today. Back in the day, people sought such frameworks of prac-
tical and institutional thinking about the world and such organising forms of 
collective and individual actions that could foster a social order aligned with and 
leading people to transcendent values.
The goal was to make human life – the life of all the members of the commu-
nity – dignified, complete by immersion in the supreme values and guiding to 
God. To organise their own lives and the life of the entire community in confor-
mity with the order of values taught by religion was a welcome task that answered 
to people’s civic responsibility and care for their own souls.
I believe this way of thinking was ubiquitous and, more often than not, fully 
consciously practised in Poland at that time. This mindset is well and amply 
illustrated by the interviews we conducted in Warsaw-based enterprises at the 
turn of 1980 within a study on the establishment of independent trade unions.75
 74 Cf. Ireneusz Krzemiński, “Polska i ‘Solidarność’ – sens ludzkiego doświadczenia,” in 
Ireneusz Krzemiński, Świat zakorzeniony (Warszawa: Wola, 1988); first published in 
Przegląd Polityczny 6, 1985, and Aneks 40, 1985.
 75 See an interview with S in the Chapter entitled “The Rise of the Independent Self-
Governing Trade Union “Solidarity”” in this volume (the passages concern masses 
which were read at enterprises during the strikes in August 1980): “A mass was read 
[…]. People had various ideas […], why that mass was read […]. The mass was read 
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Of course, the religious approach to thinking about values was not the only con-
ceptual model. But, interestingly, a thoroughly secular social thinking, dismissive 
of any religious justifications, formulated an ethos that essentially dovetailed with 
the religious one. For this ethos, generally speaking, was personalist, focused on 
the individual and foregrounded human bonds. It sought a spiritual meaning of 
life, explored possibilities offered by life in and through our own bodies, repudiated 
violence and force and rebuked the constraint of moralist norms and formalised 
values. Both the religious and the secular ethoses defined human life as dignified 
and fully creditable only if the individual actively expressed his/her beliefs and 
priorities, let others do the same, looked for the good and sought agreement with 
others despite differences.
Both ethoses produced slightly different understandings of democracy and 
emphasised slightly different elements in the civil society agenda. Directly 
inspired by religion, the former was a bit more authoritarian, demanded self-
limitation, required observance of the established rules of conduct and extolled 
formal and fixed action modes as protection of freedom. More liberal and, so 
to speak, pliable, the latter model stressed first and foremost negotiations and 
transactions in social life, viewing the community’s life as a vast discussion, a 
debate in which rules were flexibly proposed so as to adapt to the circumstances 
at hand and take into account as numerous voices and suggestions as possible. 
In this way each member of the community could feel that they had an influence 
on common life and that their opinions, as well as grievances, were listened to 
by others.76
an enormous pressure from the people to hold a mass, actually […] Why did people 
need it so much? First, as everybody knows, most workers, like a huge majority of 
Poles, are Catholic; besides the situation, let’s face it, was quite hazardous, and every-
body was aware of that. In previous years, strikes were cracked down violently, so in 
this sense, people better remembered what mattered most to them. Well, what matters 
most to a Catholic is being close to God above all” (Interview S 3, see pp. … in this 
volume). The quotations aptly illustrate religious elements in people’s way of thinking 
and motivations.
 76 Such differences were found in the studies on which I  rely (Krzemiński et  al., 
Polacy  – jesień ‘80.), where I  discuss two religious ethoses and two models of 
democracy (cf. pp. 187– 91). Cf. also Grzegorz Bakuniak, “My –‘Solidarność.’ Nowy 
Związek we własnych oczach” (Ibid., pp. 286–327). In “Polska i ‘Solidarność,’ ” I con-
clude: “Identification with the Catholic Church and religion took either a more uni-
versal, so to speak, ‘European’ form or a more ‘particular,’ national form. In the latter, 
the Church was referred to as the root and a defender of national culture. Universal 




Touraine’s study also shows other viewpoint differences, which were espe-
cially evident among trade unionists in Gdansk, many of whom represented 
quite discrepant ways of thinking. While the liberal model of democracy was 
strongly championed, there were also advocates of force and the rule of the 
majority above “community” and “citizenship.” Some workers-activists thought 
of the trade union as “our organisation” which should vie for the upper hand and 
be the voice of society. Undoubtedly, the trade unions were treated as “parties,” 
so to speak. This ethos demanded that individuals and minority groups submit 
to the will of the organised majority for the sake, of course, of common good. 
Such approach was associated with a sense of risk, the belief in the “established 
norms” of collective life, authoritarianism and anti-Semitism. Such sentiments 
tended to fuel ambivalent attitudes to the intelligentsia and a distrust of educated 
people. Touraine referred to this as a populist tendency.77
The rhetoric and attitudes of some social activists indeed resembled what 
Tocqueville explored as “the tyranny of the majority,” which he deplored as the 
prime internal threat to democracy.78 Characteristically, however, Touraine’s data 
imply that the supporters of the authoritarian, or “populist,”79 model were, in 
practice, nor really inclined to disrupt dialogue and exclude some people form 
debates and negotiations in advance. Neither were they inclined to attempt any 
wilful assault on their opponents’ unity and destroy them.
The preference for the rule of and individual subordination to the majority was 
not as extreme as to use the organisation as an instrument of violence in order to 
‘human rights’ and the dignity of the human person were upheld hand in hand with 
the attitude of ‘being my own self ’ and ‘being Polish’ ” (Ibid. p. 13).
 77 Cf. Touraine, Wieviorka, Dubet and Strzelecki, Solidarité (see also Solidarity).
 78 Tocqueville, Democracy. Tocqueville writes: “So what is a majority taken as a col-
lective whole, if not an individual with opinions, quite often interests, in opposition 
to another individual whom we call a minority. Now, if you admit that an all-pow-
erful man can abuse his power against his opponents, why not admit the same thing 
for a majority? […] Omnipotence seems self-evidently a bad and dangerous thing. 
Its exercise appears to be beyond man’s powers […] and I see that only God can be 
omnipotent…” (pp. 293–4). Tocqueville goes on: “…a king has a power which is only 
physical, affecting people’s actions and unable to influence their will. But the majority 
is endowed with a force both physical and moral which affects people’s will as much 
as their actions and which at the same time stands in the way of any act and the desire 
to do it” (p. 297). Cf. also Book IV, Chapter VI: “What Sort of Despotism Democratic 
Nations Have to Fear” (pp. 803–809).
 79 I put this phrase in inverted commas, for I do not find it quite clear. Even less clear is 
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force the “resistant” ones to submit. Even the activists who upheld authoritarian 
principles recognised that social negotiations and deliberation were necessary 
and everybody had the right to speak out and voice their opinions though, admit-
tedly, their hostile attitude to some groups and worldviews impeded agreement. 
Though eager to be leaders of the community, they were by no means eager to 
seize leadership by force and escape social control.80
This was associated with the tendency to think of society as a community 
and, therefore, as the agent of legislation. First and foremost, democracy made 
people feel that society was alone capable of determining the direction in which 
social life should move, the forms of social actions, the structure of human 
relationships and what was good and bad for the community.
Solidarity trade-union units faced a number of practical problems. The 
organisational model and the political ideal which were being forged in prac-
tice at the time closely resembled what theorists often refer to as participatory 
democracy.81 The priority of participatory democracy is to include as many com-
munity members as possible in decision-making and to structure social actions 
so as to promote spontaneous initiatives. The emphasis, therefore, is on partic-
ipation, instead of on control, and on active engagement in the common cause 
and common life, instead of on the representation and the functional segmenta-
tion of life with a view to guaranteeing freedom of action and equal rights. The 
supporters of the authoritarian model also found the sense of belonging to the 
community and involvement in its transactions highly appealing. This naturally 
mitigated their attitudes.
The intelligentsia, in particular intellectuals, characteristically thought of 
democracy as of an institutional order. Their visions of democracy as a tech-
nique of decision-making, as a mode of publicly expressing varied interests, as a 
principle of bargaining among various social forces and as a way of achieving the 
social equilibrium or homeostasis very clearly surfaced in the process of building 
independent trade unions of Warsaw’s intellectual circles.82
 80 I believe that the fraction of the so-called true Poles, with their strongly nationalistic 
leanings, was the greatest threat to the consensus evolving in Warsaw. It seems, how-
ever, that the consensus was not broken then.
 81 The model of “participatory democracy” is discussed, for example, by Paweł Śpiewak. 
See “Demokracja,” Powściągliwość i Praca 5, 1984.
 82 Cf. Ireneusz Krzemiński, “Jak powstał i działał Niezależny Samorządny Związek 









I believe this was linked to sociology and sociological standards of thinking 
about contemporary society. The structural and functional model of society 
associated with the study of social attitudes underpinned their practices initially, 
it seems.
This model of the trade-union movement was definitively rejected by 
trade unionists themselves when the members of the Niezależny Samorządny 
Związek Zawodowy Pracowników Nauki, Techniki i Oświaty (Independent 
Self-Governing Trade Union of Scientific, Technical and Educational Workers) 
decided to join the NSZZ “Solidarity.”
Sociology and Social Processes
The sociological inspiration turned out to be entirely misguided in this case. 
Sociologists found themselves fully surprised by the developing social process. 
Despite several studies conducted in the 1970s, Polish sociology was entirely 
at a loss facing the events at hand. First, most sociologists had not anticipated 
what was actually going on at all. They had even failed to notice that the former 
mechanisms of legitimising the socio-political system were crumbling. Second, 
the conceptual tools and research methods used by sociologists did not help 
understand the occurrences the were witnessing. The dominant framework of 
social diagnosis formulated in the late 1970s was clearly useless in identifying 
the actual elements of the social process. Stefan Nowak’s article “System wartości 
społeczeństwa polskiego” (“The Value System of Polish Society”) is an excellent 
case in point.83 Concluding Nowak’s research, this “sociological portrait” of Poles 
posits that Poles’ self-reported endorsement of the democratic system goes hand 
in hand with the common approval of suspending democratic freedom for the 
sake of “important social goals.” Nowak insists that people are deeply attached 
to egalitarian ideology and negatively assess aggravating social differences (as 
judged by the criteria of social equality). This involves a declared support for 
the socialised economy (state-owned industry, especially heavy industry) and 
increasingly critical views of economic management policies. More importantly, 
Nowak’s findings indicate that Poles are “an uncorrelated society,” which means 
that differences in views and attitudes do not add up to any coherent pattern. 
The differentiation of views does not depend on the differentiation of social 
situations. The key components of the social situation, such as demographic 
 83 Cf. Stefan Nowak, “System wartości społeczeństwa polskiego,” Studia Socjologiczne 
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factors (e.g. sex and age) and the social position (e.g. education, prestige, income, 
occupation) are only weakly associated with the attitudes reported in surveys. 
Religious identification is a poor predictor of the attitudes as well. As a result, 
society seems a contingent assemblage – a “motley” of sorts. People’s identifica-
tion with family and the nation seems the only spontaneous ordering structure. 
Family ties, family as a value, national bonds and the nation as a value are the 
axes around which people’s attention and activity crystallise.
Both the events of the summer of 1980 and the explosion of sustained social 
activity in September 1980 question this sociological portrayal. The endorsement 
of the democratic organising principles of social life was the only of the elements 
highlighted by Nowak which could be observed in the process. Otherwise, the 
events disproved Nowak’s major finding that Polish society verged on social 
anomie,84 i.e. the state of sparse and meagre social bonds which are irrelevant 
in people’s lives and do not express either common interests or shared ethoses. 
Admittedly, social activists were initially preoccupied with building a network 
of mutual contacts and with establishing social relationships among individuals 
and groups. Yet, a trade union assembling millions of members could not have 
possibly come into being within such a short time without a pre-existing net-
work of social bonds and multifarious relations among various, socially distant 
groups. The portrayal of social identifications as revolving around two remote 
axes – “at the bottom” and “on top” of the ladder-like social structure – turned 
out to be misconceived. In all likelihood, the methodological model and the-
oretical underpinnings of Nowak’s research were not suited to identifying and 
showing relevant facts of the emergent social process.
At that point, another sociological study could effectively help anticipate and 
understand the events of the early 1980s. In his 1979 study “Struktura społeczna 
i postawy a grupy ethosowe” (“The Social Structure and Attitudes vs. Ethos 
Groups”) (published only in 1982),85 Tadeusz Szawiel claimed that the social 
dynamics could be usefully explored within other frameworks than the struc-
tural and functional model, which was commonly adopted by sociologists and 
in so-called attitude research. Szawiel insisted that people’s desire to found their 
lives on moral values could be a dynamising factor in social action. He explained 
 84 The concept of “anomie” was proposed by Robert K. Merton, drawing on Durkheim’s 
theories. See Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1949), Chapters 
VI and VII.
 85 See Tadeusz Szawiel, “Struktura społeczna i postawy a grupy ethosowe,” Studia 
Socjologiczne 1/2, 1982; and Tadeusz Szawiel, “Social Structure and Attitudes vs. Ethos 






that people’s aspiration to live in conformity with their moral beliefs and to 
ground the life of their social community in the ethoses they upheld could fuel 
broad social activity and set the goal of a social movement. On this model, “social 
energy” could accumulate not so much in groups on top of society’s formal struc-
ture (i.e. the institutional structure) as rather in “ethos groups,” which exemplify 
possibilities of a life of dignity by the mere fact of being there. Szawiel discussed 
such ethos groups in Poland and the influence they radiated in the late 1970s: the 
independent democratic opposition, religiously dedicated Catholic groups and 
groups stemming from counter-culture.
Indeed, it seems that people from those groups were spontaneously 
approached for help and counsel when mass-scale social action was attempted.86 
Interestingly, rather than being expected to lead the action, they were called on 
to be experts and advisors.
The approach proposed by Szawiel also showed that aspirations to install a 
social order that met the needs and interests of various social groups and was 
based on negotiating the rules of the game were not the only vital factor in 
people’s social involvement. Equally important were also aspirations to work out 
practical principles which developed and enacted moral values. The impact of 
the ethos groups suggested by Szawiel represents, I believe, quite accurately the 
mindset common among Poles as outlined above.
Comparing social developments in Poland at the threshold of the 1980s with 
the pictures of society offered by the sociological studies of the day exposes 
other inadequacies of social research. Namely, it seems that the dynamics 
of the developments in Poland were considerably affected by “generational” 
configurations.
The Role of Generational Groups in the Social Movement
“Generation” is one of the notions largely abandoned by mainstream sociology. 
In Polish sociological studies, “generation” is also hardly a significant concept 
although interesting theoretical insights concerning “generation” appear here and 
there and sociologist have carried out survey studies of the young generation.87
 86 In Warsaw, workers involved in the establishment of new trade unions sought help 
and advice from various Catholic activists and from democratic oppositionists about 
whom they had heard or read in the official press (see “The Rise of the Independent 
Self-Governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’ ” in this volume).
 87 In Polish scholarship, the concept of generation has been discussed by Maria Ossowska 
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Such choices and preferences follow a general trend observable in sociology 
worldwide. The “youth revolt” movement made sociologists reconsider the no-
tion of generation, but, so far, they have hardly moved beyond the study of the 
generation gap, i.e. conflict between the generations of parents and children. 
Perhaps the theoretical “shift” noticeable in sociology will eventually produce a 
new generation concept.
As a matter of fact, the experience of Polish society can be relevant to such 
a future theory. The mass social actions undertaken by Poles clearly revealed 
generational differentiation. While this differentiation did not actually deter-
mine engagement or non-engagement in the collective organisational effort, it 
was certainly an illuminating factor in a clear differentiation of ethoses and in 
the system of “active” social bonds.88 In other words, generational groups played 
an important role in the process of social actions. First, they were spontaneous 
manifestations of respective ethoses, articulated particular values and simul-
taneously embodied certain modes of thinking and lifestyles. Secondly, they 
afforded a sense of generational identification and activated real generational 
ties, which served as the basis for actions and as building blocks for a new net-
work of social relations.
Generational groups are, in a sense, latent groups. The social contacts and the 
offshoots of the group spirit which are visible on the surface of social life are just 
the tip of the iceberg which is composed of a vast potential of mutual human 
bonds and people’s sense of community. Generational belonging is very closely 
correlated with our sense of self-identity and our self-image. The self-image is 
partly built of symbols of values which we share with people with whom we also 
share our major social experiences. Hence, a generational group must forge its 
own ethos or, at least, its own lifestyle, and the formation of such a generational 
group is linked to stages in individual human development.89
(“Pokolenie jako pojęcie socjologiczne,” Studia Socjologiczne 3/4, 1968); and Jan 
Garewicz (“Pokolenie jako kategoria socjologiczna,” Studia Socjologiczne 1, 1983).
 88 The social movement that arose around the NSZZ “Solidarity” has been studied 
from the perspectives of participants and witnesses by Mirosława Marody et  al. 
Cf. Mirosława Marody et al., Polacy ‘80: wizje rzeczywistości dnia (nie)codziennego 
(Warszawa: Instytut Socjologii UW, 1981; and a 2004 re-edition).
 89 “Lifestyle” designates a phenomenon which is, so to speak, “more non-committal” and 
less binding for the individual than injunctions of an ethos. Lifestyle is also less rig-
orously defined than ethos, but the two notions are interrelated. For an insightful dis-
cussion of ethos, see Maria Ossowska, Ethos rycerski i jego przemiany (Warszawa: IFiS 
PAN, 1978); for information on lifestyle and related issues, see: Styl życia. Przemiany 






In my argument, I  draw partly on the concept of generation proposed by 
Jan Garewicz, who emphasises that generational identifications are determined 
by participation in seminal social events which are experienced together with 
peers.90 Importantly, such an experience must coincide with the moment in 
individual development when one’s self-image, hierarchy of values and repre-
sentation of society are taking shape. Participation with peers in such an impor-
tant social event forces the person to side with some views and against other 
ones and to endorse some values while rejecting other ones. In a peer group 
which experiences this, a specific system of relations, links and divisions arises, 
accompanied by a unique manner of assessing reality, which becomes a perma-
nent component of the generation’s thinking and lifestyle. In post-war Poland, 
such generation-forging impulses were provided by participation in dramatic 
socio-political events, erupting social conflicts and cabinet changes that followed 
them. Hence, generations were formed around events associated with such dates 
as October ʼ56, March ‘68 and June ʼ76. The sense of community, of “social kin-
ship” even, is connected to the necessity to make an axiological choice in dra-
matic situations.
This process can be viewed as the formation of people’s social identities. Social 
relationships that will develop among the members of a generational group will 
be permanently marked by a certain camaraderie, even if the individuals side 
with opposite parties to the conflict. The durability of such generational bonds 
seems to be essentially boosted by the elites or individuals symbolising the shared 
generational experience and practically embodying the shared ethos, or at least a 
given lifestyle. Allegiance to the idols and to the elites reinforces people’s identi-
ties and makes even latent generational identification a lived experience.
I argue that the social dynamics of the “hot summer” of 1980 and the signing 
of the Gdansk and Szczecin accords provided a stimulus which activated gen-
erational bonds. Of particular importance in the recent process of social 
transformations were two generational groups: the generation of March ʼ68 and 
the generation of June ʼ76. These two generations were the fulcrum of the social 
reforms movement.
 90 Cf. Jan Garewicz, “Pokolenie jako kategoria socjofilozoficzna,” Studia Socjologiczne 1, 
1983. Garewicz defines “generation” as “a group of people whose way of thinking has 
been formatively determined by the same experience, which will henceforth be referred 
to as generational experience. […] Generational experience is acquired in various ways 
which depend on individual traits and individual circumstances […] Importantly, for 
all the people involved in it, it is a breakthrough event in their lives which they cannot 
erase from memory and which filters all subsequent events for them” (p. 77).
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The two generations are linked to each other. In a sense, the generation of March 
ʼ68 mentored the generation of June ʼ76 and were the primary point of reference, 
in not the model, for them. Crucially, the two generational groups are not symmet-
rically distributed across the social structure. The March generation form a clearly 
recognisable social circle within the intelligentsia, without much active resonance 
in other social groups, workers in particular. The March generation is comprised of 
people who were students at the time of March events. The June generation is cer-
tainly far more varied structurally. It is, basically, a worker formation though it also 
includes people who were freshmen and sophomores in 1976 as well as some white 
collars. The generation of June ʼ76 is comprised of a fairly broad group of people 
who stood at the threshold of adulthood during the memorable events in June 1976. 
That the June generation is so heterogeneous crucially affected the evolution of the 
social movement. The feeling of generational bonds served as a bridge which helped 
span blue- and white-collar workers, especially in big and complex enterprises. The 
sense of camaraderie produced earlier and the “currently” recognised similarity of 
viewpoints coalesced to encourage the differently positioned members of the gen-
eration to renounce mutually negative stereotypes of clerical and manual workers, 
which were as a rule deliberately reinforced by the enterprises’ organisational 
structure.91
The two generational groups had their ethos representatives, with those of the 
March generation being, obviously, a bit older than those of the June generation.
People who made up these two generations were an inspirational force behind 
the development of the social reform movement in 1980 as well as eminent opinion-
makers in the new trade unions.
Notably, the intelligentsia or (former) students of the June generation 
powered the establishment of the Independent Students’ Association (Niezależne 
Zrzeszenie Studentów, NZS) at universities. The NZS was developed by the 
oldest students, who relied on their earlier experiences for models (e.g. protest 
demonstrations following the murder of Stanisław Pyjas92), while their younger 
classes remained predominantly sceptical.
 91 I discuss this issue in my “System społeczny ‘epoki gierkowskiej,’ ” in Społeczeństwo 
polskie czasu kryzysu, ed. Stefan Nowak (Warszawa:  Uniwersytet Warszawski, 
1984) (re-edition: Warszawa 2004).
 92 Stanisław Pyjas was a student of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow and an activist 
of the students’ anti-communist opposition. He died in 1977 in still unexplained 
circumstances. While the official post-mortem cited a fall from the stairs as the cause 






Sociology, Society and Roots
The major point of my argument above, which all too sketchily outlines and 
interprets the social processes observable in Poland in recent years, is that social 
life is incomparably more arcane than “scientific sociology” assumes it to be, 
because society is neither an isolated being nor an interhuman space where 
solely physical, material forces are at work.
Social life takes place not only in a natural, physical environment, a setting that 
makes it “a thing” to be studied. Crucially, social life unfolds also in a spiritual 
pace, a space of meanings which facilitate – or, for that matter, impede – making 
sense of the world, deciphering the meaning of life and giving a point to human 
existence. Although social and shared with others, the spiritual space is essen-
tially internal and concealed. It is bound up with thinking of and experiencing 
moral values and hinges on axiology.
Simone Weil, on whose insights I draw throughout this text, writes:
Uprootedness is by far the most dangerous malady to which human societies are exposed, 
for it is a self-propagating one. For people who are really uprooted there remain only 
two possible sorts of behavior: either to fall into a spiritual lethargy resembling death 
[…] or to hurl themselves into some form of activity necessarily designed to uproot, 
often by the most violent methods, those who are not yet uprooted, or only partly so.93
The belief that my life is meaningful depends on my experience of “being myself ” 
and “being at home.”
The two things are inseparable. The interaction of these two phenomena and 
these two notions is not simple, for one can remain oneself even if one “is not 
at home,” that is, when one is enslaved and has no possibility to influence one’s 
life. Yet, I  can only be myself if I have experienced having my own place and 
if I endeavour to make myself at home. People’s roots have little to do with an 
idyll, and rooted life is by no means a land of unalloyed felicity, but it always 
upholds and safeguards people’s dignity. As such, rootedness is an outcome of 
efforts launched and sustained by entire human collectives.
The efforts promote the harmonisation of value orders and planes of existence 
in which human lives unfurl. In particular, the internal, spiritual, essentially 
personal and individual order is harmonised with the external, social and com-
munal order. “Every human being needs to have multiple roots. It is necessary 
regime. Pyjas’s death sparked vehement public protests in Cracow and across Poland. 
(translator’s note)
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for him to draw wellnigh the whole of his moral, intellectual and spiritual life by 
way of the environment of which he forms a natural part.”94
If I grasp Weil’s thought, the inner hierarchy of values should be understood 
as an element that ushers human beings into transcendence, into an objective 
order of values. The inner hierarchy is, so to speak, a compass that helps us move 
in the right direction and keep in touch with spiritual reality, despite multiple 
adversities and inconveniences. The social hierarchy as a “practical” and “mate-
rial” regulator of human life is always merely a crude personification of the order 
of values, which is more immediately appreciable in our inner reality. However, 
if the inner hierarchy is destroyed, the social order and the social hierarchy are 
destroyed by default as well, which leaves people stranded without the sense of 
roots and joy of life. It is the disintegration of the internal hierarchy – the impos-
sibility to harmonise “the inner” and “the outer” – that uproots the human being. 
There is also another obstacle on workers’ way to culture. Slavery is this obstacle. 
Weil insists:  “The mind is essentially free and sovereign when it is really and 
truly exercised. To be free and sovereign, as a thinking being, for one hour or 
two, and a slave for the rest of the day is such an agonizing spiritual quartering 
that it is almost impossible not to renounce, so as to escape it, the highest forms 
of thought.”95
Yet, effort can be undertaken to act in accordance with one’s own thoughts 
and beliefs for more and more hours of the day. Effort can be made to restore the 
alignment between the internal and the external orders of life.
I believe that social processes developing in Poland in recent years have 
shown that huge human collectives can be guided by quite specific “interests,” 
by the desire to impart meaning to individual lives and to found common life 
and its structures on values such as human dignity, truth and justice. Even the 
most “empirical” social experience itself shows that sometimes ordinary people 
find rather abstract values as palpable and material as a loaf of their daily bread. 
Contemporary sociology looks for explanations and locates the sources of pro-
cesses and conscious social movements in what could be referred to as nat-
ural conditioning. Natural conditioning includes needs, life exigencies, social 
interests and natural and quantifiable forces.
Even if this layer is not fully equated with the material sphere of life infrastruc-
ture and economic processes, it is at any rate considered absolutely essential. The 
naturalist worldview of scientific sociology hinders our understanding of events 
 94 Ibid., p. 43.






which overthrow the established order and reverse explanatory patterns, thereby 
showing that social action is underpinned by far more complex calculations than 
just counting returns to meet current needs.
Human communities generally do not forget about the material, “nat-
ural” foundations of their life and, as a rule, rely on such quantifiable, mate-
rial calculations. But this is only the framework for a degenerated, desperate 
and uprooted, to use Weil’s term, human life. Societies usually recognise the 
danger of uprootedness, and people are not passive vis-à-vis the greatest threat 
to their both material and spiritual existence. The social space, as the life space 
of human masses, accommodates not only calculations of cost-effectiveness of 
social energies but also calculations of the meaningfulness of such energies and 
of the meanings of cost-effectiveness. “But that is not social;” observes Weil, “it 
is a human environment of which one is no more conscious than of the air one 
breathes. A contact with nature, the past, tradition. Rootedness lies in something 
other than the social.”96
Nonetheless, the discipline that studies society should take into account 
human roots and the human need for roots. The study of what Weil calls “the 
social,” the study of social forces conceived as “things,” is not enough to depict 
and understand our world.
 96 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 169.
 
 
Poland after Solidarity: Social Consciousness 
and People’s Attitudes
Unexpectedly, Poland of the 1980s stubbornly resists understanding and defies 
sociological accounts, if an account is taken to mean something more than just a 
report on survey data. It is a major challenge to put one’s finger on and call by its 
proper name that which one has so profoundly and poignantly experienced as a 
member of society. Sociological and psycho-social interpretations of social life 
are strikingly reductive, partial and superficial. We have no adequate theoretical 
idiom to help us channel and hone our reflection. Nevertheless, I would like to 
go beyond ordinary, common-sensical observations in order to offer common 
sense more food for thought.
My other aim is to leave a testimony. In Poland, the time passes in an uncanny 
and mysterious way. For a country that cherishes tradition and continues to 
build its identity upon the nation’s past, Poland has done a surprisingly poor job 
objectifying and preserving its social experience. If our lives are to make sense, 
we are obligated to bear witness in order to help others in their quest for the good 
and the true.
Social Consciousness
My major concern in this chapter is to focus on what social life researchers tend 
to refer to as social consciousness.
The notion of “social consciousness” calls for a clarification. In general terms, 
I equate social consciousness with whatever people think or could think, given 
their current knowledge and thinking habits. I define social consciousness here 
as popularly adopted ways of interpreting the world which determine both people’s 
attitudes manifested in everyday life and the space of discourse, i.e. symbols to 
which people relate in everyday thinking. Consequently, social consciousness 
consists of symbolic images of the world which are more or less critically adopted 
by people and shared with others, and used by actors of social life in mutual com-
munication and explanations of their actions.
The shared symbolic images of the world (interpretations, “expositions,” 
definitions of situations, ideologies) provide a framework for attitudes which the 
participants in social life tend to spontaneously adopt on an everyday basis and 
which they can expect from other people in their daily interactions. The sponta-






situations give people a sense of reality and demarcate the perceived community 
with others. This sense of community is continually confirmed by default and 
taken for granted “here and now” by an overwhelming majority of social actors, 
if not by all of them.
Of course, community members can object to “the obvious.” But their 
objections and, even, calls for altering the situation or their own conduct must be 
preceded by their recognition of “the obvious.” The definition of the situation is 
in and of itself an element of the world. As such, it transforms as it is confronted 
with “the world” and the lived social experience of people involved in action.
The definition of the situation is comprised of and reflects an ensemble of 
attitudes which are symbolically represented in the individual selves of commu-
nity members. Basically, social consciousness is thus understood as the broadly 
shared mode in which society members interpret their own situation. But this 
world picture is affected by and expresses more fundamental and more general 
beliefs about what the world should be like. Coupled with current experience, 
these beliefs co-determine the interpretive approach to the world’s present con-
dition. They become normative, forming, so to speak, the moral roots of change-
able experience. Sometimes, they also act as regulators which make change 
difficult, if not entirely impossible.
In the following, I  will outline such a broadly shared image of the social 
world – the “here-and-now” world – “obvious beyond explaining,” prevalent in 
Polish society in the 1980s.
Any study of social consciousness is a study of transformations in the broadly 
shared definition of the situation and, as such, has its obvious limitations. 
Moreover, my aim is to focus on the process involving the broadest group of 
people, i.e. on definitions of the situation which are accepted “as obvious” by the 
so-called general public. Sociologists know very well that “the general public” 
is rarely “general.” Yet, when I refer to a “generalised definition of the situation,” 
I mean both the fact that this definition is broadly shared in everyday life and 
that it as a rule determines people’s everyday behaviours. Consequently, such 
definitions are definitions of the situation which prevail in most cases.
Offering accounts of “social consciousness,” sociologists often classify attitudes 
in various categories. They divide attitudes into “social,” “political,” “moral,” “eco-
nomic,” etc. Such a classification of attitudes can sometimes be useful, especially 
if it overlaps with defined and specific fields of human activity. I will refer to 
such categories from time to time, but what matters more to me is a different 
scheme of the “consciousness content,” or human attitudes, one in which they 
are hierarchically arranged in terms of their degree of generality. Some sym-
bolic images can be regarded as more fundamental – “primary” – because other 
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interpretations rely and draw on them. As a rule, some attitudes are explained by 
other attitudes. Some time ago, Adam Podgórecki insisted that we needed to dis-
tinguish “meta-attitudes,” which he understood as people’s generalised mindsets 
which ordered current attitudes to the changing world, retaining some of them 
while discarding other ones, etc. Consequently, there are “upper,” “more general” 
and “abstract” interpretations which enable us to capture the entire field of ac-
tion and in which we find generalised meanings inscribed in various attitudes of 
people who act with and relate to each other, as Alain Touraine observes.97
I hope to outline such “meta-attitudes,” or “upper” interpretations of “primary 
images,” which underpin the structure of secondary, fragmentary and alternative 
attitudes.98
Ubiquitous Politics
In a paper tellingly entitled “Mieć aby być” (“To Have in Order to Be”),99 delivered 
at a nationwide sociological conference in Cracow, Mirosława Marody described 
the social consciousness of Poles as organised around three attitudes: 1) a sense 
of deprivation and impending civilisational degradation; 2) a sense of pointless-
ness, which leads to questioning the utility of the previous forms of action for goal 
achievement; and 3) monetisation of social consciousness. Marody understands 
the feeling of deprivation very broadly, i.e. as a perceived growing threat to civi-
lisation, to people’s standards of life and to their moral customs. She argues that 
his spurs a re-casting of deep consciousness structures linked, for example, to 
the scale of social prestige, standards of life satisfactions and goals worth pur-
suing in life. According to Marody, the model of upward social mobility as 
enabled by and tied to education is losing its significance. Education as such is 
 97 Cf. Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements, trans. 
Alan Duff (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP, 1981), pp. 139–148, 191, 192, 205, 206; 
Alain Touraine, Michel Wieviorka, François Dubet and Jan Strzelecki, Solidarité. 
Analyse d’un mouvement sociale. Pologne 1980–1981 (Paris: Fayard, 1982); for the 
English edition, see Solidarity: The Analysis of a Social Movement, trans. David Denby 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
 98 Such a hierarchy is conceptualised by researchers who use the concept of 
framing and distinguish master frames. Cf. Jürgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht, 
“Mesomobilization:  Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West 
Germany,” American Journal of Sociology 98(3), 1992; and Robert D. Benford and David 
A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” 
Annual Review of Sociology 26, 2000.










less and less valued, while material possessions, money in particular, are growing 
increasingly important. To possess more is becoming the major aspiration of 
ever broader social circles, and money is becoming the central, if not the only, 
yardstick of social respect. Building on these observations, Marody insists that 
consciousness has been “monetised” as money is turning into the basic criterion 
of people’s mutual assessments and evaluations in Poland. Sociological research 
suggests that “money has invaded the spheres of social consciousness where it 
was not a frequent guest before. […] At the moment, sociologists observe what 
they call the monetisation of motivations, in which success in life is equated 
with making money rather than with making a social, political or vocational 
career.”100 Marody’s argument leads to a general conclusion that “in 1981–1985, 
a shift in the social focus took place from purely political phenomena onto eco-
nomic ones.”101
Marody’s fundamental insight is that in the 1980s, i.e. beginning with martial 
law, the social consciousness of Poles veered from “political concerns” (whatever 
the enigmatic phrase may mean), which, I  take it, had been common before, 
towards “private concerns,” ultimately evolving into “economic concerns.” The 
latter are defined, specifically, as money-making, which serves to achieve per-
sonal satisfaction and social recognition.
Marody’s findings have generally been received with acclaim. Nonetheless, 
I believe that the picture Marody has painted largely misses the point. Here is 
why I think so.
To start with, I do not think that the social consciousness of Poles between 
1981 and 1988 can be adequately encapsulated in a single picture. In fact, social 
“definitions of the situation” have changed a few times since 13th December 
1981.102 The first transformation was bound up with this ominous date. When 
exactly the subsequent transformation of social consciousness (as formed in the 
aftermath of the December’81 events) took place is rather difficult to pinpoint, 
but there are reasons to believe that it occurred in the symbolic year 1984. If 
I were to define a single turning point, I would choose the murder of Father Jerzy 
Popiełuszko and the trial of his murderers, which stretched over the following 
months. It was then, I believe, that a form of social consciousness was moulded 
which persisted without much variation by 1987. The autumn of 1987 and, in 
particular, the beginning of 1988 mark the onset of a transformation process 
 100 Ibid.
 101 Ibid.








which has eluded any accurate description as yet. In this context, we should 
think of a sequence of developments rather than of one clear breakthrough mo-
ment: the release of political prisoners, the referendum on the second stage of 
economic reforms and price rises. The transformation is still in progress and, 
as such, it is difficult to define. Given this, 1988 will circumscribe my argument.
Secondly, in total opposition to Marody’s thesis, I  argue that politics has 
almost completely pervaded social consciousness and the way people have 
experienced their lives in this period (and are probably experiencing them as 
we speak of it). People’s popular thinking, including the way they think about 
their lives and opportunities in life, is nearly fully delimited by, let us call it, a 
“political consciousness,” that is, by viewing life concerns in conjunction with the 
political situation, the “system,” the assessment of the party-and-state authorities 
and “them” – the regime that governs the country. Almost all important matters 
in life, therein living conditions, are interpreted in relation to the state and the 
government, which means that they are defined in political terms. Sometimes 
it seems that even people’s attitude to nature depends on their appraisal of the 
state and its communist rulers! I will focus on the upsetting aspects of this situ-
ation later. The narrowing down of discourse, which is divested of knowledge-
related, aesthetic and, even, psychological preoccupations, is observable both 
in everyday life with its popular forms of social communication and in higher 
forms of cultural life and communication within academic, literary and artistic 
elites. What is more, the same can be said about the religious life of Poles. 
Scholarship, literature, art, journalism and religion seem to be steeped in ideo-
logical thinking, which directly translates each field’s specific values and quali-
ties into a defined position – “our” position – on every important matter. Such 
ideologisation entails that the declared and represented values are “our” values, 
i.e. on the one hand, we serve them and, on the other, we have a “title” to them. 
Agentive subjects make axiology part of their identities and, consequently, any 
axiological doubts about or criticism of their actions are viewed as a direct at-
tack on the more or less honest guardians of these values. Patent in cultural and 
religious life, such ideologised thinking reveals the ubiquity of politics and, con-
sequently, the instrumentalisation of values. The effect is strengthened by the 
prominence of the national element in people’s self-images and images of the 
social situation (which Marody entirely overlooks). “National” concepts are 
emotionally loaded, serve to define the situation and frame what I called above 
“political consciousness.”
In a sense, to evoke national concepts became expedient for entire society in 
protecting their identity. The politically relevant national concepts were, as if by 
definition and by default, pitted against “them” – the winners who, despite their 
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victory, were unable to strip us of our identity. This fostered the ideologisation 
of thinking, as it was exigent to show the world and ourselves that the Nation 
embodied true values and the political failure was only a short-lived triumph of 
evil over good. In this way, thinking in national terms set the scene for what I call 
“ideologisation.” Still, to answer the question “How does the ubiquity of politics 
manifest in everyday life and in individual attitudes?” is a different matter.
The transformation that took place in the mid-1980s primarily concerned 
the definition of the political and the place of politics both in social life and in 
unique individual existence. In 1980–1981, politics was positively defined by an 
overwhelming part of Polish society as a result of an extended conceptual and 
social process. Politics amassed positive existential connotations. Yet in the fol-
lowing years, these meanings changed, and today politics is defined in purely 
negative terms.
In 1980, political participation meant participation in discussion, in 
negotiations, in social bargaining, where the development of the entire com-
munity and people’s own interests were at stake. Politics as engagement in the 
constitution of the social order was believed to be a condition of individual self-
fulfilment and of life lived meaningfully and in dignity. The prospect of political 
participation was highly appealing. Above all, it transformed the self-image of 
“an ordinary person” in Poland. The right to take part in public life – in deci-
sion-making about individual lives and collective life – gave people a sense of 
self-worth and conferred value on individual existence. Such an understanding 
of politics produced the unique, existentially elevated tone that resounded in 
Poland in the Solidarity period. Such mindsets showed in multiple ways and, 
admittedly, were sometimes counterproductive in terms of effective collective 
action.
Martial law abruptly broke the emergent new definition of politics which 
accorded a new meaning to participation in public (social, collective, etc.) life.
The brutal, well designed and carefully executed crackdown on the social 
reform movement came as an utter shock to social consciousness and new forms 
of individual mentality, which were deeply transforming and developing at 
the time.
Politics reverted to its old, menacing self. The shock of martial law was, above 
all, a moral shock. Force and violence opposed higher values in everyday life, 
negated the idea of human – social and national – accord and undermined the 
psychological reality of the shared world.
Violence and malice  – that is, “politics” as a capacity and readiness to use 
force in order to subordinate others  – drenched the social space. The shock 
of martial law was, I repeat, a moral shock: malice triumphed, and the will to 
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power surpassed the will of social concord and collaboration. The new sensi-
tivity suffered a blow, and with it also the emerging belief that satisfaction from 
participation in shared life was stronger that the urge to command others, and 
that mutual trust was a suitable foundation of social relationships. Somebody 
(“they”) chose violence over the effort of earning recognition; they chose to seize 
power by force and domination rather than by winning public support and social 
approval. Despite its moral and cultural resources, society proved helpless in 
confrontation with violence and force.
We had to understand how it was possible in the first place.
Stage One: Moral Victory and Underground Society
The psychological shock caused by martial law demanded a new definition and 
a new attitude. As such, it had two consequences which followed on each other’s 
heels. One of them was a religious – spiritual even – re-invigoration experienced 
by a huge part of society. The other was the re-defining of politics. Actually, 
there was also a third effect which abruptly blocked spontaneous individual and 
social action and, consequently, compelled people to change their life plans and 
re-direct their life energies. I will analyse these problems selectively, in line with 
my major argument.
The Solidarity reformist movement largely grounded the idea of society in 
ethics.
The goal of building civil society can be seen as an aspiration to express uni-
versal moral values through giving collective life a particular form, to align social 
life with the objective order of values discovered and endorsed by people, and 
to bring principles of social life in agreement with moral principles. The meta-
physical dimension of the world, which had strongly informed social action, 
appeared in a new light in the aftermath of martial law.103
Previously galvanising the citizenship attitudes,104 religion now offered some-
thing else: solace and hope despite shattered individual and collective plans and 
 103 Cf. Ireneusz Krzemiński, “The Rooted World,” p….in this volume; Józef Tischner, 
Etyka solidarności (Kraków: Znak, 1981), Etyka solidarności and Homo Sovieticus 
(Kraków:  Znak,1992). For interpretations of Solidarity, see also Józef Tischner, 
Polska jest Ojczyzną: w kręgu filozofii pracy (Paris: Edition du Dialog, 1985); and 
Józef Tischner, Polski młyn (Kraków: Nasza Przyszłość, 1991).
 104 See “The Rise of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’ ” in this 
volume; Grzegorz Bakuniak and Krzysztof Nowak, “Kryzys legitymizacyjny systemu 
w perspektywie doświadczenia życia codziennego,” in Społeczeństwo polskie czasu 








expectations. Religion not only provided mental refuge but also helped under-
stand the moral shock and handle the situation mentally. Inspiring freedom 
strivings and cooperation with others, religion provided a framework in which to 
understand the unexpected defeat and the brutal breach of the value consensus.
Even though Catholicism is obviously prevalent in Poland, the religious resur-
gence in 1982–1984 concerned not only Christianity and the Catholic Church. 
It was also an upsurge of religious sentiments in other denominations and of 
para-religious investments.105 The freshly experienced shock, especially pro-
nounced in terms of morality, powerfully triggered people to embark upon reli-
gious explorations in search of the meaning of life and insights into good and 
evil in the world as such. The recent developments were understood in religious 
terms:  the experience of martial law was an experience of evil. The breach of 
the accords and promises by the party-and-government partner, the internment 
of several thousand trade-unionists, the suppression of all social action and 
constraints imposed on individual activity, the sense of complete helplessness 
vis-à-vis violence, all added up to the experience of operations of evil, even of the 
victory of evil in social life or in this world.
Because religious faith – above all Christianity – was embraced as a rescue and 
a remedy for the shock and suffering, the Catholic Church in Poland acceded to 
a very special position. Criticising violence and advocating for the imprisoned, 
the interned and the persecuted, the Church became the only authentic space, 
“our own” space, a site of community, so abruptly demolished and threatened 
in the collective’s everyday life. The meanings and roles of the Church multi-
plied, and participation in the community of believers became an unambiguous 
expression of moral and political allegiances, besides its spiritual and metaphys-
ical dimension.
The definition of the social situation was thus expressed almost entirely in 
the language of “practical morality.” The social world split into two unequal 
parts. One part included “them,” i.e. the government and “people of the regime,” 
in other words the minority that resorted to violence and were by definition 
“immoral” and “strangers.” The other part comprised “society,” Solidarity and the 
1987), pp. 223–229; Grzegorz Bakuniak and Krzysztof Nowak, “The Creation of a 
Collective Identity in a Social Movement: The Case of ‘Solidarność’ in Poland,” Theory 
and Society 16, 1987.
 105 Cf. Tadeucz Doktór and Krzysztof Koseła, Ruchy pogranicza religii i nauki jako 
zjawisko socjopsychologiczne (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 
vol. 1, 1984; vol. 2, 1985).
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Church, i.e. “our own” people who, despite their differences, upheld the shared 
basic principles.
Faith acquired a tangible social meaning and laid foundations for a unique 
religious ideology. The victory of “them,” shocking and painful though it was, 
could not be permanent. After all, it was not founded on any profound basis 
and, above all, it was bred by a disdain for ethics and the sacred. The defeat of 
Solidarity and the failure of collective action could be construed as a difficult 
ordeal, but also as a moral victory. People – society – did not betray their ideals 
and confirmed their resolve to abide by the ethical principles instituted by God 
and asserted by Christian, European and national tradition.106
The further development of events and later forms of social consciousness 
were determined by two factors. One of them was that various relatively auton-
omous social forces united around and under the patronage of the Catholic 
Church. The other was that various layers of social consciousness overlapped, 
producing a homogeneous, moralist definition of the situation.
The Solidarity reformist social movement presupposed that the state structures 
could be transformed in a peaceable way. Martial law derailed such calculations 
and overthrew hopes that the communist regime would re-define its notion of 
power and, thus, that the state-citizens relations would be non-violently re-cast.
In fact, such hopes were not entirely unrealistic. The signing of the agreements 
in August 1980 was a good reason to suppose that the prospect of governance 
based on social approval and reliant on public opinion indeed appealed to the 
regime. Yet martial law thrashed such hopes.
It was imperative to protest against evil. In the first attempt to grasp that social 
and existential situation mentally, most people, though smitten by violence, 
made recourse to new forms of social engagement. This meant, first of all, an 
unusual proliferation of all kinds of “clandestine activities.”
I use this euphemism because only some of these activities could properly 
be called underground resistance. The catchphrase of “underground activi-
ties,”107 which came to be used spontaneously and commonly, also in the offi-
cial propaganda, perfectly illustrates a banal sociological thesis:  in problem 
 106 In 1997, a reminder is in order that both “morality” and the political meaning of the 
Church were then interpreted quite differently than now. The Church and the religion 
it taught were allies of and supported the idea of human and civil rights, which were 
supposed to be the moral basis for a society of free citizens.
 107 The actual Polish word used to refer to such activities was (and still is) konspiracja, 
which literally means conspiracy, but usually has no pejorative or criminal overtones, 






situations, people define the state of affairs by means of ready-made “symbolic 
clichés” which are stored in the collective memory. Both sides  – i.e. society 
and the regime – used associations available in the collective memory which, 
though slightly differently handled, hardly corresponded to what was actually 
going on. The “attacking,” party-and-government side (the government could 
then be called “the militarised PUWP”) understood “underground” endeavour 
as an outbreak of (also armed) resistance of various group within Polish society 
against the communists who had gained power after the Second World War. 
Society evoked “underground” activities as defined by two frameworks of refer-
ence: a closer and more entrenched “cliché” of the wartime resistance movement 
against the Nazi occupiers, which continued in resistance against the regime of 
the People’s Republic of Poland; and a more remote paradigm of national resis-
tance in the period of partitions, with the January Uprising108 as its highlight. 
The association between the Solidarity reformist movement and the January 
Uprising was very vivid and compelling in the first years of martial law.
Yet the associations marshalled by the two sides were, essentially, inadequate. 
Both the government’s and the opposition’s interpretations of “underground 
resistance” referenced literal rather than metaphorical political struggle  – 
struggle conceived as actual combat, therein armed combat, and thus as an 
organised fight dictated by political goals, whatever moral justification of those 
goals was relevant to the dynamics of social life.
In fact, the actual “conspiratorial” activity, often dubbed “underground” by the 
official propaganda orchestrated by the government’s press officer Jerzy Urban, 
was based on entirely different mechanisms and rules. The struggle focused on 
citizen’s rights, and its predominant, if not sole, weapon was civil disobedience. 
The confrontation of the opposing political forces was, at most, a game in which 
“society” – “the underground” – engaged with the state’s policing apparatus and 
did not go beyond mass demonstrations, which were staged and joined by largely 
unprepared people.
 108 Toward the end of the 18th century, Poland was overwhelmed and gradually split into 
three parts seized by the neighbouring countries: Prussia, Russia and Austria (with 
the third – and last – partition occurring in 1795). Stripped of its statehood, Poland 
continued divided and without political sovereignty until 1918, when with the end of 
the First World War it became an independent state again. The period of partitions was 
punctuated by armed uprisings, which aimed to oppose the policies of the occupying 
empires and to regain the national independence, with the January Uprising (January 
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Interestingly, the idea of “non-violent fight” did not develop either, despite 
some attempts to push social actions in this direction. To talk of underground 
Solidarity’s non-violence movement in the Poland of the 1980s would indeed 
be an exaggeration. Some exceptions, notably including Wrocław’s Orange 
Alternative and certain initiatives of the Wolność i Pokój (Freedom and Peace), 
only prove this general observation.109
Given this, “underground resistance” was rather psychological, so to speak, 
and concerned a moral struggle for people’s hearts and souls. Paradoxically, the 
site of “confrontation” prioritised by underground Solidarity was citizenship, 
and its mode was civil disobedience against the government, which always made 
it clear that the democratically defined civil rights would not be respected.
In this sense, “underground resistance” meant a nexus of more or less inte-
grated undertakings, many of which were experiments with social action forms 
in new socio-political conditions, starting from operations of the proscribed 
trade unions and ending with tentative preparations for armed resistance. The 
latter, scarce as they were,110 vividly show how inadequately “symbolic clichés” 
were to the actual situation they were supposed to illuminate. History offered 
ready-made interpretations, yet their uninformed application could and did 
have disastrous consequences.
Ultimately, independent action split into two trajectories: active and passive, 
with the difference having an impact on individual lives and social conscious-
ness. To grasp the complexity of the situation, this division must be coupled with 
another one, i.e. the distinction into practical and symbolic activities. The com-
bination of the two criteria renders a tolerably apt typology.
“Active protest” means, basically, taking independent action in which an indi-
vidual or collective project with a defined, be it only very immediate, objective 
is developed. This includes a wide range of possible activities, such as collecting 
information about the situation in the country, helping the imprisoned, the 
interned and the sacked and their families, distributing foreign aid (which was 
gradually taken over and institutionalised by the Church), publishing samizdat 
books, papers, leaflets and appeals for resistance and protest, disseminating 
independent periodicals and books, manufacturing symbolic objects (badges, 
 109 Stating that there had been no far-ranging non-violence movement I mean that there 
were only various forms of collective protest, such as rallies, marches and other public 
demonstrations of dissatisfaction.
 110 A notable example includes a youth group accused of the murder of the People’s Militia 






pins, etc.), continuing trade-union activities (collection of fees, organisation of 
gatherings, etc.), and organising all kinds of meetings (which often evolved into 
quasi-seminars) and, later, the self-education movement, in which Solidarity’s 
Free University (Wszechnica Związkowa) played a crucial role. No less impor-
tant than active protest were various ancillary activities, such as making support 
and flats available for the above-listed operations as well as helping and accom-
modating the trade-unionist who had gone into hiding. Among active protest 
forms, I also count participation in public undertakings of symbolic significance 
to both parties involved, such as demonstrations, 1st May and 3rd May marches, 
holy masses commemorating the nation’s historical and recent events (e.g. anni-
versaries of the assassination of John Paul II, martial law and, later, the murder 
of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko) or arranging flower crosses in public places and 
holding rallies around them (singing religious and patriotic songs, etc.). Other 
active protest forms also included open letters and petitions, private exhibitions 
and performances/concerts at private homes and churches.
By “passive protest” I  mean various ways of refusing participation in state 
institutions, both individually and collectively. The latter is represented by actors’ 
boycott of the state-controlled mass media, visual artists’ withdrawal from the 
state-run galleries and other similar participation refusals of entire communi-
ties. They represent passive protest alongside millions of individual refusals to 
get involved in state institutions and/or to observe the newly introduced rules. 
Of course, the actors’ boycott of television was made possible by co-ordinated 
action of the community’s large segment. Particular activities undertaken to 
exert pressure not to appear on TV belong to active protest forms, yet individual 
actor’s refusals to perform were not necessarily tantamount to any “practical” ac-
tion. While the entire community as a social group was a significant nomen omen 
actor on the public, political stage, individual actors did not have to do anything 
more than people in other institutions who ignored new regulations or just pas-
sively refused to perform their roles and worked inefficiently.111
Passive protest consisted in refusing to perform certain activities, in contin-
uing to perform other ones against the current orders (such as social workers still 
helping people dismissed from work and aiding the families of the arrested and 
 111 In the early 1990s, the protest of actors was interestingly described by Małgorzata 
Molęnda-Zdziech in her MA thesis. Her numerous interviews with the striking 
actors corroborate the insights presented in this chapter. Cf. Małgorzata Molęda-
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interned activists) and/or boycotting routine activities and behaviours (“silent 
breaks” at schools and extremely slow work in production plants).
In such cases, resistance was simply reactive and did not generate any goals 
for further action. It was first and foremost an attitude which millions of people 
readily embraced. What passive protest demanded was disengagement from 
occupational roles, because even if one’s labour fundamentally contributed to 
society’s daily life, one anyway “worked for them.” And one did not want to work 
well “for them,” because “they” were bound to squander the fruit of one’s labour.
Psychologically, passive protest forms resulted in – and were at the same time 
motivated by – the sense of belonging to the community, sharing the common 
definition of the situation and involvement in society, which manifested its will 
and values in active protest forms. More courageous and principled, the minority 
committed to active protest showed the others a positive image of entire society. 
Those individuals who were brave, so to speak, for us and on our behalf expressed 
the collective “will of the people” and the enshrined values. The majority’s pas-
sive protest helped them assert their bond with the “active” minority in daily life, 
enact the shared values and, thus, resist the state.112
At the same time, bonding and mental mobilisation, especially in 1982–1983, 
helped society, i.e. ordinary people, build an obvious, albeit invisible, wall that 
divided them from the regime and “its people.”113
Spurred by the need of the moment, ordinary people often performed deeds 
which made them part of active protest for a while, when they, for example, 
rescued protesters from militiamen, sporadically made their flats or cars avail-
able to conspirators, occasionally bought samizdat newspapers and handed them 
over to others, etc. This was made possible by the common mental mobilisation, 
which was sustained by the primary, generalised definition of the situation: this 
can’t go on for long now.
The negative mobilisation of public opinion in Poland and abroad kindled 
hopes that “they” must finally cave in, accept society and Solidarity’s will and 
seriously take the Church into account.
The assumption that the situation was temporary impacted daily life in a 
variety of ways. The attitude of passive resistance was expressed in pithy slogans, 
such as “Winter is yours, spring will be ours” and “When the sun is higher, Wałęsa 
is nearer.” This attitude persevered for two winters and two springs, which was, 
 112 Cf. Jan T. Gross, Polish Society under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernement 
1939–1944 (Princeton and New York: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. x–xi.






of course, surprisingly long. Such an approach, such a mental mobilisation and, 
consequently, such a definition of the situation could not be sustained any longer.
The Turning Point: Society Disintegrates as “They” Prevail
The following stage was marked by the disintegration of society and, thus, the 
decline of Solidarity as a mass reformist movement and a trade union. I believe 
that the moment which effected this pivotal change in social consciousness came 
at the end of 1984, in the wake of the murder of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko and 
events surrounding the crime.
John Paul II’s second trip to Poland strengthened the primary definition of 
the situation as society’s “survival tactic” and the positive image of Solidarity 
as a morally impeccable victim. At the same time, it somewhat undercut the 
comforting idea that the victory of violence was illusory and the current state of 
affairs temporary (“You need to ask more of yourselves,” said the pope). Survival 
demanded long-term action and concerted organisational effort. Consequently, 
the year 1984 saw, a dwindling of hope and, so to speak, a faltering of society. In 
such circumstances, the national and religious identification of Poles strode to 
the foreground. More emphatically than before, society framed itself as a bearer 
and champion of national tradition. Solidarity was incorporated into the his-
torical series of national and liberatory feats as a contemporary variety of the 
traditional Polish freedom ethos. Paradoxically, this caused everyday state-
challenging behaviours (e.g. the boycott of the press and TV, wearing Solidarity 
badges, etc.) to erode and bolstered the popularity of ceremonial national and 
religious rituals.
At the same time, however, society increasingly wanted to express resis-
tance to and disapproval of the situation, “somehow” in an organised way. Such 
social expectations defy clear articulation even today. To put it simply, people 
eagerly wanted to salvage bonds and to rescue society as a political and sym-
bolic force opposing the victorious regime. Such expectations revolved around 
underground Solidarity. A study of the samizdat trade-unionist press and texts 
published then by the hiding leaders of underground Solidarity would prob-
ably help define these expectations more accurately. Underground Solidarity 
defended its unionist identity at that time, sought to represent society insofar 
as they expressed themselves through the unionist movement and consistently 
stood up for its democratic and unionist status.
The murder of Father Popiełuszko was a violent demonstration of the 
regime’s hatred of the Church, Solidarity and society. In its aftermath, outraged 
and terrified people were anxiously waiting “for something” in the belief that 
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“something” must be done, that, specifically, Solidarity should do “something.” 
But what “should” actually have been done?
Of course, my answer will be a sociological speculation, even though, 
as implied above, it can be proved or disproved. A  unique act of the will of 
millions of people, society cannot persist in a homogeneous form without an 
organisational structure despite its complex grid of internal ties (which, practi-
cally speaking, never span the entire population). Such an organisational struc-
ture has its practical and symbolic functions. It compiles social expectations, 
expresses people’s interests and aspirations and publicly represents their will. For 
a representation is both a unique expression and an image – and, thus, a mirror – 
of society. As such, it helps channel everyday practical actions and establish, or at 
least coordinate, principles of popular behaviours and judgments. In this sense, 
a representation is a specific vehicle of and an instrument for mustering social 
energy. Without a representation, be it only a symbolic one (which has no effec-
tive means of enforcing obedience), society cannot survive long as a cohesive 
whole and a psychological and interactive community. This was, emphatically, 
the case when social actors were forced to participate in the state which, though 
perceived as antagonistic to society and no longer capable of representing the 
public, had practical measures to make these social actors obedient. Additionally, 
the state, which was only a positive point of reference for the minority of “people 
of the regime,” impacted the entire population by controlling all institutions of 
social cooperation requisite to life. The state actually had at its disposal both vio-
lence and an array of rewards to make life far easier and more comfortable to its 
loyal subjects.
The murder of Father Popiełuszko perpetrated by society-hating state func-
tionaries helped the state re-claim at least some of its power to impact society, if 
not to represent it.
With no special representation of its own, society can hardly face up to its 
opponent – the government that controls the state, though being, sociologically 
speaking, a social minority. Without a representation, society cannot “speak in 
one voice.” For this reason, the murder of Father Popiełuszko triggered a surge 
of expectations concerning the social representation that could enable society to 
“address” and confront the opponent on an equal political and systemic footing. 
Until then, dissent had been chiefly moral and predominantly channelled by the 
Church.
Even though a man of the Church was murdered, the Polish Catholic Church 
did not act as a purely political agent, as the state’s equal and a contestant against 
the government in power. Had the Church played this role, it would have 
risked undercutting its political significance and, even, undermining its social 
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structure. Importantly, the Church’s socio-political relevance was founded on 
the fact that it was superior to the state in one sense and completely independent 
of it in another.
Without a doubt, both Solidarity and the Catholic Church would necessarily 
have had its representatives in the imaginable social representation expressive of 
society’s expectations.
Of course, such a representation of society never came into being, while the 
state and the government gained a lot by having Father Popiełuszko’s murderers 
arrested, publicising the regime’s actions and then ensuring a wide media cov-
erage of the perpetrators’ quick trial.
One of the major gains was a certain blurring of the previously clear-cut 
society-state opposition. This was effected by undermining the identification of 
the state with the government in power. General Jaruzelski’s cabinet took action 
against its own officers. “They” prosecuted “their people.” Whatever the assess-
ment of the trial of Father Popiełuszko’s murderers and whatever the intention of 
the party-and-state authorities therein, the fact was that the killers were indeed 
sentenced for the crime. The state asserted itself against the current interests 
of “their people” and displayed willingness to observe, partly at least, general 
human norms and the principles of justice.
A detailed sociological and legal study of the case could perhaps produce a 
different picture of the situation. But it is not the point. The point is that a certain 
social vision was generated which affected people’s thinking and conduct and, 
though vague and wobbly, fostered an approval of the state the way it was.
What the party-and-state authorities did in the wake of Father Popiełuszko’s 
murder represented an interesting social action. The aim was to encourage 
people to believe that the regime wanted to rule justly, while re-asserting the 
government’s positive power and adamancy. The mutual hatred of society and 
the regime’s people was supposed to be tempered by crafting an image of a strict 
and autocratic, yet fair government.
Still, the political spectacle was not fully successful. The state could have 
benefited far more from the trial of Father Popiełuszko’s murderers with all its 
trappings (such as the statements of the judges, commentaries of the cabinet 
members, etc.) if only the enterprise had been more consistently implemented 
and suggested more openness.
Soon after the trial, an attempt was made to institute a tolerably credible social 
representation within the state. The attempt failed even though a body called 
the Social Consultative Council (Społeczna Rada Konsultacyjna) was eventually 
established.
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The difficulties in forming the Social Consultative Council and the purely 
sham nature of the institution (in which it resembled the earlier founded 
PRON114) raise questions about the state’s recovery of some of its “power to com-
mand” entire society, which was posited above.
Generally, the social sentiment was that the state was “not ours”: the state did 
not express society’s aspirations, needs and interests, taking care chiefly of “their 
people” and expressing the will of the government (of the regime, of “them”), 
rather than the “will of the people.” But in critical situations, “they” were pre-
pared to exact justice on “their people.” Admittedly, “they” demanded subor-
dination and obedience, but they also expected “their people” to be disciplined 
and, minimally at least, abide by the rules of law and morality.
The positive political message embedded in the trial of Father Popiełuszko’s 
murderers could indeed justify a change in attitudes, which had already been 
underway for a while, as a matter of fact. The argument above only outlines 
what I believe to have been the justification which the popular social conscious-
ness used to construct a new generalised definition of the situation. Negative 
elements prevailed in that new definition because although the state proved 
ready to punish “their people,” the general public did not assume it to restore 
the rule of law in Poland. Rather, it implied that the state was willing to respect 
the commonly endorsed, fundamental rules of justice and morality; by the same 
token, the government, or the regime, displayed readiness to control immorality 
and lawlessness within their own ranks. This promised some degree of protec-
tion against the arbitrariness of the apparatus of oppression. However, the social 
expectations were not met as no representation of “the will of the people” came 
into being. As a result, a new attitude took hold in society: the negative accep-
tance of the state.
People only rarely embrace a thoroughly negative account of their situation in 
life. That is why a positive element was needed to produce a new definition of the 
situation though the definition was basically and intrinsically negative.
The Church as a Substitute of Society: The Devil in History
The new definition of the situation was founded on the simple conclusion that 
“we need to submit to ‘them’ because ‘they’ have the power.” Its consequence was 
that, first and foremost, the public abandoned the civic aspirations which had 
 114 The Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego (Patriotic Movement of National 






underpinned a symbolic society contesting the state form in place. Did that in 
and of itself mean an appreciation of the state and the government?
The situation was thoroughly paradoxical, in fact, since the realisation that 
“we need to submit to them” did not entail any positive recognition, at least not in 
the sense of any real legitimisation of the regime, an insight shared unanimously 
by all sociologists and even acknowledged by the propaganda.115 Defeating 
Solidarity and society, the state did not win supporters. What happened instead 
was that individuals and groups started to develop their personal, egoistic adap-
tive strategies and stopped responding to the situation together and in solidarity 
with others.
Adaptive strategies should be viewed dynamically as being developed in stages 
by individuals and collectives. In the first phase, “negative adaptation” involved 
passivity and withdrawal from public life, which prompted a further decline of 
work ethos, going through the motions of social roles and the focus on family 
matters. This only aggravated social atomisation.
Another consequence was that the Catholic Church was ascribed the new role 
of a representative and a substitute of society. Solidarity’s ideals of the new social 
order turned out to be impossible to implement, because “they” did not allow 
that, while “we” – society, nation – were not strong enough to defeat “them” (at 
least for now). Because these ideals were rooted in traditional Christian ethics and 
because the Catholic Church was a champion of social justice and human dig-
nity, it became society’s refuge and mainstay. The Church was the only common, 
public site where people could be themselves, that is, behave and present them-
selves as their identities dictated. Consequently, since no other symbolic and 
organisational form was available, the Catholic Church – as an institution and, 
also, as a community – began to function as society’s representative.
In other words, society took shelter in the Church, while the Church became 
society’s protector in solidarity with the oppressed. This emphatically brought 
national sentiments to the fore. At the same time, the national was interpreted 
as “the Catholic,” with the Polish nation embodying, so to speak, the universal 
system of Christian values. At the same time, towards the end of martial law 
and further on, society started to frame itself as a community of believers 
and a national church opposed to “them”: atheists, Marxists, communists, the 
 115 “Legitimisation” is one of the issues which are most frequently addressed in sociolog-
ical research and theory. Cf., e.g. Gzegorz Bakuniak and Krzysztof Nowak, “Kryzys”; 
Włodzimierz Pańków, “The Roots of ‘The Polish Summer’: A Crisis of the System of 
Power,” Sisyphus. Sociological Studies 3, 1982.
 
 
The Church as a Substitute of Society 181
government and “people of the regime.” In such circumstances, a moralist and 
metaphysical “diabolic” interpretation of events spread as the Church acquired 
a new political significance and power. Residing now in society which united in 
and around the Church, the strength of the Catholic Church was considerable 
enough to make the state acknowledge the Church and seek a settlement with 
it. After Father Popiełuszko’s murder, bargaining started in order to establish the 
principles of mutual relations, delineate spheres of influence and define scopes 
of control.
The Church’s political and religious functions were impossible to distinguish 
in some circumstances. As soon as society, including both the silent majority and 
the political elite led by the Solidarity-affiliated opposition, had been incorpo-
rated within (or at least joined) the Church, the Church as an institution became 
the nation’s representative, retaining its institutional and symbolic indepen-
dence. This afforded double possibilities. Namely, on the one hand, the Church 
functioned as society’s – or, rather, the nation’s – representative, engaging in a 
game of influence with the state. On the other, the Church was the protector 
of society, the nation, the opposition, briefly: Poles in Poland and abroad, and 
could mediate between the regime and society (as well as between the state and 
the world or the state and the nation). Because the protector-and-representative 
in one wanted to shield people, the Church willy-nilly had to play a political role 
and negotiate with the state. The best intentions notwithstanding, this led the 
Church into a risky territory. Representing society and, consequently, defining 
itself as an opposition against the regime, the Church at the same time negoti-
ated with the state and engaged in a political game with “them,” which demanded 
splitting the nexus of common interests. It demanded dividing the interest of the 
Church as an institution from the interests of society, Solidarity and social oppo-
sition groups. The political game threatened to demarcate the religious, moral 
and national domain as subject to the Church and severed from the rest of social 
life as subject to the state.
1987 witnessed a conspicuous campaign around a family education text-
book. Falling within the sphere of morals, upbringing and family, which were 
subject to the Church’s secular authority, the textbook was fiercely objected to 
by the Church and, consequently, withdrawn from schools by the government. 
What was a victory for the Church was, simultaneously, a defeat for society and 
stamped the loss of autonomous social subjectivity. The domain of morals and 
educational ideals which form the core of cultural models was seized by the 
Church and made part of political bargaining. People lost the right to speak up 
for themselves and, worse perhaps, rational discussion on morals and education 
proved entirely impossible.
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An important factor in this context was the “besieged fortress” syndrome, 
which is one of the most characteristic deep structures of Polish culture, as con-
vincingly argued by Marcin Król.116 Disputes and conflicts within society, in par-
ticular within the Church as society and the Church as nation, were deemed 
highly unseemly, and they needed to be muffled in time to prevent an internal 
disintegration which would only benefit the enemy. Consequently, society-
turned-nation entrenched itself, so to speak, in the Church’s ramparts. The 
Church became a national fortress, and even its critics, themselves within the 
walls of the fortress, had to recognise the authority of the clergy, the stewards of 
the Church as an institution.
As a result of the union of society, Solidarity and the Church, political dis-
course was almost entirely identified with moralist discourse. Moralist speech 
is the Church’s natural language, and it imprinted itself on the entirety of polit-
ical discourse and consequently on the modes of political action as well. While 
moralist speech initially strengthened the Church, society and, above all, the 
Solidarity-affiliated opposition, in the long run this high-brow speech failed to 
translate into lucid, everyday, political rules and socially enforced principles. As 
such, it became merely ritualistic and superficial. As a result, the image of the 
world burst into two parts: an immoral everydayness (or “this sinful world”) and 
a religious-national sublimity, which came in two varieties: a supplicant and pen-
itential one (“we must cleanse ourselves of the sins of everyday”) and a moral and 
grandiose one (“we are a faithful though sorely tested and oppressed nation”).
The fragmentation of the world image was associated with what was called 
above the diabolic interpretation of the events, which amply deserves a socio-
political study of its own. Namely, a third important factor in the forming of 
the negative definition of the situation was the image of “them” – “people of the 
regime” or “people of the state” – against whom one was completely powerless 
in daily life.
“They” comprised not just General Jaruzelski’s cabinet, but above all the 
Soviet Union. The powerful USSR served to justify inaction and the surrender 
of social and personal aspirations. In 1984–1987, popular consciousness came 
to rely on a trope which the official propaganda and Prime Minister Mieczysław 
F. Rakowski had utilised skilfully since the imposition of martial law. Specifically, 
the Soviet Union represented the most important “them”: that the USSR would 
not allow democratic reforms in Poland, instead backing the communist regime, 
had been incessantly reiterated. Ultimately, the USSR’s military power validated 
 116 Cf. Marcin Król, Podróż romantyczna (Paryż: Libella, 1987). 
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the necessity to submit – in this world, in daily life – to the “party-state” and to 
give up on the ambition of social and national self-determination.
A religious, or metaphysical, reading of politics spread in which the USSR, 
its ruling communists and Poland’s regime “represented” Satan. Of course, 
such thinking was fuelled by the murder of Father Popiełuszko and President 
Ronald Reagan’s famous speech in which he called the USSR the “evil empire.” 
Both the USSR and the Polish communists, who ruled the country and propa-
gated atheism, were viewed as enemies of God and, consequently, servants of 
hell. Helpless against them, common people had to relinquish their aspirations 
and could save themselves, their souls and their identity only within the Church. 
Devotion became a civic duty as a way of asserting identity, national belonging 
and human decency. In time, displays of devotion became ever more ostenta-
tious as the daily compromise with “the powers of evil” grew deeper and deeper.
The upsurge of the diabolic interpretation of the socio-political situation 
unexpectedly gave the regime an advantage as the Church and society could 
easily be accused of flouting the spirit of Christianity by the “diabolic” branding 
of atheists, Marxists and communists. Jerzy Urban, the government’s press 
officer, resorted to this argument on several occasions masterfully, if cynically. 
This compelled the Church to moderate its position somewhat and, as a result, 
diluted the interpretation of social reality. Since no accurate, judicious language 
was coined to describe the current situation, the tempering of the moralist inter-
pretation bedimmed the image of “what is going on” in the population’s popular 
thinking.
The authorities of the party-state deliberately used the national framework 
of reference to produce a picture of a covenant with the Church. In the official 
propaganda, especially on TV, the national, so to speak, image of the govern-
ment was being crafted with considerable consistency. The national and religious 
stratagems were perhaps best visible during John Paul II’s third pilgrimage to 
Poland. The impression of the actual and alleged collaboration of the ecclesi-
astic bureaucracy and the party-state’s bureaucracy was so overriding that many 
social groups were deeply confused. At moments, the Polish government could 
indeed pass for personal friends of the Polish Pope. The official propaganda 
sought to fabricate an image capable of convincing people that, even though 
lacking social legitimation, the government was indeed “our government.” After 
all, it was a Polish government, and Poland neither had nor could have any other 
one. I believe that in 1988 such an effect on the popular consciousness of many 
social groups in Poland was achieved.
Fourthly, as martial law was lifted, small entrepreneurship began to bur-
geon. The development was promoted both by dissent against the state (i.e. the 
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preference to “work on your own account” or “for a businessman” rather than 
“for them”117) and by the state’s policies for boosting the economy, first of all 
agriculture (the years 1983 – 1985 were good for farmers). The legislation that 
provided for the rise of private businesses was enforced by economic exigen-
cies and social pressures. Given increasingly more opportunities throughout the 
1980s, private entrepreneurship was controlled both formally and financially 
(through taxation, rationed supplies and administrative constraints), yet grew 
dynamically and ever more robustly. However, despite indisputable profits and 
successes, individual entrepreneurship, especially if legal, was initially a negative 
experience. Even if prompted by dissent against the state, private businesses had 
to go along with compromise and corruption as without corruptive collaboration 
with various state agencies no private business was practically able to operate.
Most people in Poland found private entrepreneurship far less important than 
half legal, if not entirely illegal, trading abroad. It seems that millions of people 
were involved in it, engaging in commerce during what formally passed for 
tourist trips. The commerce was very primitive and small-scale, yet it required 
at least a show of subordination to the “state” as the passport became one of the 
most precious and coveted goods. One could not refuse to submit to “them,” lest 
“they” refused one the passport. Apparently, nothing could be done about it, and 
people had to obey the state.
As a result, society’s disintegration progressed, and the ethos of honest 
economy and fair business decayed. People focused on quick profit (before “they” 
levy taxes on the company or forbid travelling), and their economic thinking 
prioritised egoistic (at best family-serving) outcomes and consumption instead 
of long-term investments, while private interests came to seem unrelated to, if 
not entirely incompatible with, the public good. All this ultimately exacerbated 
social differentiation and atomisation.
In this way, the generalised negative definition of the situation was formed in 
Poland, enhancing the appeal of temporary or permanent emigration as an at-
tractive and active alternative.
The Negative Definition of the Situation: “People 
Don’t Matter One Bit, Only Force Does”
The negative definition of the situation can be succinctly summarised as 
“Nothing can be done the way it should and the way you want to, because ‘they’ 
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have the power.” The conclusion that “people don’t matter one bit” became the 
axis of a comprehensive ensemble of attitudes which contributed to that neg-
ative definition. The slogan “nothing can be done because people don’t matter 
one bit” generated a new image of the world and a new concept of individual 
social identity.
The belief prevailed that whoever wielded force had the upper hand in the 
world. Force determined who was right and how the world was organised. 
If one did not have enough force and courage to oppose violence, one had 
to submit to the winners. This change was deeply consequential. It spoke to 
a scepticism about the ideal of civil society, which affected even the ideal of 
democracy, even though the latter was still invariably professed in surveys. 
Democracy ceased to have unambiguously positive connotations and evoked 
ambivalent responses.
The image of the world ruled by force, a world in which submission to 
those who had the upper hand was inevitable, was not entirely homogeneous 
in popular consciousness. In daily life, the negative definition of the situa-
tion had a highly distressing ring. Inscribed in it were threat, humiliation and 
fear. This may be why the image of the world it produced, rather than being 
stable, fluctuated, even though its foundation was fixed and commonly shared 
by the upholders of the definition’s different variants. These variants inces-
santly shifted and circulated as if people continued to swap and re-configure 
ready-made components of the general definition of the situation. Having 
embraced the negative definition of the situation, popular consciousness 
seemed to wrestle with itself to find a constructive way out, being at the same 
time trapped  – enclosed within the negative horizon. There was no reason 
to reject the fundamental negative insights resulting from the division of 
the universe into the “ideal eternity” and “this sinful world of mortality.” All 
thought processes seemed to revolve within an enchanted – and at the same 
time vicious – circle:  elements of the definition of the situation continually 
rotated, but their movement was only illusory. The new accounts included 
the same components, even though different people composed them into new 
interpretations. I call this highly interesting phenomenon a fluctuating world 
image and discuss it in more detail below.
The core of the definition of the situation was double-layered. One layer 
involved the observation that Solidarity and society – the “we” who wanted to 
reform the world and align it with the civic ideal – had failed. People had been 
very naive to believe that “they”  – firstly, the USSR and, secondly, the Polish 
communists – would consent to the reforms. The power of the USSR was far too 
formidable to overcome. Fighting “them” did not make sense as it was “doomed 
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to failure” in advance. The diabolic interpretation of the Soviet power effectively 
bred a sense of helplessness.118
Helplessness and impotence were reinforced by a general unwillingness to 
put up a fight and to resist violence actively. Social consciousness perhaps made 
a virtue of necessity, falling back on the Christian justification in which killing 
was condemned as immoral. Violence could not be countered with fight. The 
justification was underpinned by the memory of wartime experiences (“Would 
you like yet another war?”). This prompted the assertion that “life is the highest 
value,” which was identified with Christianity.
The other layer of the definition of the situation was deeper and, I would say, 
more pessimistic. Solidarity and society had assumed that a good social order 
could be built and that politics and social life could be based on human rights, 
solidarity and cooperation. They were proven wrong as an order had triumphed 
in which some people could and did rule others. This implied that in order to 
institute a certain order in the social world, one needed to seize power even if 
that order was an ideal cherished by many people. By the same token, social con-
sciousness practically abandoned the civic perspective in which all people had an 
equal right to define rules of life and principles of governance together.
As the interviewed head of an CRZZ Enterprise Council said, “there must be 
somebody in charge of the whole thing.”119 Being in charge of the whole thing, 
by definition, meant the exercise of power and commandeering, i.e. making 
decisions for one’s subordinates and exacting their obedience. This is the reason 
why the pronoun “they” started to be used also to refer to Solidarity. “They” – i.e. 
Solidarity – also wanted power and, as such, sought to impose their own order. 
Accepting that “the world is ruled by force” prompted another change in the 
social understanding of politics. Politics came to be seen as a site of a struggle 
for power, that is, for commanding others. This change deeply and, in my view, 
pessimistically affected social life and the totality of social transactions.
The definition of the situation was, nevertheless, problematic. It bred two grip-
ping questions. One of them was: “How can this image of the world be reconciled 
with religion and allegiance to the Catholic Church?” The other was: “How can 
 118 Symptomatically, popular consciousness only poorly registered the USSR’s failure 
in Afghanistan. Independent publishers and oppositional political thinkers did not 
devote much attention, either, to the Soviet army’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
the long-term relevance of this fact.
 119 Ireneusz Krzemiński et  al., Polacy  – Jesień ‘80. Proces powstawania niezależnych 
organizacji związkowych (Warszawa: Instytut Socjologii UW, 1983), p. 239; see “The 
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the rule that ‘force rules the world’ (comprehended as ‘somebody must be in 
charge of the whole thing’) be reconciled with the image of the West, especially 
with the stereotypical image of the US as the land of plenty founded on freedom 
and democracy?”
Different answers to these questions produced different versions of the defini-
tion of the situation. I outline them below, by necessity, merely cursorily. For in 
this definition of the situation only the emotional undertone was homogeneous 
and vivid, resulting from the obsessive reiteration that “nothing can be done,” 
“they won’t let it happen” and “people don’t matter one bit.” At the same time, 
the definition itself was unstable in intellectual terms as new ways were invented 
to conceptually make sense of the experience, even though the same statements 
were repeated time and again.
Variant One: Conformist Harmony
In this variant, the image of the world was dictated by conformity to “the events 
at hand.” In the religious version, this meant assuming that whatever happened 
depended on the rulings of Providence. If the winners won, it apparently had 
to be so, since our good Lord ruled the world after all. The tension between 
the world ruled by force and violence and the religious ideal of love and ethics 
in social life was considerably alleviated by specific personalism:  that various 
people, some of them of “evil nature,” came to power was a general rule, even 
among the clergy; some succumbed to evil while others did not. because some 
were worse whereas others were better people.
The Church was the highest and ceremonial authority. One needed to be part 
of the Church, because everything depended on our good Lord who would judge 
people in the afterlife. At the same time, one needed to “render to Caesar the 
things that are Caesar’s.” The verse from the Gospel was erected into a general 
principle of conduct, so there was no reason not to submit to the party-state. 
If they governed and were Polish, one had to yield to them. Nonetheless, there 
was no reason to condemn Solidarity and the underground movement as their 
intentions were good. The Church should not “meddle in politics.” The most 
important thing was to live a decent life, i.e. not to steal, to comport oneself mor-
ally, to start a family and take care of them, in brief: to do exactly as others did.
The ecclesiastical-national identification encapsulated in the ideal of a decent 
human being justified the view that “life is the supreme value.” It was human 
duty to surrender humbly to the circumstances, therein to the winners. Fight 
could lead to bloodshed, while killing was expressly forbidden. The meekness 




humble calf will feed from two mothers.”120 And, as a matter of fact, it was more 
about feeding than about humility.
Variant Two: A Manichean Drama with Messianic Elements
This variant was founded on a dichotomous picture of the world, split into “good” 
and “evil,” “the harrowing everydayness” and “the desirable order of life,” and 
“mortality” and “transcendence.” In its religious version, the tension between the 
mortal and the transcendent, which was somewhat alleviated in variant one, was 
considerably enhanced. Basically, human life in this world wallowed in sacrifices, 
unfulfillment and a necessary surrender to the forces of the “world,” i.e. the Satan 
active on earth. As such, life was sinful and replete with suffering. However, if 
people, sinful though they were, were also pious, they could count on the for-
giveness of sins and a reward in the afterlife. Consequently, one could expect 
neither “the world” nor society nor oneself to attain the ideals of a moral and 
happy life on earth. People should strive to live in conformity with moral rules, 
but they are weak, sinful and helpless against the organised power of violence. 
This religious, dichotomous image of the world generated a unique social form 
of the Jungian “persona.”121 Namely, it more or less deliberately referred to the 
cliché of Poles as victims – Poles as suffering oppression for the sake of higher 
values, devotion and the fight for the national independence.
Now, the “oppressed Pole” had become a Pole victimised by communism. The 
persona of the oppressed encouraged feelings of entitlement and, at the same 
time, spread the belief that the suffering borne by Poles was messianic, as they 
fought for “our values and yours.”
The upholders of both more and less religiously inflected versions of this var-
iant of the definition of the situation accepted that it was necessary to come to 
terms with this mortal world. It was imperative to respect life and succumb to 
violence, yet the nation could not forget about their calling.
In this framework, society faded entirely, transmuting into the Suffering 
Nation. This was the basic structure of identification; this was the supreme and 
broadest collective self of “us.” Appropriated as another iteration of national 
uprisings, Solidarity came to invite ambivalent appraisals. In positive terms, 
the defeat was a sacrifice and a moral victory over “them.” In negative terms, 
 120 Polish: pokorne cielę dwie matki ssie, meaning roughly “humility will get you any-
where.” (translator’s note)
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Solidarity was reckless and failed to salvage and to implement the nation’s socio-
moral Catholic ideals.
The variant came in many different versions, each of which invariably pitted 
“us” against “them,” stressing the diabolical interpretation of the situation and 
the world’s dichotomous nature.
The moralist attitude came to the fore unlike in variant one, which emphasised 
the acceptance of “things as they were” and defined “decency” on the micro-level 
of individual conduct within the closest social environment. Variant two was 
different as the dramatic tension between this sinful world of mortality and the 
eschatological ideal generated strongly loaded images of good and evil, black-
and-white interpretations and a zealous pressure on the fulfilment of moral 
obligations.
More secular versions of this variant of thinking were similar in projecting 
a future victory of “our national ideals” as a reward for the loyal cultivation of 
values. Society’s memory – the national memory – would preserve our struggle, 
and our moral refusal to bow to evil would be appreciated in times to come. The 
effort would bring forth fruit some day in the future.
This account of the variant slightly downplays its Manichean undertone of 
the tussle between good and evil. However, the moralist sense of entitlement 
mentioned above resulted from the perception of the world as a playground of 
the forces of good and evil. At the same time, it channelled people’s alliance with 
good, which was invariably, though in different ways, located in the nation.
Variant Three: Egoistic Escapism
Escapism does not have to designate an active escape or turning back from 
life. Rather, it implies a conscious withdrawal into one’s own world and the 
abandonment of public life and public concerns. “One’s own world” is not so 
much another culture as rather the private world, where “private” does not nec-
essarily equal “individual” or “personal” and, certainly, not “lonely.” In this con-
text, privacy rather means enclosure in one’s group, community or bunch, which 
abide by their values and, though embedded in a broader world, express their 
désintéressement in the rules which this broader world follows.
The broader world is where “they” have won, and it does not make any sense 
to strive to change this situation. One must first and foremost “be oneself,” that 
is, mind one’s own business and attend to one’s own matters without looking 
back at society. Of course, one must take others into account, but one also has a 
right to act as one’s nature dictates, i.e. associate with the like people to support 




some rules which are neither quite right nor quite wrong, but politics is basically 
an evil, dirty and immoral business. Even the Church as a political actor makes 
mistakes, but they are a “normal” thing and, as such, should not be abhorred. 
The Church is founded on religion, and that is crucial. “They” – the communists 
in power – are egoists as any other human being. “They” are evil, and that they 
govern is the country’s and the nation’s a disaster, but after all everybody has 
their weaknesses and sins, so they deserve some leeway.
What in variant two was a radical tension between eternity and this sinful 
world of mortality, between the ideal and the quotidian, between the sacred and 
the profane is diluted in variant three into an unending chain of dichotomies 
which render a diversified image of the world. The world consists of very dif-
ferent people who are, nevertheless, predominantly guided by dedication to need 
fulfilment and egoistic pleasure-seeking.
This variant very strongly opposes practical moralism by insisting that, first, 
phenomena and motives are complex and, second, some good and some evil 
can be found in all people and in all actors of social life. The relativist stance 
inscribed in this variant of the definition of the situation is well captured in the 
rhetorical question “Can we really judge the situation unambiguously?” The rela-
tivism is tempered a bit by allegiance to the nation and religion, but the religious 
version of the variant, somewhat resembling variant one, compartmentalises 
experience into various segments which are ruled by entirely different principles 
and instructs to “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; and to God the 
things that are God’s.” Religious devotion and the endorsement of moral com-
mandments do not entail here either an uncritical and conformist identification 
with the Church nor thoroughly personal beliefs independent of the Church.
Occasionally, this variant of the definition of the situation was a stimulus to 
go abroad, yet rarely to emigrate without any prior preparations. Life in Poland 
could be attractive and personally satisfying for those who had enough hard cur-
rency and could travel the world. The variant of egoistic escapism was very often 
embraced by people who constructed their “private world” upon intense and 
profitable contact with the world.
Variant Four: Desperate Dissent
The commonly repeated “It’s impossible to live here anymore” best conveys 
this variant of the definition of the situation, which tends to propel desperate 
decisions, such as sudden escapes abroad and/or unprepared emigration. 
Alternatively, it breeds self-destructive behaviours and substance use in search 
of “another world.” While the previous variants locate the causes of the negative 
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situation and seek the means of relief outside, this variant agglomerates all neg-
ative aspects of life that “target” the human being, without offering any counter-
balance to them.
Generally, it is associated with resenting God, the world and people. It involves 
abandoning religion, or at least the Catholic Church, as well as Solidarity and 
society, which failed to uphold their ideals. Reality is nightmarish and/or absurd. 
The attitude that results from such a definition leads to interrogating transcen-
dence, fighting God, quarrelling with the advocates of humanism and moral ideals, 
denouncing the current form of the world and despising people’s current conduct.
Often the variant is not carried to such extremes, targeting not so much God and 
religion as rather social forms of worship, which fall short of the moral ideal. The 
triumph of evil in the world and one’s own enslavement fuel an individual quest for 
God and meaning of life along new ways, which stray from the commonly trodden 
paths and, especially, from the national tradition.
In another version of this variant, the old tradition is contrasted with the current 
debacle. In this version, the nation is framed as entirely conquered, demoralised by 
the system and self-debasing. Society, often associated with the nation, is assessed 
in as pejorative terms as “they” – the state, the system, communism (and the USSR, 
of course) – are.
This often goes hand in hand with a negative account of Poles, who are described 
as dirty, sycophantic, petty-minded drunkards and haters with no honour. This 
basic inventory of Polish vices is, naturally, open to various modifications.
In this variant, the individual is placed in a hopeless position and can only 
rise above it (and, sometimes, above others) by renouncing any false illusions. 
This engenders social and mental isolation, while the definition of the situation, 
which, as such, describes alienation from life, fixes this alienation itself.
Consequently, self-defence mechanisms are activated, and the individual 
fashions him/herself – and possibly his/her loved ones – into a fortress besieged 
by the hostile world. Unlike in variant three, the individual walled up in the for-
tress of the self feeds on misery rather than on pleasure.
The Polish Modes of “Escape from Freedom”
The ensembles of attitudes that founded and were encouraged by the definition of 
the situation lend themselves to various theoretical descriptions. Below, I inter-
pret the variants of the definition of the situation in terms of Erich Fromm’s 
concepts.122







This variant of the definition of the situation is likely to produce a psychological 
meta-attitude which Fromm called “automaton conformity.” Its important fea-
ture is “pseudo thinking”: “[T] he problem is whether the thought is the result of 
one’s own thinking, that is, of one’s own activity; the problem is not whether or 
not the contents of the thought are right. […] The pseudo thinking may also be 
perfectly logical and rational. […] The decisive point is not what is thought but 
how it is thought.”123 Fromm associates “automaton conformity” with the “pseudo 
self.” The condition is thus explained by the loss of identity. The abrupt collapse 
of ideas about life and desired bonds, coupled with the invasion of violence as a 
determinant of individual lives, could without a doubt undercut people’s sense 
of identity. “[I]n order to overcome the panic resulting from […] loss of iden-
tity, [the individual] is compelled to conform, to seek his identity by continuous 
approval and recognition by others. Since he does not know who he is, at least 
the others will know – if he acts according to their expectations; if they know, he 
will know, too, if he only takes their word for it.”124 Undoubtedly, the mechanism 
of the “collectivisation” of people and replacing “selves” with “pseudo-selves” was 
grounded in national and religious symbols and in the authority of their official 
proprietors. Consequently, the “pseudo self ” of Poles was intrinsically national 
and Catholic.
Variant Two: A Drama of Mortality and Eschatology
This variant seems to be linked to authoritarianism. Fromm is known to have 
regarded authoritarianism as a sadomasochistic symbiosis that seeks to “over-
come the unbearable state of powerlessness.”125 “Masochism is one way toward 
this goal. The different forms that the masochistic strivings assume have one 
aim: to get rid of the individual self, to lose oneself; in other words, to get rid of 
the burden of freedom,”126 as Fromm puts it. In turn, “[a] ll the different forms of 
sadism which we can observe go back to one essential impulse, namely, to have 
complete mastery over another person, to make him a helpless object of our will, 
to become the absolute ruler over him, to become his God, to do with him as one 
pleases.”127 Fromm continues:
 123 Ibid., pp. 192–3.
 124 Ibid., p. 203.
 125 Ibid., p. 139.
 126 Ibid., p. 151.
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To rule over another person, if one can claim that to rule him is for the person’s own sake, 
frequently appears as an expression of love. […] Is not sadism, as we have described it 
here identical with the craving for power? The answer to this question is that although 
the more destructive forms of sadism […] are not identical with the wish for power, the 
latter is the most significant expression of sadism.128
Fromm catalogues several notable features of the authoritarian character, which 
helpfully illuminate our argument:
The authoritarian character is never ‘revolutionary’; I should like to call him a ‘rebel.’ 
[…] The authoritarian character worships the past. […] The courage of the authoritarian 
character is essentially a courage to suffer what fate or its personal representative or 
‘leader’ may have destined for him. To suffer without complaining is his highest virtue 
[…] Not to change fate, but to submit to it, is the heroism of the authoritarian character. 
[…] The concept of original sin […] is characteristic of the authoritarian experience. 
[…] Man’s own doing becomes the power that rules over him and never lets him free. 
The consequences of guilt can be softened by atonement, but atonement can never do 
away with the guilt.
Finally, Fromm concludes: “For the authoritarian character activity is rooted in a 
basic feeling of powerlessness which it tends to overcome. […] The authoritarian 
character wins his strength to act through his leaning on superior power.”129
In the specific Polish version of authoritarianism in the 1980s, “this world 
of mortality,” in which one has to submit to “them” – i.e. to the state – because 
“force rules the world,” represents the masochistic component, while the reli-
gious identification with the Church and the nation stands for the sadistic com-
ponent. Incessant complaints about and grievances against “them,” who force 
one to live the way one lives, fully justify relinquishing responsibility for the 
public good in everyday life. At the same time, the identification with national 
religion motivates the moral denunciation of “them” and all strangers as inferior, 
threatening and morally “flawed.” This attitude is interwoven with permanent 
fear and guilt feelings, so characteristic of Polish daily life and religiosity.
Variant Three: Egotist Escapism
The variant of egotist escapism is implicated in the mechanisms of “escape 
from freedom” which Fromm describes as: “the withdrawal from the world so 
completely that it loses its threat (the picture we find in some psychotic states), 
and the inflation of oneself psychologically to such an extent that the world 
 128 Ibid., pp. 159–60.








becomes small in comparison.”130 Fromm does not discuss these mechanisms 
in much detail, because he does not attribute a lot of cultural relevance to them. 
However, in the Poland of the 1980s such mechanisms became very significant 
and common. In fact, researchers of Western societies have also taken more 
notice of them recently as contributing to the rise of the narcissistic personality.
Ortega y Gasset seems to have had a similar character in mind when he 
deplored the “superlative abnormality” of “the mass man” represented by the 
“self-satisfied man.” In today’s Poland, a specific species of the self-satisfied man 
has emerged which absolutises private needs and justifies them as purportedly 
springing from a universal ethical principle. As the principle is not honoured 
by “the system,” we allegedly deserve to do whatever we can do to humour our 
whims.131
Variant Four: Desperate Dissent
This variant triggers destructive attitudes. “I can escape the feeling of my own 
powerlessness in comparison with the world outside of myself by destroying it. 
[…] If for any reason other persons cannot become the object of an individual’s 
destructiveness, his own self easily becomes the object.”132 Fromm observes 
that: “There are destructive tendencies which result from a specific situation; as 
reaction to attacks on one’s own or others’ life and integrity, or on ideas which 
one is identified with.”133 While this kind of destructiveness can be a rational 
response to threat, the destructive mechanism is at work when the individual 
permanently harbours hostility, only waiting for an excuse to display it. “It would 
seem,” explains Fromm,
that the amount of destructiveness to be found in individuals is proportionate to the 
amount to which expansiveness of life is curtailed. […] The more the drive toward life is 
thwarted, the stronger is the drive toward destruction; the more life is realized, the less 
is the strength of destructiveness. Destructiveness is the outcome of unlived life. Those 
individual and social conditions which make for suppression of life produce the passion 
for destruction that forms, so to speak, the reservoir from which the particular hostile 
tendencies – either against others or against oneself – are nourished.134
 130 Ibid., p. 183.
 131 Cf. Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, trans. anonymous, 25th anniversary 
edition (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1957), pp. 102 ff.
 132 Fromm, Escape, pp. 177–9.
 133 Ibid., p. 179.













“Internalisation of Violence” and Privatisation of the World 195
“Internalisation of Violence” and Privatisation of the World
Quoted above, Fromm’s words invite us to reflect on another issue. Martial law 
created the “individual and social conditions which make for suppression of life.” 
The process of constructing a negative definition of the situation was society’s 
response to violence which put an end to spontaneous social action and conse-
quently thwarted innumerable individual actions.
The negative definition of the situation helped alleviate the disagreeable 
experiences to a degree and shove responsibility onto the world outside. The 
negative definition of the situation can thus be viewed as a paradoxical strategy 
of overcoming the experienced negativity of people’s situation in life.
Popular consciousness began to avail itself of various means to surmount this 
negativity. One of them was a relatively simple operation referred to as repres-
sion in the Freudian framework. Namely, Solidarity seemed to be forgotten. Not 
only Solidarity’s ideals but also people’s engagement in social action were erased 
from popular consciousness. Particularly striking was people’s decision not to 
hand the Solidarity experience down to the young generation, to their own chil-
dren. The memory of Solidarity’s legal activities seemed to be distressing as a 
memory of defeat and a reminder of how difficult it was to abide by the ideals 
treasured at the time.
Consequently, in another turn of events, people started to deprecate their own 
experience and ideals. Solidarity was re-positioned as “them” as well.
A feasible way of separating the individual self from the collective self of 
Solidarity was persistently offered by the official propaganda, which dissemi-
nated the cliché of Solidarity as an organisation vying for power. This prompted 
the belief that Solidarity would exercise power in exactly the same way as the 
communist regime did. The official propaganda proved successful, at least tem-
porarily, since such an interpretation, as already indicated, was incorporated 
into the “fluctuating” definition of the situation. As the hatred of the humiliating 
winners abated, people’s own experience and ideals were deprecated.
Crucially, the spirit of citizenship fell into oblivion in popular conscious-
ness. The civil thinking viewed personal prosperity as dependent on the political 
system’s capacity to foster effective collaboration and presupposed individuals’ 
active influence on people’s general prosperity. As a community member, one 
had the right to pursue one’s own happiness, but one also thought of personal 
wellbeing as tied to others’ success and, consequently, was ready to work for the 
sake of “common good.”
The privatisation of the social world also bred an eagerness to fight for one’s 




in which “the stronger” inevitably won. Power and interests came to be con-
ceived in increasingly naturalistic, nearly biological terms.
This confirmed and additionally justified the negative definition of poli-
tics as evil and immoral. Governance meant one-upmanship. As such, it was 
immoral because, sooner or later, the human being was bound to defile him/
herself with violence in the name of self-interest. Governance and power were 
mendacious since, once involved in them, one trumpeted ideals, while egoisti-
cally committing only to one’s own success. Such an image of politics (which, 
notably, was often found in totalitarian movements, including the communist 
movement) prompted subordination to the strong ones, but also salvaged one’s 
self-dignity on condition that one kept one’s hands clean. Taking action for the 
sake of material success did not soil one’s hands.
Mentioned above, the family-focused ideology greatly promoted such 
thinking. Not only the “clean hands” but also the care for the family helped jus-
tify surrendering to violence and obedience to orders even if they completely 
defied common sense.
This attitude was fostered by what I refer to as the “internalisation of violence.”
Such an attitude makes it nearly impossible to build a community. When one 
can count only on oneself, while the world is less the common good and more a 
trove from which one must “snatch” the needed and coveted goods, every other 
human being turns into a competitor. In this context, competition is not what 
the Western ideologues and sociologists have decried. Capitalist competition 
requires mutual negotiations and clear rules and, as such, is a form of social 
cooperation, paradoxical though it may sound. In Poland, the “natural competi-
tion” I am outlining is decultured and apparently governed by the principles of 
the biological survival of the fittest.
The attitude harbours a diluted hatred of the entire world, for the world of 
other people is always perceived as inimical, unpleasant, competitive and bent 
on robbing us of what we need and desire. Against this backdrop, strength, 
resolve and the effective use of violence can indeed be affirmed. Hatred is 
reversed, for the more powerful and the stronger one is, the more admiration 
one deserves.
Internalised violence is necessarily accompanied by the instrumentalisation of 
people and social bonds. In daily life, the internalisation of violence produces a 
new style of interpersonal relationships. Any situation of social contact (including 
situations of play) can only be effectively handled if the individual gains advantage 
over partners and can exert direct pressure on them.
Sociologists have repeatedly insisted that social relationships cannot do without 
the subordination-vs.-superordination interplay (which was compellingly 
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described by Georg Simmel135). The subordination-superordination pattern 
forming spontaneously in Poland above all concerns commandeering others 
and imposing one’s fashion of defining the situation. Specifically, the stronger 
can command in the symbolic sphere. What this implies is that as violence was 
internalised, the system of spontaneous human interactions in Poland started 
to reproduce the centralist model of social organisation. In his book Polish 
Society under German Occupation, Jan T. Gross insightfully analyses the General 
Governorate and the Third Reich to portray the social system based on the 
strictly centralist, peremptory principle. All social systems based on this prin-
ciple are equally ineffective, as they continually engender anarchist leanings.136 
Collaboration is permanently vulnerable to disruptions and erratic actions of 
various actors, despite their formal submission to their superiors’ commands. 
The definition of the situation imposed by the commander induces both a docile 
acquiescence to orders as well as a revolt against and aversion to the commander.
This relationship model was widespread in “real socialism” period of the 
People’s Republic of Poland; now its essential features have come to be spontane-
ously reproduced.
The “Enactment” of Declared Values
Yet, in spite of all the subordination mechanisms, in spire even of the affirmation 
of the party-state’s power, the authoritarian affirmation of the victorious force 
and the abandonment of civil ideals, mainstream popular consciousness sought 
a positive solution to the situation. That meant an active disagreement with the 
status quo.
If practical life grew ever more dependent on internalised violence, a more or 
less formalised sphere of the symbolic enactment and collective experience of 
the declared moral and cultural values was forming at the centre of everyday life. 
The development was not identical with “ceremonial values” (wartości odświętne) 
as defined by Stanisław Ossowski.137 Rather, at its core lay the “enactment” of 
professed everyday values as ceremonial or solemn values. Crucially, a range of 
social activities were marshalled with the sole aim of collectively enacting and 
experiencing the values proclaimed to guide everyday life. They were elevated 
 135 Cf. Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans. and ed. Kurt H.  Wolff 
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950), Part Three.
 136 Cf. Gross, Society, cf. particularly pp. 145–159, 199–212.











into ceremonial values, but they were not intended to be practised in everyday 
life outside the symbolic reality in the belief that this was impossible. People 
behaved, so to speak, as stage-actors who, leaving the theatre, do not as a rule 
intend to behave like the characters they have just played on stage.
In Poland, the symbolic sphere of life grew uniquely autonomous to serve as 
an isolated, dedicated social stage on which to enact and document people’s at-
tachment to national and religious values, augmented with enigmatic sentiments 
of dissent and entitled veterancy: a symbolic participation in Solidarity’s social 
movement.
Emphatically, despite the highly histrionic nature of symbolic reality, partici-
pation in it was anything if not a real experience, even though it was thoroughly 
impractical, if “practicality” is taken to mean the resolve to behave in accordance 
with the enacted and declared ethics. What happened in Poland was a species of 
the social “theatre of values.”
The Right to “Make Money”
The opposite of the national and religious theatre, another way of finding 
positives in the negative world involves an ensemble of actions and attitudes 
which Marody has dubbed the “monetisation of consciousness.”
Jan T. Gross observed analogous processes at work in the General Governorate. 
In his book, Gross writes:
Despotic rule of terror and equality go well together, as Tocqueville predicted. 
Nonparticipation in power, severing of individuals’ links with their traditional reference 
groups (be it family, social class, or professional group) through physical displacement, 
discontinuities in authority patterns, impoverishment, imposed changes of occupa-
tion, dissolution of the state, political parties, unions and voluntary organizations of all 
sorts – all contributed to the atomization of Polish society. […] Everything in the new 
situation was casting the individual away from his fellow citizens whom he no longer 
trusted, whom he feared, and with whom he fiercely competed in order to survive, grad-
ually losing a sense of what are, or should be, the “rules of the game” of coexistence in 
society.138
Gross continues:  “The only dimension of social stratification still effective in 
wartime society, the economic dimension, also demonstrated peculiar features 
in the Generalgouvernement.”139 Specifically, “The emphasis on money was evi-
dent in various aspects of Polish social life. In conditions of scarcity and inflation 
 138 Gross, Society, p. 177.
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the major preoccupation of people is to find ways to earn more money.” Gross 
insists:
It is important to note here that the confinement of all social interaction to economic 
exchange signifies a dramatic weakening of commitment to values as the regulative 
factors of social interaction and the disappearance of qualitative distinctions from social 
life. […] The possibility of putting a price on everything, from a piece of bread to a 
human life destroys moral life as we know it.140
Gross describes a process in which money becomes the only gauge of the 
individual’s social worth. I believe that this is exactly what we are witnessing in 
Poland today.
If it is so, the aim of the chase for money (registered so strongly in the popular 
consciousness of Poles) would be to maintain certain living standards and at the 
same time to produce mechanisms which, in the wake of social disintegration, 
could order the entire structure of social relationships by the money criterion.
Yet, in the light of the definition of the situation outlined above, what Marody 
calls the “monetisation of consciousness” can be viewed as one of the major strat-
egies people in Poland use to find positive ways out of the predicament faced by 
the community.
Currently, “making money” is already erected into an institution in Poland. 
It is geared to accumulating considerable wealth (preferably in the form of a US 
dollar account) relatively quickly. It would not be adequate to classify the activ-
ities involved as the black market or the “black economy” because, basically, the 
processes are symbiotic with and condoned by the state.
People’s commitment to “making money” either by starting their own 
businesses or by doing gigs abroad and by “foreign trade” at open-air markets 
has been boosted by legal and systemic policies encouraging spontaneous indi-
vidual or group activities. The freedom and opportunities of social action in 
the economy have been remarkably expanded over recent years. Consequently, 
“money-making” has a political facet as well.
The free economic activity gravitates towards the market economy, i.e. 
towards “capitalism,” to negate and abolish which once far all was socialism’s 
apparent mission.
The activities praised now by the official propaganda were an object of hei-
nous propagandist attacks but a few years ago, when a vast campaign against 
“profiteers” was launched in the semblance of the famed anti-capitalist cam-
paign of the 1940s. In 1984–1985, patent references to history were by no means 
 140 Ibid., p. 174. 
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random:  they deliberately aimed to mobilise public opinion in support of the 
government’s operations and to sway “society” in favour of the “party-state.”
Relative liberty granted to economic pursuits produced new opportunities of 
“playing with the system.” No longer anathematised, money-making was allowed 
by the “system,” so fears could subside. At the same time, the persisting obstacles 
and ideological relics of the past still helped people regard and fashion them-
selves as struggling with “them.” Economic success could be framed as a victory 
in the fight against “them.”
A peculiar and rather enigmatic contract was evolving between “the regime” 
and “society.” The administration of the party-state okayed the spontaneously 
developing economic and quasi-economic activities. The price to be paid 
involved, importantly, not so much relinquishing political partisanship (as that 
had long been the province of a social minority only) as rather abandoning the 
widely manifested dissent attitudes. (One had to forego all gestures defined 
as political by the party-state and performed by people long after the lifting 
of martial law.) The state administration apparatus played quite a game with 
society, attempting to compel conformist behaviours and the endorsement of 
justifications for such conformist behaviours.
For all its specific aims and rules, the economy became a substitute of 
social activity for some groups and communities. Relieving frustration and 
the aversion of the “system,” the economic activity did not remove political 
and social aspirations, providing at the same satisfaction and sustenance. For 
such individuals, groups and communities, small entrepreneurship helped 
re-capture subjectivity, influence upon their lives and the right of full communal 
participation.
Nevertheless, this truly positive impact of the economic space for manoeuvres 
within the strictly controlled site of social action only concerned a small social 
minority, predominantly groups associated with the oppositional social elite.
Things were rather different for the majority of the population. “They” had 
to make concessions pressed by society’s real needs and the “natural” laws of 
life and economy – this is the gist of positivity achieved by popular conscious-
ness. Options of entrepreneurship restored to people good moods and the sense 
of having control over their lives. Above all, they meant leaving behind with-
drawal, shaking off passivity and encouraging initiative in the face of long-term 
prospects.
At the same time, fear subsided. By revoking the “anti-profiteering” campaign 
and enabling “money-making,” the party-state authorities alleviated the previ-
ously ubiquitous dread and, at the same time, garnered an approval of people, 
who no longer needed to fear them. A  common ground for people and “the 
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regime” emerged, as both found money important and the pursuit of wealth 
understandable.
This leads us to an essential question: What was actually the relevance of the 
positive upturn of the negative definition of the situation?
The Latent Negative Worldview behind Positive Changes
“Negative” has meant different things in our argument. Fundamentally, the neg-
ativity of the generalised definition of the situation in 1984–1987 was about 
denying the aspirations, goals and ideals which had found their supreme expres-
sion in the social reformist movement of the NSZZ “Solidarity.”
Even though towards the end of 1988, a possible re-construction of indepen-
dent trade unions clearly emerged as a topic of interest, the prospect animated 
a less-than-considerable part of society. Popular consciousness was permeated 
with images of the world which did not nurture engagement in such activity and 
did not promote turning it into a personal aspiration which it had been back 
in 1980. “The positive” in popular consciousness was grounded in the right to 
“make money” and barely affected the substance of the negative definition of the 
situation.
I believe that, crucially, the underlying basic pattern of “people don’t matter 
one bit” remained intact even if it was subject to a positive modification. “People 
didn’t matter one bit” if they were not shrewd enough to either muster power to 
enforce others’ obedience or to have money to buy others. Such thinking was 
interlocked with the philosophy of “natural egoism” and “primary needs,” in 
which informed the negative definition of the situation.
What altered was people’s attitude to the world, which was portrayed as a 
hostile space ruled by violence and mechanical force, where the only principle to 
abide by was the care of the self and, at most, of one’s family.
Now, as this world image has been favourably re-appraised, people aspire to 
gain – if not power, which is after all “their” domain, and nobody yet wants to 
associate with “them” – money, which has become a partial equivalent of power 
in that it helps order and “commandeer” in everyday life situations. The sec-
ondary positivity achieved now by a considerable part of society is, as a matter 
of fact, rooted in the symbiosis of “power” and “money.” Economic operations 
are not necessarily creative, and they do not really bode well for the future. Most 
of them, I believe, do not produce any new economic assets. Even when they 
provide goods, they do not expand the economic infrastructure. They do not 
offer new approaches to organisation, economy and production; nor are they 




by corruption and speculation. Rather than on any new economic principles, 
the economic freedom is based on the fact that legal norms and regulations 
are missing. As the “anti-profiteering” legislation can be re-instated at any mo-
ment, entrepreneurs have to be on good terms with the members of the party-
state apparatus and possibly quickly accumulate capital in the forms which are 
least vulnerable to inflation (this is one reason why the art market has rapidly 
developed). Long-term investment policies are hardly possible in the current 
conditions.
Incorporated into the negative definition of the situation, the philosophy 
of “natural egoism” reduces the relationship between “my” prosperity and the 
community’s prosperity to the point of non-existence.
The question is whether Polish society has just entered the stage of change 
with long-term consequences. In all likelihood, the positive re-casting of the 
generalised negative definition of the situation in the 1980s heralds a profound 
cultural transformation. Based on the consensus between the government and 
citizen, saying that making money is the most important thing, “positivity” is 
achieved at the cost of a drastic curtailment of aspirations and ambitions. There 
is more collateral damage to it as the traditional criteria of people’s mutual eval-
uation are invalidated, and human personalities are depleted by excluding huge 
vistas of motivations and self-realisation modes. These changes first of all affect 
the hierarchies of values which were so emphatically and clearly championed 
at the onset of the 1980s. Now, precedence is given to what Max Scheler called 
utility values,141 which override vital values, values of life and moral values. As 
common principles are missing and law is not instrumentalised, it is no wonder 
that morality erodes, i.e. that moral norms and models are no longer capable of 
guiding people’s everyday behaviours.
May – November, 1988




Challenges to and Risks in Poland’s Democratic 
Transition: A Social Psychology Perspective
Below, I want to address Poland’s democratic transition in rather specific terms. 
My concern is to assess social re-structuring in terms of human mentality, 
behavioural habits and normative patterns which are essential to our lives. Such 
assessment requires taking stock of social consciousness. By social conscious-
ness I  mean not so much the declared views reported, for example, in public 
opinion polls as rather less consciously grasped, latent mental structures that 
motivate people’s everyday behaviours. Consequently, I will have to delve into 
the personalities and states of mind of Poles.
I will also have to identify personality features, states of mind, predispositions 
and action skills that are characteristic of modern democracies. By necessity, my 
account of relationships between people’s attitudes and behaviours on the one 
hand and operations of societal institutions on the other will be considerably 
simplified.
A Lyrical Model of Capitalism
Let us start from defining what gives modern democratic systems, all their 
defects notwithstanding, an indisputable, positive advantage over other forms 
of social order. As I am interested in what it actually is that we so greatly admire 
about democracy and its typical economy, I paraphrase the coinage Jan Strzelecki 
invented to depict real socialism and will accordingly talk of a “lyrical model of 
capitalism.”
At first glance, what we admire are common prosperity and a considerable 
sense of self-fulfilment and life satisfaction across the populations. The two 
aspects are interrelated. The contentment is often a target of criticism from, for 
example, churches, including the Catholic Church, which accuses people in the 
West of reducing ideals to self-realisation and satisfaction derived from earthly 
and temporary material achievements. This critique aside, all observers who 
study modern democracies from within other systems notice that their conspic-
uous moral feature is a genuine respect for the individual and the dignity of 
individual life.
This moral attitude is largely associated with prosperity, daily wellbeing and 
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a developed, complex system of social actions, seems not only to promote good 
life, but also to bolster ethical values which Christianity gave Europe long ago.
Having experienced real socialism, what do we admire in the democratic 
market economy? I believe that we admire primarily its efficiency in achieving 
three feats: first, the effective attainment of prosperity and the improvement of 
living standards of mass societies; second, flexible innovativeness which helps 
societies, groups and individuals handle even serious livelihood problems, therein 
those occasioned by their own development; and third, the skilful employment 
of individual talents, desires and capabilities for the common good and utility as 
well as for individuals’ satisfaction. As people who lived through real socialism, 
we cannot but be struck by the efficacy with which a socio-economic system can, 
so to speak, use individual and group aspirations, ambitions, talents and skills 
for the sake of both society and individuals, without breaching the fundamental 
principles of freedom and human dignity.
The market economy promotes dissemination of knowledge, education and 
development of cognitive and artistic capacities. It can also further cultural 
expansion and the accessibility of culture goods, albeit not necessarily of the 
highest quality. Mass culture is subject to a well-founded criticism as some of 
its facets are nothing short of disgusting. Nevertheless, in an overall view, it 
“produces” people who are open-minded rather than narrow-minded – people 
who are kind to others, sensitive to and respectful of individual, national and 
cultural differences and appreciative both of culture and of nature; in brief, 
people who cherish life in its many various manifestations. Mass-culture people, 
boring, superficial and boasting “plastic” personalities though they may be, are 
on the whole quite nice people.
The market economy has also transformed culture by channelling away 
people’s aggression, domination drive and proclivity for hate. A  lot of human 
expansive energy, which so tragically turned into criminal aggression against 
fellow human beings in the 20th century, is now vented in the expansion of the 
material world and in peaceable economic expansion.
I mention this because the seeds of particularly disastrous developments in 
the first half of the 20th century can be found in the principles of economic orga-
nisation. Yet, what I refer to here are the forms currently developed by demo-
cratic societies, which grow increasingly concerned with, for example, the future 
of the environment. The market economy has been shaped so as to make compe-
tition and rivalry conducive to social prosperity and individual success. The idea 
that competition can be viewed as a form of social cooperation has long been 
advocated in American social psychology, yet it was only in the aftermath of the 
Second World War that the theory produced related practice. In all likelihood, 
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it was linked to the rejection of the notion that individuals, parties and nations 
were entitled to impose their will on others and, in this way, arbitrarily shape his-
tory. At the same time, egoism was restrained and insatiable individual appetites 
were reined in by socially accepted mechanisms, which helped view private 
interests in conjunction with the public good.
At this point, we can usefully turn to Tocqueville, who at the dawn of cap-
italism insisted that:  “Several causes may combine to make the customs of a 
people less crude; but the most powerful of these seems to me to be the equality 
of social conditions which, along with the softening of manners are not only, in 
my view, coincidental but also connected.”142 Tocqueville explains further:
When all the members of a community are almost equal and all men have almost the 
same way of thinking and feeling, each one of them can judge in a flash the feelings of all 
the others; all he needs to do is to cast a quick glance at himself. There is not, therefore, 
any distress that he cannot understand without difficulty and a secret instinct reveals to 
him its extent. Whether it be strangers or enemies will not matter to him as his imagi-
nation immediately puts him in their place, mingling something personal with this pity 
and making him suffer himself when the body of his fellow man is being torn apart. 
In democratic ages, men scarcely ever sacrifice themselves for each other but they dis-
play a general compassion for all the members of the human race. One never sees them 
inflicting pointless cruelty and when they are able to relieve another’s suffering without 
much trouble to themselves, they are glad to do so. They are not entirely altruistic but 
they are gentle.143
The Democratic Personality
In democracy, the human being is an independent actor in social life. Individuals 
have rights which not only regulate operations of institutions, but also underpin 
the citizens’ mutual relationships. Some of these rights are socially instituted, 
whereby everybody can participate in the process. The individual is involved in 
ongoing bargaining, negotiations and discourse, political, social and also eco-
nomic. Pursuing one’s own interest requires a clear and accurate recognition of 
one’s desires, ambitions and, above all, possibilities. At the same time, it is imper-
ative to understand others, their expectations, needs and desires to which we can 
respond with our “offer.” We must look for partners and cooperate with others who 
think similarly, have similar interests and/or face similar problems. Such coop-
eration requires precisely defined rules and a clearly delimited scope of mutual 
 142 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America and Two Essays on America, trans. 
Gerald Bevan (London et al.: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 649.
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relationships and, let us say, “dealings.” Consequently, individuals must be active, 
adept in presenting themselves, their opinions and interests and ready to learn to 
accept that others are different. In the long run, the least profitable thing one can 
possibly do, whether in the economy or in politics, is to violate the agreed-on rules 
and to fail to meet the incurred obligations. Individuals thus develop perseverance, 
self-reliance and trust in their capacities as well as learn to analyse their experiences 
and control momentary moods and emotions for the sake of long-term goals and 
relationships with others. They think of their lives in terms of investments to be 
made in order to accomplish goals, ambitions and desires. Without ever losing 
sight of their own interests, individuals must embrace whatever they assess as fur-
thering their development, facilitating collaboration with others and promoting 
goal achievement in compliance with the dictates of their consciences.
This has generated a personality model which is characterised by sound judg-
ment, rationality, open-mindedness, cognitive and emotional vigour, reflectivity, 
activeness, self-awareness, resolve in strengthening the self, self-reliance, affection, 
eagerness to both collaborate and monitor collaboration in terms of its benefits, 
readiness to extend and accept help, and mindfulness of unignorable costs thereof. 
In a word, it is a flexible personality. Social changeability, best expressed in upward 
mobility, must go hand in hand with mental and personal suppleness.
This issue has been widely explored, as a matter of fact. Suffice it to mention 
David Riesman’s already classic studies of the other-directed, radar personality 
and the latest concepts of humanist psychology.
What matters to our further argument is also the attitude to knowledge, edu-
cation and work in democracies. Individuals only have to show for themselves 
what they have achieved on their own. Consequently, work is not only a source 
of income but also, crucially, a test of the person’s quality. Contrasting work in 
democracies with work in the aristocratic system, Tocqueville observed:
As soon as work seems to all citizens an honorable necessity for the human race and is 
always clearly performed, at least in part, for payment, then the wide gap which used 
to separate the different professions in aristocratic societies disappears. […] American 
servants to not believe they are degraded for working since everybody around them is 
working. They do not feel humiliated by the idea of receiving a wage, for the President of 
the United States also works for a salary. He is paid for giving orders as much as they are 
for obeying them. In the United States, professions are more or less laborious, more or 
less lucrative but never higher or lower. All honest occupations are honorable.144
This is, of course, a morally-laden ideal which has gone through various 
permutations both in the US and in Europe. The social sciences have either 
 144 Ibid., p. 640. 
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offered theoretical justifications of or even themselves promoted systemic 
solutions that have sustained various iterations of this simple rule elucidated by 
Tocqueville.
In such societies, practical considerations prevail over high-flown ideals. 
However, the development of scholarship, particularly in the US, shows that 
Tocqueville’s old observation that only practical sciences stood the chance in 
America has in fact given way to, if not smoothed the path of, a more disin-
terested and long-term development of all knowledge, especially theoretical 
knowledge. Although several insightful critics of contemporary democratic cul-
ture have denounced the disastrous effects of technical progress (to mention but 
Ortega y Gasset’s classic works), it would be a challenge indeed to disregard the 
immense positive role of technical and scientific advancement.
Last but not least, the management style is also a relevant issue. Various 
developments in management and work organisation have increased employees’ 
sense of participating in a common enterprise. Workplace interdependencies and 
the effects of the division of labour have been simplified, discussion and nego-
tiation have been made part of the triangular relationship among employees, 
managements and owners, and various human needs, therein emotional needs, 
have been accommodated within the organisation of work.
In the democratic system, people do not fancy submitting to authorities. 
This is as much a source of great strength as a serious risks, which Tocqueville 
anticipated with remarkable insight and precision. At any rate, in democratic 
societies, the individual is, as a rule, not entirely dependent on another indi-
vidual; nor is s/he at the mercy of other people’s whims and ill-will. This also 
means that human relationships are dispersed, in the sense that people depend 
on each other within defined and understandable limits, coming in touch with 
each other via various social roles. It is relatively easy to put up even with a very 
unpleasant hardship if the effort is predictably limited in time and rewarded 
by gains elsewhere. Naturally, this situation involves a certain cost, including 
above all a gnawing solitude and an acute lack of direct, spontaneous intimacy 
with another person, a reliable companion for better and worse.
Admittedly one-sided though the above account is, it does represent the 
overall positives of human personality in the democratic order.
Polish Negativity
Briefly put, Poles’ mental attitudes and mutual relationships sharply contrast 
with the portrayal above. I do not believe that the circumstances and conditions 
currently (i.e. as of 1990)  observable in Poland promote positive personality 
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patterns. People are not infrequently sorely disappointed with what they have 
become under the pressure of the circumstances and the adaptive mechanisms 
they necessitate.
Elsewhere, I described the mental state of Poles as “negativity.” Another term 
to be used in this context would be “a negative definition of the situation.” What 
I mean by this is a generalised attitude to, and even an image of, the world and 
one’s own life. The attitude/image is informed by the belief that “nothing good 
can be expected of life,” that is, at least of life in this world, especially in Poland. 
Life prospects are vague and uncertain; life space is ridden with hostility, aver-
sion and unkindness. The inimical public space is contrasted with the private 
realm of family life, yet even there unalloyed satisfaction is not to be expected, 
while homes and flats are threatened by thieves and crooks. This belief paints the 
entire world and people’s own actions in dark colours. Consequently, whether 
or not any real obstacles are indeed in place, every activity – even, if not partic-
ularly, the economic activity – requires exhausting mobilisation and begins as a 
war party against the hostile world.
Mobilisation is indispensable. It takes loads of energy to overcome uncer-
tainty, the fear of independent action and awaited obstacles, a distrust in one’s 
capacities and suspicions about the intentions of people who offer to cooperate. 
To start any action, the individual must brace up for both offence and defence. 
When offence predominates, action begins as an assault or an invasion. When 
defence gets the upper hand, the individual moves stealthily, like a thief, to snatch 
the targeted goods when an occasion offers itself.
Social Action as Warfare
Collaborators and possible partners in action – e.g. parties to a contract – can 
only be treated either as our bitter enemies or as our closest allies. It is vital 
that collaborators be utterly united and one-minded, which is best achieved by 
ultimate group control. Because all collaborators are equally distrustful and sus-
picious, deciding who “is in charge of the whole thing” is the precondition of 
joint action. Only a strong leader can make people cooperate effectively. At the 
same time, however, a strong leader is a challenge to all the others, for people 
can only feel relatively secure when being in complete control of the situation. 
Consequently, one had better seize the superior position and make others subor-
dinate. When one finds oneself in a subordinated position, one submits fully to 
the leader and shuffles off responsibility for the outcomes of the action on him/
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This is not a purely theoretical description, regrettably. In 1987, sociology 
students conducted, as part of coursework, an informal study which found such 
attitudes in a completely voluntary and highly untypical group. The sample was 
an association of parents of children with cystic fibrosis. The Association was 
founded by the parents to support each other in helping their children survive. 
However, the students observed that the voluntarily associated parents were 
unable to collaborate effectively. They approached their mutual obligations as 
formal, institutional roles. They were afraid to take any initiative on their own 
accord and only did what they were formally obligated to do. For example, the 
Association’s president refused to drive to another town to fetch bananas for 
which the parents had been waiting for several weeks, saying that another parent 
was supposed to arrange the transport and the president was president and not 
a driver after all…
If action is conceived and implemented as warfare, all social apparatuses, 
including law, must be treated as strategic elements instrumental in achieving 
one’s goals. Law is contrasted with life and its needs. People’s energy is used to 
by-pass law, take advantage of legal loopholes or ignore law altogether rather than 
to advocate for new law and reasonable regulations promoting useful activity. 
At play here are also the individuals’ negative self-images, because people do 
not perceive themselves as capable of lawful action or of influencing the legisla-
tion. A similar attitude is also dominant among societal institutions, including 
the state.
Bad Individualism and Bad Identity
This is exactly opposite to what one wishes for in a democratic society. The 
example above shows that even a parental self-help association is treated as 
something that is “not ours.”
Polish society is permeated with bad individualism, i.e. individualism which 
does not promote long-term expansion and entrepreneurship correlated with 
broader social outcomes. This kind of individualism is hostile to others, selfish, 
envious and aggressive; its actions are restricted and short-term. Briefly, it is 
an individualism of cowed, unsuccessful shopkeepers, which has so often been 
analysed and ridiculed in scholarship and fiction.
This self-seeking individualism is more focused on defence than on expansion. 
The desire to do something and ambitions to make a fortune wrestle with a fear of 
independent action and a distrust in one’s capacities. In Poland, one more piece 
that completes this mosaic is uncertain identity: “Who am I after all?” The neg-
ativity of Poles is marked by the disintegration of people’s social identity. People 
 
 
Challenges to and Risks in Poland’s Democratic Transition210
usually assess themselves negatively and do not view their talents and abilities as 
possible springboards to the coveted material success. In popular consciousness, 
self-fulfilment, the realisation of dreams and the satisfaction of financial ambitions 
are dissociated from one another.
The Manly Attitude
The situation as sketched above is shaped, I believe, by a number of deep-running 
factors. Entrepreneurship requires, so to speak, a manly attitude. It requires an ac-
tive and business-like approach not only to the world, but also to oneself: one must 
demand a lot of oneself, face up to difficulties and learn to overcome them. The 
manly spirit is a spirit of responsibility coupled with calculated risk-taking and vig-
orous exploration. The world is a compelling space of freedom, where ample risks 
are intertwined with ample rewards. As I define it, the manly spirit firmly believes 
that there is a permanent order of values and that the human being must discover 
it on his/her own both within and in co-existence with others. It is a human duty 
to strive after ever higher values, to engage in independent action and to achieve 
outcomes to be shared with others. Thereby, one must respect those from whom 
something can be learned and whose success can serve as a model to emulate. 
Respect is also due to one’s opponents as only an honourable fight can give the 
winner any satisfaction. This entails appreciating the accomplishments of human 
spirit and labour. Such an attitude is worlds apart from the collective spirit and the 
defensive stance, though it can have its aggressive and offensive manifestations. 
Crucial to this approach is eagerness to compete with others in accordance with 
the negotiated criteria in order to see who is really superior. Given this, respect for 
values is an inalienable component of this attitude.
Babstwo: A Short Theory
The manly attitude as defined above is a rarity in Poland. In our everyday reality, 
an entirely different attitude seems to be on the ascendancy. I  refer to it as 
babstwo,145 yet it should not be taken to mean any antifeminist sentiments. As 
I see it, both true femininity and true masculinity are ousted when “babstwo” 
comes to prevail.
 145 Babstwo does not lend itself to translation easily. The slightly archaic-sounding, pejora-
tively (and also condescendingly) coloured noun denotes the totality of features typical 
of a baba and, at the same time, the totality of baba’s, with a baba generally meaning 
a woman who is either old or ugly, or irritating, or uncultivated, or any combination 
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What is “babstwo” essentially about? First of all, it is underpinned by the 
belief that “life as it is” is a fundamental value, with life meaning biological 
life, life as given to us as such, life in and by itself (to refer to Hannah Arendt). 
What is the use of higher values, moral accomplishments or improved living 
standards when life as such is gone? Consequently, it is our basic duty to protect 
life. Interestingly, though this is patently not what Christianity champions, such 
an attitude is now very easily enveloped in religious justifications. Is life not a 
gift of God Himself? Is it not our primary and humble duty to accept it as it is 
and collectedly bear all adversity and humiliation in submission to the stronger 
ones in order to save life itself whatever it may be like? Nineteenth-century 
ecclesiastical ideas and ways, which are having their revival in Poland, offer 
this position a wealth of persuasive justifications. On this model, Christianity’s 
crucial tension between life and Life, between this world and eternity – the har-
rowing question how (and, at the same time, a task) to enter the Kingdom of 
God in spite of, nay, through the paltriness of everyday existence – is completely 
obliterated and moralistically belied. Life is the greatest gift in its “natural” 
version. What is left for the human being to do is to abide by equally “natural” 
morality, which aggrandizes dutiful religious observances, clings to a sexuality-
centred code and exalts the care of family and kids as the pinnacle of individual 
moral effort.
“Babstwo” can thus thrive in Catholicism, ignoring the teaching of the cross, 
which challenges such a notion of life as the highest value. “Babstwo” is thus not 
restricted only to one sex though, admittedly, it is easily adopted as women’s nat-
ural ideology, because it emphasises protective, maternal and matronly functions. 
The attitude is through and through conservative, though what it seeks to con-
serve is an already stale life. This variety of conservatism commands to defend 
the status quo rather than risk the loss of biological existence. It conforms to 
circumstances and is ready to preserve itself at any cost, braving all humiliation 
and all abomination just to survive.
Morality is placed at the service of “life as such,” while any otherness – unnat-
ural, different and impudently disagreeing with the “natural” voice of the herd – 
is treated as the chief enemy. The principles of nature, i.e. norms and normalcies, 
are erected into true morality. And our good Lord is believed to bless the natural, 
the regular, the gregarious. God is, so to speak, neutralised.
“Babstwo” breeds an array of attitudes which are discrepant with the manly 
spirit, such as cunning, patient manipulativeness, obstinacy and non-objectivity. 
“Babstwo” lies in waiting to pounce at an opportunity when it offers itself, but 
avoids open confrontation; it engages in murky dealings; it seeks to make others 
emotionally dependent on itself; it merges with the flock and seeks naturalistic 
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justifications of all things. Consequently, the sources of life, i.e. “neutralised,” 
codified God and the mother, are lavished with utmost significance.
This model is used in Poland to justify the practical power of women, espe-
cially those who frame themselves as the Matka Polka – the Polish Mother.146 The 
“babstwo” model is without a doubt reinforced by Catholicism and works against 
the manly spirit of freedom, independence, self-reliance, rivalry coupled with 
camaraderie, friendship and cooperation for the common good. The syndrome 
of “babstwo” exiles or, at best, undercuts disinterestedness. In order to continue, 
“life as such” has the right to subdue everything and everybody around.
Democratic polity and market economy are hardly imaginable without some 
element of disinterestedness. One must allow others – all “others” – to join com-
petition. The social game, whether political or economic, is supposed to deter-
mine who is better and worse, whose propositions are more useful and whose 
solutions are more effective. In order to win, I need to calculate and if my cal-
culation is correct, I  will win. In “babstwo,” calculation is, basically speaking, 
pre-arranged so that fair loss is precluded. I must win because “life as it is” is the 
greatest value.
Resentment, or Poles Are Owed It
Consequently, any loss is by definition felt as an injustice and, as such, induces 
jealousy, envy and resentment. Resentment, as described by Max Scheler, is 
apparently a major factor in the Polish mentality. It is also, nearly by necessity, 
associated with “babstwo.” “Babstwo’s” central premise is that all “normal” people 
who abide by the naturally and commonly endorsed moral code are equal. In 
Poland, it means that if a person is a member of the nation, observes the com-
mandments and is “normal,” the person deserves to succeed. If they do not suc-
ceed, it must be blamed on some “others,” such as Jews, homosexuals, masons, 
plotting communists or any other “abnormal” individuals or groups.
Nationalistically coloured, Polish “babstwo” combines excessive protective-
ness with xenophobia and deprecation of strangers, whatever their pursuits and 
whatever benefits could be gained from cooperating with them.
 146 The Polish Mother (Matka Polka, literally: Mother Pole) is an often used and abused 
ideal of a selfless, self-sacrificing and much-suffering woman – a devoted mother, a 
fervent patriot and a zealous believer in one – derived from Polish Romantic liter-
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Authoritarianism and Lost Subjectivity
Both “negativity” and “babstwo” – alone and combined – abolish citizenship as a 
source of human self-realisation and an embodiment of trust in the social world 
and life. Produced by either of these psychological complexes, individualism is 
rebellious and entitled on the one hand while self-insecure on the other. Because 
of this uncertainty, it seeks justifications in external rationales and in licences 
which can be provided by religious morality, the leader’s moral supremacy and/
or the nation’s authority.
At the same time, Poland has been fuelled and invigorated by a money drive 
for quite a while now. The desire to make money and grow rich has overridden 
other motivations and, consequently, undermined the characteristic value struc-
ture of modern industrial (or post-industrial) societies. In Poland, the general 
public consider money to be an equivalent of power, which gives mastery over 
others. The situation is indeed paradoxical as, on the one hand, moralism thwarts 
rational analysis and clear dealings among people while, on the other, principles 
and obligations have been evacuated from the practice of daily life. The social 
hierarchy is currently based on possibilities to subordinate other people. Money 
has emerged as another source of power besides violence, which, without sub-
siding, has been democratised, so to speak, in that it is no longer the exclusive 
prerogative of the Party apparatus.
Money, Money, Money…
In democratic societies, the market economy makes money a specific, practical 
gauge of value. Max Weber already concluded that the power of money was 
more democratic (and, thus, fairer) than the power of privileged groups or of the 
centralised state. Elevating money into the measure of worth in social life pro-
voked censure from both Christian and socialist critic. As democracy developed, 
the citizenship ethos consolidated and the commitment to natural human rights 
grew, as called for by the critics of 19th-century liberal capitalism. In this pro-
cess, democratic societies skilfully demarcated the scope of the power of money. 
Indeed, money serves as a good yardstick of the real value of goods, actions and 
human abilities across various spheres of social life.
In Poland, however, money still is not an accurate measure of real values. Of 
course, the raging inflation we experienced did not help. Neither does the fear 
of inflation now. But the economic phenomenon of inflation can be scrutinised 
from a wider cultural and sociological perspective. The economic inflation can be 
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is, precisely, a chase for money as a source of personal power and advantage over 
others. Money-making has become a major avenue to human self-fulfilment, 
while money itself has been redefined, turning into a coveted good and a guar-
antee of security, instead of a means to an end.
Such an attitude to and the social role of money (i.e. as a source of power and 
security) unsettles what lies at the basis of democratic societies.
Forgotten Labour and Devalued Education
In August 1980, one of important popular concerns and grievances was that 
people felt that the management system squandered their efforts and labour. 
Popular consciousness construed the economic crisis as a ramification of 
disrespecting people and of wasting the effects of their work. In the wake of mar-
tial law, in turn, people started to boycott work. Enslaved and squandered labour, 
which brought neither satisfaction nor pay corresponding to people’s needs and 
efforts, was ubiquitously spurned. The common belief was that the disastrous 
economic situation would force the communist regime to offer socio-political 
concessions, as had been the case before. However, there was a serious down-
side to this spontaneously adopted strategy, and it soon backfired. Working for 
“them” was viewed as a necessary evil, while competent occupational role per-
formance smacked of a moral failing. It did not take long for people’s identifica-
tion with the workplace and, more importantly, with the work role to evaporate. 
As a result, labour was progressively devalued, losing its substantive and moral 
relevance.
The devaluation of labour was paralleled by the devaluation of education and 
knowledge. Knowledge neither helped understand the world nor offered quan-
tifiable benefits. Education required considerable investments yet ceased to 
matter, as it did not bring any profit, while potentially causing additional frustra-
tion: an educated person was by default predestined to occupy higher positions 
in organisations, which entailed either getting embroiled in corrupted dealings 
with the party-state or, the other way round, manifesting dissent.
It takes a lot of effort and time to re-ignite aspirations for knowledge and edu-
cation as major drives of social promotion. But, alongside restoring honest work, 
it is the main prerequisite for Poland’s rise from its civilisational slump.
Evil Legacy: An Evil Capitalist
Another adverse element of Poland’s cultural legacy is an entrenched, morally 
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re-appraisal of the image of the capitalist, the negative stereotype of a business 
proprietor (disparagingly referred to as prywaciarz) still haunts collective con-
sciousness and perhaps even subconsciousness, as Carl Jung would have put it. 
Starting a business of one’s own involves overcoming a taboo, with all the various 
psychological consequences it occasions. Even if one manages to be efficient and 
to make honest profit, the entire enterprise seems “impure” and morally ambig-
uous by default. In the long run, such associations invite one to flout rules and 
obligations as one has anyhow already entered the forbidden zone. As a result, 
one tends to treat partners either offhandedly and unfairly or aloofly and also 
unfairly, whereas negotiations cannot possibly be successful unless one treats 
potential partners, whether weaker or stronger, as equals. Old habits die hard, 
and, while not dead yet, they severely impede such an approach.
The Future and Liberalism: Anxieties and Concerns
The socio-psychological condition outlined above poses many threats to the 
development of democracy and the market economy.
Particularly adverse, in my opinion, is people’s scepticism about the future 
and about their capacity to actively shape their lives. For the last twenty years, 
sociological studies have invariably found that most Poles do not believe they 
will realise their plans and live the lives they desire. It is an important finding 
since the market economy cannot develop without prospects, without faith in 
the future and without the belief that efforts made today will bring copious 
fruit tomorrow. To thrive, the market economy requires, on the one hand, 
stable legal and political structures and, on the other, patience, strong will and 
accumulation of individual human effort. The long years of comparing cap-
italism and socialism (dubbed real socialism) prove that Marx’s portrayal of 
the market economy was profoundly wrong. He disregarded the legal order of 
democratic governance as the basis of and the framework for the free-market 
game and its ostensible chaos. Exposing the harshness and hostility of the 
economic laws to the vulnerable ones, Marx ignored other laws which help 
regulate the market mechanism when it drastically breaches the principles 
of justice. At the same time, both our and Western experience suggests that 
the liberal ideology of the free market is as utopian as the communist and 
socialist visions. Liberal ideology makes assumptions about human nature, 
believing that uncontrolled individuals involved in competition for goods will 
sooner or later grasp the value of collaboration and develop an awareness of 
the common good, as a result of which everybody will find their proper place 
in the social world.
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Such assumptions are not entirely correct. The benefits of the market economy 
only materialised when democratic societies had built institutions to alleviate 
the injustices of capitalism and give the market players a sense of security. I high-
light this aspect because Poland seems to be in the midst of a resurgence of the 
classic liberal thought, which only strengthens negative attitudes and does not 
contribute in the least to a real social reform.
Society emphatically backs the market-oriented reform of the economy, yet 
their support springs predominantly from an infatuation with the Western pros-
perity, which, as any infatuation, is blind in it obliviousness of the vast effort 
hidden behind the eye-catching facade. Most habits of Polish society directly 
contravene the principles that govern everyday life in Western democracies. 
Traditional liberal ideology often boosts bad individualism, which is afraid 
of and hostile to the world as well as reluctant to observe rules unless direct 
violence or direct profit ensues. The defensive focus prevails over dedication 
to development, and the egoistic impulse to accumulate goods for fear of the 
unknown future precludes long-term investments, which promote stable, albeit 
slow, growth.
I have my reservations about the impact of classic liberal ideology in Poland 
because, I  believe, what Poles need most now are a sense of security and an 
assurance that there are opportunities for everyone and that efforts will pay 
back sooner or later. I  do not mean a sense of security which nurtures inac-
tion and produces stupor. To stimulate social, economic and political activity, 
which is a precondition of any reform, classic liberalism must be extended and 
complemented. People need to be sure that failure will not ruin their lives, will 
not reduce them to starvation or beggary and will not deprive them of further 
opportunities.
The fear of action and the fear of the future are very strongly correlated. Both 
kinds of fear arise when people believe that they have no influence on their lives 
and are mere pawns of destiny. Ominous external powers have not disappeared 
from the stage of history and even less from the stage of human world concepts. 
There is always something or someone – “they” of this or another kind – that 
can foil human plans and smash human hopes, as it happened on 13th December 
1981.147 That day saw the onset of society’s exacerbating atomisation and of the 
progressing disintegration of bonds, relationships and solidarity. At the threshold 
of capitalist reforms, we face another threat, fearing that people will be left to 
fend for themselves if they fail. The Solidarity times should be evidence enough 
 147 Martial law was proclaimed in Poland on 13th December 1981. (translator’s note) 
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for us that the sense of community and unity in the shared fate animates people, 
reinforces individual initiatives, fosters a comprehensive enterprising spirit and 
bolsters courage.
In my view, economic reforms will not succeed if the broad public do not 
regain this sense of participation and the belief that the lives of common people 
do matter.
Another issue that deserves a serious thought is what strategies should be ap-
plied in converting the economy into the market model. So far, privatisation of the 
national assets has been contemplated. Given Polish society’s current structure 
and its atomisation with all its mental consequences described above, I believe 
it would make sense to consider first of all a family-based business model as a 
viable direction in which the economy should be developed. The atomisation is 
so deep-running and omnipresent that it will be a serious challenge to encourage 
people to collaborate with each other.
Family-based economic organisations seem a feasible alternative which is 
likely to cause the least mental and social cost. Therefore, reform policies should 
implement this model, tending at the same time to ordering the state structures 
in preparation for privatisation.
November 1989 – Summer 1990

Part Three   After Solidarity: Introduction to 
Part Three
The third and last part of this book consists of writings published several years 
after the events and developments that made up the Solidarity social movement 
both in its legal and its “underground” periods. Though the specific concerns of 
the respective texts vary, they all more or less directly refer to Solidarity as the 
“originary” or “founding” moment of contemporary Poland.
The political transition commenced by and under the cabinet led by Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, Poland’s first non-communist Prime Minister since 1945, very 
quickly produced truly political and ever more widely differing actors of the 
democratic stage. In the wake of the presidential election in 1990 (the first fully 
democratic election in post-war Poland), both the civic political faction and the 
Trade Union “Solidarity” were riven by radical divisions. The split came to be 
enduringly symbolised by the remark about “the war at the top” (wojna na górze) 
made by Lech Wałęsa in the heat of his utterly relentless competition against 
PM Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The one-time close allies turned bitter enemies in a 
very aggressive campaign in which Wałęsa fought by crook or hook. Fortunately, 
Solidarity survived as a trade union and for a while played an important polit-
ical role as a vehicle of the will of political transformation. However, ideological 
and political dividing lines were even then anything if not deep among trade-
unionists. The trade union’s leadership would soon start to make very obvious, 
if not glaring, political declarations, transforming into undisguised supporters 
of certain political parties. Consequently, it did not come as a surprise that 
Solidarity’s membership continued to shrink, especially in the wake of sub-
sequent elections, when Solidarity’s political partisanship was at its most bla-
tant. As a Solidarity researcher, I know that the current members of Solidarity 
commonly believe that the organisation’s strong political engagement does it no 
favours. Yet even all those years back, Solidarity as legalised again in 1989 was 
an entirely different social actor than the original trade union of that name, which 
came into being in Gdansk in 1980.
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In the texts which I call a theory of the Solidarity social movement, I sought 
to highlight the movement’s essential and most typifying aspects. I  focused on 
what made the Solidarity movement “revolutionary” on the one hand, “reformist” 
on the other, and simultaneously peaceable, which somewhat confounds the tra-
ditional denotations of these terms. A peaceable revolution is, after all, a paradox. 
But this is precisely what the movement in fact was, paradoxical if anything. At 
the same time, the Solidarity movement was highly creative in developing and 
testing solutions which were to serve as building blocks of the new order of society 
and polity. At its heart lay democratic and civic ideals as social action restored 
dignity to people as citizens and made civic engagement in the social movement 
a relevant personal – moral and mental – value. Participation in social life gave 
individuals a sense of fully lived lives and personal fulfilment. Put in lofty terms, 
there was indeed something of the ancient direct democracy in that (emphatically) 
common feeling that every citizen was instrumental in shaping the shared fate of 
all… Civic engagement and the practical use of civil rights were experienced in 
Poland as ushering people into genuine maturity, where responsibility for oneself 
and one’s family fused with co-responsibility for the country as a whole. People 
universally believed that personal happiness and wellbeing could be complete 
only if entire society enjoyed success. This was also how the idea of solidarity and 
community manifested itself in practice. Moreover, involvement in social action, 
in trade-unionist activities, bolstered personal intellectual and spiritual growth. 
One symptom of such development was a change in the language used by trade-
unionists, even by those who did not have much formal education.148
The change of the Trade Union Solidarity mentioned above overlapped with a 
far more poignant change in social life and in Poles. The marvel of civic engage-
ment, which engendered the Solidarity social movement and trade union, very 
quickly started to morph into an entirely different attitude. Various commentators, 
journalists and scholars have observed that, throughout the 1980s, reprisals, 
harassment, prison sentences and what practically boiled down to expelling people 
from the country did not fully enfeeble the citizenship attitude.149 However, when 
 148 Wojciech Ogrodnik, a researcher of Solidarity, has observed that most former trade-
unionists, especially those from outside big cities, decided to re-engage in education 
after 1989 in order to complete high school or to enrol at university. When we con-
clude our project at the beginning of 2013, we will present a detailed account of this 
process.
 149 This is powerfully documented in Inka Słodkowska’s book Społeczeństwo obywatelskie 
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the world of communist violence started to fall apart unexpectedly and rapidly, 
when overnight we found ourselves in a country with the freedom of expression 
and (social and individual) action, when a new state founded on the will and 
rights of all citizens started to take shape, something changed profoundly in Poles’ 
attitude to participation and involvement in the emergent democratic politics. It 
was as if the experience gained in Solidarity activities had evaporated, “vanished 
into thin air.” In very general terms, new models of “mature life,” of satisfying 
life, appeared. Amidst national and social liberty, the once-thriving civil society 
wilted and withered. The less-than-solidary spirit of competition and individual 
success came to dictate the pursuits of Poles as the noble models of social and 
political action developed by Solidarity disappeared from the political practice 
of the new elite which had emerged from the vast social movement. The political 
and psychological hiatus of the “war at the top” determined the shape of a new 
political culture. The signature features of this culture are extraordinary aggres-
sion and relentless competition, which tend to make collaboration for the sake of 
the common good a sheer impossibility.
Another text in this part reports on a series of collaborative studies which 
were carried out by the Institute of Social Change Theory and the Centre for 
Research on Solidarity and Social Movements in 2010–2017. We called this pro-
ject Solidarność. Doświadczenie i pamięć (Solidarity: Experience and Memory), 
which also served as the title of two books published in Polish.150 Written espe-
cially for this volume, the chapter discusses the findings of our investigation into 
how people remember their participation in the Solidarity movement.
The next text, which also refers to the series of studies on the memory of 
Solidarity conducted in 2010–2017, was written for the Gdansk Areopagus, an 
extraordinary project launched by Gdansk-based priests. In collaboration with 
a commercial (and thus independent) information channel, TVN24, the priests 
held debates with the public in attendance. The debates concerned various 
matters of import and urgency to Poland, Europe and the world. Regrettably, the 
new Bishop of Gdansk put this great initiative to an end. In the Polish Church, 
which supports  – also politically  – Poland’s current, anti-democratic govern-
ment, openness and independent thinking are marginalised by the traditionalist, 
hierarchical and nation-trumpeting mainstream. The text refers to the role that 
the Catholic Church once played in Poland as an advocate of individual dignity 
 150 Ireneusz Krzemiński et al., Solidarność. Doświadczenie i pamięć (Gdańsk: Europejskie 
Centrum Solidarności, 2010); and Ireneusz Krzemiński et  al., Solidarność. 
Doświadczenie i pamięć po raz drugi (Gdańsk: ECS, 2016).
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and a supportive companion of the nation and people in struggles for a better 
social order – the Church that took the leadership function as a wise advisor 
rather than as the master and keeper of people’s consciences. The text focuses on 
the factors which made the Solidarity reformist movement appreciated by and 
relevant to the world, i.e. on its non-violent commitment to the “peaceable rev-
olution.” I believe this is highly pertinent today as tensions increase across the 
world, not least in Europe, and Poland actively cultivates the model of politics as 
warfare. This war, symbolic though it is, effectively destroys the order of collective 
agreements, which the original and most important Solidarity sought to institute.
I called all these explorations by the umbrella term “After Solidarity,” even 
though a trade union going by this name still exists. However, I believe that the 
practices of this trade union, in particular its political pursuits, have compromised 
its name. Essentially, this last part examines contemporary Poland, a Poland of 
what seemed a while ago consolidated democracy, which is nevertheless being 
demolished as I write of it. The demolition is progressing with the approval of 
the historically named trade union. While we are standing at the threshold of sad 
times, a recollection of true Solidarity can give us hope for the future.
Solidarity: The Organisation of Polish Hopes
The title of this Chapter is not a random word-choice, of course. In the following, 
I would like to address at least two issues related to the Solidarity movement 
which are, as a rule, rather vague and underappreciated in sociological studies. 
At the same time, without exploring them we cannot either offer an adequate 
account of the Solidarity movement or grasp and spell out its implications for 
sociology and social experience.
The term “organisation” is not random, because I  want to emphasise what 
I consider to be a sociologically seminal feature of the Solidarity social move-
ment, that is, its remarkable organisation and institutionalisation of social actions. 
After all, actions and activities that make up a social movement are supposed 
to be essentially spontaneous, as probably all social researchers admit despite 
their different theoretical frameworks. The researcher and theoretician of social 
movements Alain Touraine wanted sociology and its intellectual method to fur-
nish spontaneous actions with a more organised, focused and rational form. By 
the same token, he presupposed, like his colleagues, the spontaneity of social 
actions to be the primary property of social movements, a property opposite to 
orderliness, in particular to a technically conceived, bureaucratic ordering.
However, the Solidarity social movement from the very beginning developed 
and clustered around its own organised institution, i.e. the Independent Self-
Governing Trade Union. Since the NSZZ “Solidarity” was founded, neither its 
rank and file nor its activists and leaders across its hierarchy had had the slightest 
doubt that the trade union expressed and represented – in many different ways to 
boot – a far broader community, that is, the social movement. Interestingly, the 
members of the rapidly expanding and consolidating trade union first thought 
of themselves as a “social movement,” even before sociologists labelled them so. 
This consciousness demanded re-reading the classic literature and re-vamping 
theoretical concepts.
But the term “organisation” refers not only to the establishment of unionist 
institutions, because the trade union itself organised people’s hopes as well, and 
not only collective or common hopes shared by all, or at least by an overwhelming 
majority; it was also a unique form of organising individual hopes, dreams and 
even plans of millions of people. In 1981, Poles decided that they could dream, 
that is, that they could freely think of the future. The point to explore is in what 
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The Transformation Process: Preparations for Joint Action
To establish this, we need to re-trace the most important mental transformations 
(to use a verbal short-cut) which it took for such a mass social movement to 
develop in the first place. From the very beginning, it had been, after all, a move-
ment of protest against and disobedience to the communist regime, to the party-
state. Thus the social definition of the situation which was capable of spurring 
people to undertake independent, self-determined actions must have been very 
explicit and shared by a major part of society, at least by the organisers of the 
protests and later of positive action, i.e. the foundation and development of the 
trade-union movement.
The process leading to this point was rather nebulous at that time, but it 
should be relatively easy to re-trace it in retrospect. In the process, two elements 
of social self- awareness underwent a particularly thorough change. First, the 
election of Pope John Paul II was a momentous event in (among other things 
which I will address later) improving Poles’ collective, national self-evaluation as 
well as people’s individual self-evaluation, at least in terms of their social identi-
ties. This increase in self-esteem was a precondition of mustering the courage to 
launch joint action. The change of self-image and the growth of national pride 
involved an ensemble of values that promoted such action.
As the image of the real-socialist social system also changed, disappointment 
with and opposition to the order in place escalated rapidly. The last but not least 
important factor in the process was a rampaging socio-economic crisis coupled 
with people’s ever more widespread knowledge about the exorbitant and still 
growing foreign debt incurred by the Gierek-governed state. Gierek’s experi-
ment of salvaging real socialism by advertising its consumer version – an affluent 
socialism matching the West – was patently and miserably failing. Additionally, 
the dramatic events of workers’ protest in June 1976 belied the promises made 
at the onset of the Gierek era and brutally trampled working people’s dignity, 
both literally and symbolically. The charisma Gierek had projected and enjoyed 
for a few years crumbled into dust. The exacerbating crisis and mounting social 
problems only strengthened the belief that the system did not respect common 
people.
The democratic opposition came into being in response to the contempt 
of the party-state for the protesting workers. Initially, only some of the intelli-
gentsia were involved in oppositional activities, though increasingly more people 
and communities cooperated with the opposition. Nevertheless, that first sig-
nificant gesture of solidarity of intellectuals, professors and journalists with the 
workers who had fallen victim to reprisals proved a powerful symbol of social 
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community. Before workers had associated the intelligentsia with the regime, 
now the intelligentsia offered workers their help and solidarity. Still, the newly 
founded Workers’ Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników; KOR) 
was at first treated rather distrustfully by workers. Despite that, the organisation 
had a huge (and growing) symbolic meaning and paved the way for an entirely 
new thinking about the situation and possible ways of changing it. Soon, other 
independent organisations were set up: first, the Movement for the Defence of 
Human and Civil Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela; ROPCiO) 
and, then, the Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski 
Niepodległej).Yet, in hindsight, the gesture of solidarity with workers – who not 
only suffered harassment but were also relentlessly debased as working people, 
despite the insistence of the official propaganda that the working class played 
the leading role in the socialist state – was perhaps even more significant than 
practical effects of independent aid. Crucially, this gesture affected the ways of 
interpreting Poland’s recent history by bridging the gap that yawned in popular 
consciousness between the intelligentsia’s protests (students’ demonstrations in 
in March ‘68) and the workers’ protests (the December’70 events in Gdansk and 
Szczecin). On those occasions, the two social groups did not support each other. 
The foundation of the KOR symbolically overcame that meaningful and conse-
quential social divide.
Besides its symbolic significance, the rise of the democratic opposition had 
also very practical consequences. First of all, the democratic opposition devel-
oped a language of moral and political dissent, and its strategic goal was to pro-
mote civil society under the nose of the quasi-totalitarian system. One of the 
kind, these strivings bred extremely good results in Poland.151 Thus, despite what 
looked like a very modest appeal, the major figures of the democratic opposi-
tion and the main freedom-focused slogans were conspicuous against the back-
drop of the increasingly desperate success propaganda at the dusk of the Gierek 
era. Hubs of social resistance emerged, the independent press and publishing 
thrived, and other social undertakings were launched, including free trade 
unions. Although its range was rather limited, what was then dubbed “indepen-
dent activity” encompassed incomparably more people and social groups than 
 151 This is highlighted by researchers such as David Ost and Michael Bernhard, who 
compared dissident movements across people’s democracies. The strategy devised 
by Jacek Kuroń and picked up by Adam Michnik and the KOR proved very effective. 
Cf. David Ost, The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
 
 
Solidarity: The Organisation of Polish Hopes226
anywhere else in the neighbouring countries, in which only very narrow cultural 
elites were involved in the dissident movement.
The language of moral rather than purely political claims (“the politics of anti-
politics,” as David Ost dubbed it in his study of Solidarity152) demanded that 
the party-state restore and observe the rights of man and of the citizen, which 
the People’s Republic of Poland had committed to doing by signing the Helsinki 
Accords. When social actors decided to undertake peaceable, reformist action 
against the system, they had a ready-made language at their disposal. And it was 
exactly this language of moral and political demands towards the party-state that 
the pope’s first pilgrimage to Poland powerfully validated.
Another instrumental factor in the mental transformation was that the 
“young pope,” John Paul II, recognised human and civil rights as natural rights 
given by God to all people and every human being. The relevance of this act 
to the dynamics of social thinking and action in Poland cannot possibly be 
overemphasised.153 It authorised what was essentially the moralist agenda of the 
democratic opposition. In fact, the Church’s gesture of solidarity with the oppo-
sitional protest actions had been important even before the pope made his first 
trip to Poland in 1979.
Human dignity, the dignity of the individual and, in particular, the dignity 
of the working person were at the centre of the pope’s teachings, as his later 
encyclicals reconfirmed. In this way, the strongly ideological and moral founda-
tion of the social transformation movement and the interpretive framework of 
reality on which the movement relied were formed.
The Organisation of Protest, the Birth of Civic 
Consciousness and Reformist Demands
The evolving Solidarity unionist movement was, as we know, informed by the 
experience of the strike wave which surged across Poland from the spring of 
1980 on. This had very practical consequences. In enterprises, organisational 
elites arose to represent the workforce, and across the country crews of different 
 152 See David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in 
Poland since 1968 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).
 153 Critics of John Paul II observe that, at the same time, he strongly opposed the lib-
eration theologians and the activists who relied on their writings in South America, 
though they championed the same values as the trade-unionist movement in Poland. 
Cf., e.g. Przed Bogiem. Ze Stanisławem Obirkiem rozmawiają Andrzej Brzezinecki i 
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enterprises began to collaborate. As these are well known facts, let us focus on 
the factors that made subsequent groups of workers and clerical personnel join 
the trade-unionist movement after the August accords were signed.
The definition of the situation which was commonly shared at the time can 
be summed up in two statements; “it can’t go on like this anymore” and “we’re 
all adults who can take responsibility for themselves and the country.” There was 
no reason any longer to believe “them” – i.e. the party-state – as “they” had never 
made good on their promises. This courage to speak up on matters of import 
“to us all” would in all likelihood have been impossible without the alliance of 
workers and the intelligentsia, which had been ushered in by the activities of the 
democratic opposition and the first hubs of free trade unions. At least, the rap-
prochement achieved in Gdansk – or, more broadly, in the Tri-City – was a key 
factor in formulating the demands which far surpassed any demands that had 
previously been put on the table in Poland.154
Yet, the mindset insisting that people themselves (workers at an enterprise, 
residents of a town, entire society) could take responsibility for their shared life 
had already been in place. “Subjectivity” was one of the symbolic  – veritably 
magical – words which were associated with the trade union movement. People’s 
overriding take on things was that we had long consented to “their” total power 
(the agreements in Gdansk and Szczecin at the beginning of Gierek’s tenure as 
First Secretary of the PUWP’s Central Committee), but now we had to take care 
of our interests as workers and employees.155 It couldn’t go on like this anymore.
Joining the trade-unionist movement meant “being adult” and thus having 
the right to take private and family life in one’s own hands, to partake of common 
fate and public life and to have an impact on whatever determined individual 
lives, the operations of the state and the principles of collective life. Without 
that, it was impossible to influence responsibly one’s own life. Decent life meant 
a life of a free person responsible for their life and co-responsible for the life of 
the socio-national community. The protest almost immediately transformed into 
constructive, future-oriented thinking and, soon, into positive action.
 154 I was reasserted in this belief by the memoirs of Bogdan Borusewicz and his account 
of the organisation of the strike in Gdansk’s Lenin Shipyard. Cf. Borusewicz: jak runął 
mur, ed. Edmund Szczesiak (Warszawa: Wolumen, 2005), pp. 125–140.
 155 Illuminating insights are offered by Jerzy Jedlicki’s somewhat undeservedly for-
gotten study of the Gierek-signed and other social contracts between the communist 
regime and society. Cf. Jerzy Jedlicki, Forma i treść “umowy społecznej,” Wykłady – 
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Individual dignity, human dignity, the dignity of the worker or, more broadly, 
of the employee became a fundamental concern. This can be explained in sev-
eral ways, but the impact of John Paul II was certainly among the factors as 
his teachings were directly transplanted onto everyday social life. Of course, 
the propagandist slogans of real socialism and its rhetoric of workers’ dignity 
also had their role in everyday life. Although the flagrant success propaganda 
was commonly viewed as a mockery of the touted “socialism with the human 
face” and “respect for the working people,” certain elements of official ide-
ology undoubtedly permeated into the popular mentality and could be usefully 
utilised, especially when a new interpretive framework of reality and individual 
lives appeared. The official propaganda’s lexicon could be treated seriously and 
even used against the decision-makers in accusing them of hypocrisy and the 
violation of their own declarations and slogans.
The fundamental transformation of the mentality of workers  – or, more 
broadly, of employees – who were all more or less involved in a game with the 
system, with their interests at stake, consisted in the budding of citizenship 
feelings, i.e. responsibility for one’s own and one’s family’s life coupled with 
the belief that ordinary people were not only entitled but also obligated to dis-
cuss common fate, the system, the state’s operations and the principles of social 
life. The respective interests and goals of workers, groups and industries were 
inscribed into a broader list of the goals of the socio-political community; they 
were re-considered as partial, but socially dovetailing, interests and demands.
It is crucial to grasp this accurately, because the word “solidarity” was one of 
the most important achievements of the new citizenship mentality forged in and 
through the social movement. On the one hand, the individual grew more sig-
nificant as the belief spread that people were responsible and had equal rights; 
on the other, the idea was accepted that “others” (any “others”) must have the 
same rights as “I” had, so it was imperative to constantly negotiate and agree 
with others on how to live and how to act in order to promote individual goal-
achievement as well.
This, of course, was very closely associated with the slogans of freedom. 
“Adulthood” reinforced the sense of individual dignity, and freedom accrued 
very specific meanings. Freedom was treated as a common value shared with 
others, while at the same time everybody could enjoy it individually. To make 
sure that people could finally decide about themselves and have an influence on 
the conditions of living, it was necessary to accept that others, compatriots, were 
free as well and thus could live as they liked.
The sense of “adulthood” and the desire to exhibit it in collective life made 
people feel that they were persons enjoying inalienable individual rights and 
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responsible for their lives, but also that every other human being had the same 
rights, which meant that the ways and principles of communal life had to be 
discussed and negotiated with others. Without that, individual success was 
impossible. The sense of individual dignity and freedom engendered the sense of 
social subjectivity: not only the individual but also the whole of society was the 
subject of action. Society regained subjectivity as a community which should be 
able to determine its own fate, which meant deciding together about the princi-
ples of life, power, governance and the polity.
This, in turn, conferred a new value on politics. Politics was re-cast as partic-
ipation in the shared fate and a condition of individuals’ capacity to take care 
of their own and their families’ wellbeing. Such participation and care were 
channelled through involvement in collective debates and trade-union activi-
ties. Politics, so to speak, capped the individual’s decent, adult life and reasserted 
individual and collective subjectivity. Exalted though it may sound, Solidarity 
embodied something of the nearly ancient experience of politics.
Moreover, the experience of subjectivity and the intertwining of individual 
and collective goals may have stamped the peaceable character of the movement. 
Of course, the peaceable approach resulted, in a degree, from the fact that the 
party-state had force at its disposal. The memory of the regime’s physical vio-
lence against the citizens, workers in particular, was acutely alive. This memory 
was especially vivid in Gdansk, where since 1977 more and more people had 
been taking part in illegal commemorations of the shipworkers killed in 1970.156 
Organising strike protests, workers as a rule made sure not to give the regime any 
easy excuse to strike back with violence.
At any rate, social and individual subjectivity bred demands which fashioned 
a public life – a life of collective, social debate – which Poland under commu-
nism had not seen yet. Indeed, the Solidarity movement produced a space of 
public debate along with the noblest, most vibrant definition of politics we have 
ever had in Poland. Additionally, all this was strictly associated with the organi-
sation of the trade union itself, which I will discuss below.
Community: The Image of the Individual and 
the Civil Image of Society and the Nation
In social terms, the new mentality entailed the emergence of citizenship: being 
a genuinely adult individual was equated with personal engagement in the 
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community of citizens whose debate should be taken into account by the state 
authorities and have a bearing on the governance of the state.
In this way, in thinking and experience, individual goals integrally concurred 
with common goals, and society, which had already developed a sense of group 
identity, had become a civic community and a political community. The social 
“we” was contrasted with “them,” i.e. the authorities of the party-state, the oppo-
sition between the two enhanced to the utmost after martial law was criminally 
imposed. The “us”/society vs. “them”/the regime division was to persist prac-
tically throughout the entire decade of the 1980s. The concerted efforts of the 
general-led regime’s157 to overcome this division all but failed. As a result, I argue, 
of the abortive conquest of its own society, the regime had to share its power to 
secure a rudimentary legitimation and an ability to govern effectively. We all 
know how these machinations ended.
The point to establish is what kind of community came into being at that 
time. Many studies of that period and the entire history of the Solidarity social 
movement posit that the sense of community was only temporary and defined 
by the confrontation with the power of the party-state. Such interpretations sug-
gest that the trade union movement was, so to speak, glued together by negative 
mobilisation, i.e. by the popular protest against the party-state, its representa-
tives and representations. Such opinions have been voiced in recent years even 
by the prominent activists of the Solidarity reformist movement, first and fore-
most by Lech Wałęsa.
However, I believe that such views are disproved by sociological explorations 
of Solidarity. If they were right, the outline of the new citizenship mentality above 
would be quite useless as a tool for analysing and explaining the dynamics of the 
events. For the rise of this mentality made the social protest movement morph 
into a mass reformist movement.
I argue that the unionist movement was guided by the ideas of social reforms 
from the very beginning and forged a mass social movement because of its pos-
itive agenda and positive goals. After the signing of the August accords, trade 
unions started to mushroom in enterprises and workplaces all over Poland, 
which was a testimony to the burgeoning of positive consciousness. This con-
sciousness was expressed in an eagerness to join in the common work that was 
the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity.” At the same time, 
every workforce or employee group which undertook practical activity for-
mulated their own demands. It would be no exaggeration to call it a demands 
 157 The “general” here refers to General Wojciech Jaruzelski. (translator’s note) 
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movement. Wherever strikes or other protest actions had earlier been organised, 
demands had also been involved which, though not yet systemic, in fact targeted 
the system. When the agreements were signed in August 1980, demand-placing 
was energetically continued, and their scope was rapidly expanding. When the 
authorities of the party-state consented to people’s independent self-organising, 
the previously ubiquitous fear subsided (albeit without ever vanishing) and 
demands proliferated, concerning first individual enterprises, then the entire 
respective industries and ultimately the practices of the state administration. 
Citizenship attitudes were quick to find a practical form in which to manifest 
and express themselves.
Research on the establishment of trade unions has shown that demands had 
an essential role in the social game between the organisers and first members 
of the new trade union on the one hand and the managements and PUPW 
organisations on the other. As a rule, in meetings during which a trade-union 
unit was set up, an array of demands surfaced as well, aiming to rationalise pro-
duction and economic processes, to put it briefly. The very fact that the demands 
formulated by workers were generally rational suggestions for streamlining pro-
duction and removing the absurdities caused by the central management and 
planning won them credit, if not always support, from the bodies that managed 
enterprises and production.158 From the very beginning, the demands move-
ment159 showcased civic and political attitudes. “Politics” was defined as thinking 
together about the way to order and arrange the world, starting from people’s 
closes environment, i.e. their enterprise. The twenty-one demands of the striking 
Gdansk Shipyard workers played a unique, symbolic function and provided a 
model of what was indeed worth fighting for. The demands made in enterprises, 
which were more and more appreciated by government-appointed directors, 
conveyed the evaluation of the situation in place.160 The courage of this assess-
ment begot an increasing boldness to think and debate on what could be done 
 158 Ireneusz Krzemiński et  al., “Trzy dusze dyrektorów,” in Polacy  – jesień ‘80 
(Warszawa: Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii UW, 2005), pp. 155–163; p.94 volume.
 159 The demands movement attracted the attention of researchers at the end of the 1980s. 
Cf. Ireneusz Krzemiński, Czego chcieli, o czym myśleli? Analiza postulatów robotników 
Wybrzeża z 1970 i 1980 (Warszawa: Instytut Socjologii UW, n.d. [1987]), pp. 1–89; 
Postulaty. Materiały do dziejów wystąpień pracowniczych w latach 1970/71 i 1980 
(Gdańsk, Szczecin), eds. Beata Chmiel and Elżbieta Kaczyńska (Warszawa: IPSiR 
Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1988), pp. 1–566.
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to improve that situation; the conclusion was that increasingly general demands 
concerning increasingly higher levels of management must be put forward or, 
otherwise, not much could be changed at the very basic, local level.
Secondly, the community shared not only the assessment of the situation 
(which, in our 1980 study we encapsulated in the already cited catchphrase “it 
can’t go on like this anymore”), but also the conviction that this situation could 
be rationally changed. The definition of dignity and responsibility presupposed 
that rational, or at least common-sensical, principles of action could be formu-
lated to accommodate the interests of all the stakeholders involved, or at least not 
to disadvantage society (or workforce, workers of an industry, residents of a town 
or a region, etc.). This, in turn, entailed debating together on the best and most 
suitable solutions, in stark contrast to the previous practice of the party-state’s – 
i.e. the regime’s – ideological prioritisation of its own interests. Additionally, the 
regime lacked sovereignty in two ways at least:  it neither represented the real 
national interests (subordination to the USSR) nor allowed the system’s to actors 
voice their own ideas and proposals (Party centralism). Now this was to change, 
and a “new thinking” was supposed to represent society’s genuine notions and 
needs as well as, obviously, to be independent of the blatant pressure of any 
external power (the USSR). The belief that rationality and common sense were 
possible and that they were best manifested in a candid and heated collective 
debate propelled one of the most important organisational achievements of the 
Solidarity unionist movement.
When social and civil discussion on what to do and how to do it, on how 
and why governance should work (while the government wanted to obtain the 
social legitimation) was put at the centre of people’s interest, the most peculiar 
organisational property of the NSZZ “Solidarity” appeared. I will address it in 
the following.
The Wisdom of the Majority and the New Citizen 
Mentality: A Short Critical Digression
Before I do that, however, let me focus for a while on another peculiarity, i.e. on 
the fact that evolving Solidarity and the developing social movement committed 
to the repair of the polity and society sought to make the practices of various, if 
not all, elements of the social system more rational.
At this point, it is indeed necessary to evoke Alexis de Tocqueville and his 
argument about the governance of the majority. In his influential Democracy 
in America, Tocqueville states: “The moral ascendancy of the majority is partly 
founded upon the idea that more enlightenment and wisdom are found in a 
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group of men than in one man alone and that the number of legislators counts 
for more than who is elected.”161 Certainly, in their daily practice, Solidarity 
members thought that a view which was agreed on and shared by many was 
in a way wiser. At any rate, the Polish proverb saying that “two heads are better 
than one” was often evoked to emphasise how useful it was to agree on various 
issues, especially those related to common action, through discussion and nego-
tiation. This could clearly be seen at the 1st National Congress of Solidarity in 
Gdansk’s Olivia Hall. Arguments reiterated by several speakers grew more pow-
erful because, in line with Tocqueville’s observation, individual wisdoms were 
aggregated into some collective “greater wisdom.”
Of course, Tocqueville very insightfully mocks this naive belief and insists 
that, even if endorsed by an overwhelming majority, a view is only one view 
when it is shared by so many people. Consequently, another, contradictory view, 
even if only voiced by one person, must be regarded as equal if we try to establish 
what is right or true by weighing contrasting views.
Tocqueville’s reasoning provokes an essential question:  What was it in the 
deliberations and discussions across all the levels of the Solidarity trade union 
that forestalled “the tyranny of the majority,” as Tocqueville puts it, i.e. prevented 
drawing practical conclusions from the belief that there was “more wisdom” in 
the majority’s arguments?
There is only one answer. It was the organisation’s unwavering adherence to 
the principle of equal participation in collective discourse, a cornerstone of that 
famous and yet so quickly forgotten ethos of Solidarity. Yet, emphatically, such 
a citizen mentality and such an ethos were neither unalloyed nor indisputable. 
The portrayal painted in the foregoing can be denounced for over-idealisation. 
Indeed, my account is an idealisation, yet in the sense of Weber’s ideal type, rather 
than in the sense of bracketing off elements which inconveniently cofound the 
researcher’s theses.
Given this, I  will avail myself of research findings and primarily of Alain 
Touraine’s studies. The point is that even if the foundations of that new citizen 
consciousness had been laid before the NSZZ “Solidarity” came into being and a 
powerful social movement formed around it, the very process of building trade 
unions was crucially instrumental in the ultimate rise of the citizen mentality. 
And the process was by no means smooth. For example, Touraine’s studies in 
Gdansk very clearly show an important controversy about action strategies and 
 161 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America and Two Essays on America, trans. 
Gerald Bevan (London et al.: Penguin, 2003), p. 288.
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values behind them which later re-surfaced in the discussions at the 1st National 
Congress of the NSZZ “Solidarity.” In Gdansk, two different models of conscious-
ness clashed over defining the basic, therein civic, interests and goals; later, we 
also came across a very similar problem in Warsaw. Sketched above, the citizen 
mentality and consciousness won and prevailed in joint thinking and action. 
Yet, arguably, it was formed in a clash with and against a far more “restricted” 
consciousness. In the latter, which could be described as a more worker-slanted 
mentality, the central matter was to define and prioritise workers’ and typically 
trade-unionist goals. As an organisation, Solidarity was supposed to safeguard 
first and foremost workers’ interests and living conditions, while the reformist 
demands that went beyond employees’ direct interests were to be abandoned. 
This entailed curbing civil aspirations and envisioned the trade union as an orga-
nisation that stood up for the strictly defined interests of workers or at most 
employees as nearly all people in Poland, including a growing group of farmers, 
had full-time jobs.
Certainly, this was a class consciousness rather than a polity-and-citizenship 
consciousness. It was underpinned by and was far more vocal about the collec-
tivist considerations. This should not come as a surprise; if the common move-
ment and its trade union were primarily to protect workers’ interests, it was 
imperative to be solidary in abiding by and defending them if jeopardised. In this 
sense, “solidary” meant a slightly different thing than what ultimately prevailed 
in Solidarity members’ view and experience of the world.
Such discussions among Gdansk-based activists clearly showed a conflict 
between the two forms of trade-unionist consciousness, a conflict that was by 
no means easy to eliminate. In fact, by the end of the research project in July 
1981, the conflict within the Gdansk group had not been fully solved.162 It later 
recurred in slightly different versions in various situations and research samples 
and often flared up in a, so to speak, more elaborate form as a clash of a more lib-
eral and a more authoritarian varieties of democratic consciousness.163 Without 
 162 I report it as a member of Touraine’s research team. To my knowledge, this informa-
tion does not appear in other reports of this study.
 163 This is how I described the situation elsewhere: “The axis of distinctions within this 
‘new consciousness’ stretches between more liberal and more authoritarian attitudes. 
At one pole of our axis, the ‘new consciousness’ is bound up with a tolerant ethos of 
openness, spontaneously established rules of action and ongoing bargaining about 
what to do next, in what ways to do it and how to coordinate action; at the other pole, 
there is a less open and less tolerant ethos which prioritises group values and reputed 
authority, protects the ‘group spirit,’ insists on subordination to the ‘collective will’ in 
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a doubt, however, the more liberal model triumphed, as evinced, for example, 
by the controversy that took place in the Mazovia Region in late autumn 1981 
between most representatives of the Region’s trade-union units and a group of 
so-called true Poles. Though vociferous about their demands, the “true Poles” 
were unable either to intimidate the Region’s trade-unionists and leadership or 
to de-rail the trade-union’s contested procedures.164 Tocqueville’s tyranny of the 
majority was kept at bay by what he called the “habits of the heart.” And these 
“habits of the heart” also obtained their organisational form when in the pro-
cess of establishing and developing the trade union a very special procedure and 
an equally special formula of Solidarity’s activity were engineered. The proce-
dure and the formula served as a safety mechanism against the hazard of the 
majority’s intolerance.
The habits of the heart were accessory, if not entirely pivotal, to it, all the 
more so that they proved to be something more than just momentary moods. 
The findings of studies carried out even in the communist period indicate a 
deep-running attachment of most Poles to the principles that prevent the tyr-
anny of the majority. Namely, Poles profess to be particularly committed to plu-
ralism in socio-political life, and pluralism entails the right to present beliefs and 
opinions expressive of minority points of view. Stefan Nowak’s studies reported 
Poles’ invariable endorsement of this principle, including the right to criticise the 
system in place.165
The Independent Trade Union as a Laboratory  
of the Democratic State
After this detour, let us return to our main track and focus on the crucial 
organisational, even structural, peculiarity that underpinned the activities 
of Solidarity both as a trade union and as a social movement. The peculiarity 
consisted in attributing utmost importance and the key role to regular meetings 
and discussions. Across all the organisational levels of the trade union, 
rules than in mechanisms of instituting rules […]. A ‘more liberal democracy’ and 
a ‘more authoritarian democracy’ are terms that best depict that fluid distinctions 
typical of the period.” Cf. Krzemiński et al., Polacy, p. 124; comp. p. 94.
 164 It would be interesting to establish in how far the divisive actions of the “true Poles” 
were orchestrated by security services. Today it would be possible to determine the 
extent of the impact of security services with some precision.
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deliberations and debates were held to address the current problems of indi-
vidual enterprise-based units, regional structures and nationwide bodies, 
including the National Commission. As a result, membership in the trade union 
also meant practical involvement in public debate. Debates and discussions 
organised common thinking and fundamentally affected collective views, which 
could not be ignored by the representatives and the elected leadership of the 
trade-union. Activists were uniquely constrained by the outcomes of debates 
among the members whom they represented in the union’s formal structures.
The democratic structure of the trade union was rather complex, and had a spe-
cial element of public debate built in into it. Prompted by the need to engage in joint 
action and by the special citizen ethos,166 debate also performed other functions. 
Importantly, the structure of the trade union should be viewed as a unique social 
experiment on a huge scale. The principles that were developed and implemented in 
practice as rules and procedures were supposed to be valid not only in people’s own 
dream trade union. The Independent Self-Governing Trade Union itself was treated 
by a vast proportion of its membership as a laboratory for testing the principles for 
the state and political life. The trade union was its members’ beloved child, for it 
grew stronger and kindled a hope that the civil fervour would help the democratic 
trade union grow into a democratic polity.
In this way, Solidarity as a trade union generated a new form of the demo-
cratic order. Admittedly lending itself to various descriptions, this form can be 
classified as participatory democracy. And if discussion and debate were put at 
the centre of people’s direct action and engagement, it can straightforwardly be 
called debating democracy,167a form of deliberative democracy, as it is known in 
sociology. Solidarity, in fact, not only created a space of and for public debate but 
also filled it with an original form rooted in the organisational practices of the 
Independent Self-Governing Trade Union.
This has important sociological implications concerning, for example, the 
reasons behind the disappointment and unfulfillment experienced since the 
onset of the Third Republic of Poland.168 Within this simple framework, we could 
 166 Despite Solidarity people’s vigorous linguistic inventiveness, “ethos” only appeared 
far later in the lexicon of significant symbols of the social movement.
 167 While deliberative democracy (as well as discursive democracy) is a frequently used 
term, my coinage of debating democracy is supposed to capture the distinctive quality 
of Polish political participation.
 168 The Third Republic of Poland (Polish: Trzecia Rzeczpospolita or III RP) is a widely 
used, though actually unofficial, term denoting the Polish state as re-built in the 
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argue that the Round Table, the election in June 1989 and later the formation of 
the first non-communist cabinet fuelled expectations of a revival of common, 
public debate.
Such expectations were still quite ardent in the mid-1990s. They were first 
associated with the Civic Committees (Komitety Obywatelskie), which were ini-
tially projected as an expanding forum of public, civic debate. Unfortunately, 
the Committees functioned in this way for a very brief period, only to be almost 
immediately subjected to straightforward political control along party lines. The 
process of reforms – of profound democratic and market reforms – took place 
without people without whom the political representation of Solidarity would 
have no say whatsoever after 1989. I believe that studies of the Third Republic 
do not attend closely enough to this general social frustration and foiled hopes 
for the revival of public debate as the fundamental instrument of political and 
social participation. It is a serious failing, for these sentiments were experienced 
by such an important worker group.
However, not only participation was at stake. Making public discussion an 
institutional part of the trade union did not simply express aspirations of par-
ticipation or channel direct engagement in public and political action. It also 
assuaged the anxieties and fears of the expansive, discussion-brimming trade-
unionist movement of social reforms. The permanent debate in which the trade 
union’s activities and life were steeped was supposed to serve as a means of social 
control over the union’s representatives and leadership. Experience had taught 
workers  – or, more broadly, employees  – that representatives were not to be 
trusted too much. They had seen all too clearly that in the exercise of power the 
governing were only too quick to leave the governed stranded and to evade the 
control of their voters.
At this point, we can usefully revisit the clash of more civic-minded and 
more worker-minded versions of solidarity consciousness. It was the worker 
class-mentality that prioritised class interests and insisted that workers  – or, 
possibly, employees, but employees of a particular enterprise, occupation or 
the re-establishment of independent Polish statehood after the hiatus of the German 
occupation during the Second World War and the post-war Soviet-controlled People’s 
Republic of Poland (Polish: Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa or PRL). On this model, 
the Third Republic is a resumption of the Second Republic of Poland (Polish: Druga 
Rzeczpospolita or II RP, 1918–1939), itself called so to evoke the ties with the 
(Polish-Lithuanian) Commonwealth of Two Nations (Polish: Rzeczpospolita Obojga 
Narodów), which was partitioned by Russia, Prussia and Austria in the late 18th cen-
tury. (translator’s note)
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industry  – should take care of and fight for their interests, whereas excessive 
discussion was only counterproductive. Consequently, the movement should be 
organised as a trade union standing up for its membership’s interests and rights, 
while the elected representatives and the leadership should be authorised to act 
firmly and decisively. Thus, they should be given power and obeyed in order to 
achieve common goals.
However, even this crude consciousness had an essential “but” to it: namely, 
this model also needed a quick solution to the problem of trust and confidence 
in the leadership. Even the elected bodies and representatives were not to be fully 
trusted, for the past had shown that such people were bound to compromise 
common interests and to succumb to the power drive over representation and 
the common cause. Consequently, debate had to be condoned as a way of finding 
out about the intentions of the elected people. Candid and open discussion was 
supposed to produce an overall agenda for the leadership and representatives to 
implement in practice. Public debate among the membership and the decisions 
it produced provided the basis for holding Solidarity’s activists and leaders ac-
countable. This is indeed what happened in practice.
What was initially an opposition between two models of the social order 
mutated in the daily practice of the trade union into a gradation, a compromise 
between the desire to have effective and obeyed leaders and the insistence on dis-
cussion as a means of controlling the leadership and consequently of restraining 
individual, arbitrary decision-making. In this sense Solidarity’s debating democ-
racy was a response to and a conclusion inferred from the past experience of 
betrayal by the Party, trade-unions and intelligentsia elites, which drove home 
the idea that even the freely elected elites had to be monitored. Erecting public 
debate and candid discussion into an institution also served as an instrument for 
achieving this aim.
Conclusion: A Handful of Still Pertinent Insights
When I revisit the past both as a researcher of and a participant in Solidarity’s 
historical events, what I recall first and foremost is the atmosphere we breathed 
at the time and the feelings overflowing in both the private and the public social 
space. Despite lingering fears, optimism and hope were the strongest overtones 
of that emotional score, as attested by the active commitment of individuals and 
entire communities. The wave of activity surged far beyond the framework of the 
trade union, spilling onto various areas of social life, starting from the initiatives 
of occupational groups (which, for example, devised and adopted their own pro-
fessional codes) and ending with local community and neighbourhood projects. 
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The organised trade union movement certainly propped those various social 
pursuits.
Importantly, these pursuits were a channel for multiple individual 
fascinations and helped people realise their dreams and needs. In this sense, 
the general social movement provided a framework for individual aspirations 
and ventures. Still, its impact was even broader. For example, for some people 
the initial involvement in social actions did the groundwork for going abroad 
as a way of individual self-fulfilment. Certainly, in 1981 it was much easier 
than ever before to obtain a passport, not to mention a visa. And very many 
Poles concluded – especially after the 1st National Congress of Solidarity – that 
they could risk going to Western Europe, for some time at least. Martial law 
changed most of these trips into emigration. By going West, I  mean not so 
much people who left for fear of further developments (and since the begin-
ning of the mass social movement more than few people had done that), as 
rather people who seized the opportunities provided by the pro-Polish atmo-
sphere and went abroad for some time to realise their dreams and aspirations, 
previously unrealisable other than by escape. After the criminal imposition 
of martial law, such people and groups were actively involved in supporting 
Poland and Solidarity from abroad.
The rise of so numerous forms of human activity invites us to ask what factors 
fostered this invigoration. The overall situation in the country was far from 
comfortable as the proliferating reformist demands and the positive agenda 
of repairing public life clashed with the regime’s confrontative strategy and 
endeavours to abolish the trade union. As a result, hope and optimism were per-
manently intermingled with anxieties and fears. For a sociologist, the situation 
presents a unique mass experiment which helps identify the factors that prompt 
people to undertake social and individual actions, risky though they may be. 
Such findings can illuminate the contrast between the citizen social movement 
as described above and the situation brought about by underground Solidarity’s 
unexpected victory and the fall of communism.
One socially relevant conclusion would be that individual activity on a large 
scale can be expected in special conditions of perceived social support and 
social security. Individuals who involved in a range of risky actions – also those 
that could cause the system’s counterstrike – were deeply convinced that they 
would not be left to their own devices if their undertaking failed. Arguably, 
the state-guaranteed system of social support was a far less significant 
factor, as it was criticised, questioned even, as failing to perform its nominal 
functions. Rather, the conviction that nobody was left alone and that every-
body could count on help and support within institutionalised social actions 
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was engendered by the prevailing sense of social community and participa-
tion in the common cause. People felt that they would not be left to fend for 
themselves as there were advocates and defenders who would offer one form 
of help or another. This disproves the notion that people undertake initiative 
and are inclined to involve in potentially precarious actions and activities only 
if pressed by necessity; in such situations they are likely to desperately catch 
at straws, which has little to do with well-informed, though perhaps somehow 
iffy, actions for the sake of change. Individuals’ pro-activeness and inventive-
ness, even in their private matters, seem to be largely triggered by that sense of 
social support.
As a sociological generalisation, this insight must be complemented by the 
role of social symbols in kindling this sense of vibrant social community. The 
fact that a powerful trade-unionist movement called itself Solidarity – that it 
could use the word and the notion expressing the awareness of active social 
community  – was rooted in a broader symbolic tradition. In my view, the 
grounding of the so pointed communal awareness and self-awareness of Poles 
can be traced back to the intelligentsia’s gesture of solidarity with workers in 
1976, which saw the foundation of the KOR, followed by a broader democratic 
opposition. In this gesture, the goals and interests of “those on top” and “those 
at the bottom” coalesced into one nexus from which the symbol of Solidarity 
was carved.
The degradation of the memory of Solidarity in free Poland, which is referred 
to as the 3rd Republic of Poland, results perhaps from the fact that the active 
reformist elites have abandoned this symbolic framework and altogether 
ignored that symbol of community. Since the Round Table talks, the meaning 
of Solidarity, which re-emerged as a legal organisation, as a symbol of reforms 
and as a meaningful social actor, has been re-defined. The social actor was, basi-
cally, important, but its duty was to support reforms rather than initiate and 
participate in the democratic re-structuring of the polity. The symbolic legacy 
was treated entirely instrumentally by the new political elite stemming from 
the Solidarity movement. The project of participatory democracy or debating 
democracy (if, never fully articulated, it deserves the name of the project in 
the first place) has never been realised, because people who were an impor-
tant part of the community which designed it have embraced other modes of 
thinking and other models of the state and socio-political life. It does not mean, 
of course, that his model, vague though it may have been, was absent from 
new social expectations and actions. I believe that the interpretive framework 
I am outlining here perfectly accommodates and is corroborated by Grzegorz 
Ekiert and Jan Kubik’s studies of Polish protests in the first years of the new 
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democracy.169 Ekiert and Kubik have shown that the popular protests sweeping 
across Poland soon after the new polity model was implemented and reform 
policies were launched can and should be viewed as an outlet for the otherwise 
blocked need for participation.
Another sociologically relevant factor, in my view, has been a transformation 
in the attitude to politics among an important and influential part of society, 
coupled with the atrophy of that unique communal individualism. Solidarity was 
saturated with the nearly ancient notion of democracy as civil participation, in 
which the individual’s good, mature and satisfying life reached its culmination. 
This went hand in hand with the perceived connection between individual effort 
and activity on the one hand and other people’s and society’s fates on the other.
All relevant research to date, most emphatically the studies by Mirosława 
Marody,170 have reported that in free, democratic Poland, another model – one of 
egoism, rampant individualism and non-communalism – has taken sway. Such 
a model poorly supports collaboration even if clearly defined group aims are at 
stake. Such developments beg an explanation, and one part of the explanation 
must point to discarding the model generated by Solidarity. In my view, the pro-
cess has not been properly examined by Polish social scientists, and accounts that 
we have, such as Jadwiga Staniszkis’s studies, only concern selected – and insti-
tutional rather than mental – aspects of the transition. To offer such a compre-
hensive account lies beyond the scope of this essay, which aimed to describe the 
rise and significance of Solidarity. I have no doubts that, even though blurred in 
social consciousness now and corrupted by various instrumental interpretations, 
that experience still bears a highly positive symbolic potential embodied in a vi-
sion of an open and active society united by communal individualism.
 169 Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic 
Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
2001), p. 278.
 170 Mirosława Marody (Ed.), Oswajanie rzeczywistości. Między realnym socjalizmem a 
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The Language of Solidarity
Only few studies examine the language of the Solidarity trad-unionist movement, 
the dynamics of language changes and the discourse in which the movement 
was engaged from its very beginning. Some studies depict the first outcomes 
of the social mobilisation, that is, the demands which were endemically for-
mulated during the protests and, later, while establishing free trade unions.171 
However, language as such – in particular oral language – has largely remained 
underexamined, except perhaps the symbols, which have been addressed by, 
for example, Jan Kubik172 and this author, who analysed significant vocabulary 
used by the mobilised people to define the social situation.173 To my knowledge, 
there is only one Polish study devoted to workers’ language within Solidarity. 
Published (like other chapters quoted in this chapter) as an uncensored schol-
arly publication in only one hundred copies, the study was authored by Anna 
Błaszkiewicz and entitled “Świadomość społeczna robotników a językowe 
 171 Ireneusz Krzemiński, Czego chcieli, o czym myśleli? Analiza postulatów robotników 
Wybrzeża z 1970 i 1980 roku (Warszawa: Instytut Socjologii UW, 1987) (an uncensored, 
mimeographed manuscript); Beata Chmiel and Elżbieta Kaczyńska (Eds.), Postulaty 
1970–71 i 1980. Materiały do dziejów wystąpień pracowniczych w latach 1970/71 i 
1980 (Gdańsk, Szczecin) (Warszawa: NOWA, 1998) (a manuscript). For discussion of 
the trade-unionists’ demands, see also David Ost, The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and 
Politics in Postcommunist Europe (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2005); Michael H. Bernhard, The 
Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectual, and Oppositional Politics, 
1976–1980 (New York: Columbia UP, 1993); Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, After the Fall: The 
Pursuit of Democracy in Central Europe (New York: Basic Books, 1992); and above all 
Jan Kubik (see the following footnote).
 172 Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity 
and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
UP, 1994).
 173 Ireneusz Krzemiński et al., Polacy – jesień ‘80 [1983], Socjologia Niezapomniana, vol. 3 
(Warszawa: WFiS UW, 2005), see particularly pp. 126–164. The book also contains 
other studies which mention and analyse language-related issues. Henryk Banaszak 
discusses the language in which daily newspapers described the social situation, and 
the last section of his contribution is entitled “semantic manipulations.” Grzegorz 
Bakuniak’s chapter also relies on language analysis to offer an account of the funda-
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formy jej uzewnętrzniania” (“The social consciousness of workers and its lin-
guistic expression forms”).174 I will not summarise Błaszkiewicz’s argument here, 
because my aim is to recall and record another experience, one involving broadly 
conceived language issues in the Solidarity social movement.
Discussion and debate were the fundamental avenues of participation in 
the unionist movement of Solidarity. In fact, talking, deliberating and confer-
ring formed Solidarity’s basic mode of being. Common discourse can even be 
said to have been one of the movement’s major modi operandi. Talking together 
actually meant thinking together. The movement developed its own notions 
and re-defined existing words, investing them with new meanings. The acqui-
sition of a new vocabulary was of paramount relevance in the social process. 
The production of the movement’s own language, of its own speech which coun-
tered the party-state’s ideologised, ritual speech, was one of Solidarity’s greatest 
achievements. To grasp this in the theoretical language of sociology, we can use-
fully draw on George Herbert Mead’s concepts and symbolic interactionism to 
conclude that such concerted common action produced and, at the same time, 
was made possible by significant symbols, i.e. by notions which imbued action 
as such with order, motivated people and helped them undertake their own 
initiatives within common action.
In this context, George Herbert Mead’s concept of the universe of discourse 
also comes in handy. The universe of discourse is, briefly, a lexicon of the social 
community which delineates this community’s cognitive perspective.
There is, however, another important aspect to it. As seen by individuals, 
the “solidarity” community prompted, if not forced, people to undertake cog-
nitive and linguistic efforts since, in order to feel at ease in the new role of a 
debating trade-unionist and citizen, one first had to learn to speak in public and 
to develop skills of persuasion, argumentation and counter-argumentation. Such 
competencies were indispensable to voice one’s ideas and propose demands for 
public discussion.
To begin with, I will resort to a personal story associated with researching the 
trade union movement. In the initial stage of building free trade unions in Warsaw, 
social committees were set up to help people establish an independent trade 
union at their respective enterprises. Information chaos was rampant, and it was 
 174 Anna Błaszkiewicz, “Świadomość społeczna robotników a językowe formy jej 
uzewnętrzniania,” in Poza granicami socjologii ankietowej, eds. Antoni Sułek, Krzysztof 
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additionally fuelled by the regime’s agencies and special services, which sought 
to frighten and discourage people from starting trade unions in workplaces. 
Given these circumstances, legal and organisational advice was in high demand, 
especially that both judiciary knowledge and practical action models were 
largely lacking. I served pro bono at one of the consultation points.175 One day, 
I went to a small town in the vicinity of Warsaw to take part in a meeting at a 
local factory. The meeting was organised by an activist involved with the KOR 
(Workers’ Defence Committee), who planned on founding an NSZZ “Solidarity” 
unit at the factory. The late meeting with a dozen or so workers was a difficult 
one. I tried to explain to them in the simplest but most encouraging terms what 
freedom of association was, what procedures were involved in establishing a 
trade union, and how self-organisation worked. The workers commented on 
what I was saying, but I could only understand very little of the conversation. 
I kept repeating what I had to say, but the worst part was that I did not under-
stand two or three questions they asked of me. Finally, the floor was taken by an 
informal leader of the workers’ group whose opinion mattered a lot. My guide 
and the organiser of the meeting explained to me what the questions were all 
about. This shows vividly the gap between the Polish spoken by the intelligentsia 
and the colloquial Polish spoken by the workers, a gap I found surprising at the 
time. The misunderstandings were not caused by any dialect differences, but by 
the variance of my language and the workers’ local jargon. This is not yet the 
end of the story. Almost a year later, I met some of the workers with whom I had 
talked back then in November 1980. Already members of the NSZZ “Solidarity,” 
they reminded me of the meeting themselves at a gathering held in the wake of 
the trade union’s congress.176 This time, our conversation was smooth and ran in 
beautiful Polish. The gentlemen told me that after the meeting they had resolved 
to set up an NSZZ “Solidarity” unit in their factory and, to my surprise, thanked 
me effusively. The man I had not been able to understand back then was now the 
most articulate orator of them all.
The story pictorially shows the changes in people’s language. Undoubtedly, it 
was participation in the Solidarity movement that stimulated people’s linguistic 
and thus mental development. Eloquent, expressive Polish replaced speech based 
on non-finite clauses and a rudimentary vocabulary.
 175 The consultation point was situated at the office of the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia 
and the editorial board of Więź.
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Words, including literally poetic words, seduced and thrilled workers. A recur-
rent theme addressed at meetings with workers and other employees when setting 
up a trade union in their enterprise was the Nobel Prize for Czesłąw Miłosz.177 
People construed their prior ignorance of there being a Polish poet who had won 
the world’s most prestigious literary prize as humiliation by the regime, a token 
of the ideologisation of the state and evidence of an ideological bias in schooling. 
The demand for Miłosz’s poetry was enormous. The demand for words of truth, 
for truth as such and in particular for historical truth became one of the most 
important engines propelling the personal growth of many trade-unionists. This 
was especially visible in the martial law period, when several translations of his-
torical literature, unavailable in Poland before, and works of political theory and 
philosophy were published in samizdat. Relatively well educated big-industry 
workers were among the major purchasers of such publications.
The very notion of the Solidarity social movement is interesting in itself. At the 
time, the purely sociological notion of a social movement was not popular in Polish 
sociology, preoccupied as it was with liberal democracy, civil society (the democratic 
opposition’s slogan as discussed by American Solidarity scholars Ost, Bernhard, 
Goldfarb and Kubik) and social mobilisation rather than with social movements. 
The concept appeared within the movement itself as its self-identification. “We are 
a social movement” would be proudly reiterated by workers whom we sampled 
for the study conducted by Alain Touraine, who himself augmented research into 
social movements with his original methodology. But the candidates to our discus-
sion teams had referred to themselves as a social movement even earlier.178
As social activities progressed, various words and notions were gaining pop-
ularity; importantly, in most cases they were serious words associated with 
intellectual discourse. Towards the end of Solidarity’s legal period, one of the 
favourite words was the Latin consensus, which fully deserves to be regarded as 
the trade union’s significant symbol at the time. It was common currency in fact. 
In late November 1981, I took part in a meeting of an NSZZ “Solidarity” unit 
assembling caretakers for apartment houses in Warsaw’s Ursynów (practically, 
they were all women responsible for the cleaning and maintenance of the houses 
 177 Czesław Miłosz, a poet and essayist, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 
1980. (translator’s note)
 178 I discussed the issue elsewhere, pointing out that the sociological notion had been 
“called forth” by people involved in action even before it came to be used in ear-
nest by Polish sociologists. See Ireneusz Krzemiński, “Solidarność  – organizacja 
polskich nadziei” in Solidarność. Wydarzenie, konsekwencje, pamięć, ed. Antoni Sułek 
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owned by the housing cooperative which overlapped with the developing metro-
politan residential neighbourhood). I was astonished to hear how often the word 
consensus was used over the 1.5 hours of discussion by the members, most of 
whom had basic trade education at most. The word “consensus” was used quite 
correctly, and the discussion concerned the trade union’s prospects, which were 
not deemed particularly promising.
These anecdotal examples must stand for empirical data as there are no studies 
that systematically registered the development of the “solidarity” language and 
rhetoric. Certainly, “subjectivity” was one of the most important notion used – 
and perhaps also abused – by the movement members. To a degree, “subjectivity” 
organised Solidarity members’ speech in general, being one of central signifi-
cant symbols of the movement and a basic element of its universe of discourse. 
Subjectivity involved freedom of speech and freedom of expression and, as such, 
was associated with the imperative of tolerance, which meant that everybody 
had the right to speak out, no matter what views they held. As such, subjectivity 
was also intimately connected to the word “democracy,” because without indi-
vidual liberty and freedom of speech no democracy was thinkable.
With all its linguistic and extra-linguistic implications, the word “subjectivity” 
became functional owing to Pope John Paul II, who addressed his compatriots in 
a very specific language revolving around subjectivity. The first trip of John Paul 
II to Poland in 1979 profoundly affected the conditions which fostered the phe-
nomenon of the Solidarity social movement.
The Pope’s words founded a new discourse, a new universe of discourse, in 
which the central role belonged to the human person, whose rights were nat-
urally guaranteed, i.e. instituted and bestowed on people by God the Creator 
himself. Of course, the Pope also appealed to the national community and the 
nation’s right to constitute the state, but the national community was conceived 
as by definition securing civil rights and liberties. More than just a product of 
social will, civil and human rights were evoked as the crux of social relationships 
which ensured that people had opportunities to engage in responsible action. 
The Pope’s words about freedom, which these rights afforded to human beings, 
were highly influential as well.
Indeed, the Pope’s public speeches were deeply inspiring and even formative 
of Poles’ later actions and thinking. All this was augmented by the impact of 
other words, specifically, the words used by the activists of the democratic oppo-
sition and the words which Poles could hear when listening to Radio Free Europe, 
Voice of America or the “Polish” BBC. The broadcasters were also instrumental 
in the rise of a new social consciousness and in the production of language that 
mobilised for action.

In the Grip of Pernicious Politics
The Social Problem Turned Political Problem
Low and still decreasing voter turnout, the widespread belief (substantiated by 
several outrageous examples) that politics is just a playground where parasitic, 
socially alienated party oligarchies vie for their own interests (with the polity as 
one of the spoils to be seized), the meagre rates of public engagement in NGOs 
and general non-involvement in activities which practically enact the principles 
of social solidarity, all these are but a few of the symptoms that bespeak Poles’ 
growing withdrawal into privacy and refusal to participate in public life. What 
are the causes behind this increasing passivity and reluctance to take responsi-
bility for the res publicae? Does this particular escape from civic freedom result 
from disappointment with Polish democracy, deficient as it is, or does it perhaps 
reflect a broader crisis of civil society which plagues the entire Western world 
(therein the US, the cradle of modern republicanism)? The Third Republic of 
Poland was founded on the idea of solidarity; what have we lost of the precious 
experience of social solidarity since then?
These questions are addressed day in day out in scholarship, in journalism 
and even in our daily lives.179 Yet they are explored and answered on an ad-hoc 
basis and are perennially entangled in the current political disputes. It is no dif-
ferent in academia, where ideological, if not downright partisan, allegiances 
show through in sociological and theory-political studies, while scholars seek to 
give their conclusions an objective ring by sticking to commenting on surveys 
and public opinion polls. As such, scholarship also proves to be bedevilled by 
crisis. What we need is a broader and more detached scrutiny of the ten years of 
our democracy, surveying the previous developments and processes through a 
lens untainted by party loyalties and interests.
To refer to Solidarity in this context seems of paramount importance to me. 
By common consensus reported in empirical research, the People’s Republic of 
Poland is now believed to have actually collapsed in 1981.180 Therefore, in order to 
 179 The original article answered the questions posed by the editors of Znak in the early 
2000, which encouraged many authors to share their reflection on civil society in 
Poland after 1989.
 180 A study we carried out in Mława ans Szczeciek in 1997 provided ample corroboration 
of this thesis. Cf. Ireneusz Krzemiński and Paweł Śpiewak, Druga rewolucja w małym 
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understand the average Pole’s present distrust of democratic politics and demo-
cratic polity, we need to go back to the Solidarity social movement. Also, we need 
to explore how the dark decade of martial law affected Poles’ representations of 
politics, citizenship and the state. We will not get far if, in exploring the effects 
of this unbearably protracted martial law, we only focus on holding – or, for that 
matter, not holding – to account the generals and party secretaries who even-
tually ceded their power (even though, undoubtedly, the issue of answerability 
must be addressed).
In this chapter, I  argue that the peculiar lack of active support for democ-
racy and the disinclination to civic participation (even to its rudimentary forms 
such as voting),181 which have been displayed by a considerable part of Polish 
society since the onset of the Third Republic, are outcomes of two overlapping 
approaches. One of them can be called an idealising and the other a cynical ap-
proach to politics, politicians and polity. The former is rooted in the ideal of 
democracy which was championed by the Solidarity social movement when it 
was taking shape in 1980–1981, while the latter originated in the experience 
of the crackdown on the reformist, trade union movement and the mode in 
which political authority was exercised by the last military cabinet of the People’s 
Republic of Poland. These developments were also powerfully affected by the 
political activity of the Church in the early 1990s, which reinforced the nega-
tive, anti-citizenship strands within the two approaches (where anti-citizenship 
means simply an utter reduction of participation in and responsibility for the 
new socio-political order). However, no accurate and inclusive account can pos-
sibly overlook the Church’s merits in bolstering citizenship and civil attitudes. 
Let us start with Solidarity.
Solidarity and an Idealising Vision of Politics
Most sociologists consider the vast trade-unionist movement of Solidarity to 
have been a significant episode, but hardly anything else – or more – than just 
a prolonged social festival, celebrating the solidary endorsement by Poles of 
shared values opposed to the communist regime. The ensemble of those shared 
values was not, at any rate, too numerous and represented mainly general per-
sonalist, national and above all socialist assertions turned, paradoxically perhaps, 
against real socialism. In this framework, the socialist investment was especially 
 181 Notably, voter turnover rates, especially in local elections, are very low in Poland, in 
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embodied in the philosophy of the dignity of the human person, even in its 
version preached by Pope John Paul II. Of course, this species of socialism was 
different from what Poles were experiencing as socialism in their daily lives. The 
motley blend of liberal, conservative and socialist slogans could be sustained, 
because it was unified by opposition to the common enemy and by the society-
and-nation’s shared will to be able again to determine their fate. Confronting 
communism and the communists blurred all differences and powered utopian 
visions of democracy and the free market as a system in which all people lived 
good and tolerably affluent lives. No wonder, thus, claim my learned colleagues, 
that when democracy and the free market unexpectedly became a reality, the 
common enemy disappeared and with the enemy gone was the alleged com-
munity of values as everybody started to pursue their own interests – interests 
that quickly proved to be entirely disparate. In such circumstances, the socialist 
overtones of solidarity thinking surfaced again in workers’ protests against the 
market reforms, which they purportedly accepted, and in the demands of state 
interventionism, which contravened the free market principles.
The truth is, as most sociologists are eager to remind us, that a new economy 
cannot possibly be built without incurring social costs. The ill-advised demands 
made by the group-laid-off workers imply that they in fact neither understood 
nor endorsed the principles of modern democracy. Hence their distrust of the 
democratic state and politics, therein of political parties, coupled with their at-
tachment to trade unions, which anachronistically protect workers and, in this 
way, hinder the dismantling of the remnants of the equally anachronistic welfare 
state. This portrayal seems very inaccurate to me, yet it is actually what most 
frameworks that explain the Polish transition (as sociological parlance has it) 
boil down to. In contrast to them, I  want to propose an entirely different vi-
sion of the Solidarity movement and its impact on social mentality and popular 
consciousness.
Solidarity was born in protest, but it was not protest as such that fuelled the 
dynamically growing organisation of the social movement, which was joined by 
millions of people. The significance of Solidarity’s trade-unionist organisation is 
notoriously ignored. Equally ignored is the role of the Solidarity experience as 
a practical lesson that taught millions of Poles how democratic principles could 
actually be applied. Solidarity was a powerful organisation which gradually pro-
duced a special democratic order. What was more or less effectively practised 
within and by the NSZZ “Solidarity” was, in fact, a project of a new social order 
and an ideal of a new state that was to oust the People’s Republic of Poland.
Some Solidarity activists were fully aware of this fact. Zbigniew Bujak, for 
one, had the social imagination enough to observe as early as in 1981 that the 
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trade unionists distrusted representative democracy. It was indeed the case, and 
the project of a new democracy included not only the basic, classical, Western 
principles. It also contained a corrective, a fact that was actually quite soon per-
ceived in the West, particularly by American and British Solidarity scholars (not 
in Poland, though…). Sociological and theory-political studies started to dwell 
on participatory democracy. The shift was largely, though not exclusively, precip-
itated by the developments in Poland (not exclusively because it was becoming 
obvious worldwide that highly institutionalised and petrified democracies had 
slid into crisis).
The democracy project which was devised and quite extensively practised by 
the Solidarity movement within its trade-unionist organisation presumed insti-
tutionally sanctioned, broad participation of ordinary people – trade-unionists 
and citizens  – in defining the social situation and the directions in which to 
move. More than that, the idea was that the rules and strategies of action should 
be established in and through public debate by discussion and the clash of views. 
The institutionally authorised form was provided by common social debate, 
which was by definition open and public. Actually, in the wake of marital law, the 
trade union’s self-criticism often targeted that all too open, public model of stra-
tegic decision-making, which the trade union’s apparatus was largely obligated to 
uphold. Trade-unionists exerted close control over their elected representatives 
by means of frequent meetings and regular debates, which were often inspired 
by the trade union’s press.
Debating went on incessantly within Solidarity even in the autumn of 1981, 
i.e. in the last legal days of the trade union, and was very vigorous despite the 
growing disappointment of the members, while regular gatherings of enterprise-
based trade-union units, regional bodies and all other agencies, including the 
trade union’s headquarters in Gdansk, were numerously attended by common 
people. Certainly, the unionised workers, or just employees, did not fully trust 
their representatives and decision-makers, which stirred them to put in place 
institutional forms of control.182
By doing so, they also added a new quality to democratic principles by consid-
erably expanding the participation of rank and file in strategic decision-making. 
This pursuit was impelled by people’s long-lasting experience of betrayal by 
 182 I wrote these words long before the study we carried out in 2010 among the members 
of the “first” Solidarity, the findings of which provided indisputable empirical evidence 
corroborating this observation. The research confirms that most trade unionists took 
part in discussions that were continually taking place within the NSZZ “Solidarity.”
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elected and trusted representatives. This largely explains the recurrent waves of 
anti-intelligentsia rhetoric in Solidarity.
If this enlarged participation is viewed as part of the democratic polity pro-
ject, we should notice that it entailed defining the politician as a representative of 
the will and voice of his/her electors. Before embarking on any action, the thus-
defined politician was socially expected to discuss it, at least with those most 
affected by particular decisions and activities. The political process of governing 
and decision-making was supposed to be guided by public opinion, by the voice 
of the people, so to speak. This was where the democratic politician differed from 
the regime politician. After all, the sense of citizenship grew around the con-
sciousness of co-responsibility not only for oneself and one’s family but also for 
the entire country and people’s common fate. The right and possibility to speak 
in discussions on matters of importance for the community was an inherent – 
and nearly ancient – part of the sense of the individual’s dignity as a citizen.
The expectations associated with this participatory model of democracy 
were revived when the system unexpectedly changed in Poland. Intertwined 
with them, the hope for re-igniting public debate on the reforms was particu-
larly fervid among the portion of society that had been – more or less actively – 
involved in the underground activities and in the Church’s varied social pursuits. 
By this, I  do not mean the hardcore underground activists, for their number 
had been plummeting towards the end of the 1980s, while remarkably numerous 
groups of people simply continued to deny the regime any support. The hopes 
of those groups were immediately re-kindled at the beginning of 1989. The first 
institutional form for channelling them, other than through the re-established 
trade unions, was offered by the Civic Committees, which came into being par-
ticularly fast outside big cities, contributing to the re-construction of Solidarity’s 
shattered trade-unionist structures. Once the trade union was re-registered, a 
broad discussion movement started to re-emerge gradually.
However, the path that the reformist elite, above all Lech Wałęsa, took – both 
when preparing for the general election in June 1989 and later under Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki’s new cabinet  – precluded the revival of the Solidarity social 
movement on as grand as scale as it had boasted before marital law. The Civic 
Committees were manipulated in ways that effectively prevented them from 
transforming into institutional incubators of reborn civic life or, later, of spon-
taneously formed political parties.
The reason was that public debate – fair and thorough discussion on how to 
re-structure the polity and build democratic and market institutions – was the 
last thing wished for by (oh, the irony of it!) the new, democratic authorities, 
which allegedly represented social ideals and common interests. The reverse was 
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in fact true: the government was resolved to take advantage of society’s enthu-
siastic consent in order to, possibly quickly, implement macrosocial and mac-
roeconomic reforms, assuming in advance that this particular implementation 
mode could not but cause considerable social costs for and dissatisfaction in a 
considerable part of society. But because the belief was that the new economic 
rules in the democratically re-built state would as if by default compel people 
to adopt proper adaptive behaviours and most, if not all, people would ardently 
join in building the market economy, the transition period was expected to be 
relatively short.
This belief underpinned a new tendency embraced by the elite that hailed 
from a broad democratic movement, namely, its growing elitism. The belief that 
the necessary reforms had to be imposed on people and launched without any 
public discussion was reinforced by dogmatically endorsed liberal philosophy, 
which implied that since market-specific behaviours were natural to people, 
the creation of macroeconomic conditions of the market economy in Poland 
would automatically trigger individual and collective adaptive responses. As a 
result, the situation of people initially disadvantaged by the reforms was soon 
to change for the better, though ultimate success depended on their individual 
undertakings.
This is what I am inclined to consider one of the two original sins of reborn 
Poland’s newly reinstated democracy. Foiling the expectations of participation, 
of replicating common, public civil debate, counts among the most important 
causes of social frustration, dissatisfaction and disengagement from the state 
displayed by masses of Poles. The tarnished hopes for participation are a major 
component of bitter attitudes to democratic institutions reported in socio-
logical research, as shown, for example, by Mirosława Grabowska.183 A  study 
I conducted with Paweł Śpiewak in two small towns rendered similar findings. 
In 1997, their populations reported the widespread feeling of non-participation 
in the process of economic reforms and building the modern state, coupled with 
the belief that the elected bodies, including those at the local level, failed to take 
their opinions into account adequately.184 Apparently not much had remained 
of the strong feeling, prevailing in the “first” Solidarity period, that citizens as a 
whole – i.e. ordinary people and their elected representatives – could and should 
 183 Mirosława Grabowska, “Demokracja – teorie i społeczne nastawienia,” Civitas 2, 
1998. Cf. also Mirosława Grabowska and Tadeusz Szawiel, Budowanie demokracji 
(Warszawa: PWN, 2001).
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create politics and governance rules together. Moreover, the clash of the dem-
ocratic participation project, which I called an idealising vision of democracy 
and politics, with the practices of the emergent political elite very soon bred 
not only disappointment, but also a growingly negative definition of politics and 
politicians. Eventually, this put people off any attempts at participation, made 
them withdraw from public life and dented their aspirations of citizenship.185
The People’s Republic of Poland, Martial 
Law and a Cynical Vision of Politics
The begrudged exclusion of citizens from the transition process coincides with 
ordinary people’s withdrawal from politics, which is defined as evil and dirty. 
This indicates an overlap of two ways of defining the world and motivating 
individuals’ behaviours. The bitterness of derailed expectations, which had been 
stirred by the idealising interpretation, was exacerbated by the opposite ten-
dency, shaped by the experience of the forceful demolition of legal Solidarity 
under martial law. In the idealising interpretation, Solidarity had been seen as 
a spirituality-underpinned mass social movement which substantially contrib-
uted to culture and elevated individuals’ everyday experience to moral heights. 
Consequently, the victory of the militarised PUWP over the peaceable move-
ment could not but breed negative spiritual outcomes. In socio-psychological 
notions, they can be described as the demise of the concept of politics as demo-
cratic representation, common debate and a peaceable negotiation process, par-
ticipating in which crowned human dignity, freedom and responsibility for the 
private and public life. This noble vision could not but (and indeed did) seem to 
many people a fantasy which fell like a house of cards when clashing with the 
tanks that the militarised communist regime sent onto the streets of Poland.
Probably even in the period which sociologists tend to depict as “festive,” a 
social majority had already adopted the attitude I describe below. At the time, 
however, nobody was too eager to divulge such a viewpoint. When the gen-
erals triumphed over the peaceable movement, that attitude was bolstered and 
 185 Continued by the Centre for Research on Solidarity and Social Movements and 
the European Solidarity Centre, studies of the members and activists of the NSZZ 
“Solidarność” show that a large part of the respondents believe that some of the “first” 
Solidarity activists betrayed its original idea by preventing common, public discus-
sion. The respondents believe that the sweeping political and economic reforms were 
launched without adequate public debate, an opinion articulated both by the advocates 
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disseminated. Despite daily resistance to the violence-based exercise of power, 
the experience of the 1980s triggered growing hopelessness and resignation – 
or adaptation  – to the power. A  new, cynical concept of politics was a direct 
outcome of these processes and a specific culmination of the long martial-law 
period.
I call by this name the entire decade of the 1980s, from the imposition of 
martial law to the Round Table talks, because these years practically form one 
period. Although formally martial law was lifted relatively quickly, the curfew 
was repealed, and people were no longer advised on the phone that their 
conversations were listened in on, nobody had any doubt that the phones were 
still tapped and that when being out at night one was bound to bump into 
more than one military and/or militia patrolling squad. The mechanisms of the 
exercise of power did not change in the least.
People had to adapt to the situation, which encouraged cynical interpretations 
of politics and fundamental social relationships. The cynical vision of politics 
was in fact a far more general representation of power in society which said that 
one had power if one had force. Power meant domination and the ability to order 
and command others, imposing one’s will on them. As such, power necessarily 
entailed violence and money, for violence is costly and sometimes requires pro-
curing (buying) support. Money and force came to be seen as closely interrelated.
At the same time, however, the new philosophy of power and politics 
presupposed a possibility  – a necessity even  – to engage in a game with vio-
lence- and force-wielders, be it for the sake of avoiding or weakening their blows. 
Money, an attribute of power, could thus help influence power. At any rate, the 
violence-based power was prone to corruption and not averse to manipulating 
its own harsh principles in order to reap immediate gains which were necessary 
to keep various spheres of life going.186 As time went by, the social game with the 
system expanded and developed, focusing predominantly on retaining the little 
comforts of life achieved in the Gierek decade “of plenty” and now jeopardised 
by the deepening stagnation and calamitous socio-economic developments 
(e.g. growing fears of environmental pollution dramatically exacerbated by the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster). Weaselling was the basis of daily life and meant 
morally dubious behaviours because, even though people generally neither 
 186 This was superbly illustrated by Jan Tomasz Gross in his Polish Society under German 
Occupation: The Generalgouvernement 1939–1944 (Princeton and New York: Princeton 
University Press, 1979). In an aside, this book sketches a rather different portrayal of 
Polish society than Gross’ Jedwabne study.
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accepted the regime nor considered the government legitimate, they showed 
submission and hypocritical respect in order to obtain various minor individual 
privileges. This made life easier and more comfortable.
The 1980s was a time of reviving and using all kinds of family connections in 
order to secure everyday goods and more long-term profits. This was a decade 
of organised queueing and trade-focused international tourism, as recorded not 
only in sociological studies of Jacek Kurczewski but also in some truly poignant 
artworks (such as songs and cabaret pieces of brilliant literary quality). They reg-
istered people’s withdrawal into family life and the privacy of their homes, which 
ran counter to any broader social engagement, excepting perhaps church-related 
activities. But even in such pursuits only a minority displayed truly pro-active 
attitudes.
Such experiences wrecked any thought of politics as a site of individual self-
realisation which capped a mature and responsible life of a social community 
member. Politics began to stand for the desire to rule others and the capacity to 
use violence combined with avoidance of its consequences and skilful submis-
sion to power in order to achieve one’s own ends. As such, politics came to be 
construed as a site of fight or play for the unfettered attainment of egoistic goals, 
while power was viewed as a source of the obvious and unquestioned right to 
enjoy privileges. Jerzy Urban’s ironic admonition not to worry about the govern-
ment, because the government would easily feed themselves symptomatically 
encapsulated this experience and this philosophy of power.
This also entailed a vision of the politician as a ruthless opportunist moti-
vated by the desire to gain privileges and by the will to command others. The 
politician was a morally ambivalent, double-faced and isolated player. Given 
this, common people should stay away from politics unless they wanted to join 
the by definition ruthless and immoral competition. The only solution was 
thus to develop a more or less duplicitous adaptive strategy and find a niche 
in which good life and the achievement of private, selfish interests were pos-
sible. The public sphere became an arena of uncertainty and distrust. One could 
only feel secure when surrounded by one’s own “folk”: family, friends and tested 
acquaintances.
In terms of social psychology, it basically meant the resumption of previous 
attitudes: a distrust of politics and the abandonment of the public sphere as a 
site of individual self-realisation and the civic culmination of human dignity. It 
seems that the crackdown on the Solidarity peaceable movement and the socio-
political practice of the dark 1980s strengthened and exacerbated the philosophy 
of politics and power which had surfaced and been commonly endorsed in the 
Gierek era. Now, it became even more bitter, “darker” and more universal.
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The dissemination of this cynical interpretation of politics first of all produced 
an image of social life and of the public space in particular as a dangerous zone 
steeped in fight and competition, where everybody was chiefly, if not exclusively, 
motivated by egoistic interests and goals, revealed (by necessity) only in part. If 
one somehow landed there, one had to be alert and forgo trust. In fact, it was 
distrust, even the distrust of one’s allies, that became the fundamental principle 
to rely on for success.
This bitter philosophy of politics was (and still is) coupled with ambivalent 
attitudes to the established, institutional social principles, including legal order 
and group loyalty. In a private game with the regime, one had skilfully to use the 
system’s weaknesses, especially legal loopholes. Consequently, it was an expe-
dient strategy to by-pass law and harness it in order to achieve one’s immediate, 
situation-bound aims, which the communist regime eagerly did at every pos-
sible opportunity. The bitter social experience taught that the authorities and the 
political elite used rules as they pleased, bending and breaking their own laws as 
the need of the moment dictated. This even concerned the legal principles the 
regime itself considered especially relevant. This was aggravated by the belief 
in the importance of money as a tool to make holes in the apparently uniform 
system.
All in all, the attitude to law and institutional rules at the end of the communist 
era was specifically ambiguous: on the one hand, the “bad law” of the communist 
governments was reviled and an equitable democratic law was demanded, while, 
on the other, people were on a hunt for opportunities to circumvent or break law. 
This was the legacy Polish society had on the threshold of the transition.
The Transition and the Original Sins of the Reborn Republic
By default, the unexpected collapse of the People’s Republic of Poland, when the 
PUWP – militarised as it was and yet incapable of governing – decided to share 
power with underground Solidarity as the representative of society, initially 
could not but bolster the former tendency described above, that is, the idealising 
vision of society and polity. All the more so as Poland’s example quickly pro-
duced global effects. Of course, the communists believed they could retain 
domination in the new arrangement of forces. By their incapability to govern 
I mean the debacle of the martial law period as looked at through the lens of 
Ortega y Gasset’s insistence on the relevance of public opinion to effective gover-
nance. Public opinion in Poland, even when hypocritically and opportunistically 
flattering the regime, never actually sided with General Jaruzelski. As Ortega 
concludes, citing Talleyrand, much can be done with bayonets except sitting on 
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them, which means that, in the long run, it is impossible to govern without the 
support of public opinion. The generals’ power was entirely negative, as they only 
proved effectual in issuing prohibitions and hunting down the shrinking group 
of underground oppositionists. Nothing else of the generals’ plans could be 
implemented, even though a considerable part of society had certainly learned 
how to use the regime’s operations for their own selfish purposes. The regime 
only governed negatively, unable even to elicit support for its right causes.
The victory of the dreamt-of democracy afforded the Poland-governing 
communists unprecedented success and emoluments, as it turns out in retro-
spect. This happened first and foremost because communism and the communist 
governments were never held to account and no moral symbol for new Poland 
was actually fashioned. This is the other “original sin” of the reborn Republic of 
Poland.
The “top-down” imposition of democracy and making the elites the leading, 
if not the only, power in the implementation of the socio-political reforms trig-
gered growing frustration and discontent within considerable groups of society, 
not only among the workers who were made redundant overnight. The expec-
tation that the mass participation of common citizens in state- and society-
building processes would be promoted also proved entirely unrealistic. As a 
result, the only remaining participation forms were protests, street rallies and 
other manifestations: a spree of political happenings, including hunger strikes. 
Jan Kubik and Grzegorz Ekiert, American scholars of Polish descent, who inter-
pret Solidarity in terms of citizenship, argue that the protest waves in the early 
1990s were a channel of workers’ (or employees’) participation in democratic 
debate and democratic order-building. No other participation form – patently 
not the one they had expected – was available to them.187
The reason was that the quickly forming party system did not (and still does 
not) offer a real political representation of the interests and views of common cit-
izens. It has always remained an elitist system. This does not result from society’s 
 187 Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic 
Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999). 
Importantly, the findings of the 2010 study and of another, still continued study on the 
memory of Solidarity in local communities directly show that a considerable propor-
tion of the respondents think that it was wrong to by-pass not so much consultations as 
real societal discussion on the systemic reforms. This implies that in the respondents’ 
view the members of the Solidarity social movement and trade union deserved a 
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lack of knowledge about and ideas of democracy and its principles, which is 
what most sociologists argue in their studies of the socio-political transition. In 
fact, the basic principles of the democratic order, such as pluralism and the rel-
evance of representation institutions, seem to have been commonly known and 
accepted, as found in studies conducted even under communism. Such findings 
were reported above all by Stefan Nowak.188 However, in the democratic ideal 
which Poles envisioned and endorsed back then, parties were underappreciated 
as chief organisers and advocates of social interests and values. If anything, this 
underestimation is even stronger today.
Similarly to Nowak, in a study we carried out in Mława and Szczecinek 
we asked our respondents to describe their ideal of a good political system. 
It turned out that the respondents’ political views had an effect on their 
preferences for a more authoritative or, alternatively, a more open, partic-
ipatory model of democracy (there were hardly any anti-democrats in our 
sample). However, even though many fundamental principles of modern 
democracy, such as the rule of law and the right of the opponents of the cur-
rent system to express themselves, were cited by nearly all respondents (the 
proportions were in excess of 90%), there was a symptomatic gap in their 
answers as support for a strong multi-party system was basically lacking. Only 
44% of the respondents in Mława and 38% in Szczecinek considered a multi-
party arrangement to be a desirable feature of a good political system. We 
also found that membership in trade unions (of whatever type) rather posi-
tively impacted people’s attitudes to parties, with the OPZZ189 trade-unionists 
proving most pro-party minded.190
These research findings are very vivid and consistent with Mirosława 
Grabowska’s earlier thesis that Poles generally disliked political parties. Such 
sentiments are not very easy to explain, though I believe that the cynical vision 
of politics can be an important, if not decisive, factor in this aversion. The cyn-
ical vision of politics (and, consequently, of the political authority) was being 
consistently bolstered throughout the transition, especially that our purported 
 188 I refer here to the OBOP (Public Opinion Research Centre) study on “Przemiany 
społecznej struktury w świadomości społecznej” (“The transformations of social struc-
ture in social consciousness”) (1965) and a later study carried out in Warsaw and Kielce 
(Ciągłość i zmiana tradycji kulturowej, ed. Stefan Nowak [Warszawa: PWN, 1989]).
 189 OPZZ is the acronym for the Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych 
(English: All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions), a Polish federation of labour unions 
created in 1984. (translator’s note)
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representatives – the representatives of society opposed to the party-state – now 
started to ignore public opinion and apparently had no intention to enact the 
good politician’s role as defined in social consciousness in 1980–1981.
The fact that communism and the communist governments were not held to 
account only strengthened this vision of politics. Its philosophy of power was 
based on the PUWP’s practice of governing. If the idea was now proclaimed that 
the regime of the People’s Republic of Poland was not to be condemned, and even 
less so the deeds of individual Party dignitaries (including General Jaruzelski as 
the engineer of marital law), it should not come as a surprise that power, the state 
and social relationships were comprehended in such and not any other way. In 
this light, the cynical vision of politics was proving thoroughly founded.
This involved one more salient feature of Polish society in the transition 
period, namely a highly asocial attitude embraced by most Poles, both those 
well-educated and those low-educated. Again, sociological studies claim that 
our society is collectivist and, as such, harbours an excessive sense of entitle-
ment. However, if we interpret the protests as a way of expressing and fighting for 
interests, and if we note people’s general reluctance to set up or join institutions 
capable of securing these interests on a daily basis, the thesis of Poles’ collec-
tivism is rather untenable. Collectivism, at any rate, entails a readiness, if not an 
eagerness, to engage in organised and, nomen omen, collective forms of activity. 
Yet, if Poles collaborate, they do so only very briefly and in a one-off action 
(such as a strike or a road block), without any apparent inclination to turn this 
situation-bound bonding into a more permanent structure. Separate individuals 
are socialised only in protest and usually only for a while.
Polish society is rather permeated by a spirit of individualism, and the 
individualised isolation is only suspended for a brief negative mobilisation in 
defence of the jeopardised (above all individual) interests. This deficiency of 
socialisation is perfectly in tune with the vision of the world which was described 
as cynical above.
At the beginning, I suggested that the Catholic Church could also contribute 
to the dissipation of the democratic spirit of citizenship, especially in the early 
years of the transition. Paradoxically, citizenship attitudes include elements 
which the Church had powerfully commended in the resistance period, such as 
individuals’ personal and subjective responsibility for their actions. As a com-
munity member, I have the right to speak out and act publicly according to my 
conscience and my understanding of the situation. Implicit in this idea is the 
belief that citizens are morally responsible and rely on their notions of good and 
evil or right and wrong. Also, as true believers, we must be guided in our daily 
lives by our moral judgment, confronting, discussing and negotiating it with 
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others within the community. At any rate, debate within the Church is inspired 
by the Holy Spirit, as the Second Vatican Council documents eloquently insist.
However, in the early 1990s, the Church in Poland abandoned such a vision 
of the People of God and scrapped the notion of the community of believers 
in search of truth and good. Very quickly, a sharp division into priests and the 
faithful was demarcated, with the former defined as indisputable experts on 
faith and morality, and the former as docile followers. Triumphant ecclesiastical 
authoritarianism came to rule the day and claim mastery over individual and 
collective consciences as well as over the political sphere. In this context, the 
Church’s fight for amending the abortion law was particularly consequential in 
its social effects. I do not question the Church’s right to take a clear and rad-
ical position on the abortion law, what I  argue, however, is that the form the 
Church chose for its campaign powerfully impacted the future socio-political 
developments. Tempting though it would be to refer to “debate” in this context, 
the term is hardly applicable, for though a debate on the abortion law indeed 
germinated in Poland, it was soon razed by ultra-aggressive attacks in which 
all views that differed from the Episcopate’s very radical project were scathingly 
deprecated. I believe that the style of this first truly meaningful political skirmish 
formatively contributed to the rise and dissemination of a counterproductive 
and woeful style of public debate in Poland as such.
Of course, many more factors were involved in this desultory process, but 
this particular one was certainly consequential as the majority of public opinion, 
though quite welcoming of the Church’s initiative, were far less restrictive than 
the Church on the permissibility of abortion. In fact, most people felt they were 
expressing their opinions in compliance with their Catholic credo and were fully 
entitled to do so as part of democratic debate, being at the same time prepared 
to change their views if persuaded by sound arguments. Regrettably, instead of 
arguments, they heard invectives and threats of retribution. The experience was a 
pragmatic lesson which taught people that their voice did not matter in the state 
and that the Church, previously the most reliable representative of society, had 
no intention to give ear to society anymore. Additionally, people of the Church 
haughtily and explicitly articulated anti-democratic notions, while a war against 
liberalism, i.e. against freedom as a systemic principle, became the major drive 
of Catholic thinking in Poland.
In this sense, what the Church did in the early 1990s can be seen as a factor 
both in undercutting the solidary, idealising image of politics and in bol-
stering the cynical image of the social world and the state. The after-effects of 
these developments still linger on, though it is equally important to notice that, 
over the recent years, the Church and its many organisations have begun to 
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contribute to building and consolidating civil society in many regions of Poland, 
especially locally, in small self-governing communities. I mean mainly the many 
inherently citizenship-minded initiatives launched by religious orders (Jesuits 
and Dominicans) as well as the commitment of several parishes to the develop-
ment of local media and social activism. Another precious, citizenship-related 
achievement of the Church is the development of charitable institutions, such 
as the Caritas.
Sad Conclusion
My answer to the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter focuses above 
all on the socio-political factors behind Poles’ reluctance to commit to civic activ-
ities. As such, it certainly does not offer a complete picture, but in choosing this 
lens I  was deeply convinced that the idea of politics, combined with people’s 
social visions of and expectations towards the state order, provided the key to 
understanding this phenomenon. I addressed what I believed to be two funda-
mental representations of politics and polity, productive of particular individual 
attitudes. I referred to one of them as an idealising vision of the democratic state 
and to the other as a cynical picture of the social world. The course and the mode 
of Poland’s socio-political transition have clearly tended to strengthen the cynical 
vision and to deprecate the idealising one. Concomitantly, the Solidarity expe-
rience has been devalued, while the lessons of martial law have been reinforced, 
attributing to force – i.e. to the violence- and money-based advantage – the deci-
sive role in social relationships and in the exercise of power.
The elites also share popular consciousness, which has become profoundly 
anti-political and detractive of the political class and the political scene (as pat-
ently evidenced by the recent election results). The vices quite justifiably ascribed 
to politicians and politics can be viewed as the products of the same conscious-
ness that spawns criticism. Yet this consciousness also underpins the behaviours 
of politicians, that is, of those citizens that dare enter the path of social career. 
As soon as they get involved in the political competition, the cynical vision of the 
social world makes them ruthlessly pursue their own and their group’s interests. 
The paradox is that this vision of politics both produces anti-political critics and 
oppresses the practitioners of politics …
The burgeoning of pernicious politics is, in my view, bound up with two 
“original sins” of Polish democracy. One of them was the fact that the demo-
cratic reformists – representatives of independent society as they were – entirely 
ignored people’s expectations of the broad, institutionalised participation of 
common citizens in the new polity. Such expectations were indeed deep-running. 
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They ensued from the project of democracy which had sprouted and been tested 
within the Solidarity unionist movement, a democracy project based on the 
broad participation of citizens in decision-making across all the community 
scales. Such expectations were overthrown by a new elitism of Poland’s emergent 
democracy.
The other “original sin” was the lack of any symbolic, moral reckoning with 
the communist governments and the entire communist period in Poland as 
such. As a result, neither was the past symbolically assessed nor was a morally 
cogent symbol of Poland’s new beginning put in place. This only re-asserted the 
practices and philosophy of Poland’s communist regime, consequently lending 
credence to the cynical vision of the social world. This vision fuelled bad individ-
ualism and thwarted people’s socialisation, a basic prerequisite of civil society.
Not holding communism to account also affected the formation of new, dem-
ocratic institutions. Of course, the still persisting, old institutional relationships, 
uncontrolled in any way, easily influenced the newly emerging or transforming 
institutions. The effects of this process, dramatic ones indeed, can be witnessed 
now in the operations of institutions which are of ultimate relevance to the new 
socio-political order, such as education.
A few years ago, researchers of the Institute of Sociology, University of 
Warsaw, set out to establish whether and in how far schools promoted citizen-
ship attitudes and democratic behaviours.191 Their findings were quite straight-
forward and rather depressing as far as initiating students into citizen roles was 
concerned. Antoni Sułek’s study showed that at most schools students did not 
stand any chance to develop democratic behaviours, even though law made stu-
dent boards mandatory at schools as the first form of democratic participation.
In Poland, student boards are hardly schools of democracy. For one, they are 
few and far between. And even if they are established and operate in one way 
or another, they are hardly ever treated by teachers and the administration as 
a real, institutional representation of students and a seminary of democratic 
behaviours, fostering the sense of democratic, civic responsibility. Another 
finding of the study was that rather few teachers believed it was the school’s 
responsibility to prepare students for independent lives as citizens or to pro-
mote pro-democratic attitudes. The generation educated in the Third Republic 
of Poland does not resemble in the least the self-sacrificial, patriotic and clearly 
pro-democratic young people brought up by the Second Republic, which was 





beset by very serious problems with emergent democracy. In my view, the chaos 
in educational ideals and the disengagement of schools from citizenship educa-
tion are largely attributable to the continuity between the People’s Republic of 
Poland and the Third Republic.
Certainly, it cannot be the only factor. Family upbringing also shapes young 
citizens, as reported in my colleagues’ older research and more recent studies.192 
The studies conducted by Mirosława Grabowska and Tadeusz Szawiel show that, 
while market-related ideals and behaviours are commonly known and accepted, 
positive pro-democratic attitudes are only promoted in a very special set of fam-
ilies in which both parents have university education. The proportion of such 
families in the overall population is indeed negligible, but only in such fami-
lies are children brought up as conscious citizens who appreciate the value of 
democracy.
I believe this outcome is linked to the triumph of the cynical philosophy of 
politics. This vision powerfully affects educational practices, both at school and 
within families. It fosters egoistic, competitive and asocial attitudes. As a result, 
young people, though vigorous, reasonable and tolerant of alterity and diversity 
of the human world, neither feel the need nor have the ability to collaborate with 
others, let alone having an inner impulse to act on others’ behalf. Moreover, the 
studies cited above show that most young people have loving and caring parents, 
with whom they get on very well (though usually far better with mothers than 
with fathers), and feel neither need nor pressure to rebel. They are focused on 
their careers and invest a lot in social contacts with a circle of friends (a slight 
departure from the self-centred pattern). Actually, an interest in social issues and 
a dedication to collaboration with peers and people who do things for others are 
mainly displayed by young people with a deficit of familial warmth and parental 
intimacy. Young people’s pro-social attitudes and behaviours seem to be largely 
dictated by an attempt to make up for insufficient family love. At homes dom-
inated by devoted mothers, the young generation grow up into adults with no 
interest in active citizenship and no civic consciousness.
There are exceptions to this rule as every major political party has its own 
youth section or organisation, but more often than not membership in it is 
related to the choice of career rather than to the commitment to social ideals. 
The young party members are, apparently, just political professionals. Other 
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activists are encountered in provincial communities, but they are so exceptional 
that nearly each of them is a conspicuously observable case…
The impact of the cynical vision of the social world is, indeed, impressive. The 
elimination of the citizenship component from education is clearly affected by 
the fact that mothers are the major pedagogical agency. The absence of fathers 
is spectacular in this context. No wonder that I called this part of the chapter “a 
sad conclusion.”
The Republic of Hateful Enviers
I guess I should first explain why this paper is included in this volume although 
it does not directly explore Solidarity as a social experience. What it does instead 
is showing how Solidarity – also as the original, conjoint experience and action – 
has been used in politics in recent years in order to sow discord among Poles, 
a political discord which is rapidly mutating into an all-embracing, ideolog-
ical discord. The ideological division is wrought mainly of national sentiments, 
which are strengthened by and enveloped in references to the past so much 
that their chauvinistic and megalomaniac investment deserves to be labelled as 
“nationalist.” This text was originally written in 2006 and, regrettably, to make 
it mirror our current situation more accurately, some of its vocabulary should 
be intensified. The point is that political actions are now fuelled not simply by 
envy, but by political, ideological and also personal hatred. In these actions, the 
Trade Union Solidarity, which still exists (though considerably weakened by its 
political engagement), is drawn into the mire of envy and hatred. Today, the 
operations of this trade union are, literally, the polar opposite of the activities 
of the “first” Solidarity. Addressing such concerns, this chapter also attempts to 
understand what has happened with and to the legacy of the “first” Solidarity in 
the realities of democratic Poland.
Changes in the Language of Public Debate
The situation in Poland has become unbearable. At moments, I have a feeling 
(which I  expect is shared by many people) that we have found ourselves in a 
world strangely resembling the People’s Republic of Poland in many respects. 
It is hard to explain how we again wound up all padded up in the propagan-
dist “cotton wool,” as the PUWP’s verbiage was commonly referred to in the 
Gierek era. The only difference is that the verbiage is now very strongly anti-
communistically coloured; yet though its colouring has changed, its structure 
has mostly remained the same.
Certainly, some of the right-wing commentators who repeat that public dis-
course has changed decisively, if not dramatically, are right. The term “public 
discourse” as such is rather vague, and when using it I have a few issues in mind. 
Firstly, I mean that the conceptual and ideological categories used to define the 
situation and the identities of political actors have changed. They actually form 
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admissible in public statements (language, formulations, expressions and the 
wording of assessments and descriptions of situations) has changed. Thirdly, and 
this is where the similarity to the communist period is at its strongest, every-
thing has become politics, politics understood rather narrowly as support for or 
criticism of the government in place, i.e. the current political authority. The split 
into the governing coalition and the opposition has reached its zenith in a public 
split. The division is deeper than disagreements in the wake of the first election 
victory of the post-communists in 1993.
To paint a full picture, we should additionally consider emotions, both man-
ifest in and induced by public articulations. Public discourse in Poland is now 
strikingly aggressive, confrontational and infested with unconcealed malice 
and evil intents. Admittedly, observers and commentators have noticed and 
denounced such features since the onset of democratic Poland, accusing polit-
ical actors of hostility and deprecatory name-calling in public debate, in which 
adversaries have usually been approached as rivals. In my analysis of the language 
of the first democratic election campaign, I pointed to the personalisation of dis-
course,193 an idea picked up later by other scholars.194 My point was that instead 
of naming and expressing differences in a language of ideas or problems, polit-
ical actors chose to launch personal attacks on their opponents. Always morally 
suspect, if not downright vicious, political adversaries were branded and humil-
iated for thinking differently and espousing different goals. This set the tone of 
public dispute in Poland, in which deprecating charges intended to demolish 
the opponents’ social and political reputation came to replace arguments and 
rational evaluations. Sociologists have attempted to describe this process in a 
variety of frameworks. They have talked, for example, of debate mutating into 
a monologue-based performance or of a ritual chaos as people who spoke in 
public had no intention to negotiate anything, least of all a shared position, and 
all they wanted was to say what they had planned to say in order to grind down 
their opponents.195
If we had a systematic account of how public discourse was evolving in Poland 
over the transition period, it would likely show that such “discussion” modes had 
 193 Cf. Ireneusz Krzemiński, “Wybrać lepszy świat,” in Mirosława Grabowska and Ireneusz 
Krzemiński, Bitwa o Belweder (Kraków and Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Literackie 
“Myśl,“ 1991).
 194 Jadwiga Puzynina (Ed.), Etyka międzyludzkiej komunikacji (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe Semper, 1993).
 195 Cf. Marek Czyżewski, Sergiusz Kowalski and Andrzej Piotrowski, Rytualny chaos. 
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systematically been encroaching on the public scene and we were now in the final 
stages of this “developmental” process. The process in fact seems unstoppable; if 
a right-wing commentator who is lionised by his supporters as a modern lit-
erary classic writes that a “monkey reason” is taking the upper hand among other 
commentators and the Polish intelligentsia as such, the people he targets cannot 
reasonably be expected not to repay in kind.
Abuses and accusations have become a common fixture in what political ac-
tors say about their political or discursive opponents. It is a kind of “whacking,” 
as the “whackers” themselves have called it. The “monologic performance stage” 
of political discourse has changed into a boxing ring where discussing is reminis-
cent of prize-fighting, well, of kick-boxing rather as the rules of engagement are 
rather scanty. To lash out with accusations first, before any arguments are even 
voiced, and then to present the adversary’s position in the light thereof has long 
been the method used by the Radio Maryja and Nasz Dziennik.196 This discus-
sion method has now become a “standard” method, widely applied by the LaO 
(PiS)197 politicians and supporters. The political discourse scene is an arena of 
fight, a political battlefield. As a result, no genuine discussion is in fact possible, 
whatever the topic. Instead, verbal – or, as they are dubbed now, media – duels 
are the only available option. Right or wrong, but after all underpinned by a rea-
soning, the views voiced by the adversaries are discredited at the start, and their 
advocates are immediately defined as strangers and enemies whose viewpoint 
cannot possibly be endorsed. The “if you’re not with us, you’re against us” logic 
rules the day, and the world is divided into beloved allies and bitter enemies. This 
discussion mode has been displayed for a while now by philosopher Legutko,198 
a LaO senator, not to mention Zdzisław Krasnodębski,199 who was my close col-
league not so long ago. I will not use any epithets in order to resist the reciproca-
tion mechanism mentioned above. But this introduction attests to siding with a 
certain “camp” anyway …
 196 The Radio Maryja is a Toruń-based Polish Catholic broadcaster of explicit right-wing 
and nationalistic leanings. Nasz Dziennik (English: Our Daily) is a daily newspaper of 
a very similar slant. (translator’s note)
 197 PiS stands for the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (English: Law and Order; LaO), a conser-
vative and nationalistically inclined right-wing party in Poland. (translator’s note)
 198 Ryszard Legutko, Professor of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, 
who was elected to a seat in the Polish Senate in 2005. (translator’s note)
 199 Zdzisław Krasnodębski is a Polish sociologist and social philosopher. Affiliated 
for many years with the University of Warsaw, he was appointed Professor at the 
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Importantly, discourse as warfare is strongly redolent of communist new-
speak. Under the People’s Republic of Poland, the public language was insep-
arable from the propaganda, which framed all events in terms of struggles and 
military campaigns, starting from “fighting winter” and ending with “the battle 
of harvest.” The diction of strife and combat was used with heightened intensity 
to describe social developments and to address or depict the actual and potential 
critics and opponents of the system. Such language was, of course, emotionally 
charged, but in time everybody got used to the aggressive convention so much 
that it became transparent: it became, indeed, a convention. As part of this con-
vention, its martial metaphors were given a deeply moralist twist. Deprecation 
of and contempt for the opponents also became conventionalised. Thus, in all 
probability, our current difficulty with fashioning a sharp, yet rational and civil 
discourse is also part of the legacy of the communist past, a bequest which at 
least some of us resent. Yet this kind of discourse is today forcefully promoted by 
LaO politicians, who are government officials and, as such, trend-setters.
Admittedly, their opponents in public discourse  – people who have been 
showered with scurrilous names, from “lying elites” (Polish: łże-elity) to “clever 
clogs” (Polish: wykształciuchy) – “lose it” from time to time and go into hysterics. 
When a scholar of my acquaintance phones me up, sobbing that Poland is now 
like Germany after the Nazis’ election victory, I tell her she is exaggerating and 
advise her to calm down.
And yet the analogies between the socio-political process at hand in Poland 
and the interwar developments cannot be purely figmental if Jadwiga Staniszkis200 
resorts to such a comparison. She has compared our current situation with the 
events in the Weimer Republic. I guess she knows what she is saying because, 
at any rate, it was her politicised account of the social situation in the Third 
Republic of Poland that became the basis for the LaO’s unfolding revolution, a 
revolution dubbed conservative by kind-minded people.
Vilifying post-communism mingled with neo-liberalism (practically called 
libertinism), conservatism is to serve as an honourable ideological banner and 
a slogan of the political “reform” of the state. In practice, the reform represents 
nothing other than the appropriation of the state by the LaO and the governing 
coalition. The axis of this conservatism is the idea of a moral reckoning with the 
founders of the Third Republic and the so-called elites. The point is that who-
ever has had any say in the public discursive space is counted among these elites 
 200 Jadwiga Staniszkis is a Polish sociologists and political scientists. For many years, she 
was Professor at the University of Warsaw. (translator’s note)
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unless they have been quick enough to join the only right camp. The moral reck-
oning is founded on two pillars; one of them is the assessment of the socio-
political reality, and the other is the moral evaluation of the new order. It was 
Jadwiga Staniszkis’s sociological vision (which Professor Zybertowicz201 aug-
mented with the idea that the transition was plotted by the secret services) that 
effectively helped justify the imperative to hold the Third Republic to account 
and to heal (i.e. repair) the polity.
But there is more to the moral project than just that. In fact, the reformists are 
out to battle social diversity in the name of limiting the rights and public pres-
ence of various minorities. Gays and lesbians, along feminists, have explicitly 
become arch-enemies. The reason for this is that the demands of moral salubrity 
in public life have nearly always drawn on the social teaching of the Catholic 
Church. Treated as the chief directive, this teaching is supposed to guide not 
only morality but also political action. Since the election campaign, faith and 
religion have been instrumentalised and Catholicism thoroughly ideologised 
in the service of political struggle. It is hardly a secret, and the political union 
of the state and the Church has long gone beyond the government’s alliance 
with the Radio Maryja. There is even a brilliant bard at hand, eager to argue 
that Father Rydzyk’s202 radio has undergone a deep “civilisational” change, eradi-
cating and even denouncing anti-Semitism. Unsurprisingly, the publicist, whose 
career seems to be spiralling, demands that the former charges against the Toruń 
broadcaster be dropped and forgotten altogether.203 That’s what you call the 
momentum, indeed!
How can we convey the situation in less partisan terms, suppressing the 
emotions, difficult thought it admittedly is, in order to analyse them, rather than 
to succumb to them?
Political Divisions and Social Divisions
One issue to examine is the ideological underpinning of the way the LaO and its 
leaders think. This is all the more relevant as in the 2006 electoral campaign, the 
ideological agendas of the LaO and the CP (PO)204 – the ideological and moral 
 201 Andrzej Zybertowicz is a Polish sociologist and publicist. Affiliated with the 
Nicolaus Copernicus University of Toruń, he has served in several public capacities. 
(translator’s note)
 202 Father Tadeusz Rydzyk is the Director of the Radio Maryja. (translator’s note)
 203 Tomasz P. Terlikowski, “Cywilizowanie Radia Maryja,” Dziennik, 8 Sept.2006, p. 26.
 204 PO is the acronym for the Platforma Obywatelska (English: Civic Platform, CP), 
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competitors on our political scene as they are  – allegedly converged to some 
extent. The political scene had itself undergone an unexpected re-modelling, 
which questioned the idea of the post-communist division.205 The post-
communists were pushed to the margin, and the “pact” they had previously con-
tributed to creating became the major target of the onslaught of the victorious 
party (i.e. LaO). The “pact” meant a collaboration of the oligarchic business and 
political circles that impacted operations of the state. Importantly, to eliminate 
the “pact” was a shared goal of the post-Solidarity groupings, as both the LaO 
and the CP considered a thorough reform of the state an absolute necessity.
However, even back then, their visions of the reform were discernibly dif-
ferent although both the parties wanted, for example, to amend the lustration 
bill. The lustration bill was perhaps the most obvious convergence point of the 
agendas of the parties, especially as exemplified in MP Rokita’s206 vocal demands 
in this respect. To have the communist secret police and security archives 
unclassified without exceptions was vigorously demanded by both Rokita and 
the Kaczyński brothers.207 Despite this, the two parties also differed on this point 
even before their electoral hiatus. For the Kaczyński brothers and the LaO, the 
reckoning with communism and the removal of everybody who had collabo-
rated with the former regime from public life were a priority, if not the priority. 
The LaO also demanded action in the judiciary in this respect and painted it in 
very radical colours. As far as I remember, the CP agenda did not include such 
proposals, even though overlapping with the LaO’s position on the most impor-
tant point, i.e. on depoliticising law enforcement and the police, combined with 
strengthening the judiciary autonomy.
Having (marginally) won the election, the LaO made the reckoning into their 
absolutely fundamental strategy. For this purpose, the LaO sacrificed quite a lot, 
including the trust and support of a major part of the intelligentsia, or the “lying 
elites” as the party dubbed them. The goal turned out to be so central that to 
achieve it, the LaO did not shrink from discrediting all independent opinion-
making elites, alongside the independent agencies of the distributed and dif-
ferentiated state power. At the same time, the political division was framed as 
 205 Mirosława Grabowska, Podział postkomunistyczny. Społeczne podstawy polityki w 
Polsce po 1989 r. (Warszawa: Scholar, 2004). My review of this book, which won the 
Reverend Józef Tischner Award conferred by Znak in 2005, was published in Przegląd 
Polityczny 73/74, 2005.
 206 Jan Maria Rokita, one of the leading CP activists and an engaged poseł (Member of 
Parliament). (translator’s note)
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a social division into the elites (beneficiaries of the transition) and “common” 
Poles, a nation that had so far been grossly abused and cheated by the govern-
ment colluding with the Third Republic’s elites. To this purpose, the shared and 
unifying legacy of Solidarity was fragmented into the solidary investment and 
the liberal preoccupation as if the liberal pursuit of freedom had not inspired all 
the members of the movement. Like religion, the social mythology of Solidarity 
was used to bolster the political position of the party.
To achieve that, a language has been mobilised which reminds many people 
of the year 1968.208 Though not targeting Jews or Zionists this time, the language 
describes reality in a similar fashion and triggers similar emotions. The ubiq-
uitous “pact,” indefatigably combated by the LaO politicians, functions like the 
Zionists did in 1968, for the narrative has it that under the cover of democracy 
“they” (politicians, in particular post-communists, and the elites of the Third 
Republic) have grown rich by robbing the people – the common citizens – in a 
variety of ways, e.g. by appropriating the revenues from privatisation. This inev-
itably involved betraying the nation and allying with foreign forces. The anti-
intelligentsia subtext of this new social division conveniently tunes in with an 
unarticulated but essential class distinction: the Third Republic’s politicians and 
elites are the class of the rich opposed to the poor people – the nation – who have 
been left to fend for themselves.209 The term “elite,” polyvalent as it is and refer-
ring to various kinds of elites, has been manipulated into representing a politi-
cally coloured whole in which the elite is synonymous with the intelligentsia.
Another similarity with the March ‘68 rhetoric is that the “winners” of the 
transition period are in various manners framed as “strangers” or “foreigners,” 
who are not fully and not really “our folk.” The class-inflected division is thus 
paired with a nation-slanted division. The latter involves associations with the 
communist past (dependence on and servility to Moscow) and with the pres-
ent-day relationships with the West (connections and subordination to the for-
eign capital, predominantly German, but undoubtedly also Jewish).
Such a model of social thinking is quite widespread. In my 2002 study on an-
ti-Semitism, over 38% of the respondents stated that there were a lot of politicians 
of Jewish descent in Poland. No wonder they would “support their people…” 
 208 For a discussion of the similarities between the current language and the March’68 
rhetoric, see Paweł Śpiewak, “Nie moja IV Rzeczpospolita,” Dziennik, 14 Sept. 2006.
 209 This is well illustrated by Andrzej Lepper’s defence of the parliamentary Investigation 
Committee for the Privatisation of Banks, in which he denounced Chairman Kot’s 
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Moreover, in comparison with the 1992 data, unwillingness to have Jewish 
entrepreneurs in Poland considerably increased: while in 1992 their presence in 
Poland was supported by almost 40% and bewailed by 45% of the respondents, 
in 2002 the proportions were, respectively, less than 25% and 61% of the sample. 
Similar findings concern all kinds of Jewish presence in Poland. Importantly, over 
the same period, the positive attitude to the presence of German entrepreneurs 
hardly changed (41% in 1992 and 42% in 2002), while the negative attitude to 
it picked up from 42% in 1992 to 50% in 2002. I will return to these data later.
I believe that the popular-national strand is fundamental to Jarosław 
Kaczyński’s political  – and probably ideological  – strategy. The LaO’s alliance 
with the Radio Maryja and with the social forces that support Father Rydzyk’s 
broadcaster “at the bottom” and “at the top” (especially at the top of the Church 
hierarchy) is probably something more than just a matter of electoral and par-
liamentary tactics. This is a deliberate alliance which, in all likelihood, best 
expresses the LaO leader’s ideological orientation and his intellectual project. 
In my view, this means building on and reviving Poland’s political tradition 
of Endecja (National Democracy; ND210), which is strongly indicated by the 
attempts to transform the state and by the changes in the rhetoric and language 
of public debate outlined above.
Sharply delineated in public speeches by the LaO leaders, the division between 
the people-nation and the intellectual elite comprises the pitting of the national 
tradition against liberal Europe as one of the key contrast. The distinction is quite 
capacious and by no means unambiguous. Still, I believe it is crystal clear that 
the LaO and its leaders champion the idea of the state which is morally rooted in 
and morally underpinned by the national tradition and the national mentality. 
Crucially, this mentality is identified with Catholicism. As a consequence, the 
state cannot possibly be morally indifferent; on the contrary, the state and its 
institutions are obligated to ensure that society act morally and, thus, to demand 
that citizens honour national values. The state’s legislation should also be subor-
dinated to the moral tradition. What results from this combination is a model 
of national democracy in which the central, authoritarian state power has a cru-
cial role to play. The planned and implemented changes in the legislation lead 
us towards a state that restrains socio-political pluralism and institutionally 
 210 The Narodowa Demokracja (English: National Democracy), called Endecja (from 
the ND acronym), was a Polish political movement developing from the second half 
of the 19th century. Originally patriotically committed, the movement grew clearly 
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exercises moral control over social life. This entails severe limitations on the local 
self-government system by making its bodies a party-based and party-oriented 
element of the nationwide political structure. In such a state, the democratic and 
liberal pursuits are without a doubt severely undercut.
The Catholic-National Socio-Political Unity
The mutations of the debate result from re-appraising and re-casting the vision of 
a democratic polity. In the new version, the state can be democratic if it is based on 
the national tradition, national values and national identification. As such, this spe-
cies of democracy is circumscribed and defined by the national and Catholic prin-
ciples. Unsurprisingly, there is no room for gays and lesbians in this model, with 
feminists and even atheists falling outside it as well. The “morally healthy” nation is 
contrasted with the intelligentsia, who are in league with “strangers” and succumb 
to demoralised, atheistic Europe.
This contrast has not only a political function but also an essential – both dividing 
and unifying – role. Shaped as it is now, the discourse and political actions of the 
election winners very incisively rupture society by framing and highlighting the 
differences and divisions addressed above. At the same time, this politics of division 
integrates all those who side with the government and evokes a “dream of unity.”
No matter how multifarious the original Solidarity was internally, the over-
whelming impression of unity for which it stood dominated the collective 
memory. In the wake of the anti-communist breakthrough and the birth of the 
new, democratic Poland, the reformists failed to produce and consolidate a clear 
symbol of Poland’s social unity. An idea of what founded the shared, democratic 
values, to respect which was central to any democratic polity, had not yet taken 
shape in social consciousness when divisions quite naturally started to prolif-
erate, and the once uniform movement changed into a tangled mesh of mutually 
warring groupings before it even had an opportunity to be fully revived. The 
idea of political unity was deeply coveted by common people all the way; in fact, 
the famous “war at the top” disrupted the democratic process so profoundly just 
because it totally contradicted the social expectations. Additionally, the conflict, 
as mentioned before, was enveloped in such a drastic atmosphere that it effec-
tively put many people off political participation. Subsequently, the victory of 
the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)211 in the 1997 election was undoubtedly a 
 211 AWS stands for the Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (English: Solidarity Electoral Action), 
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result of re-kindling the hopes for unity – a revival of the “dream of civic com-
munity” – which, as we know, ended in a dismal fiasco.
Disappointing or not, the event was an important lesson for (at least a consid-
erable group of) voters, as they saw that political unity was a misguided expec-
tation in democracy. Yet, it also served as a strong consolidating impulse for a 
radical minority, who tended to blame the failure of the political unity project 
on the presence of “strangers” and “enemies.” This produced an embryonic form 
of a mentality that was to burgeon in the late 1990s and to call for reviving the 
“truly” national community, expressed in and governed by a “truly” national 
state. In the period, major decisions were being made about Poland’s acces-
sion to the European Union, providing a backdrop against which the radical, 
national positions were emphatically articulated. As those who connived with 
the “foreigners” against the “common” Poles became tangibly real, their pres-
ence and actions could be pointed to as a “unifactorial” explanation of unful-
filled dreams and expectations and as a cause of all injustice, including individual 
failures in the new socio-economic order. This social process, which cannot be 
equated either with thinking about or with experiencing reality, but involves 
both of them to a degree, was taken advantage of by the LaO.
Hence, what I argue is simply that the layers of the mentality which more or 
less abundantly, but always clearly, draws on the legacy of the pre-war national 
and Catholic movement form the ideological fulcrum of and the real “spirit” 
infusing the practices of the governing coalition of the LaO, the Self-Defence 
and the League of Polish Families. The evocations of this tradition may not be 
fully conscious. At any rate, only a small group of Poles are really familiar with 
this tradition, yet the group is significant. The tradition was revived as an intel-
lectual legacy as early as in the 1990s by some Catholic circles (led by a group 
of professors of the Catholic University of Lublin) and a portion of the Catholic 
clergy. I believe, the tradition was also alive among academic historians.
This anti-liberal tide, anachronistically conceived as it was, did not ensue from 
reflection on the present situation in the West and worldwide but flowed unin-
terruptedly from the past. Swelling up of old (and certainly from the mid-1990s 
on), Polish anti-liberalism has been very closely associated with the national 
and anti-European sentiments, manifest in what has come to be called Euro-
scepticism. The national tradition was contrasted with democratic and capi-
talist Europe, which was painted as atheistic and morally dissolute. The national 
tradition was simultaneously set against all those who, purportedly allied 
with the post-communists and profiting from the capitalist transition, sought 
Poland’s “merger” with Europe. One of this tradition’s past chief indicators and 
integral elements, anti-Semitism today avails itself of the cluster of żydokomuna 
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(Judeo-Communism). In this framework, the Jew symbolises the “other” and the 
“enemy,” alongside with the German, a significant symbol that has been extended 
to cover the entire liberal and united Europe. This mentality accommodates all 
political and media events, from “a Wehrmacht grandfather”212 to the bashing of 
Balcerowicz.
The Mentality of Religious Repression
This mentality showed in my research findings on anti-Semitism and national 
stereotypes. As mentioned above, the first survey was conducted in 1992 and 
then repeated, with all necessary updates, in 2002, i.e. long before the 2006 
general election. These data overlap with the assessment in which Jarosław 
Kaczyński, the chief founder of the LaO, grounded his political project. Clearly, 
the Kaczynski brothers realised what kind of mindset was on the rise and what 
political opportunities it offered.
The dynamics of empirically observable mental changes were surprising, 
indeed. First, the proportion of anti-Semitic attitudes markedly increased, but at 
the same time an equally pronounced division appeared between the respondents 
who declared anti-Semitic sentiments and those who rejected them. The propor-
tion of undecided or wavering respondents became negligible. The division was 
later replicated in other data: Poles split into those embracing anti-Jewish, an-
ti-Semitic attitudes and those repudiating them, far more decisively than ever 
before.
Responses to these findings were also telling. I remember that in an Internet 
chat following a TOK FM broadcast in which I had reported the survey results, an 
internaut called me “an idiot of a professor who believes in anti-Semitic attitudes, 
whatever they might mean.” Of course, that response first made me furious, but if 
it is interpreted (together with other similar reactions expressed, in particular, by 
young people) as epitomising a certain attitude, it deserves to be taken seriously. 
Namely, it may suggest that no matter how widespread anti-Jewish sentiments 
are in Poland today, there are social groups where such attitudes do not occur 
at all and their members think of such attitudes as being “from another planet.” 
Apparently, they have no contact with mindsets that engender and sustain such 
attitudes. If it is indeed the case, the mental and moral divisions among Poles are 
 212 An argument that his grandfather had served in the Wehrmacht was used to discredit 
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profound and significant. The polarisation thesis seems to be well corroborated 
by data from everyday life.
Secondly, xenophobic attitudes are on the rise, if xenophobia is understood 
as a generalised distrust of and an aversion to national, ethnic and racial others. 
One of the items in our survey concerned the dislike of various minority groups. 
The specified group identities included Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, Arabs 
and Africans. It turned out that a dislike of one of them was associated with 
a dislike of the others. While such attitudes were not recorded in 1992, today 
xenophobes in the strict sense of the term accounted for over 10% of the sample.
Thirdly, to my surprise, an unexpected profile of religiosity was found. Totally 
unlike in 1992, religiosity – measured both as the declaration of an inner attitude 
(fervent believer, believer, undecided, non-believer) and as religious practice – 
very pointedly promoted not only anti-Semitism, but also all condemnation 
and rejection of other minority groups. Our survey questions included eighteen 
minority group-identities, from an ex-communist, to a homosexual, an inactive 
unemployed person, a prostitute, a Roma, an Arab and an African, to a femi-
nist, i.e. a woman who fights for her rights.213 In all – emphatically all – these 
cases, the respondents who declared deep faith and regular church-going, re-
ported more dislike of and were more inclined to reject these outgroups than 
other respondents. This implied a clear model of repressive religiosity, in which 
moralism served to brand, punish and exclude. Needless to say, the declared reli-
giosity and the high frequency of religious practices were coupled with the re-
ported anti-Semitic attitudes. This was indeed surprising as the finding starkly 
differed from the 1992 data, where the declared deep faith promoted less exclu-
sionary attitudes to “others,” a position, so to speak, more sympathetic towards 
minorities and “freaks.” The early 21st century brought us a new species of reli-
giosity, one prompt to stigmatise and reject; briefly speaking: a repressive reli-
giosity. This proves that the experience and manifestation of faith considerably 
transformed within Polish Catholicism.
That’s not all. Such a restrictive religiosity could not be ascribed unambigu-
ously to one, defined social category, such as, for example, the uneducated or the 
rural population. Of course, less educated people and residents of villages and 
small towns reported such mindsets more frequently, but the education factor 
 213 For the relevant data, see Ireneusz Krzemiński, Antysemityzm w Polsce i na Ukrainie. 
Raport z badań (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2004), in particular 
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was by no means univocal. Educated believers also reported such attitudes. In 
contrast, commenting on the 1992 findings, I  outlined two models of faith  – 
i.e. the religiosity of the educated vs. that of the uneducated – as significantly 
differing.214
Now, the data indicated an opposite image as an educated and religiously com-
mitted group had appeared who fully accepted and expressed attitudes which 
sociologists as a rule attribute to poorly educated people in the lower strata of 
society. This likely implies another division, i.e. a split within the intelligentsia 
caused by differences in the very basic hierarchy of values. The varying experi-
ence of faith and the self-perception of one’s own religiosity would be impor-
tant factors in and signs of these differences. Apparently, the attitudes are also 
(getting) polarised within the intelligentsia. The emergence of educated, religious 
anti-Semites and enemies of alterity would corroborate the idea of the return of 
old ideological worldviews, at least of the nationalist-Catholic ideological bias. 
I believe that this hypothesis is fully justified, given the political practices of the 
LaO coalition, its young ministers and state functionaries, whose cradle was the 
All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska).215
Hateful Envy and Anti-Democratic Authoritarianism
Thus socio-class and socio-national divisions are coupled with the politically 
meaningful moral divisions between different value systems. To put it briefly, 
since the 1940s, social-psychological and sociological research has studied the 
types of consciousness that support democracy or thwart it by turning towards 
a totalitarian – or at least an authoritarian – style of governance. The mentality 
I am discussing here can certainly be described as authoritarian consciousness.
The notion of authoritarianism had a momentous role to play in the history 
of sociology and social sciences in the 2nd half of the 20th century. As it were, 
the concepts of the authoritarian personality and the totalitarian order served 
to explain Nazism, Fascism and Bolshevik communism (even though belatedly 
and with some reluctance). Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom, which was only 
published in Poland at the threshold of the Gierek era, presented one version 
of this concept. The concept was explicated in a more scholarly way, based on 
 214 Cf. Ireneusz Krzemiński (Ed.), Czy Polacy są antysemitami? Wyniki socjologicznego 
badania (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 1996).
 215 A Polish youth organisation embracing the Catholic doctrine and nationalistic 
standpoints, affiliated with the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin), an 
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empirical field research, in the volume The Authoritarian Personality, which 
stirred enormous interest and considerably affected social thinking and research, 
inviting at the same time fervent criticism. The criticism concerned both the very 
notion of the authoritarian personality, which seemed to describe the “modern” 
devil, as well as the empirical ways of studying attitudes and mental objects. As 
a result of this criticism, new concepts were developed. One of them was the 
theory of “open” and “closed” minds and Rokeach’s concept of “pro-democratic” 
and “anti-democratic” mindsets, which re-worked the original concept of 
authoritarianism.
The idea that there are mentality types which foster adaptation to demo-
cratic societies and those better suited to an ordered world managed by author-
ities continues to be an important factor in sociological knowledge. In Poland, 
scholars such as Bogdan W.  Mach wanted to see how authoritarian-minded 
people coped with the new realities and whether mental openness and flexibility 
promoted success in democratic Poland.216 The findings from the early transition 
period, analysing which took a few years,217 were indeed very interesting, albeit 
little known. Consistently with sociological knowledge, the data showed that 
mentally flexible and open-minded people coped well with the changing world, 
even if they found themselves in adverse situations. Yet the data also indicated 
that authoritarian people did not cope worse, especially if they had retained 
bonds with authoritarian families. What interests me most is that, in the 1990s, 
the authoritarianism of workers decreased considerably as if the new demands 
convinced them that flexibility, mobility, knowledge and openness to the world 
should promote success. At the same time, the level of authoritarianism among 
the intelligentsia did not change significantly as if democratic freedom of action 
and the new rules of life did not matter much in terms of coping with reality. 
Mach explains this finding by positing that the intelligentsia had earlier had 
good reason to feel a greater social fear and anxieties in relation to the socio-
political transformations. Since educated people had been more aware of the 
possible difficulties and risks of the transition, their anxiety could “conserve” the 
levels of authoritarian attitudes and orientations among them.
 216 Bogdan W.  Mach, Transformacja ustrojowa a mentalne dziedzictwo socjalizmu 
(Warszawa: ISP PAN, 1998).
 217 Bogdan Mach’s research was a rare example of panel studies as the researcher surveyed 
again the same sample of respondents whom he had originally studied towards the 
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While it may be an informed explanation, the data briefly discussed above 
encourage another thesis: the intelligentsia’s authoritarianism was strengthened, 
because a considerable part of the intelligentsia adopted ideologies that justified 
the value and applicability of authoritarian notions and attitudes. Based on the 
Catholic and national tradition, Polish conservatism exemplifies an ideology that 
justifies authoritarianism as a mental and psychological orientation. The religious 
identification of some intelligentsia clearly pushed them to adopt the tradition 
of the National Democracy as embodying conservatism and anti-communism.
As already mentioned, studying authoritarian attitudes is a challenge. The 
authoritarian attitude includes an inclination to punish severely, assess rig-
idly, hold an ideologically clear-cut (black-and-white) world-picture and, as 
emphasised by all researchers, have a very simple take on child-raising. The latter 
is a very good predictor of the authoritarian attitude.218 Our surveys included an 
item asking whether children should be brought up to be obedient or to think 
independently. Obedience was chosen by almost one fifth (about 20%) of our 
respondents. It represented a minority of the sample, but it was certainly a signif-
icant minority. The study confirmed that the authoritarian orientation produces 
a strict form of the mentality discussed above. The mindset including anti-Semi-
tism, xenophobia and a dislike of all “freaks,” combined with strong religious loy-
alties and the affirmation of the nation, represents the authoritarian attitude to 
the world. It is not a coincidence that people who embrace such attitudes are, at 
the same time, the listeners of Radio Maryja. Thus the notion that the Radio has 
undergone an ideological transformation is rather ill-informed: in fact, the type 
of religiosity represented and propagated by the Radio is certainly not indifferent 
to general ideological, social and political orientations. The Radio also inculcates 
authoritarian attitudes in the listeners.
This authoritarian mentality, nurtured by the nationalist and Catholic tradi-
tion, is undoubtedly fuelled by resentment or, as it is put in Poland, by envy. This 
mentality absolutely identifies itself with its own national group as the champion 
of the only true values, in defence of which it blasts all those who think differ-
ently. This mentality divides the world into “our folk,” who are devoted to the 
nation and united by collective, strong leadership, and the strangers, who must 
be removed from sight or excluded from society. Prototypically, this mentality 
 218 This is also reported by Mach as well as by Jadwiga Koralewicz, who first studied 
authoritarianism in Polish society in the 1970s. See Jadwiga Koralewicz, Autorytaryzm, 
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found its major enemy in Jews, who – diffused across the group as they were – 
had to be branded and isolated somehow (including, as we know, the idea to 
send them all off to Madagascar…). Now, the enemy has changed, and the role 
of Jews as enemies of the Catholic morality in Poland has been taken over by 
gays and lesbians. Still, the political arch-enemy of national Catholicism is the 
liberal, synonymous with an atheist, a capitalist voluntarist and a hedonist rolled 
into one. The anti-minority answers in our survey contained one more telling 
element, namely a set of attitudes analogous to xenophobia, which I called the 
religious political correctness factor. The respondents who expressed reluctance 
to acquaint an abortion-allowing person at the same time disliked atheists, 
feminists, members of parties whose agendas they didn’t endorse [sic!], the passive 
unemployed, ex-communists and alcoholics (though the last item had a lower 
factor “loading”). This is a very revealing “cluster” of dislike attitudes. It adds 
up to a whole which aggregates hostile views identified and attributed by the 
respondents. This produces an impression of a right-wing, Catholic political cor-
rectness, which surfaces in Polish journalism and Polish politics. Interestingly, 
the dislike of members of the parties whose agendas one does not endorse ranks 
very high on the scale of social aversion.219 Clearly, the anti-liberal orientation 
shows here as well.
Inferably, the authoritarian, nationalist-Catholic mentality has its social and 
political expression. It generates a particular image of the social world in which 
the national substance encounters foreign elements – those who are not, or are 
only ostensibly, “our folk” – that must be identified and labelled to prevent them 
from harming the nation. Of course, this is a projection of self-experienced hos-
tility, as is the case in the classic model of anti-Semitism in which hostility one 
experiences is justified by features and actions attributed to Jews. The enemies 
are produced in a certain way in order to confirm their evil features and intents. 
It has an important implication that points to the particular role of Polish an-
ti-Semitism, which is, as a matter of fact, more of a symbol of the national men-
tality than an actively hostile attitude to real Jews! The liberal – let alone the gay 
and the lesbian – is actually something and somebody far more real and palpable.
To finish with, one more feature of this mentality must be named, especially 
when it serves as the basis of social and political action. This feature is our epon-
ymous envy, which appropriates the right to attack enemies who treacherously 
 219 Thirty-eight percent of the respondents reported the dislike of the members of parties 
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(always treacherously!) plot against the noble, unsuspecting, intrinsically 
national majority. The thus-produced enemy is made responsible for the social 
ills that affect individual people and individual families who are made redun-
dant, cannot find new jobs and are forced to re-make their lives. At the same 
time, new houses are built next door, people make careers and individuals get 
rich; how is that possible in an allegedly democratic world? Equality and equal 
laws for all are the symbols of this world, yet only some really enjoy success in it. 
In this way, we arrive at the backdrop against which it is easy to build a new com-
munity of the disappointed and disaffected who defend themselves by accusing 
the entire world (in particular the successful ones) for letting this happen. They 
do so even if their own situation is not bad at all; but when aspirations, strong 
as they are, are not satisfied, we end up with an excellent psycho-social material 
for a community of hateful enviers, which especially thrives when an ideological 
form and an emotional expression are found which can serve as a political view 
and the foundation of political mobilisation.
Emphatically, this is where sociology and politics intersect as a pretty popu-
lous representation of a certain social mentality is assembled and expressed in 
a political project. For I believe that these resources of social mentality are con-
sciously and deliberately mobilised by the LaO leaders.
Factor 3 – religious political correctness (2002)
Acquaintance with a person who condones abortion – 728 Acquitance
Acquaintance with an atheist – 597 Acquitance
Acquaintance with a feminist – 571 Acquitance
Acquaintance with a member of a disliked party – 494 Acquitance
Acquaintance with a passive unemployed person – 484 Acquitance
Acquaintance with a former communist – 403 Acquitance
Acquaintance with an alcoholic – 384 Acquitance
1. Prostitute 648 69.1
2. Homosexual 635 67.7
3. Alcoholic 530 56.5
4. Gypsy 471 50.2
5. AIDS patient 394 42.0
6. Member of the party whose agenda I don’t endorse 359 38.3
N = 938 valid answers

Solidarity: Experience and Memory. Narratives 
of the Activists of the Gdansk Region
When the Solidarność  – doświadczenie i pamięć (Solidarity:  Experience and 
Memory) project was being launched, the Mayor of Gdansk Paweł Adamowicz 
was very enthusiastic about the venture and planned on encouraging local self-
governments to support the relevant field research in several Polish cities. The 
idea was for the local self-government agencies to co-fund the continuation of 
the qualitative study, including a series of short publications devoted to indi-
vidual cities and towns. While the idea however proved difficult to execute, 
the Municipality of Gdansk indeed provided enough funding to conduct field 
research in Solidarity’s old Gdansk Region.
The funding helped us carry out studies in Elbląg, Tczew and Gdansk itself 
as the cradle of Solidarity. Earlier, in the first stage of our research in the Tri-
City, we had conducted there as many interviews as in the other cities and 
towns; but given the special relevance of Gdansk and Gdynia to the rise of the 
Solidarity social movement, we were happy to augment the data we had previ-
ously collected.
In this account of the project findings in Solidarity’s former Gdansk Region, 
I would like to focus above all on some new data, new information and slightly 
different phenomena than those we had found in the study’s first phase.220 Of 
course, I will mention what seems consistent with the data generated in the first 
stage of our research as well. In particular, I will briefly discuss essential data that 
corroborate the hypotheses we had adopted in our project.
Small Town vs. Big City
Our first crucial observation is that people’s situation and activities differed 
between cities and towns. Previously, most data were collected in Poland’s big and 
even largest cities, such as Warsaw, Cracow, Poznan and the Tri-City. Basically, 
only one study carried out in the Świętokrzyskie Region concerned smaller 
towns of Skarżysko-Kamienna, Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski and Starachowice. 
 220 Ireneusz Krzemiński et al., Solidarność – doświadczenie i pamięć (Gdańsk: ECS, 2010); 
see also Ireneusz Krzemiński, “Pamięć Solidarności w świadomości społecznej,” 









Certain issues reported in these towns were directly clarified by the data from 
Tczew and Elbląg. Specifically and importantly, people feared reprisals that could 
be inflicted on the organisers of the new trade union as well as on those who 
simply joined the Solidarity movement. The actual reprisals and the dread of 
them became probably even more relevant in the dark years of martial law, i.e. 
in the 1980s.
On the whole, big-city dwellers tend to have difficulty imagining how closely 
knit people are in small towns and, consequently, how easy it is to obtain infor-
mation about them. In such places, the job of security services was far easier 
than in large urban agglomerations. At the same time, however, the personnel of 
the People’s Militia, as well as of other repressive agencies of the state, army and 
special services, were far less anonymous in small towns than in big cities. Still, 
even though the transparency of interpersonal bonds could counterbalance the 
facility with which the repressive bodies operated in small towns, their residents 
had certainly every reason to be more afraid to get involved in illegal activities 
than big-city dwellers. While those who vented their dissent very privately could 
expect their acquaintance from the power apparatus to look the other way, full 
and socially effective engagement was far more dangerous.
This is what I conclude on the basis of our data and the experience of mar-
tial law years. “People were regularly intimidated,” a respondent states (01), 
emphasising that “it may not have been so awfully dangerous, but people gener-
ally felt that if you didn’t stay low, the regime would crack down on you.” Such 
observations also appear in interviews concerning martial law. The idea recurs 
in group interviews as well, showing that to join Solidarity in a small town took 
more courage than it did in a big city. Of course, Gdansk was and still is the 
point of reference for the residents of both Elbląg and Tczew. Admittedly, strikes 
held in solidarity with the Gdansk Shipyard strike were very common in Elbląg. 
Telex 123 sent at 6 pm on 18th August 1980 reads:  “At the moment, no work 
activity is going on at the Provincial Communication Services, the Municipal 
Sanitation Services, the Great Proletariat Factory, the State Motor Transport, the 
Elbląg Ship Machinery Factory, the Elbląg Automobile Repair Works, the Truso 
Textiles and the Automobile Fittings Manufacture.” The list omits the Elbląg 
Integrated Construction Plant.221 This made things easier. A solidarity strike was 
also organised in Tczew; in fact, it was a series of strikes, commenced at the local 
Motor Transport Company and picked up by the Municipal Motor Transport, 
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both enterprises joining the Gdansk-based Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee. 
Yet the strike movement was less robust in Tczew, while fears were greater there, 
which was clearly linked to the town’s size. I mention the solidarity strikes quite 
deliberately, for wherever strikes were launched, workers of various enterprises 
(even those uninvolved in the strikes) were quicker to set up their own trade 
union units after the August agreements had been signed.
There question of fears and overcoming them is associated with the pres-
ence and activities of the local elites and authority figures. While the Gdansk 
interviews attribute a lot of relevance to the intelligentsia’s support for workers, 
in both smaller towns the respondents imply that, rather than setting an example 
of civic action, the intelligentsia (or at least people with jobs in offices) were 
more scared. This, again, is understandable in view of the dense network of 
connections and dependences:  people in high positions were far more visible 
than workers and, consequently, more dreaded losing their jobs, even if their 
hearts went out to the new trade-unionist movement. In the Elbląg study report, 
Justyna Nesterowicz-Wyborska writes: “Without articulating this issue directly, 
the respondents seem to deplore the insufficient number of engaged leaders, 
therein mainly the inadequate involvement of the intelligentsia in Solidarity and 
during the martial law years. This problem is often addressed when assessing 
engagement, the effectiveness of strikes and inter-enterprise collaboration.” This 
practically meant an important difference between strikes in smaller towns and 
in Gdansk, where in most enterprises, including the Gdansk Shipyard, the strikes 
were organised and joined equally by workers, foremen, engineers and some 
white collars. A  Gdansk respondent confirms this insight:  “So, as regards the 
intelligentsia, that is, if we talk of the intelligentsia, because, mind you, the ‘intel-
ligentsia’ is a broad term, I personally felt that the intelligentsia helped us a lot, 
because we had contacts with them” (Gdansk, resp. H). The author of the Tczew 
report emphasises that in this town workers enjoyed far less support from their 
superiors, let alone from the frightened office personnel.
At the same time, greater fear made workers more reserved, as a result of 
which the intelligentsia – office workers in particular – were not viewed with a 
kind eye. As a result, it was rather difficult to go on strike together with workers, 
as our respondent, a Zamech222 accounting clerk, recounts: “It wasn’t easy to join 
 222 Zamech (Zakłady Mechaniczne ZAMECH im. Karola Świerczewskiego; English: Karol 





the blue collars, because they treated the clerks like ‘the director’s moles.’ ” She 
was helped by her blue-collar family who vouched for her (Elbląg).
As there were several reasons for the smaller engagement of the intelli-
gentsia in the early stage of the development of the social movement in 
small towns, there were also several, sometimes surprising, consequences 
of it. For example, workers tended to consider the intelligentsia better pre-
pared for and more knowledgeable about formal aspects of collective action 
and to ascribe the authority role to them. When the intelligentsia offered no 
help and did not engage in joint action, it was difficult to work out a modus 
operandi, especially one that differed from the patterns implemented under 
the People’s Republic of Poland. The point is that this quandary concerned 
no trifling matters, as at stake was, for example, how to organise a discussion, 
how to hold equitable and democratic elections, etc. The intelligentsia could 
also use their knowledge and skills to arbitrate, as an authority, in conflicts 
that escalated within the striking and then unionising workers’ communities. 
Interestingly, our respondents addressed this point themselves:  it was easier 
for big-city workers, they had their authority figures, their educated people 
who could temper disputes, make them more to the point, bring a conflict to 
an agreement. This may reflect the symbolic influence exerted by the advisors 
of the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee at the Gdansk Shipyard. At any 
rate, I believe this fact should be stressed because, after all, big-city factory 
workforces were certainly more self-assured about their own competences 
and had more differentiated ideas about the role and participation of edu-
cated people, i.e. the intelligentsia. Importantly, the trade-unionists were wary 
of making their movement subordinated to the intelligentsia leadership both 
in 1980–1981 and as the trade union movement developed later. This guard-
edness was emphatically showcased during the 1st National Congress of the 
NSZZ Solidarity in Gdansk Oliwa.
Differences in memories and interpretations of the Solidarity-related past are 
also patent when our respondents talk of motivations for joining the unionist 
movement. In the first stage of our study, we had already found some differences 
in portrayals of the situation prior to the August 1980 strikes and in reasons why, 
according to the respondents, people had joined protests and then got involved 
in the trade-unionist movement. Our respondents from the Świętokrzyskie 
Region (i.e. Skarżysko-Kamienna, Starachowice and Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski) 
had differed somewhat from the residents of Poland’s big and largest cities. Now, 
the interviewed activists of Elbląg and Tczew emphasised the poor financial sit-
uation, subpar standard of living and unjust access to material goods far more 
than the activists in Gdansk and other big cities. Poverty, the unavailability of 
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goods and the unjust distribution of wages were foregrounded as reasons for 
launching protests and then joining the Solidarity movement.
This is not meant to imply that the activists and members of the trade-union 
movement in big cities did not talk a lot about the economy and people’s poor 
living conditions. However, in big cities, justice and freedom were far more pow-
erfully stressed than in towns. The report states, among others, that “generally, 
the strike was launched and joined because of the common dislike of the People’s 
Republic of Poland.” This dislike was caused above all by very poor availability 
of goods needed in daily life, a factor mentioned by all the respondents. As 
supplies were lacking, all people had to find ways to cope, helping each other 
out within families and friend groups, while they devoted their time to domestic 
engagements. Side by side with the economic problems, the respondents also 
cited the negative atmosphere linked to the aloofness of power-wielders vis-à-vis 
ordinary people. Summarised in this way, the Elbląg interviews imply that the 
dislike of the People’s Republic of Poland had chiefly economic overtones. Yet, 
there are interviews which register attempts at arranging motivations in a kind 
of hierarchy:  Solidarity is usually perceived as a social movement committed 
to welfare and liberty which developed under the banner of a trade-unionist 
movement. Some respondents state directly that the focus on living conditions 
could serve to mobilise and consolidate people, while the patriotic ideas were 
put forward immediately afterwards. A respondent from Gdansk says: “It seems 
to me that it wasn’t only about the economic frustration, but also about debasing 
people, I guess. People already knew that the regime was debasing them. I also 
didn’t accept such debasement, people being treated like… as if they had no 
rights.” Another respondent from Gdansk says: “We were preoccupied precisely 
with such matters of the soul rather than of the body. And this has changed now 
so much that I think back nostalgically on those conversations till small hours, 
eating hard-boiled eggs” (Gdansk, resp. E). So the concerns of the body were not 
the only focus, but people also attended to the concerns of the spirit, that is, the 
spirit of freedom and respect for the human being.
Additionally, class- and stratum-membership is differentially associated 
with motivations to get involved in action and to join the new trade union. As 
Nestorowicz-Wyborska observes:  “Importantly, some respondents attribute 
different motivations and aspirations to different social groups; specifically, 
freedom-related motives are ascribed to the intelligentsia, while workers’ com-
munities, in particular workers hailing from rural areas, are identified above 
all with the struggle for better livelihoods and living conditions” (Gdansk). 
Nevertheless, even though in their interviews the activists of Tczew stress the 
economic and financial matters, these concerns involve a sense of injustice as 
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well:  “Honestly, the pay-rises were the main impulse… the privileges that the 
United Workers’ Party kept for themselves, this struck people first of all. They 
had their canteens, their shops, their positions from cradle to grave… Social 
inequality. This annoyed people a lot” (Tczew).
Although people’s motivations (and the weight of respective motives) are dif-
ferently distributed in big cities (e.g. Gdansk) and smaller towns (e.g. Elbląg and 
Tczew), all our respondents very similarly interpret the fundamental meaning 
of people’s engagement in the strikes and protests of 1980 and of their involve-
ment in the establishment of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union 
“Solidarity.”
Motives and Goals of Social Action: The Solidarity 
Movement as the Basis of the Trade Union
Let me start with a quote: “Solidarity is most frequently perceived as a social 
movement committed to welfare and liberty which operated under the banner 
of a trade union. Some respondents state directly that the focus on living 
conditions could serve to mobilise and consolidate people, while patriotic 
ideas were put forward immediately afterwards.” This implies that resent-
ment caused by life hardships combined with injustice spawned a more gen-
eral demand of national freedom. Without a doubt, describing their motives 
for action and the fundamental goal of initiating the social movement, which 
was to lead to the founding of an independent trade union, the respondents 
mention two demands:  livelihood- and welfare-related on the one hand and 
national independence-focused on the other. The very genesis of the move-
ment, as addressed by our respondents, is a compelling issue because they state 
that from the very beginning Solidarity was a social movement which could 
operate under the banner of a trade union. Later, as the respondents con-
clude, this splicing proved fatal both to the Solidarity movement and to the 
trade union Solidarity (we shall return to this issue when assessing the past and 
the current Solidarities). “According to the respondents, from the very start, 
Solidarity included two currents, one focused on national liberation and the 
other dedicated to welfare. For people from outside big cities, the focus on the 
living conditions was important. even though they also recognised the rele-
vance of the right that people and employees should have to be treated with 
dignity. Differences in their social status notwithstanding, all the respondents 
claim that Solidarity was a social movement. One subject was even corrected 
by the others when he talked of ‘a trade union,’ ” as Tomasz Tobis concludes in 
his report on the Tczew findings. Notably, the respondents clearly stressed the 
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difference between the residents of the “small” Tczew and big-city dwellers (e.g. 
in Gdansk).
Examined carefully, the quotation above yields three basic elements in the 
typology of the activists’ motivations: the welfare factor, the patriotic factor and 
the human and employee’s rights factor. In our data – both in the transcribed 
interviews and in reports from all three sites – people’s motivations and goals are 
clearly simplified and only reduced to two elements: livelihoods and national lib-
erty. But in fact, as can be gleaned from both Gdansk and Elbląg interviews, the 
welfare factor included a varied bundle of values and demands. The bad financial 
situation and poor living conditions of people employed in the state economy, 
which contravened the regime’s declarations and promises, combined with chaos, 
nonsensical socialist economic decisions and inefficient management – all this 
indeed stirred people’s protest. Yet, at the same time, people were incensed by 
unjust privileges, which, if anything, wrecked the organisation of labour (incom-
petent people in executive positions); they were enraged by inequitable wages, 
the unfair distribution of goods and the flouting of employees’ – but also human 
and civil – rights. The question of dignity is nearly always addressed when the 
respondents describe workplace relations and the communist political system. 
Based on the Tczew data, Tobis observes:
An overwhelming majority of people actively involved in Solidarity wanted socialism 
“with the human face,” a socialism without distortions. Revindication and welfare were 
the most important and strong motivations as people called for improving food supplies, 
demanded revoking coupons, insisted on putting an end to goods rationing and wanted 
financially decent lives. The birth of Solidarity was triggered first and foremost by the 
government’s failure to solve livelihood-related problems. This means that poor living 
standards, low wages and the lack of decent living and working conditions were the 
main reasons behind the social revolt.
Another relevant motive involved restoring moral dignity and subjectivity to people. 
This is emphatically articulated by R3:  “ ‘Solidarity’ was something beautiful, some-
thing great, people felt appreciated, important, acknowledged by others – they felt they 
mattered. It was a movement of joy, of awakening from being stifled by the atmosphere 
of life in the People’s Republic of Poland. You felt connected to other people, be it just by 
communicating with each other – this bred solidarity among people. It was a huge social 
movement. Every person was important and had an opportunity to shine.”
And the third essential motivation that fuelled people involved in the “first” Solidarity 
involved the patriotic and historical investment. A few respondents refer to this issue 
and R4, one of the youngest activists back in 1980, even states that this in fact mattered 
most to his group. They wanted history put straight [“unlied” as it was worded then], 
the truth about the Katyn massacre and freedom of expression. Katyn symbolises the 
mendacity of the officially propagated version of Poland’s recent history and its relations 
with the Soviet Union. The goal was to put an end to the omnipotent arbitrariness and 
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arrogance of the Party functionaries. R4 depicts Solidarity as a self-limiting revolution, 
where self-limitation refers to the collapse of the impetus to repair Poland caused by the 
Round Table. (Tomasz Tobis, Tczew)223
Here, the rights of man and the citizen appear in conjunction with the idea of 
national liberty and a poignant assessment of the supremacy of the unaccepted 
Party. This leads us again (as was the case with the data from the first, core stage 
of our research) to Alain Touraine’s hypothesis of the Solidarity movement’s tri-
partite goals and values. Touraine’s “triad” included trade-unionist aspirations 
(demands focused on welfare and equitable industrial relationships), democratic 
aspirations (subjectivity of civil society and insistence that the state respect the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen) and independence aspirations (the capacity of 
Poland’s citizens to decide about their fates and the fate of the state, i.e. liberation 
from subjection to the Soviet Union).
I believe that various statements both in individual interviews and in focus-
group discussions indicate that the independence aspirations were ultimately 
stirred by the perceived humiliation, the feeling that people as employees and as 
persons were treated with contempt and the sense of being denied human and 
civic dignity. “In my opinion, it was all caused by… by the feeling of enslavement. 
And, secondly, by bewilderment that so much was produced, but nothing was 
ever to be got. […] So everybody felt that some insurrection was in order, but 
how to do that?” (Gdansk). In my view, “enslavement,” as used in this interview, 
seems to aptly encapsulate the denial of dignity. Besides, as already mentioned, 
the respondent tellingly refers to the inefficiency of the socialist economy, in 
which ineffective labour was divested of any dignity:  hard work produced no 
perceivable outcomes, which made it pointless:  “It boils down to one thing, 
namely that livelihood without liberty is like tearing one off from the other. 
That’s exactly how things are here […] Only independent information makes 
you look at all these things in a different way.” The respondent goes on:  “For 
today, despite appearances, life is more difficult than [back then] […] back then 
you had enough for your chow, but there was nothing to get except that chow. 
People weren’t even particularly angry about that, because they had no compar-
ison, not a clue what things might be like, only when the thaw came, all informa-
tion, all those things that happened after 1980” (Gdansk, respondent F from the 
working-class background).
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In conjunction with the observation in the Tczew report that many people who 
were to become Solidarity activist just wanted “socialism with the human face,” 
similar statements were registered during last year’s core research. I must admit 
that the popularity of the “socialism with the human face” wording is, basically, 
rather surprising. As far as I remember, the term certainly was not used with any 
special frequency by the members of the Solidarity social movement in 1980 and 
1981. The expression did not feature frequently either in Touraine’s study or in 
our interviews with the founders of the NSZZ “Solidarity” in Warsaw.224 Even Jan 
Strzelecki, a member of Touraine’s research team, did not refer to “socialism with 
the human face” back then, even though it was a common slogan among the pro-
active, progressive, post-October intelligentsia. In the 1950s and 60s, the coinage 
expressed liberal and pro-democratic attitudes. Of course, it was socialist liber-
alism, which sought some enlargement of people’s freedom and a reduction of 
the real-socialist state’s control functions.
The fact that this slogan recurs in both individual and group interviews in 
the context of people’s motives and the goals of the trade union movement, 
should certainly be explained. I can give no explanation of it here other than the 
belief that this aspect had been largely absent in 1980–1981 and was only later 
planted in the consciousnesses and memories of most of our respondents. It is 
all the more intriguing as “socialism with the human face” was, by and large, 
the intelligentsia’s slogan, paraded and touted in by no means commonly read 
magazines such as, notably, Po prostu. I believe it was in this magazine that the 
slogan first appeared to be later vocally advocated by its editors. Yet the “socialism 
with the human face” catchphrase is reiterated in our interviews not only by the 
intelligentsia, but also by workers, even by those who were very young in the 
1950s and 60s, or were born later (as is the case with one of our very important 
Gdansk respondents).
Such phrases might have been used in articles published in trade-unionist pa-
pers and brochures across Poland in 1980–1981. It is not impossible because the 
trade-unionist movement, in particular the institutional agencies of the NSZZ 
“Solidarity,” were very careful not to defy socialism directly. In this context, 
“socialism with the human face” was useful as a slogan which the party-state 
could not possibly combat and which helped freely express aspirations to create 
an order based on respect for civil rights.





This is indeed the context in which the slogan is used in the interviews; it 
appears when people describe how their attitudes evolved. As before, the data 
from the Gdansk Region basically imply two attitudes to the People’s Republic of 
Poland. One of them is an attitude that evolved from the initial acceptance of the 
system and the belief in its ideological declarations to a criticism of and a revolt 
against the party-state. It can be called an attitude of disappointment with and 
rebellion against the system. The other attitude involves a critical non-acceptance 
of or, even, enmity towards the regime, developing since childhood or adoles-
cence. It can be called an attitude of distrust of and aversion to the system.
Very often, people in whose homes the system was resented – not infrequently 
because of historical knowledge, for example, about the Katyn crime  – were 
rather cautious not to voice their criticism and reveal their attitudes openly. They 
were only outspoken among the trusted friends. One of our Gdansk respondents 
(interview A) belonged to this category: while thoroughly critical and not ame-
nable to the manipulations, propaganda and misinformation of the regime’s 
media, he had internalised a very strong fear of the system (and, as such, he did 
not join the ROPCiO225 despite his loyalty to the movement).
In the second stage of our study, the interviews in Gdansk tackled the previ-
ously unaddressed theme of the Borderlands experience. As is well known, many 
re-emigrants from Poland’s former Eastern Borderlands settled in Gdansk in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. The dramatic events they had gone through 
with their families under the wartime Soviet occupation tended to powerfully 
affect their assessment of the communist order and motivated them to under-
take independent action as soon as they felt relatively secure to involve in social 
activity. It was exactly his family tradition linked to pre-war Vilnius that formed 
the mindset of respondent B of Gdansk: “I was brought up amidst very strong 
patriotic sentiments. We sang the Legions’226 songs at home. I’ve been told about 
free Poland since I was a young child. By parents and grandparents alike.” The 
respondent continues:  “Generally, there wasn’t much talk about it, about fear. 
That’s what needs to be done, I thought. My grandparents saw the Legions, the 
Bolshevik war and, later the Second World War; what’s going on now is an idyll 
 225 ROPCiO is the acronym for the Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela; English: the 
Movement for Defence of Human and Civil Rights. (translator’s note)
 226 “The Legions” refers here to the Polish Legions (Legiony Polskie), a Polish military unit 
formed within the Austro-Hungarian Army by Józef Piłsudski in 1914, when Poland 
was still partitioned. Though relatively short-lived, the force fought in a number of 
battles during the First World War, and its memory has been cherished in the Polish 
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compared with what they were through” (Gdansk, interv. A). In her report on the 
Gdansk findings, Justyna Nestorowicz-Wyborska observes: “The symbolic words 
that appear in this narrative about the ancestors and their wartime experiences 
include ‘the Vilnius Region,’ ‘Haller’s Army,’ ‘the Bolshevik war,’ ‘the saga of 
Pilsudski’s Legions,’ ‘the Pilsudski-ite,’ ‘the Soviets,’ ‘the Siberia saga,’ ‘Kozielsk,’ 
‘Anders’ Army,’ ‘Monte Cassino,’ ‘the Polish People’s Army,’ ‘the 3rd Division of 
the Polish People’s Army,’ ‘the battle of Berlin.’ Importantly, the ancestors’ tra-
dition of struggle for national liberty was also the tradition of the Borderlands, 
as emphasised by the respondent. As he observed during the interview,227 it had 
been a key factor in shaping his later life and perception of reality, defined, basi-
cally, as the communist enslavement; today, this investment shows in his robust 
interest in history.”
The Borderland tradition was slightly differently expressed by an Elbląg 
respondent:  “Because my parents, and they were really fantastic people, and 
I  had a great family home. But as regards politics, they never talked about it 
with the kids. I guess they thought it dangerous. They became more open after 
1980. Perhaps, it was so because my parents came here from Lviv, and they still 
remembered what the NKVD had been doing, the Bolsheviks, all that, and 
believed it was… They were still afraid of everything. And I was raised in com-
plete ignorance, I’d say” (resp. 03, Elbląg). Nevertheless, on most occasions when 
the respondents mention the Borderlands tradition, they voice a special, crit-
ical, distrustful or straightforwardly loathing attitude to the regime, even if their 
parents and grandparents did not “become more open” after 1980.
The Relevance of the Earlier Experiences 
and Protests in the Coastal Region
While, generally speaking, the formation of such a widespread and disciplined 
social movement as Solidarity was could hardly be envisioned without the prior 
phases of workers’ protests, for most areas of Poland such experiences were rel-
atively fresh and strictly bound up with the “hot summer” of 1980. The feelings 
were different in Gdansk and, as it turns out, in the entire Gdansk Region as 
well. Of course, the key factor was the experience of December ‘70, but – appar-
ently – it was not the only one, as the mass protests of students in 1968 were also 
deeply etched in the memory of the residents of the Tri-City, Tczew and, above 
all, Elbląg. The view expressed in one of the focus-group interviews in Gdansk is 






indeed widely shared: “I think that all this started more or less in 1970 and later 
just grew on. And it culminated in the period when Solidarity was developing” 
(Gdansk). In Elbląg, a respondent recounts the 1968 and 1970 events in more 
detail. At the time, she was a student at the Gdansk Technical University and now 
views this period as a “political initiation” (interview 03). She treats the Gdansk 
events as an important experience in her life: she was part of the student board 
which was supposed to meet the Gdansk Shipyard workers, and she took part 
in students’ meeting with the leader of the Socialist Youth Association (Związek 
Młodzieży Socjalistycznej), which paradoxically “opened her eyes” to many is-
sues (Elbląg, Karolina Ciechorska-Kulesza). The Elbląg respondents also often 
mention the December ‘70 events and the shooting of the shipworkers in Gdansk 
and Gdynia, which is understandable as young workers hailing from Elbląg were 
among the victims. A TV film about the December events says that the man who 
was shot dead and carried along the Gdynia streets was a twenty-one-year-old 
from Elbląg.
But, interestingly, many respondents observe in individual interviews that 
their anti-system sentiments were catalysed by the far earlier “Letter of the Polish 
Bishops to the German Bishops” of 1965.228 A respondent from Elbląg says: “Of 
course, there was a huge uproar by the government that it was national treason 
and so on. But we, they young, liked that letter a lot. We were all for handling 
things in this way” (resp. 03, Elbląg).
In the Gdansk interviews, the practical lesson of the December ‘70 events was 
also emphasised:  in 1980, people were careful to keep the strike from spilling 
into the streets and to lock themselves up at the factory, taking responsibility 
for the property at the workplace. Taking to the streets came to be associated 
with the deadly shooting the government had ordered against the workers in 
December ‘70. I  will not dwell on this issue because it was also addressed in 
the first stage of our research. The current data from Pomerania re-confirm that 
people commonly remembered the imperative of striking within their enterprises 
and avoiding going out to manifest in the streets. This was the effect of the social 
memory of December ‘70 and the lesson learned from those experiences. As one 
 228 What is meant here is “The Pastoral Letter of the Polish Bishops to Their German 
Brothers,” in which Polish bishops invited their German counterparts to take part in 
the celebrations of the 1000th Anniversary of Poland’s Christianisation and reflected on 
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of our respondents says: “December’70 was a real trauma. In comparison, the 
year 1980 was nothing” (Gdansk, resp. C).
Past and Present Divisions and Conflicts
Our current data from Gdansk, Tczew and Elbląg paint a far more vivid pic-
ture of a fundamental conflict among the former Solidarity members than the 
prior nationwide data. Admittedly, those data indicated a clearly critical attitude 
to Lech Wałęsa in some towns, but it was nowhere near as keen as what the 
current findings imply about the conflict between the supporters of the former 
Solidarity leader turned President of the Republic of Poland and the followers of 
the Gwiazdas. Both the interviews and the analyses employ telling expressions 
borrowed from the colloquial language used in the Gdansk Region, such as 
“Lechistan” (the Wałęsa camp) and “Gwiazdozbiór” (the Gwiazdas camp).229 
In group interviews (particularly in Tczew), the respondents recall that the 
independence-oriented, or national liberty, wing within Solidarity clashed with 
the livelihoods-focused, or welfare, wing, as already mentioned. The trade union 
was associated first and foremost with the welfare concerns, but the social move-
ment went far beyond that preoccupation and envisaged national independence. 
A respondent said: “But there were many people […], from the countryside for 
example, who did not cultivate the tradition of national liberty. Secondly, many 
people didn’t think it was possible to find a way out of the situation Poland had 
found itself in after 1945. And because of this, they thought that the economic 
issues were essential. Many of my friends, especially perhaps from the working-
class background, were more focused on… thought of it as a trade union that 
would take care of my economic interests. ‘And what are they meddling with pol-
itics for,’ that’s what our conversations were often like. I’d distinguish two groups, 
exactly like that. A group that [was] absolutely trade-unionist and focused on 
the economy and a group that [cared] less about the living conditions and more 
about liberty …” (Gdansk, resp. B).
This interpretation of the conflict, which is clearly observable even today, is 
rather peculiar and differs from the genesis of disagreements and the mutual dis-
like between the “Lechistan” and the “Gwiazdozbiór” as outlined in the Gdansk 
 229 The terms use play on words. Lechistan means “the country of Lech,” with Lech being 
the name of both the legendary founder of Poland and Lech Wałęsa. “Gwiazdozbiór” is 
the Polish equivalent of a “constellation” and a compound noun derived from gwiazda 
(star) and zbiór (set), which directly refers to the name of the Gwiazdas, i.e. Andrzej 






interviews, which link them to Andrzej Gwiazda’s loss in the election of the trade 
union’s president in the autumn of 1981. Our respondents in Tczew also inter-
pret the conflict between the supporters of Wałesa and Gwiazda, respectively, as 
an outcome of power struggle. Interestingly, people state that: “Wałęsa was our 
guy, a worker, and Gwiazda was then an intellectual, for he had university edu-
cation …” (Tczew). Tobis describes the image of the past as seen by the Tczew 
activists in the following way: “[The respondents] in the lower rungs were, as 
they claim themselves, divided into two camps: siding either with Wałęsa or with 
Gwiazda, yet this did not cause any conflict but only some joking and teasing. 
They emphasise that despite the differences they treated each other with respect 
and dignity” (Tczew).
The memories of one Elbląg respondent imply that the conflict was already 
evident in the legal period of Solidarity’s activity. Respondent F from Elbląg 
narrates a visit to Nowy Targ in detail:
I was there; we came there for that dinner, twelve people in all. Andrzej Trupa [possibly 
the name was misspelled in transcription] was there, too. And Andrzej tells me:  ‘T…
[the respondent’s name], don’t you see what’s going on? Look, Wałęsa’s putting him-
self forward everywhere as one to scoop credit for all this.’ And when Ania230 wanted 
to say something, I remember, in Nowy Targ, there was a moment where we’re all sit-
ting there and Wałęsa too, and, right, Andrzej Gwiazda winks at us, and then the boys, 
from Elbląg I guess, go “Lech, you’ve already spoken.” Everybody starts shouting: “Ania, 
Ania.” Wałęsa was eager to take all credit, but he was only the first relay. “Ania, Ania,” 
everybody’s crying spontaneously. It wasn’t about people but about politics, not about 
trade unions. Then the social movement began to split. Then Walentynowicz said those 
famous words that:  “I’ve got three things dear to me:  Our Lord is most important, 
I respect John Paul II and carry Solidarity in my heart.” She got a spontaneous round of 
applause. We left and Wałęsa says [to her?]: “Just had to mess around, didn’t you?” And 
I say; “Lech, it’s not the way to go, or we’ll be all at each other’s throats like dogs.” And 
then it all broke loose. It was then that I noticed for the first time that Wałęsa was soft. 
But all of them [the supporters of Gwiazda] were radical, tough players. (Elbląg, resp. F)
The author of the Elbląg research report observes that at this moment the split 
into the “Lechistan” and the “Gwiazdozbiór” becomes clear for the first time. In 
further interviews, the division is emphasised when the respondents talk about 
the imposition of martial law, assess the Round Table and evaluate contempo-
rary Poland (though names are rarely used, except Wałęsa being mentioned a 
few times, and Gwiazda and Walentynowicz one time each). The author also 
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observes that, as a rule, the ideological differences, conflicts and divisions within 
Solidarity are brought up by people who critically evaluate Lech Wałęsa’s actions. 
Other respondents either do not address that issue or underscore Solidarity’s 
positive, integrative aspects (respondents 03, F, Elbląg).
This longish passage exigently outlines the background of a very sharp, current 
conflict among the activist of the “first” Solidarity. Anna Walentynowicz, who 
tragically died in the Smolensk catastrophe, is pitted against Lech Wałesa both in 
the above narrative of the Elbląg respondent and in other interviews conducted 
in other towns. Obviously counted among the “Gwiazdozbiór,” Walentynowicz 
is regarded as enjoying considerable recognition among the movement members 
and as a counterweight to Wałęsa as the trade-union leader. Such conclusions 
are also corroborated by the Gdansk data: “Walentynowicz took over the initia-
tive entirely and came up with the idea of holding a mass on 17th [August 1980]. 
And… she transformed this strike. At any rate, the mass on 17th [August] 
lifted that sense of fear and threat off me and other people” (Gdansk, resp. G). 
Crucially, Anna Walentynowicz is credited here with salvaging the strike at the 
Gdansk Shipyard, which is particularly strongly emphasised by all the supporters 
of the “Gwiazdozbiór.” The opponents of Lech Wałęsa tend to view it as a factor 
that delegitimises his leadership. However, our interview data from, for example, 
Tczew do not imply such radical positions, though divergences indeed become 
definitely more pronounced when the respondents shift from their past mem-
ories to the assessment of the present times. In the Tczew focus-group inter-
view, the respondents manifest rather untypical attitudes, as they negatively 
evaluate the current Solidarity trade union. By contrast, the Gdansk and Elbląg 
interviews, as well as the first-stage research data, express a relatively homoge-
neous attitude which combines the support for the “Gwiazdozbiór,” a critique 
and dislike of Wałęsa, an even sharper criticism of present Poland, an aversion 
to the current government, the support for the LaO and the positive appraisal of 
the current Solidarity.231
Many or our respondents both from Gdansk and from the towns of Tczew 
and Elbląg regard conflicts within Solidarity – above all the basic conflict around 
the trade-union leadership – as a permanent element of the social movement. 
Moreover, their descriptions of the conflict between Lech Wałęsa and Anna 
Walentynowicz or Andrzej Gwiazda in 1980–1981 transition smoothly into 
depictions of the current situation. It is difficult to conclude, at least on the first 
 231 Our study and the trade-unionists’ views concerned the leadership of Janusza Śniadek, 




examination, whether that conflict was indeed so deep-running and so impactful 
socially (organising the trade-unionists as either the followers of Lech Wałęsa 
or the supporters of Andrzej Gwiazda and Anna Walentynowicz) as early as in 
1981, or perhaps, the other way round, the post-1989 conflict retrospectively 
produced such and not another image of the past. At any rate, in the late 1980s, 
but still before 1989, the conflict between Solidarity leaders caused the rise of the 
Gwiazdas’ camp with Anna Walentynowicz as its integral member. Described 
in more detail below, this development involves a very important and, simul-
taneously, very challenging aspect of the study of people’s memory. Namely, it 
is difficult to determine what part of our interviews is a tolerably accurate and 
factual report of the respondents’ real experience and what is an outcome of 
interpretations indivisibly entwined with and re-organising their memories. In 
other words, what is actually a memory here and what is an already re-processed 
image of the experience?
It is not my aim here to theoretically explore my findings. I intend to do it in 
another study. But I must observe that the very way in which the respondents 
themselves presented their memories, both in individual and in group interviews, 
helps us set apart those in which “memory work” is consciously shown by the 
interviewees from those which the researcher must analytically filter in order 
to distinguish the objective record of the past from the later, superimposed 
interpretations. The developments we are discussing here, i.e. the Wałęsa–
Walentynowicz and Wałęsa–Gwiazda conflicts – regrettably belong to the latter 
group, which is rather opaque in the initial analysis.
Important in this context is the above-quoted observation made by a respon-
dent and corroborated in a group interview that even if the leadership conflict 
arose in 1981 and even if it divided the members and activists into the Wałęsa 
or the Gwiazda followers, this conflict did not fundamentally affect people’s 
attitudes and ideological identifications. The conflict showed in “joking and 
teasing” rather than in any stern confrontation of thoroughly different ideals. 
Confrontational behaviours and divergent investments started to be attributed 
to the conflict after 1989, and particularly intensely today.
An interesting thing to observe is how reductively – and, in a sense, tyranni-
cally – time is treated in this context: in the picture painted by Wałęsa’s opponents 
and the supporters of the “Gwiazdozbiór,” the emotionally laden assessment of 
the present moment is extended onto 1989 and the events that instituted a new 
order for Poland. The objections to the Round Table and the charges against Lech 
Wałęsa and his then allies who organised the negotiations between the Jaruzelski 
cabinet and the underground Solidarity inform the descriptions of the current 
conflict. In the view of our respondents, the Wałęsa vs. Gwiazda conflict gathered 
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momentum and definitively divided Solidarity members during the Magdalenka 
negotiations and the Round Table talks. We can see a certain hyperbole at work 
here as a very explicit, current conflict situation basically overlaps with the image 
of the past. The interpretation of the past events is encrusted, so to speak, into the 
meanings of the present conflict. This obviously refers to a considerable part of 
our respondents who are fervent supporters of the “Gwiazdozbiór.” At the same 
time, they are also supporters of the Law and Order, which we will attempt to 
show below.
Before that, however, let us outline an alternative picture of the events which 
crowned the Solidarity movement as the Soviet system collapsed and Poland 
obtained its first post-war non-communist government. People who positively 
assess both the Magdalenka talks and the outcomes of the Round Table have an 
entirely different view of the “primary conflict” that bred such an essential dis-
pute and split society, generating patently differentiated social identifications. 
Namely, they refer to the “thick stroke” (“gruba kreska”), i.e. an essential element 
“read out” from Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s exposé and re-worked for 
Lech Wałęsa’s election campaign. I put “read out” in inverted commas, because 
the “thick stroke” slogan and its symbolic content, which has been so relevant 
to social consciousness ever since, were a serious modifications of the original 
“thick line” (“gruba linia”) coinage in Mazowiecki’s exposé. It was actually the 
“proper meaning” of the term that was at stake in the heated discussions of the 
Pomerania activists in our focus-group interviews. The advocates of the Round 
Table (and consequently of the Mazowiecki cabinet) cited the exposé formula-
tion as having an entirely different meaning than the one invested in it during 
Wałesa’s campaign and wrongly attributed to Mazowiecki. Here is an extensive 
passage from our Gdansk resources. The same people are of the opinion that 
the “thick stroke” was a good thing. The respondents who uphold this position 
emphasised in individual interviews that their opponents misconstrue the con-
cept (03, 01). This issue also brings to light anti-revisionist attitudes to people 
involved with the PUWP:
And from the very beginning, we kept explaining it to people that the “thick stroke” was 
not what the opponents made it out to be. It was just vilely used, because the thick stroke 
meant that he said in his exposé that we are drawing a thick line between the past and 
the present and from now on we work for and by ourselves. It means, we won’t build on 
what was, but we’ll have a fresh start. […] Anyway, I’m quite surprised because, in my 
opinion, those who did little back then are most vocal now about punishing those al-
leged culprits of the communist period […], I’m surprised at this inclination now to rub 
it into people’s faces. That’s what the conditions were like back then. It wasn’t our doing. 
That’s what our allies, so to speak, served to us, the Yalta deal. And we landed under the 
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Soviet influence. Of course, every immoral action must be condemned, that is, snitching 
on people, jailing people lawlessly, torture, and so on. But to harass people only because 
they were PUWP members is, I believe, absolutely inappropriate. (Elbląg, resp. 01)
Our respondents are aware of the differences and, above all, believe that the divisions 
among Solidarity’s former activists are currently deep, if not fundamental. Given 
this, as shown above, they attempt to produce an unambiguous interpretation of the 
shared past in terms of the current ideological and political conflicts and divisions. 
At the same time, effort is made to make the memory of the past capable of sus-
taining the local community and camaraderie. This is well captured in an interview 
with an Elbląg respondent whose words vividly describe the situation:
 – You know, some of us could [be called] liberal or whatever. We joined the 
Freedom Union [Unia Wolności]. Some of us stayed away [of the current trade 
union] at all. Others joined the Centre Agreement [Porozumienie Centrum], 
so they’re radical. And today it looks like that: when we talk, we don’t talk 
about our, well…
 – But you still keep in touch, do you?
 – Yes, we do, absolutely. I  read Wyborcza, and a friend of mine reads Nasz 
Dziennik. But when it comes to Solidarity and victimised people, we […] are 
always on the same page. But when I start to tell him things or he to persuade 
me, then, no, at this moment we go: thick stroke [laughter]. For either I stop 
seeing you or you stop seeing me.
 – Is that what you say at such moments?
 – Yes, it is. Thick stroke. And the unease’s over. Because neither will he get me 
over to his [point of view] nor will I him. But it’s not like that when I listen to 
one of ours out there. No, not really. We’ve got a few hotheads who, as I told 
you, would go to the Palace [Presidential Palace in Warsaw]. They would 
go there. With crosses, and the like things. And some of us have moved on 
and claim it’s the way it should be. That it’s good that Poland is free, that it’s 
not in chains [laughter], that it’s not anybody’s condominium or anything. 
But others say it is. And they are the same people we worked together with. 
(Elbląg, November 2010, respondent 04).
Unfortunately, as we continue our research in Poland’s other regions, we find 
that there are areas where people fail to sustain the sense of camaraderie and 
solidary community in the face of dramatic differences caused by the positions 
the former trade-unionists take in Poland’s conflicted ideological and political 
structure today. Unlike in Elbląg, in many Polish towns the bonds established in 
the past have not survived and a deep chasm rifting Solidarity’s former members 
and activists is a sad reality.
The Crowd, Civil Society and the National 
Church: The Polish Dispute over the National 
Symbols and Identity in 2010
In Poland, the fundamental political conflict and essential social divisions that 
crisscross people’s daily lives involve national identity issues, including questions 
such as what makes one a Pole (a good Pole, that is) and how the national aware-
ness and interests should be defined in political and social life.
The 30th anniversary of the Gdansk Agreements signed by the striking workers 
and Poland’s communist regime seemed to warrant an exuberant celebration. 
After all, an overwhelming majority of Poles very positively assessed Poland’s 
post-1989 transformations and the standard of living achieved in its wake. Most 
Poles harbour no doubts that the collapse of communism and the democratic 
transition of 1989 would not have happened but for Solidarity.
The celebration, however, did not unfold the way it could reasonably have 
been expected, and the anniversary occasioned a pointed manifestation of 
disregard, if not an outright contestation, of the state leaders by the politi-
cally partisan trade-union leaders. The symbolic anniversary of the birth of 
Solidarity showed actually that nothing of the atmosphere that had prevailed 
in Poland thirty years before had been preserved in Polish society. More than 
that, the quarrels, insults against statesmen and hostile rhetoric in which the 
last days of August were steeped were a continuation of the earlier iterations 
of the social spectacle commenced by what came to be known as the defence 
of the cross in front of the Presidential Palace in Warsaw. The rhetoric used by 
prominent trade-unionist of the current Solidarity, LaO politicians and some 
of the clergy perfectly dovetailed with the language which was unleashed after 
the preceding presidential election. Jarosław Kaczyński, the twin brother of 
Lech Kaczyński, Poland’s President who had died in a plane crash, lost the 
election. In objective terms, his result, i.e. progressing to the second round of 
the election together with Bronisław Komorowski, a member of the governing 
Civic Platform and the electoral favourite, was certainly Jarosław Kaczyński’s 
immense personal success. Prior to the electoral campaign (precipitated by 
the tragic death of the former President), Kaczyński had been the second 
least trusted politician in public opinion polls. Despite that, he questioned 
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The crash of the presidential aircraft stirred extreme emotions in the majority 
of society. Grieving took a very long time, with the official national period of 
mourning extending for over a week. (Incidentally, the national mourning in the 
wake of the 9/11 assault on the WTC in New York took three days.) In a spec-
tacular show of spontaneous social response, people kept gathering in front of 
the Presidential Palace in Warsaw, flowing in from all over Poland. Up to a mo-
ment, the grieving and the manifesting in front of the Palace were indeed a show 
of national concord and community feelings:  though divided and differently 
minded before, now the entire nation mourned and went through the sorrow of 
loss together. This formula of the national unity in shared grief was promoted by 
the fact that the President was accompanied aboard the aircraft by the delegates 
of not only his own party, i.e. the LaO, but also of all other significant political 
parties, including the governing CP, representatives of the Catholic Church and 
other Churches, Polish Army generals and several high ranking state function-
aries (e.g. the ombudsman and President of the National Bank of Poland). Soon, 
a huge, competently crafted cross was placed in front of the Palace, and the scouts 
appeared and formed a guard of honour around it. Girls and boys wearing scout 
uniforms took to arranging and having an eye on thousands upon thousands of 
candles and flower bunches brought along by the mourners. Where they came 
from is not clear; it would have been logical for the Municipal Guard to continue 
to see to the order in front of the Palace. Be it as it may, the hosts of reporters 
swarming at the venue never enquired into that, irrespective of their affiliation. 
The cross was christened “the scouts’ cross,” even though it was a riddle how the 
scouts had become the “proprietors” of the cross. What makes this even more 
puzzling is that there are two, ideologically divergent scouting organisations in 
Poland. One of them is the ZHP, i.e. the Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego (Polish 
Scouting and Guiding Association), which is a continuation of the old and 
biggest scouting organisation that also operated under the People’s Republic of 
Poland. The other one is the ZHR, i.e. the Związek Harcerstwa Rzeczypospolitej 
(Scouting Association of the Polish Republic), an organisation of a pronounced 
national and religious slant, which began to function legally in 1989, initially in 
a clear opposition to the ZHP. Despite these differences, the media coverage only 
mentioned “the scouts’ cross” as if some young people of an indefinite organi-
sation had taken two planks and nailed them together into a cross in order to 
manifest their grief and mourning.
This was patently not the case, but how it actually had come to pass was 
completely obscure and, surprisingly, was not investigated by the media. The 
scouts appeared again as organisational stakeholders when an agreement was 
negotiated between the President’s Chancellery, the Warsaw Curia and…the 
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scouts. The information posted on the Internet said that the agreement had been 
signed by representatives of both scouting organisations and also the Student 
Chaplaincy. However, TV news programmes did not offer any coverage of 
the event. Who brought the cross in front of the Presidential Palace and per-
suaded the scouts to take care of it remains an enigma. Although this looks 
like a story cut out for reporters to investigate, Polish journalists seemed pecu-
liarly uninterested in it. Their lack of curiosity is all the more surprising as the 
issue suggests that somebody deliberately interfered with people’s spontaneous 
manifestations in order to accomplish their specific political agenda, which is 
blatantly obvious today.
The basic pattern followed by the official media coverage of the events 
emphasised the shared sorrow, sadness and the recaptured sense of unity in 
the face of the tragic death of the country’s president and prominent political 
and social figures. Thousands, perhaps even hundreds of thousands, of people 
heading to the Palace were to symbolise this mourning community. From 
the very beginning, the media-constructed image of reality had very specific 
overtones to it, which were amplified in some media while remaining less pro-
nounced in other media. Namely, a symbolic association was suggested between 
the tragic catastrophe and the reason why the Polish delegation boarded the 
plane in the first place. The reason for their trip was, of course, to participate 
in the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre, in which the 
Soviet state had murdered POWs – officers of the Polish Army. What was hardly 
mentioned in this context (and is becoming specifically significant now) was 
that the visit of Poland’s President with a very numerous delegation representing 
the entire spectrum of the differentiated Polish socio-political scene was part 
of an already commenced electoral campaign preceding the presidential elec-
tion, which was scheduled for the autumn of 2010. The fact that Poland’s Prime 
Minister had earlier gone to Katyn (and also to Smolensk) and met Russian 
Prime Minister Putin became a very important element of an entirely new defi-
nition of the situation which the Radio Maryja has been constructing for a long 
time and which Jarosław Kaczyński has now joined in constructing, marshalling 
the strongest, pernicious emotions.
The national-communal definition of the situation in the wake of the air 
crash did not stay there for long, especially that things were anyway heading to 
turning the crash victims into martyrs for the Polish cause, or, more specifically, 
to elevating the deceased President Lech Kaczyński into such a martyr. The pro-
cess in which Lech Kaczyński was elevated into and glorified as a national hero 
advanced very fast, culminating in the decision to bury the presidential couple 
at the Wawel Cathedral, a move that surprised a considerable part of the public. 
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The image projected by TV and radio broadcasters did not show the fractures 
which were caused by the Cracow funeral and the interment of the Kaczyńskis in 
a crypt close to the Marshal Pisłsudski’s tomb. In fact, the communal definition 
of the situation embodied in the grieving national concord broke down when 
the decision was made and state agencies began to organise the burial in Cracow. 
Protests against the Kaczyński funeral at the Wawel only appeared as snapshots 
in the official media coverage. On the Internet, the most spontaneous and dem-
ocratic of the media, the developments took a completely different course, soon 
fledging into an emotional and belligerent spat between the advocates and the 
opponents of the Wawel burial.
In fact, this more than heralded an important political confrontation of cit-
izens of different beliefs and worldviews. This is my basic thesis:  the attempt 
to turn Lech Kaczyński into a national hero and the way of interpreting the 
Smolensk plane crash and its implications afford us a unique insight into the 
essential mental issues Poles are facing today. Let us try to explore what the fol-
lowing events can tell us about Polish society.
Spontaneous or Pre-Programmed?
Mourning is not reducible to individual responses; mourning is a social duty 
or at least a symptom of individuals’ obligations towards their own group. If 
every death inspires fear and a sense of group enfeeblement, the deaths involved 
in the Smolensk catastrophe – deaths of the country’s leaders – could not but 
breed a feeling that the national community and the polity had been dented. 
This stirred the need for rituals to restore the sense of community to society 
and to re-invigorate social bonds. This was what we could witness in a crystal-
clear form. Evolving out of the mourning rituals, the cult of Lech Kaczyński 
complemented – or was meant to complement – the symbolic reclamation of 
the sense of community, power and the coherence of the nation and the polity, 
which had been undermined by the senseless disaster. The process of the social 
construction of the hero worship – the cult of the tragically (and undeservedly, 
one could say) deceased President of the Republic of Poland – was very rapid 
in Poland. The Wawel burial of Lech Kaczyński and his devoted wife was the 
crowning gesture of these efforts.
At the first glance, this seems a sound analysis. Yet, when scrutinised in a 
more detached way, distressing ruptures and gaps are revealed. First of all, the 
social construction of the cult, as analysed by sociologists, did not take a week 
but, rather, long years. Secondly, formally speaking, if the Wawel tomb attracts 
institutionally organised pilgrimages of working people who are now assembled 
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in the Solidarity trade union, some form of hero worship is indeed in place. The 
point is that the cult neither did nor does mean that Poles have gained (or, better, 
regained) the sense of unity and community. If there was any unity and com-
munity at all, it fell to pieces as soon as the fateful funeral decision was made. 
Intended to cement that sense of oneness, the decision bred entirely opposite 
effects in practice. This is the reason why I have always rejected such an interpre-
tation, even though it indeed helped understand the common and spontaneous 
response to the catastrophe. However, as we can see, the construction of the hero 
cult was, in this case, chiefly a calculated ploy rather than an actual social pro-
cess. The social process could not have developed so quickly. Besides, the mo-
ment which once and for all created a symbolic hero through interring him at the 
Wawel Cathedral immediately split society, and the community disintegrated.
Arguably, the process of constructing the hero worship on the social scale 
started in fact only when the symbolic cross placed at the site of mourning 
manifestations became an object of a surprisingly fierce conflict involving 
politicians, Church dignitaries, reporters and, above all, common citizens. The 
social battles, or at least the spectacles of the social conflict, at the Presidential 
Palace bear testimony to a vehement social fight for which values are truly the 
glue and the vehicle of social bonds and which ones do not deserve that status. 
The answers to the question whether Lech Kaczyński deserves to be a symbol of 
the united, national civil society and, as such, a national hero chart the basic axis 
of the social and now full-blown political conflict. It is not true that the Wawel 
sepulchre put an end to the conflict for good, because its very idea sparked an 
overt revolt and dissent in many (if not most) Poles, even as they grieved for the 
crash victims. The shared sorrow, which was so spectacular that it featured in 
TV news programmes across the globe, was not enough to re-ignite the commu-
nity. On the contrary, it engendered an impassioned political, social and cultural 
conflict.
The intensity of mourning could as a matter of fact be regarded as an indi-
cator of Polish society’s everyday frailty as a community. It was a divided, torn 
and individualised society, a society in which the bonds of daily collaboration 
and mutual trust were so feeble that it urgently needed shared rituals. For a 
weak community feels all the more threatened when faced with socially relevant, 
frightening death.
The events in the wake of the grieving rituals, in particular the political 
and social conflict around the cross, were a very logical extension of the failed 
enthronement of a new national hero. And, in fact of something more: of the 
failed, because brief only, enactment of the social, national and political com-
munity. The image of the new national hero constructed in those circumstances 
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was practically rejected by an overwhelming part of society despite the official, 
institutional, state-propped and church-anointed legitimisation of that hero.
Given these developments, the presidential campaign which began immedi-
ately after the mourning celebrations is an interesting thing to explore. Jarosław 
Kaczyński’s decision to run in the election was, as it were, a culmination of the 
efforts to turn Lech Kaczyński into a national hero. Jarosław was, so to speak, 
the dead president’s – emphatically, his twin brother’s – successor. Everybody 
knew that Lech Kaczyński was to have run for re-election. At the same time, the 
election campaign of Jarosław Kaczyński, who in view of the tragedy could not 
follow the normal line of action, was informed by the idea that the mourning 
had essentially reduced the earlier divisions. Importantly, Lech Kaczyński’s 
tenure as president had been deeply marked by his party ideology, as he had 
unquestioningly and consistently supported the political line of his brother and 
the Law and Order. As such, his time in office had been a perfect emblem of 
political divisions in Poland, embodied in his repeated conflicts with the Civic 
Platform-led cabinet. For this reason, the grieving rituals nearly begged for a 
communal definition, one of reconciliation among the feuding social and polit-
ical actors in the face of the deaths of President, LaO leaders and representa-
tives of the entire political arena. Jarosław Kaczyński’s presidential campaign 
was based on the notion that the communal process had indeed taken place, 
even though very many citizens (and voters) protested against the concerted 
efforts to make the dead President into a hero. The campaign as such, as well as 
its style and language, was designed to assuage the public aversion and produce 
a new image of the twin-candidate as embracing reconciliation and endorsing 
the value of the newly rebuilt community. The politics of confrontation and 
constant fighting over who was right and, even more so, who was and was not 
worthy to represent the common good of Poles and to govern in accordance 
with the national interest, was supposed to mutate into a democratic politics, 
in which debate and conflict focused on rational aims and on devising optimal 
policies.
But when the election day came, bringing Jarosław’s defeat (though, as already 
implied, it was also his personal success), the situation changed drastically. The 
refusal to accept the democratically elected president and to participate in the 
secular democratic state rituals immediately overthrew any idea of commu-
nity. Jarosław Kaczyński contested those rituals, denying them any value, and 
questioned the legality of democratic procedures. Unsurprisingly, he quickly 
started to promote emotional political action aimed at re-asserting the hero 
worship of Lech Kaczyński and the vision of Polishness and the Polish national 
interest his camp had cultivated.
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Kaczyński’s manoeuvres are highly ideological, with a very important issue at 
stake. The point is that his version of politics concerns the definition of national 
identity and the way in which Polishness should determine the political order 
and both domestic and foreign policies.
In the mid-1990s, Claus Offe, a researcher of political transition processes, 
proposed a typology of fundamental problems post-communist societies were 
going to face. One of them was national identity, which he viewed as a source 
of conflicts, not only in the Balkans. When I read his ideas years ago, I thought 
he was not really right to focus so much on potential conflicts around national 
issues. Now I admit that Offe’s emphasis on these issues was accurate and timely. 
In fact, the current political conflict in Poland, which is coupled with funda-
mental social divisions that cut across daily lives of Poles, concerns first and fore-
most national identity, i.e. what it takes to be a Pole (a good Pole, that is) and 
how the national awareness and interests should be defined in social and polit-
ical life. Notably, this issue has never been directly and clearly tackled in public 
debate, even though it both induces heated emotions and triggers socio-political 
behaviours.
All this indicates that the attempts to turn the deceased President Kaczyński 
into a new national hero were a deliberate political move. Certainly, this logically 
constructed ploy was engineered by political strategists.
The Media, the State and the Church
Though apparently not only by them. The Catholic Church was another impor-
tant actor on the stage of social developments. The mourning rituals, as it 
were, could not have been emptied of a religious component in a society as 
religiously observant as Poland. The emotions caused by the crash of the pres-
idential aircraft importantly included a kind of metaphysical fear. A  sudden 
and senseless death terrifies because it shows the fragility of individual life and 
life in this world as such. Consequently, a pressing need is aroused to bestow 
meaning on such an event, which by default triggers religious thinking as well 
as fuels religious rituals. In Poland, Catholics are extraordinarily worshipful of 
the memory of the dead. The great Catholic feast of All Saints’ Day has long 
been turned in Poland into All Souls’ Day (or, as the Polish phrase tellingly 
has it, into Święto Zmarłych, i.e. the Day of the Dead), becoming a third most 
important religious holiday after Christmas and Easter. On 1st November, Poles 
flock to cemeteries, and not to appear on the day at one or another grave of 
one’s close (or, for that matter, not so close) family is, veritably, a disgrace. The 
behavioural patterns enacted at churchyards on 1st November were effectively 
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and spontaneously transposed onto Warsaw’s Krakowskie Przedmieście,232 with 
the square in front of the Presidential Palace turning into a symbolic grave, 
where all the victims, notably the President, were commemorated. Putting up 
a cross at the site capped, so to speak, the building of a symbolic tomb in the 
street. The models of the cemetery-to-streets behaviour transfer were already in 
place, because when Pope John Paul II had died, Poles had put candles and bou-
quets – funerary symbols as they are – along Warsaw’s streets and in Piłsudski 
Square, where the Pope had read the famous mass. (Of course, when Princess 
Diana died, flowers were also placed at the gate of London’s Buckingham Palace, 
spilling into the surrounding streets.) The events in Warsaw had a ring of a 
spontaneous impulse to them as well, yet the religious ritual seemed to prevail. 
The cross, brought along and given to the scouts, emphasised the sacral nature 
of mass society’s grieving celebrations.
The media, above all TV stations, greatly contributed to creating the sym-
bolism of the site and to legitimising the mourning rituals in progress. All TV 
stations not only embraced the requirements and rules of the national mourning, 
but also put up their special studios in front of Warsaw’s Presidential Palace. 
Commercial televisions showed the national mourning footage all days long, too. 
Had it not been for a considerable uniformity of the broadcasts which focused 
on constructing and sustaining the sense of social, national and political unity, it 
would have been impossible to achieve the aim of turning President Kaczyński 
into a national hero.
But all this took the input from the Catholic Church as well. Generally, the 
situation showed how thoroughly the state rituals were permeated with reli-
gious patterns and church rites. The secular state ritual proved too modest and 
was quickly brought in alignment with to the rules of ecclesiastical mourning 
rituals. Much of the conduct displayed by the mourners, e.g. kneeling in front 
of the victims’ coffins, was religiously unwarranted. Still, the composite image 
produced in the first days of mourning emphatically showed the social power 
of Catholicism and the model-setting impact of the Church. Unsurprisingly, 
the ecclesiastical hierarchs started to play an increasingly important role in 
the grieving celebrations. The decision made by Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz, 
Archbishop of Cracow, crowned the national sanctification of President 
 232 Krakowskie Przedmieście is one of Warsaw main avenues. Centrally located, it is 
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Kaczyński.233 At the same time, it spurred sharp social protests, also among 
Catholics, who are an overwhelming majority of the Polish population.
The decision had also clear political implications and marked the beginning 
of the Church’s later involvement in the political process, an involvement so pro-
nounced that it reminded of the first years of Poland’s democratic transition. The 
fight for the cross at the Presidential Palace showed how pivotal the engagement 
of many influential bishops was (though it had been obvious in the earlier elec-
toral campaign as well). The lessons from the Church’s previous direct involve-
ment in election campaigns, resulting above all in the sharp decline of social 
support in 1993, had clearly been learnt. The Church dignitaries were now cau-
tious not to express their political support too overtly. Admittedly, some influen-
tial priests endeavoured to participate in political processes, e.g. in constructing 
the coalition government, but these attempts were not very successful and always 
triggered sharp public responses. Also, for a long time, the Church purpurates 
did not comment on the conflict between the two major non-communist parties. 
Arguably, it was not necessary to comment as the bishops fully consciously 
supported the Radio Maryja with its very lucid political and ideological message. 
Since its foundation, the Radio Maryja had embraced the national-and-Catholic 
position and formulated a politically-inflected worldview, tackling matters 
far beyond the purely religious concerns. The Radio emphatically used values 
defined as Catholic and Christian to forge a very clearly delineated national 
political awareness. It certainly was, and still is, an attempt to update and mod-
ernise the ideological notion of the Pole as a Catholic.
Drawing on the old tradition as it did, the worldview crafted by the Radio’s 
Director and his team certainly did not just reproduce that tradition. Rather, it 
retained the structure of beliefs and ideological images analogous to the National 
Democracy’s mindset and ideology. Analogous was also the Radio’s definition 
of politics as geared to making Poland a significant state in Europe in the sem-
blance of the National Democracy’s aspiration to make Poland a sovereign state, 
a goal achieved in 1989 as unexpectedly as in 1918. Additionally, the Polish state 
was supposed to express religious values defined by the Catholic nation. Politics 
propagated by the Radio Maryja is, unchangeably, nationally inflected, and only 
this national slant really matters. And as national equals Catholic, the merger of 
the national and the Catholic (and, consequently, the ecclesiastic) thinking and 
 233 “The decision” here refers to the decision to have President Kaczyński and his wife 
buried at the Wawel Cathedral. (translator’s note)
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rituals forms an inextricable and inviolable symbolic whole. This produces a very 
sharply delineated version of the national Church.
Another important aspect is sectarianism of the Radio and its listeners. Father 
Rydzyk, the Radio’s Director, has managed to construct a new social identity: the 
community of the Radio Maryja listeners. Since this identity and community 
(called the Radio Maryja Family) crystallised, the Catholic Radio has explic-
itly shaped sensu stricte political attitudes. Without Father Rydzyk’s backing, 
Roman Giertych, a radical continuator of the National Democracy line, would 
have stood a very slim chance of getting a seat in parliament. The support from 
the Radio Maryja changed his niche party into a parliamentary grouping.234 
Lech Kaczyński’s electoral success was also considerably channelled by the 
Radio Maryja backing. The Radio and its accessory media launched by Father 
Rydzyk became a platform for the LaO politicians when the party was the Radio’s 
cherished item. It was the mindset of the Radio Maryja listeners that had made 
President Lech Kaczyński into a representative of national and Catholic interests, 
long before his tragic death in the plane crash.
Previously, however, the criticism of the Radio and its Catholic “politics” in 
a way allowed neglecting its impact. Also, within the Church itself, controversy 
was rife about the position and interpretation of the message propagated by the 
Radio Maryja. Apparently, the Smolensk catastrophe helped the Radio Maryja 
advocates and supporters gain advantage in the Polish Episcopate and, gener-
ally, among the bishops. This is at least how the Warsaw cross events can be 
interpreted.
The agreement signed by the President’s Chancellery, the two scouting 
associations, the Student Chaplaincy and the Warsaw Curia was totally ignored 
by the people who came to be called defenders of the cross. In a brief, yet vio-
lent, affray at the cross, the priests and officials who had come to execute the 
will of the state and the local bishop were assaulted. This, I  believe, is deeply 
meaningful and consequential235 because the fundamentalist national Catholics 
completely disregarded the decisions of the Catholic bishop which should have 
been binding for them. Moreover, they did so in the name of a purely secular, 
rather than religious, political venture.
 234 The party was the Liga Polskich Rodzin  – the League of Polish Families. 
(translator’s note)
 235 On 16th September 2010, the cross was transferred from the square before the 
Presidential Palace inside, to the Palace’s chapel. Ultimately, it was placed in the Loreto 
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I have no doubts whatsoever that the people who were gathered and mobilised 
to, as they put it themselves, defend the cross were shaped by and subscribed to 
the religious-cum- national ideology of the Radio Maryja.
The fight for the cross evolved into a struggle for a total acceptance of the 
national hero worship of Lech Kaczyński and, as such, into an attempt to enforce 
the universal endorsement of the idea of the nation and national politics as 
defined in national Catholicism. The conflict around the cross was a complex 
and polyvalent development as constructing the hero cult was only a vehicle of 
multiple meanings. The meanings concern, first, the contents of national aware-
ness; second, an operationalised way of defining the national interest; third, 
the place and function of religion and the Catholic Church in politics and the 
state (what is the Church supposed to be today?); fourth, the role, duties and 
obligations of the independent state towards the nation; fifth, the relationship 
between the thus-defined political nation and society as a whole. This invites 
several questions, for example, about the extent to which the Catholic values, as 
the most commonly (formally at least) endorsed values, can be used as a basic 
symbolic resource and the cornerstone of the state. Briefly, in how far must citi-
zenship mean the guarding of the religious values of Catholicism?
The Church, Polish Catholicism and Civil Religion
At the moment, the place and the relevance of religion in Polish politics are a 
highly paradoxical issue. I believe that the Church has been explicitly politicised, 
and the bishops have been lured by the power and pertinence of religious rituals 
in society’s spontaneous mourning behaviours. These behaviours have been con-
strued as re-asserting the notion of the Catholic Church’s strength and power 
over the social imaginary and conduct, observable in the national mourning. 
Despite all possible (and serious) theological and intellectual reservations, the 
strength of Polish Catholicism can hardly be doubted. The religious investment 
in collective behaviours and social manifestations and rituals is deeply associ-
ated with the role the Church played under communism in Poland. Without the 
Church, Polish society could have hardly stood up for freedom and indepen-
dence. The intertwining of the democratic opposition’s goals and the Church’s 
teaching promoting human and civil rights in the late 1970s bore unusual 
fruit in the form of the Solidarity social movement. The word “solidarity” itself 
became an internationally recognisable slogan of the non-violence movement 
that sought to achieve social goals. Consequently, whatever their response to the 
Catholic Church’s post-1989, hardly democratic political and social demands, 
Poles are still grateful to the Church. In the dark decade of the 1980s, when 
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Poland’s communist regime waged a war on its own society, the Catholic Church 
was a mainstay of citizenship, liberty, independent thought, art and culture. 
Without this kind of backing, and without the Church’s deliberate policy of sup-
port for society, Solidarity’s victory and the surprising effect of its activity – the 
collapse of the regime in Poland and the rapid crumbling of the USSR power – 
would hardly have been imaginable. Hence it does not come as a surprise that the 
function, significance and rootedness of the Church and its rituals, as well as the 
role of the Catholic clergy in daily life, are so fundamental and indeed unques-
tionable. Admittedly, the institutional Church has always taken advantage of this 
social position, sometimes infracting the democratic, legally instituted rules.
To define the relevance and social functions of religiosity in Poland, we can 
usefully resort to the notion of civil religion. The concept helps distinguish the 
national religion from the institutional denomination, no matter how tightly 
the two are interconnected. For the US, Robert Bellah argued that this kind of 
religion included beliefs that framed various features of the American nation as 
sacred and demanded that the civil nation submit to the ethical principles that 
conferred transcendence on the earthly order. This is basically what happened in 
Poland in the 1980s. The Catholic Church and simply church buildings chroni-
cally played a double role as places of the common Roman Catholic worship and 
as sites of the national and civil mobilisation of Poles under the official patronage 
of the ecclesiastical institution. This afforded opportunities of resistance and 
empowered society’s freedom aspirations.
Paradoxically, now we can clearly see the ramifications of that civil religion, 
especially when the universal Catholic Church excessively expresses the political 
will and frames itself still as the nation’s representative despite, or even against, 
the democratic state and its democratic institutions. As a result, the civil religion 
of the 1980s is turning into an ideological and political faction, while the Church 
in Poland is becoming a party-like political actor.
The consequences of these developments may indeed be interesting since the 
distressingly clear-cut and unbending position of the bishops must at a certain 
moment clash with the attitudes of the majority of citizens, who are at the same 
time Catholics and form the Church’s congregation. The events in front of the 
Presidential Palace and a lack of any clear reaction to the explicit dismissal of 
the ecclesiastical decisions imply that the institutional Church finds itself in an 
utter confusion and an inner impasse. Frankly speaking, Polish religiosity has 
long been known to be differentiated and internally conflicted, while the way 
in which the institutional Church has nestled itself in Poland’s democratic and 
hastily democratising society is likely to trigger even more disputes and conflicts. 
The style of the Polish clergy, who look down on the faithful and harshly 
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admonish them – a style in which moral models and interpretations of moral 
dilemmas, proliferating in modern societies as they are, are imposed without 
any debate or discussion – must sooner or later stir negative responses. In the 
long run, it is impossible to maintain the absolute and aloof power of vicars and 
bishops, who do not allow any discussion, not even any exchange of views within 
Catholic communities. A democratic society which pursues increasingly better 
education will not put up with such authoritarian patronising for much longer. 
This is the likely site of the first clash with national Catholicism, which embodies 
not so much conservative as rather traditionalist customs, norms and moral 
definitions, which it will be ever more difficult to reconcile with the democratic, 
open and human rights-championing mindsets.

Mourning as a Significant Social Fact
Antoni Sułek discussed, first at meetings at the Department of Sociology and 
then in a paper,236 collective behaviours observed in the wake of the Smolensk 
catastrophe, drawing in his conclusions on Émile Durkheim’s insights. As a result 
of extensive media coverage, Warsaw’s Krakowskie Przedmieście, where people 
spontaneously assembled after the fateful plane crash, quickly acquired symbolic 
meanings. Krakowskie Przedmieście became the focus of international media 
and as such attracted enormous attention in and outside Poland. Following 
Durkheim, Sułek argued that what was going on in front of the Presidential 
Palace was an expression of the fundamental meaning of mourning: the social 
actions served to re-build the sense of bonding, stability and unity in the disaster-
stricken national group.
Mourning is well known to have a unifying function. Funerals are concluded 
with a special ceremony: the wake attended by all mourners. The gatherings in 
front of the Presidential Palace in the aftermath of the Smolensk catastrophe 
served as spontaneous, communal mourning rites.
Of course, describing those past events we should not overlook the role 
that the media played in producing the symbolism of the venue in front of 
the Presidential Palace, both the office and the dwelling of Poland’s President 
who had died in the plane crash. It was not surprising that people spontane-
ously assembled there. However, from the very beginning, the site was an arena 
not only of spontaneous impulses but also of entirely deliberate political and 
organisational manoeuvres. The media, in particular TV coverage, fashioned an 
official framework of the events from before the Palace and at the same time 
invested them with specific meanings:  in the media rendering, the mourning 
restored the sense of community, overriding all previous divisions among Poles. 
TV broadcasts added thus special trappings to the spontaneous and pre-planned 
social actions. The very presence of TV cameras at the site (and indeed, the 
reporters hardly ever left the place) inclined people to more or less consciously 
stylise their behaviours in order to affect the internationally transmitted image 
of Krakowskie Przedmieście. The presence of an array of TV stations and 
networks produced an official stage on which to manifest grief. The spontaneous 
behaviours rapidly mutated into a social spectacle.
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Independently of TV coverage, another, unofficial stage was emerging on 
the Internet. The initially exhibited sense of community was, in my view, very 
quickly dispersed. The decision to have the President and his wife buried at the 
Wawel Cathedral immediately divided what the mourning had just forged into a 
unified, national, Polish society.
Consequently, there were two stages on which the mourning celebrations went 
on. The official one included Krakowskie Przedmieście, continually shown by all 
TV stations, which by the same token participated in the national mourning 
rites, making them accessible to their viewers. The other one, developing on the 
Internet, painted a completely different picture than the image disseminated on 
TV, especially towards the end of the official mourning period. On the Internet, 
a veritable war burst out between the advocates and the opponents of the Wawel 
burial. War is an apt term, indeed, for basically all online discussions were steeped 
in an extraordinarily virulent language, quite unbecoming the circumstances. In 
retrospect, we can conclude that if there was any shared, communal manifesta-
tion of mourning at all, it only took place in the first days after the catastrophe.
I do not think that those April days237 told us anything new about Polish 
society. But I believe that they did bring out some noteworthy issues. Looking 
at the patterns of Poles’ electoral preferences following the events, we can see 
that they are rooted in a very important conflict which, in my view, underlies 
the current political dispute between the Law and Order and the Civic Platform. 
The conflict concerns national identity and awareness, an issue as important as it 
has been latent in our discourse so far. It shows most clearly in the choice of the 
symbolic embellishments to accompany the representation of collective feelings 
and meanings. In my view, it is one of the fundamental Polish conflicts, and it 
has both a cultural dimension and a political dimension to it. In this context, it 
concerns above all the way of understanding and defining national interests in 
the modern world and modern Europe.
Over time, the ensemble of representations shared by the advocates of the 
Kaczyńskis’ burial at the Wawel Cathedral developed into what is now referred to 
as the Smolensk myth. The emergence and consolidation of the Smolensk myth 
as a rather permanent set of beliefs, including political beliefs, are evidence of the 
profound enrootment of the conflict around cultural identity and the models of 
experiencing Polishness involved in it. Additionally, these models are translat-
able into two different visions of politics.
 237 The presidential aircraft crashed at Smolensk on 10th April 2010. (translator’s note) 
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One of them is a pragmatic vision of politics. In this framework, the respon-
sibility of the state is to prevent various problems, for example, by forbidding 
housing construction in areas which get flooded when the water level goes up in 
rivers (in circumstances less dramatic than the disastrous flood that devastated 
Poland in 2010). Goals set in this kind of politics are realistic and achievable 
within defined time-frames. While its aspiration is to strengthen and develop 
both the state and society, it does not overlook the international partners and 
engages in transactions with them so as to boost the country’s growth. The citi-
zens’ prosperity is the politicians’ supreme aim.
This pragmatic vision is opposed by the model of politics based on preaching 
Poland’s greatness and constantly emphasising the Polish interest, which must nec-
essarily originate and be rooted in Polish tradition. The fundamental aim of this 
politics is safeguarding the national tradition and whatever results from it now. In 
practice, this means turning away from the entire world. Depending on the call of the 
moment, everybody is evil: Russia, Germany and, of course, the European Union.
In this model of politics, Polishness is constituted by strictly defined, per-
manent national values, which are incompatible with the modern world. The 
world  – Europe in particular  – tends to refuse to recognise them (some of 
them at least), which cannot possibly be condoned. Given this, the only pos-
sible and appropriate way for Polish diplomacy to communicate with others – 
with Germans, Russians, Europeans, etc. – is “putting our foot down.,” and that 
not even metaphorically speaking. This species of politics takes it for granted 
that Poles as a nation and consequently the Polish state have a unique historical 
calling. In national ideology, the national values bear a universal moral mes-
sage. Unsurprisingly, the national values are believed to command recognition 
and respect of other nations and obviously of the states that represent these na-
tions. Consequently, the responsibility of politics and diplomacy is to constantly 
remind others of those values and demand heeding them.
Of course, this vision of national politics is grounded in and refers to the 
national-Catholic tradition of Poland. It was also poignantly visible in the period 
of mourning following 10th April. This vision attributes a special role to the 
Catholic Church, which very skilfully joined the political game played in the 
aftermath of the Smolensk tragedy, both during the mourning celebrations and, 
later, during the presidential election campaign, which was precipitated by the 
death of the President of the Republic of Poland in the fatal crash. People of the 
Church got astonishingly deeply engaged in the election. I guess a comparable 
situation last took place in Poland in 1993.
This issue is linked to the national identification of Poles. Kinga Lachowicz-
Tabaczek and Beata Pachnowska have found in their research that Poles’ 
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identification with the nation is very strong in comparison with other European 
countries, such as the UK, Holland, Italy and Germany. For a considerable pro-
portion of Polish society, the statement “I am Polish” is a very important element 
of not only national but also personal identity. Only Italians scored similarly in 
the study, meaning that Italians very strongly identified with their nation. Yet 
Poles significantly differed from Italians in terms of a very strong differentiation 
within the national group. Specifically, while identifying very closely with the na-
tion as such, Poles tended to exclude some people from it, believing that not all 
Poles are true Poles. A very considerable part of the sample agreed with the state-
ment “I cannot generally identify with all Poles because there are always some 
bad Poles.” The feeling of internal division makes us unwilling to accept in-group 
differentiation, and we have no framework that holds the whole together over 
differences.
My reference to Italy is not random. Living in a unified country and one state 
is more of an exception than a durable historical experience for Italians. What 
is now Italy evolved from a collection of highly varied political and cultural 
traditions, which were united into one nation-state not a long time ago. This not-
withstanding, the sense of national identification with other compatriots is far 
stronger in Italy than it is in Poland. Italians do not seem to have a problem with 
national unity despite deep-running historical differences.
These findings overlap with the stereotype that Poles are able to unite and 
collaborate effectively when faced with crises and/or external threats, yet they 
are unable to cooperate in peace, a belief often cited in the context of the events 
following 10th April. At any rate, the “Smolensk myth” is nothing else than a 
manifestation of the “true” Poles against all others who do not deserve this name, 
a manifestation conserved and perpetuated in the political agenda. The sponta-
neous and institutional efforts following the Smolensk catastrophe and aimed at 
uniting the civil and national community produced in fact a deep rift dividing 
Poles into the “true” ones and a non-national rest. Or it is at least what a small, 
albeit significant, part of society believe to be true.
This state of affairs, which has only exacerbated over the years since the 
Smolensk air crash, is a dramatic negation of the basic experience of Solidarity. 
And yet it is difficult to imagine the collapse of the People’s Republic of Poland 
and the entire Soviet system without Solidarity. Even if preserved in the memory 
of the millions of its participants, the experience of the Solidarity movement 
does not seem to help establish any kind of community above divisions. On the 
contrary, the trade union, which still underscores its continuous activity across 
the 1980s and up to the present moment, has become a social and national actor 
that contributes to deepening the split within the Polish nation.
Peace as a Method of Social Action: The Path  
of Polish Solidarity
Let me start with a personal remark. It seemed paradoxical to me to write about 
peace in the context of memory, an exceptional context concerning the vast 
movement of Solidarity, which laid the foundation for modern, free and demo-
cratic Poland. Throughout my young years, especially when I went to school in 
Gdansk, I was daily exposed to peace slogans and bombarded with the symbols 
of peace, for which socialism fought with so much aggression under Gomułka 
and with equal adamancy, though less belligerence, under Gierek. Such words as 
“peace” and “the fight for peace” were on everybody’s lips, rehearsed on every oc-
casion, while flocks of doves of peace, drawn once by Picasso, hovered over our 
heads at school and outside it. Back then, “peace” was exceptionally ruthless, not 
to say ferocious, in its peaceable [!] rhetoric. It was like the huge, clenched fist of 
the “leading system” that menaced the world.
However, the word “peace” did not surrender and came back with enormous 
power as the Gierek era drew to its end and a new consciousness was germi-
nating in Poland. First, the rise of the democratic opposition (with the KOR as 
its first organisation) and, later, the teachings of the Polish Pope John Paul II 
encouraged “demanding what’s due to us” – that is, the rights of man and the 
citizen – by peaceable methods. The idea of a non-violent struggle for human 
rights against the violence of the party-state was being forged in reflection on the 
remote and recent past.
The year 1970 was that recent past which was remembered mainly in the Tri-
City and Szczecin. The memories of the vile, bloody crackdown on the protesting 
shipworkers executed by the government, which posed as the “workers’ govern-
ment,” were very vivid. Those memories taught people to take all precautions 
against another betrayal by the people’s government (as the communist author-
ities referred to themselves) dedicated to “fighting for peace,” a government that 
had never hesitated to institute “peace” by violence over the dead bodies of its 
own citizens.
The remote past was a past of the Second World War, notably of the defeat in 
September 1939 and the fall of the Warsaw Uprising, so tragically consequential 
for Poland. The Uprising experience was particularly traumatic, as it took the 
toll of several hundred thousand lives and robbed Polish society of a huge part of 
its elite, leaving the surviving part paralysed by distress and the sense of failure.
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All this was on the minds of people who organised and joined the protests 
in 1979 and 1980. The shipworkers, followed by masses of other employees, 
arranged the protests so as to force the regime to negotiate, in full awareness 
that any direct confrontation would have a dire end for the protesters, because 
the regime’s advantage was overwhelming. As a result, people consistently and 
pointedly chose peaceable protest methods and claims. This peaceable approach 
to demanding that the government respect the rights of man and the employee 
was, in a sense, an effect of rational calculation: to provoke the powerful oppo-
nent to resort to violence simply did not make much sense. Such was the basic 
lesson of the December’70 events. It taught that violence posed a lethal threat to 
people and trampled all demands, no matter how morally sublime they might be. 
At the same time, the regime on which demands were laid continually perorated 
about “humanistic values,” which it allegedly made a reality with incomparably 
more effectiveness than “(morally) degenerate capitalism” did. The government 
could not entirely give up on its flowery verbiage if the protesters used a sim-
ilar language… Consequently, it only made sense to talk insistently, using the 
humanistic language without provoking the regime.
The firm resolve not to oppose the government in any forceful way and not 
to respond to the regime’s provocations had also other roots and implications. 
I believe that it resulted from a re-making of the Polish model of fighting for the 
right cause and values. My reference to the memory of the Second World War 
(in September 1939 we declared we would not surrender a single button off the 
Polish army uniform) and the Warsaw Uprising was by no means gratuitous. 
I deeply believe that popular consciousness – the consciousness of a democratic 
people, to use the grandiloquent term  – drew conclusions from Poland’s his-
tory, in which fight as a rule entailed self-destruction and failure in the name of 
higher values. The years of the communist oppression and the violence-founded 
regime reinforced by the power of the USSR also taught that the policy of small 
steps and toilsome pressures could persuade even an omnipotent opponent to 
offer some concessions. At the same time, people were beginning to think that 
failure was simply failure, and whatever ennobling sense was attributed to it, the 
losses it incurred and the painful price to be paid for it would not be reduced. 
The crucial element of national symbolism, in which failure in the name of supe-
rior goals and universal values was paraded as a spiritual victory, fortunately 
stopped appealing first to the founders of the democratic opposition and the 
leaders of workers’ protests as well as, later, to the organisers of the Independent 
Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity.” The recent experiences made people 
re-assess the heroic history of Polish martyrdom and relinquish the earlier model 
of struggle for a higher cause, in which an opponent against whom victory was 
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entirely impossible was taken on without any calculation of odds but, instead, 
with an enthusiasm fuelled by moral reasons and noble, universal goals.
The peaceable movement, which ultimately swept off the face of the earth 
the germ of a new totalitarian civilisation purportedly created “in man’s name,” 
chose the most effective method possible. One reason behind its efficacy was 
that the “peaceable” world of socialism and communism was entirely unpre-
pared for such tactics. In its fight for peace, communism was basically a war-
ring movement, in which the conquest of the world in the name of the right 
idea was the main engine and motive of action. A belligerent approach always 
demands simplified definitions of the situation which determine the most 
important interests, goals, strategies and tactics. This simplification involves 
distrust, expects subterfuges on the part of the opponent and ineffectiveness 
of the allies, presumes the necessity of scheming and ruses, insists on constant 
control and demands keeping at least current aims and action plans secret. The 
fight necessitates rejecting, or at least limiting, openness, even among the allies, 
who are never believed to be consistently uniform and unanimous. By default, 
war cannot be fair, and the belligerent approach itself precludes transparency 
and sincerity, as already mentioned.
A truly peaceable struggle, justified by its proclaimed goal, is different. There 
is nothing to hide, because the aim of changing reality is not only a symbol but 
also an essential demand in the name of which action is launched in the first 
place. Peace requires collaboration, collaboration and above all collaboration, 
even in competition, just like sports events need referees or umpires to assess 
whether the contestants abide by fair play rules. Peace is truthful.
This, however, does not mean that peace equals quiet! Just the other way 
round, peaceable action and peaceable collaboration must cause a terrible 
din: fists and blows are replaced by words, which seek both to drown other words 
and to tune in with them in sync. The daily reality is engulfed in the cacophony 
of discussions and negotiations, but this jarring tends to mutate into a sonorous 
harmony that alloys voices and behaviours into unified collective action.
Peace is predicated on and enforces honesty and openness. Openness means 
on the one hand a clear articulation of motives, goals and expectations involved 
in action and, on the other, a capacity to listen to others and understand their 
motivations, desires and fears which may be triggered by our declarations, plans 
and conduct. Solidarity’s peaceable movement had no reasons to conceal its fun-
damental desires that swayed millions of people to get engaged in joint action. 
The solidary community proved a force with which violence had to negotiate. 
The Solidarity movement laid simple and fundamental, truly elementary claims, 
demanding that society and citizens have their own organisation to express their 
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interests, to fight for their rights and to make the state equitably apply its laws to 
all citizens.
Today, however, research on social memory shows that an overwhelming 
majority of the then-solidary Poles remember the peaceable movement as 
pursuing clearly political goals, with independence being the most important 
of them.
CBOS.a What do you think was the most important element in the 
Solidarity movement in the period 1980–1981?
Efforts to make Poland a free country 57%
Fight for people’s freedom and civil liberties 49%
Fight for equal rights and equal treatment for all citizens in Poland 40%
Efforts to ensure decent working conditions and wages for workers 39%
Generally, attempts to make life better for people in Poland 34%
People’s attempts to be able to control the authorities and influence 
important decision-making
18%
Desire to restore traditional national and religious values to their 
rightful place in Poland
12%
Something else 1%
It’s difficult to say 5%
Beata Rogulska, Ocena historycznego znaczenia NSZZ “Solidarność.” 
Komunikat z badań. (Assessment of the Historical Relevance of the NSZZ 
“Solidarity”: Research Report) (CBOS BS/72/2010, p. 15).
a CBOS is the acronym for the Centrum Badania Opinii Publicznej, i.e. the 
Centre for Public Opinion Research. (translator’s note)
The study on Doświadczenie i pamięć Solidarności (Solidarity:  Experience 
and Memory), carried out by the European Solidarity Centre, the Centre 
for Public Opinion Research and the University of Warsaw, led by Ireneusz 
Krzemiński, 2010. Quotation from an interview:
[The year] ‘76. It was one more example showing that all they could do was throw [a 
beating] on people. [Before] I’d gone through ‘70 and seen them shoot people. And I’d 
been through [the year] ‘68. But that’s the way I’ve always been: yes to socialism, no 
to distortions. I knew that things would be rough, that there’d be protests […]. What 
happened in ‘80, I mean that the guys, and first of all the girls, blocked the gates and 
said “No one’s going out,” was to prevent the year ‘70 from repeating. And because of the 
memory of the year ‘70, in ‘80 there was basically no problem with taking to the streets, 
because our basic doctrine was that we stayed put at the shipyard and they had to come 
over to us… (Gdansk)
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However, such a demand and such a goal were not announced at the time, at least 
not when the leaders and members of the NSZZ “Solidarity” articulated their 
aims and engaged in debates and negotiations with the authorities, or rather 
with the regime. Where were the openness and candour of the social movement 
assembling ten million people back then? Is peace by any chance misrepresented 
in the description provided above?
I argue that it is not, because openness and candour indeed mean being able 
to explicitly and openly dispute and reveal, also amidst one’s allies, different 
visions of future actions, goals and motivations. Solidarity’s peaceable move-
ment, as any other huge social undertaking, was not homogeneous in that it 
accommodated and expressed various desires, motives and aims. After all, it 
had developed from scratch, evolved from bottom-up activities – as the pop-
ular phrase went back then – and, as such, pursued different goals at different 
enterprises, factories and offices. It formulated different goals at the regional 
level and within various industries as well (Poland’s economy under Gierek was 
organised in industry branches). The movement had also its, so to speak, “offi-
cial” core mainstream of shared, commonly defined goals. One of the strategies 
of collective action involved presenting those goals and negotiating with the 
government how, if at all, they could be pursued in the realities of the state 
and the country by changing practical legal and institutional regulations. At the 
same time, in dozens of voivodships (provinces), concrete issues were negoti-
ated with voivodship (provincial) governments, even though it was becoming 
increasingly clear that local bargaining did not matter much and could at any 
moment be marred or revoked through an interference of an upper agency. This 
made people realise that peaceable struggle was arduous and prolonged, that it 
might “squander strength” every now and then but that, in return, it was not 
stained with the blood of victims.
The peaceable way is all the more wearisome because it presupposes 
that within one faction people can have various views and launch various 
initiatives. The method also showed that those who endorsed negotiations 
and debating, rather than a warring confrontation, could be expected to differ 
widely. War demands special discipline, which forestalls all discussion and 
private initiative. Peaceable social struggle, on the contrary, proceeds from 
debate to debate, from negotiation to negotiation. The peaceable method 
adopted by the government in August 1980 required the same approach; 
unsurprisingly, the governmental delegations from Gdansk and Szczecin time 
and again headed to their headquarters to negotiate and agree on the succes-
sive stages of bargaining.
Peace as a Method of Social Action326
CBOS. Why did you decide to join the strikes in 1980–1981?
I thought it was time to start fighting for working people’s rights and 
interests.
54%
Everybody else around wanted to go on strike, so I joined them. 44%
I wanted to fight for free and independent Poland. 38%
I felt solidarity with other enterprises on strike. 37%
I thought the wages-related demands were sound and wanted better 
living conditions.
32%
I wanted to contribute to changing the system gradually. 20%




Michał Strzeszewski, Doświadczenia z okresu “pierwszej” Solidarności. 
Komunikat z badań (Experiences of the “First” Solidarity Period: Research 
Report) (CBOS BS/87/2010, p. 9)
 
Categories of answers 
to the question about 
trade-union meetings
Memory of general 
trade-union meetings 
N=320 (%)
Memory of meetings in 
your organisation N=14 
(%)
Yes, there were regular 
meetings.
31.3 22.6
Yes, I remember that we 
had general trade-union 
meetings from time to 
time.
39.0 48.7
I don’t remember any 
general meetings of the 
trade-union unit
28.9 22.6
No answer 0.8 6.1
Doświadczenie i pamięć Solidarności (Solidarity: Experience and Memory), 
European Solidarity Centre, Gdansk 2010.
Peace as a Method of Social Action 327
The study Doświadczenie i pamięć Solidarności (Solidarity:  Experience and 
Memory), 2010. Quotations from interviews:
 1. As one Gdansk respondent said:  “In that period, it was like, as the phrase 
went, a gust from the sea, of that freedom, liberty, sense of security, feeling 
that we were free. That somehow nobody controls us, we could freely speak 
our minds, though it wasn’t [for] long.”
 2. “A lot of journalists [use this phrase], I have a request, no carnival, please, 
look up in the encyclopaedia what carnival means. [In Solidarity] it was hard, 
creative work” (Tri-City).
 3. “I remember, w attended such regular ‘roundups’ – these meetings were very 
lively, because we talked not only about how to set up a trade union, to collect 
declarations, etc. A public forum arose there right away, discussions about 
most diverse themes were rife. In this way, leaders emerged, because people 
who had the gift of the gab immediately appeared as good candidates to elect. 
They were immediately elected for various positions, to be leaders” (FGI, 
Bydgoszcz/Toruń).
 4. A Solidarity member from Poznan: “You could be fully yourself. You didn’t 
have to pretend anything, didn’t have to sell yourself to gain something.”
Still, peaceable struggle and peaceable action cannot be naïve. If Poles gave up the 
belligerent way of obtaining important goals for society and the nation, they did 
so because they recognised the peaceable way as more efficacious. Importantly, 
peace in social action demands discipline as well. Mentioned above, the din of 
voices in which shared positions are established must not transform into a chaos 
of actions once decisions are made. Peaceable action requires discipline, yet 
this discipline differs from the discipline of warfare. The peaceable discipline is 
informed by the idea that all people involved in action make the common goal 
their own, private goal and feel responsible for it the way a parent feels respon-
sible for the child, i.e. not in general terms but at every moment of the day. Given 
this, the discipline of peaceable action allows a bit more freedom of individual 
initiatives for the sake of streamlining the achievement of the common goal.
Discipline also showed in joint action in another way. Effective action had to 
avoid provoking the government, which had chosen to follow an unfamiliar path 
it had not trodden before: a path of debate, negotiation and agreement. In such 
circumstances, if common goals were to be achieved and people’s lives protected, 
it was imperative not to prod the insecure opponent, who was ready to put the 
machinery of violence and war in motion at any moment. In this huge theatre 
of bargaining, it did not make a lot of sense to openly make demands which the 
other negotiating party considered unrealistic and did not even conceptualise. 
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As a result, a new kind of discipline was established which prevented voicing – at 
least not during the key negotiations – the dreams and desires which only irked 
the opponent into adverse reactions.
Let me return to our previous observation about the choice to give up the 
bloody, heroic gesture for the sake of the arduous toil of negotiations and incre-
mental, yet bloodless progress. As I see it, the discipline of prudent demands and 
unspectacular steps merges with this choice into sound judgment, a judgment 
which does not erect the order of the heart into the only, apodictic, indisputable 
imperative. Sound judgment understands morality as the toil of everydayness, 
values every human life and as such must act so as not to enforce heroism or “the 
gift of the blood.”
At this point, another property of the peaceable struggle method appears as 
a piece completing this jig-saw puzzle. Freedom is this property, meaning that 
people involved in common action are free to speak out, to propose things to do, 
to group in various configurations and to be separate social actors, each having 
their own voice. Indeed, Solidarity’s peaceable struggle messed up the previously 
homogeneous sector of power. The group of power-wielders started to differen-
tiate as well, demanding individual freedom of expression and implementing 
(not for long though) a considerable freedom of debate (i.e. empowering the 
horizontal structures within the PUWP).
I believe it was then the regime of the “leading system” came to regard that the 
peaceable method of fighting for social and national goals as very hazardous. The 
peaceable method relied on discussion, debate and negotiation, which not only 
demanded relinquishing force and violence, but also produced a new quality in 
social life, whether people’s allegiance lay with one crucial political actor or with 
the other. The new quality involved an eagerness to speak out, voice one’s views 
and discuss things. It was, so to speak, people’s keenness to compare their ideas, 
to search for the best means of expression, to agree on and, then, to make a thing 
happen. Such a desire is, as it were, one of the deepest human desires. The wish 
to shine, to garner recognition, admiration and prestige, to enjoy authority and 
to be heeded by others is intrinsic to human social life. In peace, such yearnings 
can be satisfied through words and articulations in public rather than through 
battling and war. Debate, no matter how objective and to-the-point, affords 
ample opportunities for individual shows, self-presentations and proposals of 
varied pathways of goal-achievement. Appearing in public is always a chance 
for individuals, especially when the stage they enter is discussion rather than 
combat.
The stage of discussion is extremely dynamic and confers meaning and rele-
vance on people, groupings and factions… It leaves people no other option but 
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to reveal, so to speak, their own face, judgments and views, which are not anon-
ymous but belong to a specific individual who is accountable for them. Peace in 
society makes people into individuals and, consequently, differentiates a coherent 
collective… The community must repeatedly re-establish and re-assert itself, for-
ever remaining heterogeneous and unstable as some matters breed unanimity, 
while other ones divide people and permanently preclude any uniform approach. 
The “collective” camp finds all this an unacceptable scandal! Consequently, the 
peaceable communist camp soon had to counteract such individualising and 
freedom-sowing developments.
This is not where the notions of the “peaceable struggle” or the “peaceable 
road to social goal-achievement” arrived at their end. When General Jaruzelski’s 
regime declared war on its own society and nation, a new model of social action 
emerged very quickly. The military, warfare-like methods were again rejected 
with utmost determination. The former way of accomplishing peace turned out 
to be unacceptable to the “peaceable” government. Violence annihilated the 
forum of debate, discussion and negotiation. Nevertheless, society did not relin-
quish its peaceable mindset. Its more active portion continued practical civic 
activities, despite the punishments they faced. And a considerable part of society, 
while not up to a more heroic conduct, adopted another method by choosing to 
struggle peaceably through dissent, through refusing support and through with-
drawing from whatever the now militarised regime proposed and cajoled people 
to do. As life had to continue, people did what they had to do, but slowed down 
and only performed the necessary minimum of their duties. Everyday dissent 
also consisted in denying any trust to the “peaceable” power of real socialism. 
Nobody gave ear to what the government said anymore, particularly when 
attempts were made to persuade and mobilise people to undertake one activity 
or another. Admittedly, the regime grew ever more omnipotent, put opposition 
activists to jail one by one and chased people away from the social niches of 
engaged communities. To no avail, however. Nothing seemed capable of stimu-
lating people to come up with initiatives and to work better, more efficiently and 
more creatively. Whatever creative and/or productive action was undertaken, it 
was only pursued outside the state’s institutions, which in fact was welcome to 
the government as the time went by and the increasingly impotent economy des-
perately needed to be propped by the outcomes of people’s half-illegal ventures, 
starting from allotments where fruit and vegetables were grown and ending with 
small trade disguised as tourism. Willy-nilly, the regime had to tolerate various 
forms of entrepreneurship that cropped up and developed outside the system, 
because they filled the gaps which continued to proliferate in the peaceable 
system of real socialism…
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Ultimately, society’s peaceable dissent prevailed over the regime’s omnipo-
tent violence. The government had to resume the peaceable method showed by 
Solidarity in 1980. The nearly ten-year-long standstill was not a fruitless time as 
over the period the system of mendacious “peace” slowly but surely effected its 
own self-destruction.
However, things became far more complicated when ideals and dreams 
could finally be made a reality. The basic problem which PUWP reformists 
faced in 1981 consisted in reconciling liberty and freedom of speech and initia-
tive with discipline, without which no joint action could effectively accomplish 
its aims. In order to bridge the gap between the two quite divergent tenden-
cies, Solidarity applied the method of ongoing discussion. Debating went on 
not only in the bargaining with the government and its various agencies. First 
of all, the trade union internally practised what was considered the ideal model 
of the nation’s and the polity’s life, i.e. democratic debate in which proposals 
and solutions were worked out to be enacted by the previously elected repre-
sentatives of Solidarity’s trade-unionist community. The din of discussion and 
the long hours devoted to often less-than-pleasant quarrelling resulted in joint 
decisions, while reasonings and votings guaranteed the peaceable method of ac-
tion. Divisions and conflicts are undoubtedly highly relevant aspects of people’s 
shared life. Ubiquitous debating and discussing where everybody could present 
their arguments was Solidarity’s invention which was supposed to strengthen it 
and foster coherent action.
This debating – or, to put it in more scholarly terms, deliberative – democracy 
was a model for and an expected quality of democracy which was envisioned for 
Poland. We know now that we are rather remote from this model, and the model 
itself has lost much of its practical relevance, even though it is still remembered 
and appreciated. The return of Solidarity as an organised trade union meant 
a decisive shift in relationships between society and the government, leading 
to the change of the system. The change happened far more quickly than any-
body could expect. It was possible because of that profound, practical lesson of 
discussing, persuading, negotiating, voting and electing that served as a corner-
stone of truly peaceable, democratic practices.
But this text was supposed to address social memory and the peaceable method 
of pursuing, even fighting for, social and civil rights. In the annals of history, 
Polish Solidarity is inscribed as a peaceable movement of protest and reforms 
which brought about the collapse of the communist Soviet system. Peaceable 
negotiations and dissent form a method that will always be symbolically linked 
to Solidarity. Yet do we, the founders of that social method and the participants 
in collective actions that we are, remember this and are we proud of it?
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One of the most surprising findings of our research into the memory of – 
the first and inimitable – Solidarity was the view of the peaceable method held 
by some of the former activists, now members of Solidarity as re-established 
after 1989. The view was not exceptional; it surfaced across Poland. Specifically, 
some trade unionists believed that “we were wrong” to abide so consistently by 
the peaceable methods in the trade-unionist, democratic and independence-
pursuing movement. Had we been better prepared, some activists in Silesia and 
Gdansk concluded, and had we not given up so easily, Poland would have been 
reborn different. For the peaceable method remained the Polish road of transi-
tion in 1989. For once, a revolutionary re-building of the state and social life did 
not take a bloody toll of deaths.
Yet, today, some participants in those seminal events find the lack of victims, 
fight and confrontation somehow disturbing, if not downright distressing. As 
if they were disavowing the shift of the 1970s and 80s, when the Polish model 
of fighting “for noble values” despite the inevitability of failure was discarded. 
The arduous, demanding and sometimes dispiriting peaceable method, though 
proven surprisingly effective, is suddenly becoming suspect and not so noble after 
all. As if the dream of Poland’s martyrdom were on the rise again. Perhaps even 
more surprising is the tendency to consider one’s own reasons and standpoints 
to be absolutely indisputable. Generally, religion, faith and the Church are used 
to justify their special and unquestionable superiority. Even when discussing 
matters completely unrelated to the articles of faith, those who proclaim them-
selves allies of the Church present their positions as irrefutably and uniquely 
right. In other words, faith and religion are now utilised as a special argument in 
debate. As a result, the special rights to which some of the participants in debate 
lay claims practically eliminate any and all discussion. Discussion as practised by 
and within Solidarity presupposed that everybody was equal and had the same 
right to speak out. When this principle is violated, discussion as such vanishes.
When the conditions of candid, common discussion vanish, divisions become 
entrenched and insurmountable; and when these divisions are enhanced by 
deliberate inequality, peace itself vanishes as well. Peace has won because the 
work of Solidarity showed that dialogue was possible even between as unequal 
parties as society organised in Solidarity and the half-totalitarian, omnipotent 
communist regime. Still, peace seems to be losing its attractiveness and value in 
free Poland as views held by some of the former activists are elevated into the 
only right and the only Polish ones.
Their position is justified by a critique of the equality of the successors to the 
old regime and the continuators of Solidarity’s social movement. They seem to 
contend that if fight had been launched, post-communists would never have been 
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able to accede to power again. Critical of Solidarity’s peaceable character, the 
proponents of this view seem to say: if a part of society that always endorsed the 
communist regime could and does have their political representation, the Polish 
state is not fully Polish. Worse than that, such a state is even unjust, because it 
has not put the past on trial. In this perspective, it does not matter that such a 
trial has in fact (also literally) taken place and is still taking place, even though 
amidst the building of a new life this trial has not been foregrounded as the most 
important event. Without a doubt, the views that question Solidarity’s strategy 
of peaceable struggle for social reforms are quite specific. They are apparently 
linked to grievances about and disappointments with the post-1989 transition 
period.
Be it as it may, the change is indeed surprising and shows emphatically how 
fragile the idea of peace with all its important aspects and factors is. Peace is 
predicated not only on reflection but also on inner discipline, including the dis-
cipline of honest memory.
The study Doświadczenie i pamięć Solidarności (Solidarity:  Experience and 
Memory), 2010. Quotations from the interviews:
 1. Solidarity was “An outburst. A gust of freedom.”
 2. “I experienced something that nobody can take away from me” (Szczecin). 
“There’s a song about the best things that have happened to us in life. I believe 
it is, it was Solidarity. That’s what I’d say. In one sentence” (Lublin).
 3. A statement from a group interview in the Tri-City: “I think it would have 
been better for us if we’d sacrificed 3000 people back in 1989; we’d have peace 
and quiet now. I was of a different opinion back then, but not anymore today. 
Today, I don’t know. If I were to stand up in a year, in six months, in two years, 
I surely could” (Gdansk).
 4. The respondent interprets Solidarity as an unfulfilled – because bloodless – 
revolution: “For what could the ZOMO do to as after all? They’d have swung 
their batons a bit, end of story. And if they’d got a good licking, they’d have 
known they’d got it and would have had to fear the workers, right? […] When 
you’re born, there’s blood. And whatever is paid for in blood is more appreci-
ated. How is Solidarity appreciated? Go out and ask people. It means nothing 
to most” (Bydgoszcz).
 5. The respondent describes how former friends from Solidarity get on with one 
another (Elbląg):
 – Some remained [in Solidarity]… You know, some of us could [be called] 
liberal or whatever. We joined the Freedom Union [Unia Wolności]. Some 
of us stayed away [from the current trade union] at all. Others joined the 
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Centre Agreement [Porozumienie Centrum], so they’re radical. And today 
it looks like that: when we talk, we don’t talk about our, well…
 – But you still keep in touch, do you?
 – Yes, we do, absolutely. I  read Wyborcza, and a friend of mine reads Nasz 
Dziennik. But when it comes to Solidarity and victimised people, we […] 
are always on the same page. But when I start to tell him tings or he to per-
suade me, then, no, at this moment we go: thick stroke [laughter]. For either 
I stop seeing you or you stop seeing me.
 – Is that what you say at such moments?
 – Yes, it is, Thick line. And the unease’s over. Because neither will he get me 
over to his [point of view] nor will I him. […] No, not really. We’ve got a few 
hotheads who, as I told you, would go to the Palace [Presidential Palace in 
Warsaw]. They would go there. With crosses, and the like things. And some 
of us have moved on and claim it’s the way it should be. That it’s good that 
Poland is free, that it’s not in chains [laughter], that it’s not anybody’s con-
dominium or anything. But others say it is. And they are the same people 
we worked together with.

Conclusion: Solidarity and Bad Memory
It took me several weeks to start writing this book’s final chapter, and with every 
week gone, it was getting more and more difficult. Originally, I  planned this 
chapter as an argumentative essay on how the Solidarity social movement had 
disappeared from the real lives of Poles but, at the same time, still continued in 
them. The paradox of this situation was supposed to convey the quintessence of 
my argument. When I finally got down to writing, another academic year had 
just started and our socio-political life had acquired a new dynamism, which 
undermined my earlier conclusions about the legacy of Solidarity. Additionally, 
the subsequent stage of my field research into the experience and memory of 
Solidarity only generated very depressing data. Of course, the findings were 
depressing for me, that is, in terms of a particular socio-political and moral ap-
proach, and at the same time they radically differed from social-scientific ac-
counts and interpretations of the vast social movement of the 1980s.
The title of this chapter is ambiguous. First of all, “bad memory” means a “poor 
memory,” or rather a missing memory, that is, not referring to, not recognising 
and not developing what Solidarity’s social and unionist movement produced. 
Both the post-1989 socio-political practice and the studies carried out in 2010 
and 2011 showed a paradoxical situation:  the collective memory, which sur-
faced in everyday life, in the media and in political modes adopted by Poland’s 
democratic politics, hardly ever referenced the “first” Solidarity. Admittedly, in 
2015, parliament made 11th August a public holiday of the Solidarity Day, but 
the fact had long been known only to public servants until the LaO government 
sparked a sharp conflict about anniversary celebrations of the accords between 
the striking workers and the communist regime, which had paved the way for 
Solidarity. The conflict centred on who and how should organise the anniversary 
festivities. For years, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the Law and Order, and 
his aides had tried to deprecate the work of Lech Wałęsa and Wałęsa himself, 
their manoeuvres triggering a fierce clash among the ex-Solidarity members. 
Kaczyński is the leader of the LaO, the governing party which has been system-
atically wrecking Polish democracy – democracy the old reformist movement 
envisioned and pursued.
The celebrations themselves turned into an aggressive political confrontation. 
It was hardly a good “public holiday.”
The democratic system built in Poland seemed to be deep-seated and well-
entrenched. Today, however, it is not so obvious anymore. The system had, and 
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still has, features that drastically differ from the model which Solidarity spon-
taneously developed in the 1980s. The Solidarity model of democracy was fun-
damentally grounded in citizens’ political participation in governance. The 
“first” Solidarity came up with a participatory democracy model, an essentially 
direct, deliberative, debating democracy, which was based on an institutionalised 
form of common and public social debate. What emerged from discussions was 
supposed to serve as the basis for decision-making and actions launched by the 
elected representatives. The envisaged ideal of democracy went much further 
than representative democracy based on the system of political parties, which 
arose in Poland after 1989.
Admittedly, in many cities and towns the Civic Committees, which were 
set up after 1989, became embryos of the revived citizenship movement. 
The local Committees, which represented not only underground Solidarity 
but also other oppositional Solidarity-affiliated groups and circles, put for-
ward their own candidates for the upcoming election. However, which of the 
candidates spontaneously proposed by the local Civic Committees ultimately 
made it to the election tickets was decided in Warsaw. Worse still, those 
centrally made decisions often contravened the local Committees’ express 
opinions. Regrettably, the democratic principles were indeed violated. This 
bred bitterness in people, many of whom had made quite serious sacrifices to 
remain loyal to the Solidarity ideals throughout the hardships and gloom of 
the 1980s.
Secondly, after the election in June 1989, Solidarity  – that is, basically, the 
NSZZ “Solidarity”  – became society’s direct political representative as the 
trade union’s members took seats in parliament. At the same time, Solidarity 
was also a member of the Civic Committees, which made their status unclear. 
Unsurprisingly, a political fight soon ensued over the position of the Civic 
Committees as political actors. Their founding idea, which picked up the notion 
of political participation championed by the Solidarity movement, got inscribed 
in entirely new realities. In these realities, competition, power struggle and fight 
for representing the public opinion completely overrode Solidarity and com-
munal political action. A pluralistic party system – a system of democratic rep-
resentation of interests – started to form at a lightning speed. This triggered a 
sharp conflict as a result of which the Civic Committees became one of several 
political actors, and their political life was nipped in the bud.238
 238 For an insightful discussion of this issue, see Aleksander Hall, Osobista historia III 
Rzeczypospolitej (Warszawa: Rosner & Wspólnicy, 2011).
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We can thus posit that the freedom of socio-political action not only spurred a 
very fast institutional differentiation of social functions and goals, their dispersal 
and attempts to find distinct forms for their expression, but also produced very 
clearly delineated ideological orientations and party lines, for which competitive 
distinction was the need of the moment. Civil society nearly overnight changed 
into an active public, whose attention had to be stirred in order to win support 
for the party’s performance, for its agenda and its place in the government. The 
freedom of political action set off a breakneck process in which ideologically 
diverse actors emerged and a pluralistic political arena was formed to host the 
competition for power. This is where the earlier communal experience of the 
Solidarity social movement was questioned and undermined since even diver-
sified social action had previously presumed the precedence of the communal 
over the competitive.
I believe that this shows the crucial role of the former “party-state”-vs.- 
“society” opposition. The fact that the “party-state” was around disciplined the 
Solidarity movement members and reinforced an authentic sense of “togeth-
erness,” in which unity was sustained through the endorsement of the long-
term goal of changing the principles of governance. This perspective unified 
the members over and across any divisions, different concepts and discrepant 
interests. When freedom was finally won, the power of the hostile regime, 
which had cemented people together, faded away and social goals became 
particularised by differently-minded actors. The actors not only wanted to 
express their distinct goals in a public, equal and communal debate, but also 
sought to fashion and convey their own social identity in order to garner max-
imum support. As a result, public debate thoroughly changed, and ventures such 
as the Porozumienie Ponad Podziałami (Agreement Over Divisions) movement 
proved entirely unrealistic.
The dark decade of the 1980s had considerably changed Polish society 
as well. Notably, the reborn Trade Union and the Civic Committees, with 
Lech Wałęsa and under the banner of Solidarity, won nearly everything they 
could win in the “contractual” election of 1989, but only slightly over 60% of 
the eligible voters cast their ballot in it. How can this voter absenteeism be 
explained?
Certainly, it showcased a new mentality and an essential shift in the attitudes 
of the citizens, which are in fact still widespread in Poland. Sociologists such as 
Mirosława Marody and Marek Ziółkowski have written about the “privatisation” 
of attitudes and a retreat from citizenship. They certainly have a point, but 
I believe that the change involved a more serious development, i.e. a regression 
to the negative definition of “politics” and consequently of “citizenship.” The rise 
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of Solidarity as a mass social movement assembling millions of people,239 was 
based on and reinforced a positive definition of civic politics. After the Second 
World War, the fear of “politics” was instilled in Poles for long years in a variety 
of manners and fashions. The Solidarity movement as we know it would not 
have happened if that fear of politics had not been overcome, making people 
believe that everybody had the right to be a citizen and, as such, to speak out 
on all matters of interest to individuals, ranging from the simplest, private live-
lihood issues to the questions of relevance to entire society and the nation. The 
Solidarity movement was fundamentally based on the recognition of people’s 
universal right to have and articulate their own views and to pursue their own 
and communal interests. As such, the  – emphatically  – peaceable Solidarity 
movement expressed the deepest belief in the sense and importance of debate 
and discussion as promoting the best individual and collective decisions. People 
believed that it was possible to negotiate even with the violence-wielding party-
and-state authorities. Martial law was a criminal act just because it smothered 
that civic consciousness, a consciousness erected largely on a vision of citizen-
ship rooted in the Christian, personalist notion of the human as a person and 
thus as a citizen.
The experience of the 1980s instructed people about the significance of force 
and violence in politics. It revived the negative definition of politics as action 
that indispensably involved force and, consequently, some violence. Suddenly 
regained in 1989, freedom afforded citizens an opportunity not to involve in pol-
itics, even if it was “our” politics. Politics could be “sidestepped,” for it had lost 
its moral justification, which had formerly been bound up with opposing the 
evil represented by the regime. Now, the moral meaning of politics could easily 
be undercut, or politics could be classified as morally ambivalent and “suspect,” 
all the more easily as the pluralistic party system produced the image of compe-
tition rather than of community, thereby side-lining solidarity as manifested in 
the shared care for all.
Quite positive and even expected in and of itself, the explosion of indi-
vidualism in Poland had a different tenor than the atmosphere in which the 
Solidarity movement had formed. While previously civic engagement had been 
a moral norm inextricable from the idea of the person as a citizen, now these 
overtones were clearly “private” and heralded a withdrawal from civic involve-
ment. Participation in the Solidarity social movement had considerably elevated 
 239 Importantly, there was also a peasant Solidarity movement in rural areas, 
complementing the image of Poles’ universal civic engagement.
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the human being as an individual and enhanced the value of personal life. 
Involvement in debate on general, communal issues had significantly augmented 
individual lives. Now, the opposite moods prevailed.
The inroads of violence into politics and the notion that force was a weightier 
attribute of politics than persuasion, reasoning and negotiations affected a con-
siderable part of society and formatively impacted the development of democ-
racy models in post-1989 Poland. Aggression and forcefulness in democratic 
transactions marked the Polish political arena very early, becoming in fact the 
fundamental factor in shaping political behaviour models. Today, we reap the 
poisonous fruit of those early developments as the governing party implements 
aggressive politics which not only practically questions the rights of the opposi-
tion but also consistently seeks to topple democracy as such.
All this started from the slogans which the founder of Solidarity240 used in his 
presidential election campaign in 1990. The catchphrase of “war at the top” pro-
foundly affected the social image of Solidarity. The slogan both underscored the 
role of force in a brutal political struggle and fractured the sense of community – 
of solidary community – underpinned by the mutual care of all its members for 
each other.
Re-established after 1989, Solidarity performed a dual function. On the 
one, hand it served as an “umbrella” of the political and economic reforms, 
as a result of which in the transition period it was losing social support and 
approval, especially among the groups whose interests were seriously threat-
ened by the transformations. This concerned a huge proportion of employees 
in the privatised enterprises and institutions. When Solidarity became a polit-
ical actor, clearly siding with the right-wing and nationalist factions, the sup-
port rates for the trade union slumped even more. Admittedly, Solidarity could 
and did win new voters, but it was rapidly losing those who had viewed it as a 
symbol of community before. Previously identified as a unique embodiment of 
social, national and liberty ideals, Solidarity mutated into just one of the several 
political actors. This resulted in a degradation of the symbolic Solidarity. It was 
 240 I have long observed that an utterly competitive and violent vision of politics arose in 
Poland after 1989. I have recently come across a vivid illustration of the idea that the 
Polish pattern of political game is quite particular. Talking to the TVN24 [a TV news 
station; translator’s note] after an interview with Zbigniew Brzeziński, Lech Wałęsa 
said that he saw “democracy as a fight” and even a war, in which all political actors 
struggle for power and social influence. In fact, Brzeziński had earlier insisted that 
competition must lead to cooperation, but Wałęsa completely failed to notice that idea 
… (TVN24, Fakty po faktach, 8 Nov. 2012).
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only in the celebrations of “late anniversaries” that the Solidarity of the 1980s 
was evoked otherwise than in terms of the trade union as an actor in the socio-
political transition.
Obviously, the more the activists of the NSZZ “Solidarity” are drawn into the 
political power play today, the stronger emphasis they put on the continuity of 
the trade unionist movement. However, nobody actually believes that this con-
tinuity is anything but an illusion. Like many other politicians over the past two 
decades of the Third Republic, the trade union’s activists have recalled Solidarity 
in order to further their own interests. In practice, this means that interpretations 
of the Solidarity social movement have disintegrated. What the Solidarity move-
ment was and what goals it pursued has been interpreted differently, depending 
on the varying immediate political aims. This atomisation has prevented devel-
oping and preserving a homogeneous, canonical image of the 1980s movement.
I use the word “disintegrated” deliberately. People who were involved in 
Solidarity formed their own image of the movement. People who joined 
Solidarity in 1981 had a highly developed self-awareness of their organisational 
identity. This awareness was enhanced by the presence of a perfidious enemy, 
i.e. the party-state with its apparatus of secret services and overt violence, which 
was ultimately used against Solidarity. But this self-awareness was shaped not 
only by the sense of threat. Another important formative factor was the nov-
elty of the situation in which new problems had to be solved and, in fact, social 
inventions had to be continually put on the table and tested while developing 
the procedures of trade-unionist activities. The least it required was a serious 
“re-making” of the patterns developed and implemented by the communist state. 
The organised activity itself provided a strong intellectual stimulus that triggered 
mental explorations. For thousands, nay millions, of people, participation in the 
Solidarity movement was an impulse for personal development, for learning 
a new language and for acquiring new mental and interactive skills. All this 
could, and did, serve as capital for the future. As it were, the activists of the first, 
legal period of Solidarity who had stayed in Poland became the core workers in 
institutions of the democratically transforming polity after 1989.
The individual development and the mental and spiritual growth were stim-
ulated by Solidarity’s ongoing debate, in which values and goals were defined 
and social identities were moulded. Who are we, if we defined ourselves as a 
peaceable social movement? What are our goals? Which of our goals can be 
achieved? Solidarity’s awareness was not so much an awareness of the movement 
as rather an awareness in the movement: it was in the process of producing its 
own identity. The imposition of martial law was a blow to this vigorously devel-
oping social self-awareness, in which the conceptual framework instituted for 
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social reflection in the People’s Republic of Poland was being pulled to pieces. No 
wonder that the jeopardised communist regime chose to strike back.
Although, the developing critical and constructivist social reflection could 
not be fully halted, the extraordinary process of communal thinking spawned 
by the Solidarity movement was frozen indeed. Consequently, the development 
of self-awareness and the “self-image” of the movement – the representation of 
the rising social and also national identity – were not symbolically perpetuated. 
Admittedly, the findings of empirical research on Solidarity carried out at the 
time (Touraine’s research and my own studies on the establishment of Solidarity) 
could be regarded as an at least partial image of this living self-awareness. In 
Poland, Touraine’s study was particularly relevant insofar that the participants 
in the project later became activists of underground Solidarity. In keeping with 
Touraine’s specific research method, they had acquired skills of organising 
activity even in highly adverse circumstances. They put to good use what they 
had learned when participating in the study.
Strikingly, there are very few Polish sociological studies on the Solidarity 
movement. No wonder that Solidarity researchers have been too feeble an actor 
to seriously put their image of the trade union and the movement into play. 
Additionally, as citizens, the researchers were also involved in the transition 
process and as such stood no chance to come up with a discursive, study- and 
argumentation-based image of Solidarity, an image disentangled from all cur-
rent biases.
We can thus wonder whether the civic awakening caused by the Solidarity 
movement indeed bore no fruit in the transition, when a new social and political 
order was being forged. It is not easy to answer that. After 1989, sociologists have 
tended to report a decline of citizenship attitudes and social engagement. The 
image of a pro-active society in the conditions of repression of the 1980s differs 
sharply from the image reported after 1989.241 It may all be slightly exaggerated. 
If we re-assess the situation by focusing on the social protests, demonstrations 
and other public activities of the 1990s, in all of which the people involved put 
forward a range of demands, our appraisal of the period may be different. Two 
American social scholars of Polish descent, Jan Kubik and Grzegorz Ekiert, 
have made every effort to show that Poles were not passive and meek “objects” 
 241 For an excellent analysis of social and civic activities in the dark decade of the 1980s, 
see Inka Słodkowska, Społeczeństwo obywatelskie na tle historycznego przełomu: Polska 
1980–1989 (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2006).
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worked upon by the reformist elites after 1989.242 For one, the organised move-
ment of social protest in Poland was incomparably stronger than in the other 
transforming real-socialist countries. Besides, it expressed social demands 
which insisted on taking various social interests into account. Since no forum 
for any direct and common public debate was created, civic participation found 
its outlet in mass protests. Seething with social demands, the protest movement 
was undoubtedly a manifestation of unfulfilled expectations. As time went by, it 
faded away because people had adjusted to the levelling-out political system, a 
system of pluralist, party-based representation.
An interesting and partly realised aspiration pursued by the Solidarity trade 
unionists of the 1980s which certainly deserves mentioning was the idea of 
socialising enterprises. Such socialisation meant that the employees were to 
take over proprietary control of their workplaces. During Touraine’s research, 
our activists had come up with such a notion and, in fact, addressed it in con-
junction with the market principles. Owned by their employees, the enterprises 
were supposed to be rational economic stakeholders on the market. The first 
step towards making this idea a reality was taken when General Jaruzelski’s 
cabinet adopted a law on employees’ self-management. The employees’ repre-
sentatives and the managements formed an executive body of an enterprise. 
I  believe that the fact that many workers had been part of such employees’ 
self-management boards significantly contributed to the later transition, as 
it offered experience which helped people grasp the rules of management 
and economic rationality. This had an important role in the transformation 
processes. Subsequently, revived in 1989, the NSZZ “Solidarity” succeeded 
in implementing a special privatisation model against the objections raised 
by Leszek Balcerowicz, Deputy Prime Minister who launched the neoliberal 
economic reform programme. The model had it that employees, boards and 
managements became owners of the privatised enterprises. The model was 
dubbed the “employee-owned company path” or, in bureaucratic parlance, the 
“leasing path.” The enterprises were given a rather short period to restructure, 
become competitive on the market and achieve profits. After this period (of, as 
a rule, five years), they were turned into companies with employees becoming 
 242 Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Rebellious Civil Society:  Popular Protest and 
Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1999); see also Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, “Protesty społeczne w nowych 
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shareholders in their enterprises. When a few years ago I  collaborated with 
Professor Andrzej Kojder on a research project studying these enterprises, 
we found that the workplaces turned into “employee-owned companies” were 
among the most effective privatised enterprises.
Moreover, with such a privatisation model, the costs borne by the employees 
were lowest. However, rather importantly, an overwhelming majority of the 
employees sold their shares and, as such, gave up on the possibility to co-own 
their enterprises. If this privatisation model had been the major mechanism 
of the economic transition, the social cost of the transition would certainly 
have been much lower. At the same time, it turned out that ideal of engage-
ment through company co-ownership was not socially attractive. Only a negli-
gible fraction of the employees decided to keep their shares. Consequently, even 
this ideal inherited from the “first” Solidarity proved insignificant in motivating 
people’s behaviours in the new order.
Essentially, the vast social movement of Solidarity was without a doubt a 
critical factor in the collapse of Soviet communism and certainly served as the 
real and symbolic origin of the post-1989 independent and democratic Poland. 
Despite that, it can be doubted that the experience of the “first” Solidarity 
became a broadly accepted foundational myth of the Third Republic of Poland. 
If it had been so, at least the most important values preached and practised 
by the Solidarity movement would have become the symbolic lynchpin of the 
new socio-political order. This, however, is debatable especially if we survey the 
developmental trajectory of the NSZZ “Solidarity” as a socio-political actor after 
1989. Similar doubts arise when examining the input of the trade-union leaders 
into the dismantling of the democratic order we have been witnessing of late. The 
currently endorsed values are the polar opposites of the values championed in 
1981 and, later, into the 1980s.
When we study the NSZZ “Solidarity” activists today, we find an orga-
nisation which is above all a political actor with clearly defined ideological 
leanings, which have little in common with the movement of the 1980s. This 
shift is symbolically expressed in the Law and Order’s famous slogan that sur-
prisingly cleaves Solidarity’s fundamental message by pitting “solidary Poland” 
against “liberal Poland.” The point is that “liberal Poland,” as it were, stands for 
what the movement members cherished in the 1980s, i.e. for democracy, which 
enables citizens to undertake individual actions in accordance with their views 
and interests, protects human rights and safeguards personal rights. The current 
Trade Union Solidarity’s leadership and activists side with one party – the LaO – 
and subscribe to its slogan, which fractures the past. The political competition 
has ultimately abolished the possibility to derive shared models from the past. 
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Solidarity with its ideological message has lost the power to generate patterns of 
conduct and action appealing to all Poles.
And yet, paradoxically, the experience of the past is extraordinarily – aston-
ishingly even – vibrant. In many local communities, especially in 2010 and 2011, 
we found groups of friends dating back to the old Solidarity who met up on a 
regular basis, albeit not very often. They treated these meetings as a ritual of 
sorts, which spoke to the significance they all attributed to the experience of 
that “first” Solidarity. However, the latest field research of 2012 found that those 
Solidarity-based friendly bonds had been broken nearly everywhere. In many 
towns, it proved virtually impossible to bring together people who had once 
played important roles in the Solidarity movement. As the political conflict exac-
erbated last year, the meetings serving to revive the memory of the old commu-
nity were impossible to continue.
In spite of that, further studies have provided evidence of robust memories 
of what a stupendous experience the involvement in the Solidarity movement 
had been. They are certainly lyrical memories. Whatever more or less dramat-
ically tinted reprisals the respondents faced during martial law for their earlier 
engagement, almost all of them regard the time of the establishment and legal 
activity of the NSZZ “Solidarity” as one of their most important and constructive 
experiences in life. They speak of it as living their lives to the full and enjoying 
the rewarding sense of social community. The lyrical overtone of these memories 
is an effect of this fundamental experience of communality in everyday public and 
private life. Such feelings from 1980–1981 were often extended onto the after-
math of martial law and expressed in people’s readiness to help others, especially 
those who suffered harsher harassments.
It could seem that such memories, emotionally laden and coming alive in 
vivid colours in sociological interviews, still carry a significant social and cultural 
potential. However, expressive of the current conflicts, the swiftly aggravating 
contrast between the edifying memories and the scathing, hostile evaluation of 
people who now think differently questions the potential of that lyrical remem-
brance. There is good reason to conclude that the individuals who are so deeply 
attached to the good inscribed in their memories hardly build on this good in 
their everyday lives. The implication of this insight is sad indeed: the most beau-
tiful event in the lives of Poles only exists as a memory now… This memory, 
heartening though it may be, has hardly any bearing on our life today.
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